Lessons Learned from OIF

**Shek** · 19 Apr 06,, 17:02

There's been a lot of discussion over the mistakes made during OIF re: the Generals speaking out against Rumsfeld. In order to separate out the SecDef portion, I wanted to create a thread that would run the gamut from tactical to strategic lessons learned.

I've got to run to class, so I'll start with a simple and what should be hopefully an uncontroversial and uncontested lesson learned - the lack of linguistic capabilities.

This affects everyday operations, whether it's interacting with the local populace to just say hi and see how things are doing, or to be able to exploit intel from a just captured Motorola Talk About that the insurgents are using. Learning a language not provides for the ability to communicate, but language classes also instill knowledge about culture. While it would be costly in terms of time soldiers would spend away from units, I think additional language capability is a necessity.

As far as languages, concentrating on some key languages - Arabic, Farsi, Chinese, Korean - would give you bang for your buck. Given that the global language for terrorists is Arabic, Arabic is a skill that will be in demand for decades and would be a great investment. Furthermore, it is a skill that would increase the recruiting pool for the NSA/CIA/DIA/etc., so even if a soldier gets out, it would still be an investment in our national defense (unfortunately, because of the way budgeting works, there is no incentive for DOD to train soldiers with a goal of increasing the pool of potential recruits for other governmental agencies - this is an obstacle).

**Bill** · 19 Apr 06,, 17:11

Agreed.

My first observation of a huge mistake, the EXACT THING that happened to US forces(ie assymetrical ambush style warfare from unexpected directions using unconventional forces) at the hands of Retired USMC Gen Van Ripper during the highly publicized wargames in the months before the invasion was repeated by the Iraqis to great effect.

His warplan was largely mimiked by Iraq, but on land, and with the Fedayeen as his "suicide boats".

Coincidence?

Perhaps in the future it would be a good idea to A) sit on this sort of information, and B) To actually LEARN from it.

Perhaps it is just me...

PS: As far as i know, i am the first person to publically bounce this theory/criticism against the wall. Let's see if it sticks...

**Blademaster** · 19 Apr 06,, 22:05

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

Agreed.

My first observation of a huge mistake, the EXACT THING that happened to US forces(ie assymetrical ambush style warfare from unexpected directions using unconventional forces) at the hands of Retired USMC Gen Van Ripper during the highly publicized wargames in the months before the invasion was repeated by the Iraqis to great effect.

His warplan was largely mimiked by Iraq, but on land, and with the Fedayeen as his "suicide boats".

As far as i know, i am the first person to publically bounce this theory/criticism against the wall. Let's see if it sticks...

Uh... IIRC, Gen Van Ripper pulled off some spectalur "casualties" while Fedayeen pulled off spectatular "showing of grandiose stupidty."

The Feyadeen had little effect on the coalition machine. The suicide attacks methods employed by the Fedayeen resulted in nothing but dead Fedayeen and little or nothing else.

To me the biggest mistake was not putting enough troops on the ground and enough police/civil servants to oversee the transition. THey failed to heed the Iraqi expert, what's his name, and did not even employ him for the first two years.

**Bill** · 20 Apr 06,, 01:19

Originally Posted by Blademaster

Uh... IIRC, Gen Van Ripper pulled off some spectalur "casualties" while Fedayeen pulled off spectatular "showing of grandiose stupidty."

The Feyadeen had little effect on the coalition machine. The suicide attacks methods employed by the Fedayeen resulted in nothing but dead Fedayeen and little or nothing else.

And the first overrun US combat unit since the vietnam war. And stop a bde level Apache attack dead. And harrow our LOCs for months. And organize into a national insurgency.

Yeah, they were real ineffective alright.

It boggles the mind how you can be A) so consistently wrong, and B) so consistently and contemptuously dismissive of the opinion of someone that's forgotten more about modern land warfare than you will ever know.

**Officer of Engineers** · 20 Apr 06,, 01:29

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

And the first overrun US combat unit since the vietnam war. And stop a bde level Apache attack dead.

Fedayeen did those? I thought it was the regular Iraqi Army.

**Bill** · 20 Apr 06,, 01:38

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Fedayeen did those? I thought it was the regular Iraqi Army.

The first was definitely Fedayeen, you're probably right about the second.

The 507th got whacked by irregulars, fo' certain.
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/arc...php/t-675.html

One thing's for sure, the fedayeen did play hell with our LOCs, effectively stalling our lead elements for 24+ hours with no fuel, and forcing 3/7 Cav to take on a whole division alone.

A masterful stroke really.

**Shek** · 20 Apr 06,, 01:56

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

And the first overrun US combat unit since the vietnam war. And stop a bde level Apache attack dead. And harrow our LOCs for months. And organize into a national insurgency.

Yeah, they were real ineffective alright.

It boggles the mind how you can be A) so consistently wrong, and B) so consistently and contemptuously dismissive of the opinion of someone that's forgotten more about modern land warfare than you will ever know.

Snipe,
What unit was overrun?

**Wraith601** · 20 Apr 06,, 02:02

Originally Posted by shek

Snipe,
What unit was overrun?

I think he means the 507th Maintenance Company.

**Bill** · 20 Apr 06,, 02:13

Originally Posted by Wraith601

I think he means the 507th Maintenance Company.

Yep, "Jessica's unit" got overrun and killed or captured to the last 'man'. Many of them were executed.

First time in almost 30 years that's happened.

**Shek** · 20 Apr 06,, 02:32

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

Yep, "Jessica's unit" got overrun and killed or captured to the last 'man'. Many of them were executed.

First time in almost 30 years that's happened.

