T-55 VS M48 Patton - Page 2

RepublicanGuard · 04-24-2006, 11:33 AM

Id rather be in a JS3 than either the M48 or T-55 during that war.
Not if the enemy was 200 meters or less though, JS3 turret speed sucks.

I think the russians still have 30 of these beasts in reserve.

Anon · 04-24-2006, 15:05 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by lemontree

I did rather stay out of any of these machines....they make prime targets -everyone from the AF, arty and armd corps is gunning for them, and they leave the poor infantry man to do his eveil stuff.

Agreed.

kNikS · 04-24-2006, 15:46 PM

Agreed too. But I wouldn't complain if I had any of them as a part of my force.

One correction - IIRC South Vietnamese had a regiment of Pattons and they were fighting good but they were all destroyed. Not exactly "came ahead". Also there are numerous factors that should be included with these conflicts...

There is also huge list of improvment packages for T-55 - FCSs, gun launched ATGMs, all sorts of added armor like ERA, new engines... They are more or less in the same class.

And such comparisons are always pointless - tank is a tank untill it is in similar class with its oponent and the sole statistics and characteristics on paper are certainly least important.

sappersgt · 04-24-2006, 16:37 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by kNikS

Agreed too. But I wouldn't complain if I had any of them as a part of my force.

One correction - IIRC South Vietnamese had a regiment of Pattons and they were fighting good but they were all destroyed. Not exactly "came ahead". Also there are numerous factors that should be included with these conflicts...

There is also huge list of improvment packages for T-55 - FCSs, gun launched ATGMs, all sorts of added armor like ERA, new engines... They are more or less in the same class.

And such comparisons are always pointless - tank is a tank untill it is in similar class with its oponent and the sole statistics and characteristics on paper are certainly least important.

Back when I was evaluating, you could get an upgrade package for a T-55 or it's PRC equivelent for about $300k. It included an L7 gun, Cummins engine, AC, wiring harness/coms ,Ferranti sighting system, etc., NOT including the reactive armor package.
I wonder how much they are now?

kNikS · 04-24-2006, 16:59 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by sappersgt

Back when I was evaluating, you could get an upgrade package for a T-55 or it's PRC equivelent for about $300k. It included an L7 gun, Cummins engine, AC, wiring harness/coms ,Ferranti sighting system, etc., NOT including the reactive armor package.
I wonder how much they are now?

Slovenians did something like that few years ago, IIRC 30 tanks for 100 mil... Only bad thing is engine - same power as older Russian but few tons more. Official desigantion is M-55S1. Awsome tank, I guess that there is no M48 version good enough for this one (specifications only, of course).

RustyBattleship · 04-25-2006, 12:56 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by RepublicanGuard

Id rather be in a JS3 than either the M48 or T-55 during that war.
Not if the enemy was 200 meters or less though, JS3 turret speed sucks.

I think the russians still have 30 of these beasts in reserve.

Josef Stalin III tanks were fuel hogs. Though their armor was thick and well sloped, they were not very manueverable. Since then a lot of secondary armor and metalwork (side skirts for example) have been removed and their designation changed to T-10.

At Fort Irwin I was trained and certified as a tank turret mechanic on M-41 Walkers and M-48 Pattons. The 90mm gun had a neat "computer" of precisely machined cams to set sight angles so the gun elevation could be changed for the type of ammo you were going to fire. The range finder was hard for me (being near sighted) as it used the "geese" method of "focusing" a "V" shaped set of vertical dashes over the target. However, our instructors said that the split vision system was already installed in some M-48's and they expected all of them to receive that type of range finder as time goes on. Fortunately they had one of the Patton's in the shop that had that "new" kind of range finder and we all found it to be much easier and much faster to calculate the distance of a target.

At 1500 yards the 90mm gun had to be elevated about 26 mils from bore sight to hit target center. The 76mm gun on the M-41's however only required 17 mils of super elevation because of the higher velocity round. A lot of debate naturally arose wondering if a Walker could take out a T-54/55 though it did not have a range finder.

Hopefully one of you guys have some data on M-48 and M-41 kills of T-55 and PT-76 tanks in Viet Nam. A kill rate comparison between the M-48 with a 90mm and the M-60 with a 105mm would be interesting to read also.

kNikS · 04-25-2006, 18:20 PM

I would really need some time to find Mr. Zaloga's book about T-55, but this could give you a hint.

Quote:

The 20th Tank Regiment

Northern Military Region 1, a critical area bordered by North Vietnam and Laos, was protected in the summer of 1971 by South Vietnamese infantry, three South Vietnamese armored cavalry squadrons, and the U.S. 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), scheduled to leave the country in August.2 Analysis of terrain, the probable enemy threat, and enemy armored actions during LAM SON 719 made it clear that armored units would continue to be needed in this area. Consequently, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff authorized on 31 July 1971 the formation of the 20th Tank Regiment. Equipped with M48A3 tanks, it was the first South Vietnamese tank regiment

Tailored specifically to fit the needs and capabilities of the South Vietnamese Army, the 20th Tank Regiment had an unusual organization. During LAM SON 719, armored vehicles had proven vulnerable to individual antitank weapons when not protected by infantry. The Joint General Staff had therefore directed an addition to the regiment, a 270-man armored rifle company. Ninety riflemen were assigned to each tank squadron and were to ride on the outside of the tanks, providing local security.

Other changes in the tank regiment's organization and equipment included the addition of tracked M548 ammunition and fuel cargo vehicles, elimination of the regimental scout platoon, for which a five-vehicle security section was substituted, and elimination of the armored vehicle-launched bridge section and all infrared fire control equipment. Later six xenon searchlights per squadron were authorized after advisers questioned the wisdom of limiting $15 million worth of fighting equipment to daytime use by refusing to spend $300,000 on searchlights. Unfortunately, the decision to dispense with the vehicle-launched bridge section was not reconsidered, and lack of bridging during the enemy offensive proved a major factor in the loss of tanks.

Training for the 20th Regiment began at Ai Tu near Quang Tri City, but proceeded slowly because of many problems, particularly in maintenance. About 60 percent of the tanks received by the regiment had serious deficiencies beyond the repair capability of the tank crews. Repair parts and technical manuals were missing and the language barrier prevented U.S. instructors from communicating adequately with the Vietnamese crewmen.

On 1 November a gunnery program based on U.S. tank standards got under way. Unfortunately, the inexperienced tank crews had difficulty in comprehending the integrated functioning of the rangefinder and ballistic computer. In fact the Vietnamese language could come no closer to the term ballistic computer than to translate it "adding machine." Partly because of their experience with the M41 tank, which had no rangefinder, Vietnamese commanders at first could not be convinced of the rangefinder's value. Rapid troop turnover and manpower shortages also adversely affected crew performance. Training therefore made slow headway, with many reversions to basic lessons. By 25 .January gunnery training ended, with 41 of 51 available crews qualifying, using test criteria as rigorous as those used for U.S. units.

Unit tactical training began in the foothills west of Quang Tri City on 1 February and was judged successful in its later stages. A recurring problem during tactical testing was the Vietnamese inclination to disregard maintenance before, during, and after an operation. Continued emphasis on maintenance resulted in some improvement, but standards remained below acceptable levels, even after the unit completed its training.

The regiment's final tactical test, a field training exercise, was to be conducted by the South Vietnamese Armor Command along U.S. lines, with the proviso that any portion not completed correctly was to be repeated. Several problems delayed the exercise past its scheduled starting date of 13 March. Poor weather during the gunnery phase, the necessity for some tactical retraining at the troop level, and the lack of M88 recovery vehicles and M548 tracked cargo vehicles to carry fuel combined to cause setbacks. Finally, after devoting several days to vehicle maintenance, the regiment began its training test on 27 March. Within a few days the exercise was transformed into the ultimate test-survival on the field of battle.