Not true. Only a small section from the company got overrun, and while combat is part of combat service support, I was thinking combat arms and not log when you were talking "combat." Nonetheless, my guess is that combat focused training among CSS units has grown by leaps and bounds, both in terms of quantity as well as quality.

Speaking of log, two of the supply SGTs from my battalion are now heading off to Leavenworth - they were part of the MRE on eBay (plus other items) that got busted at Fort Lewis and were in the Army Times a few weeks back. They used to call my Supply SGT crazy because he wanted to go out on missions with the company (he had been a 11B2P at Bragg until he burned in on a jump. A few cracked vertebrae later, his jumping and infantry days were numbered, and he became a supply SGT. I was happy for him when he got his CIB (his secondary MOS was still 11B, and since he did infantry tasks when he was on patrol, he was eligible and earned it).

**Blademaster** · 20 Apr 06,, 03:26

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

And the first overrun US combat unit since the vietnam war. And stop a bde level Apache attack dead. And harrow our LOCs for months. And organize into a national insurgency.

Yeah, they were real ineffective alright.

It boggles the mind how you can be A) so consistently wrong, and B) so consistently and contemptuously dismissive of the opinion of someone that's forgotten more about modern land warfare than you will ever know.

A combat unit got overrun? I haven't heard anything like that. If you are referring to the 507th Maintenance Company, that doesn't count because only a small portion of the unit got overrun. It was an isolated platoon. Hell less than a platton. About a squad.

A brigade Apache attack stopped. That wasn't the Feyadeen. It was regular Iraqi Army coexisting with local militia who managed to put up a barrage of fire. As for the LOCs, it is easy to harrass the LOCs but much harder and difficult to stop a LOC. Unless you show me an example of a LOC being overrun or stopped, then harrowing the LOCs doesn't count.

It boggles my mind how you can overbloat the effectiveness of an irregular unit who knows **** from one end of a gun or use basic unit manuever tactics.

By the way, I was no way dismissive of you. By the way, you are saying that you forgotten about modern land warfare? If so, then why are you complainging about my opinions?

**Bill** · 20 Apr 06,, 04:11

Originally Posted by shek

Not true. Only a small section from the company got overrun

True, and i took care to identify that section as "Jessica's unit". Specifically i believe it was her platoon that was wiped out.

General commentary: As far as i am concerned all units on a battlefield or in theater are combat units. Isn't that the entire point behind the CAR? Was that not definitively proven in WWII? Wasn't the M1/2 carbine fielded because of that very reality?

**Bill** · 20 Apr 06,, 04:20

Originally Posted by Blademaster

A combat unit got overrun? I haven't heard anything like that. If you are referring to the 507th Maintenance Company, that doesn't count because only a small portion of the unit got overrun. It was an isolated platoon. Hell less than a platton. About a squad.

Nope, it was a platoon. Losing an entire platoon is no small thing. It has not happened to any other US platoon since probably the very early seventies.

Originally Posted by Blademaster

A brigade Apache attack stopped. That wasn't the Feyadeen. It was regular Iraqi Army coexisting with local militia who managed to put up a barrage of fire.

Actually it was a well executed "Flak trap" akin to those used by the Nazis during WWII, and i would suggest that "militia" is a synonym for "fedayeen" or "irregular".

Originally Posted by Blademaster

As for the LOCs, it is easy to harrass the LOCs but much harder and difficult to stop a LOC. Unless you show me an example of a LOC being overrun or stopped, then harrowing the LOCs doesn't count.

It has been discussed here indepth, and i have posted articles here that have directly stated such. Former V corps CO William Wallace has stated so, and did state so in the early stages of the war- publically. The 3d AAR specifically mentions the disruptions to it's LOCs. Any amount of research at all clearly shows the problems the US had securing them. It is also common knowledge that 3IDs advance had to be stopped for some time due to fuel shortages at the vanguard, and it is clear that the activities of the fedayeen and other militia groups had a significant role in the situation.

Originally Posted by Blademaster

It boggles my mind how you can overbloat the effectiveness of an irregular unit who knows **** from one end of a gun or use basic unit manuever tactics.

Yet those same yokels have planted over 2000 Americans in the dirt since 2003.

Imagine that.

Motivation is what you want above all else, and they are- and were- highly motivated individuals.

**Officer of Engineers** · 20 Apr 06,, 13:35

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

Yet those same yokels have planted over 2000 Americans in the dirt since 2003.

In the scheme of things, especially in historic contexts, those yokels are losing a hell of alot more than they are inflicting on the Americans. Those American casualties are extremely regrettable but also extremely tolerable.

**Shek** · 20 Apr 06,, 14:08

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

Yet those same yokels have planted over 2000 Americans in the dirt since 2003.

Imagine that.

Motivation is what you want above all else, and they are- and were- highly motivated individuals.

Snipe,
The fedayeen don't make up the core of the insurgency. The insurgency is very diverse, and most of our Fedayeen targets just six months after the war turned out to be busts - they had given up on Saddam, who had not acquitted himself well in the post-war period. That isn't to say that some aren't/weren't involved, but if the Fedayeen had been the driving force, then I find it hard to explain the nearly complete lull for two months and then only a very slow build up of attacks over the summer.

As far as your comments vice General Van Ripper, how would you have dealt with the Fedayeen problem? The accounts portray that it was the decision to press forward with all due speed to Baghdad (which in hindsight has been shown not to have been the grand factor that it has been played out to be in terms of the cause of success) that left the LOCs vulnerable and some Fedayeen units intact. Remember, while 1CAV and 1ID were on the original generated start list (since the TPFDL was thrown out the window), they would not have entered theater through the choke point called Kuwait City and been deployed until probably the June/July time frame (remember, 1AD and 4ID flowed in during May and I believe early June).