Attack Across the Demilitarized Zone

By the end of March 1972, South Vietnamese defenses in Military Region 1 were arranged in a roughly crescent-shaped pattern of fire support bases in northern Quang Tri Province, with the majority of forces oriented to the north and west in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. (See Map 16.) To the south and stretching westward to Highway 1 from the sea were a number of small Regional Forces outposts commanded by province and district chiefs. From Highway QL-1 west and south, roughly paralleling the mountains, was the newly formed South Vietnamese 3d Infantry Division, bolstered in the west by the Vietnamese Marine division. Deployed with the regiments of the 3d Infantry Division was its organic cavalry, the 11th Armored Cavalry. Farther to the south, guarding exits from the A Shau valley and the approaches to Hue, was the South Vietnamese 1st Infantry Division with its organic 7th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

In the early morning hours of 30 March devastating rocket, mortar, and artillery fire fell on every fire support base in Quang Tri Province. The bombardment continued all day, and late in the day the northernmost bases reported North Vietnamese Army tanks and infantry moving south across the Demilitarized Zone. Major General Frederick J. Kroesen, Jr., Deputy Commander, U.S. XXIV Corps, described the action:

The artillery offensive was followed by infantry and armor attacks in the east across the Ben Hai River following the axis of QL (Route) 1 in the west toward the district capital of Cam Lo and Camp Carroll. Elements of the 304th and 308th Divisions, three separate infantry regiments of the B5 Front, two tank regiments, and at least one sapper battalion were later identified among the attacking forces. Initially then, the enemy concentrated a numerical advantage of more than three to one over the defending 3d Division and attacked forces which were disposed to counter the infiltration and raid tactics heretofore employed by the NVA in the DMZ area.

The tactical situation on 30 March was confused; the 3d Infantry Division received vague and conflicting reports from fire bases at an astonishing rate. Most disconcerting were accounts of the ferocity and widespread nature of the attacks. Just before noon the 20th Tank Regiment received a frantic message from Headquarters, Military Region 1, ordering it to return to Quang Tri City. Since no explanation was given, Major General Nguyen Van Toan, Chief of Armor, and his American adviser, Colonel Raymond R. Battreall, Jr., flew to Quang Tri City to see General Vu Van Giai, the South Vietnamese 3d Division commander. There they learned that the western fire bases near the Demilitarized Zone had been overrun in a preclude to what was apparently a major enemy offensive. Since the main attack had not yet been identified, and since no one was sure where the tank regiment would be of the most value, General Toan persuaded General Giai not to commit the 20th Regiment prematurely but to hold it as a division reserve or for use as a counterattack force. He also convinced General Giai that he should permit the unit to stand down for maintenance before its commitment. With that determined, the regiment, then conducting its final coordinated assault phase of the training exercise, completed the assault, did a right flank on the objective (out of line formation and into a column) , and, without stopping, returned to Ai Tu Combat Base.

The Rock of Dong Ha

By early morning of 1 April most of the outlying fire bases along the Demilitarized Zone and in western Quang Tri Province had been evacuated or overrun, leaving no friendly positions north of the Mieu Giang and Cua Viet rivers. Poor weather prevented air support and contributed to the relative ease with which the enemy pushed back the South Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese forces advanced south with impunity. By late afternoon on 1 April Mai Loc and Camp Carroll, south of the Mieu Giang River, were under heavy attack.

Frantically redeploying the three infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and two Vietnamese Marine brigades at his disposal, General Giai established a defensive line along the south bank of the Mieu Giang. In an effort to stabilize the situation, he committed the 20th Tank Regiment on the morning of 1 April with the mission of relieving the embattled 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and attached infantry units then fighting around Cam Lo, along National Highway 9. (Map 17) After joining a South Vietnamese Marine battalion, the tank regiment moved north from Ai Tu along Highway 1 toward Dong Ha.

Poor traffic control and refugees congesting the route forced the tank regiment to move cross-country to the southwest of Dong Ha, and in so doing it surprised and routed an enemy ambush along Highway QL-9. Prisoners taken during this action were dismounted members of a North Vietnamese tank unit whose mission was to seize and man South Vietnamese armored vehicles expected to be captured in the offensive. With its forty-four operational tanks, the 20th Tank Regiment moved on toward Cam Lo, which was burning. As darkness approached, the unit set up a defensive position southeast of Cam Lo Village, withstanding enemy probes throughout the night.

At daybreak on Easter Sunday, 2 April, the 20th Tank Regiment received reports that a large North Vietnamese tank column was moving south across the Ben Hai River toward the bridge at Dong Ha. About 0900 the commander, Colonel Nguyen Huu Ly, received permission to move to Dong Ha, then north across the bridge to engage the enemy forces. When he reached the town he found enemy infantry already occupying positions on the north bank of the Mieu Giang River that prevented his crossing the bridge. He deployed the regiment around the town of Dong Ha, with the 1st Squadron in a blocking position on the high ground about three kilometers to the west, the 2d Squadron to the south, and the 3d Squadron defending positions within the town to prevent enemy elements from crossing the bridge.

About noon men of the 1st Squadron, from their vantage point on the high ground to the west, suddenly observed a North Vietnamese tank and infantry column moving south along Highway 1 toward Dong Ha. Moving their tanks into concealed positions, they waited as the enemy tanks moved closer. At a range of 2,500 to 3,000 meters, the South Vietnamese tankers opened fire, quickly destroying nine PT76 tanks and two T54 tanks. The North Vietnamese unit, which by its column formation showed that it was not expecting an attack, was thrown into confusion. Unable to see their adversaries, the North Vietnamese crewmen maneuvered their tanks wildly as the South Vietnamese tank gunners destroyed them one by one. The accompanying infantry dispersed, and the surviving T54 tanks turned and headed north without firing a single shot. The South Vietnamese regimental headquarters, monitoring the North Vietnamese radio net at that time, heard the enemy commander express surprised disbelief at losing his tanks to cannon he could not see.

The steady deterioration of the tactical situation around Dong Ha was arrested by the arrival of the 1st Armor Brigade headquarters. Although the brigade headquarters had been in the area solely to monitor the 20th Tank Regiment's training exercise, it was a well trained organization, possessing the armored vehicles and radios needed by General Giai to establish control of the scattered forces and direct the defense he hoped to establish at Dong Ha. General Toan had urged its employment, and on the afternoon of 2 April the brigade, under 3d Division control, assumed command of all armored, infantry, and Marine forces in the Dong Ha area. Its units included the 20th Tank Regiment, two squadrons of the 17th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 2d and 57th Regiments of the 3d Infantry Division, the 3d Battalion of the 258th Marine Corps Brigade, and the survivors of the 56th Regiment from Camp Carroll.3

The bridge spanning the Mieu Giang River at Dong Ha afforded the enemy the opportunity to cross the river unimpeded and then drive straight south to Quang Tri City. Before the armor brigade headquarters arrived, the 3d Division engineers had made two unsuccessful attempts to destroy the bridge with explosive charges. When Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, the 1st Armor Brigade commander, arrived he decided to leave the bridge intact for the time being, since the enemy had been stopped and the armor brigade forces were holding. Colonel Luat was preparing to make a counterattack to the north across the bridge when the bridge charges detonated and dropped the near span, putting an end to any counterattack plans.

Other enemy forces continued to move south toward Dong Ha on the afternoon of 2 April, engaged first by limited tactical air strikes and then by artillery, mortar, and tank fire. A large search and rescue effort had been launched for the crew of a U.S. aircraft downed near Cam Lo. The U.S. Air Force temporary nofire zone was twenty-seven kilometers in diameter, encompassing nearly the entire combat area and South Vietnamese Army defenders were unable for several hours to call for artillery support or tactical air strikes against the onrushing North Vietnamese Army. The enemy therefore had an opportunity to advance artillery, tanks, and infantry until 2200, when the restriction was lifted.

During the next several days, enemy activity was relatively light, with sporadic attacks by fire and numerous small ground actions. The North Vietnamese artillery fire was extremely accurate, and although South Vietnamese units moved frequently to avoid the shelling the enemy seemed to be able to locate new positions very quickly. On 3 April a North Vietnamese artillery observer in a South Vietnamese officer's uniform and driving a South Vietnamese vehicle with radios was captured south of Dong Ha. The observer had papers supporting several identities, and spent his time driving throughout the area spotting and adjusting artillery fire for North Vietnamese guns near the Demilitarized Zone. Although South Vietnamese units conducted attacks to eliminate pockets of resistance south of the Mieu Giang River, the pressure from the north remained intense.

The next tank combat occurred on the 9th when all three squadrons of the 20th Tank Regiment fought enemy armor. The 1st Squadron, shifted several kilometers west of Dong Ha six days earlier, occupied high ground overlooking an important road junction along National Highway 9. Again the tank gunnery training paid dividends as the tankers engaged an infantry unit supported by ten tanks at ranges up to 2,800 meters. A few answering shots fell short, and the enemy tanks scattered, several bogging down in the rice paddies near the road. Eventually eight were destroyed. In all, the regiment destroyed sixteen T54 tanks and captured one T59 that day, in turn suffering nothing more than superficial damage to several M48's.

For the next two weeks the South Vietnamese carried out clearing operations interrupted by frequent engagements with North Vietnamese armor and infantry which normally withdrew in the late afternoon. Nights were punctuated by artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks on South Vietnamese positions throughout the area. The defensive lines established on 2 April continued to hold, and on 11 April the 1st Armor Brigade was augmented by the arrival of the 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment from Military Region 3. By 14 April the 3d Division controlled five regimental size South Vietnamese task forces, including units of the 4th, 11th, 17th, and 18th Cavalry Regiments and the 20th Tank Regiment.

On 23 April, several kilometers west of Dong Ha, the 2d Squadron of the 20th Tank Regiment was attacked by an infantry-tank force using a new weapon. For the first time the enemy employed the Soviet AT3 Sagger wire-guided missile, destroying an M48A3 tank and an armored cavalry assault vehicle. A second assault vehicle was damaged. At first the South Vietnamese Army tankers seemed fascinated by the missile's slow and erratic flight. Through trial and error, however, the troops soon learned to engage the launch site of the AT3 with tank main gun fire and to move their vehicles in evasive maneuvers.

Heralded by massive artillery attacks with 122-mm. rockets and 130-mm. guns, on 27 April a new enemy offensive began against South Vietnamese Army positions all along the Mieu Giang-Cua Viet River defense line. The barrage was quickly followed by violent attacks by enemy infantry and armor, met by equally determined resistance on the part of the South Vietnamese defenders. The 3d Squadron, 20th Tank Regiment, supporting the 5th Ranger Group, received the brunt of the attack and was soon heavily engaged. By midmorning all officers of the 3d Squadron had been killed or wounded, and three M48A3 tanks had been destroyed by Sagger missiles.

All along the defensive line, units were being overrun or pushed back. Forced to yield ground, Ranger and tank elements gradually withdrew to the southeast, Although losses were heavy on both sides, the numerically superior North Vietnamese continued their drive, and by nightfall had pushed almost four kilometers south of Dong Ha. In the early morning of 28 April, the 20th Tank Regiment had eighteen operational M48A3 tanks. During the South Vietnamese withdrawal the accurate gunnery of the 3d Squadron cost the North Vietnamese five T54 tanks.

At that point the South Vietnamese found large enemy forces to their rear and for the armored units the withdrawal became an attack to the south. The 2d Squadron of the tank regiment, attacking south to secure the bridge over the Vinh Phuoc River at midmorning on the 28th, was badly battered in an enemy ambush. The commander lost control of his unit and the surviving vehicles, after crossing the bridge, continued to the south in disarray.

It was then obvious to Colonel Luat that 1st Armored Brigade units were threatened with encirclement, so the entire force began moving south. All along the way fighting was heavy for the next two days. The terrain as well as the enemy took its toll of vehicles. At the Vinh Phuoc River seven vehicles were stranded on the north shore when the bridge, struck by enemy artillery fire, collapsed.4 Farther south at the Thach Han River near Quang Tri City, the bridges were already destroyed. Two tanks were lost there in fording the river on the 30th.

By then the tank and cavalry units were beginning their fifth day of almost constant fighting. South of Quang Tri resupply of fuel and ammunition was nonexistent as the armored force continued its attack. Forced from the highway by a determined enemy, the tanks and assault vehicles moved cross-country, falling victim to the many rice paddies, canal crossings, and streams as well as the antitank rockets and artillery. On the first day of May the vehicles began to run out of gas.

Finally, on 2 May, having fought their way through the last enemy units, the battered survivors of the armor command, intermingled with the remnants of other army units, reached Camp Evans at midafternoon. Only armored cavalry assault vehicles were left; the cavalry regiments and the tank regiment had lost all their tanks. The once proud 20th Tank Regiment was reduced to a demoralized, dismounted, and defeated unit. Employed primarily in a static, defensive role in frontline areas, the unit had steadily lost men and equipment without receiving replacements. Although vastly outnumbered, cavalry, infantry, tank, and Marine units of the 1st Armor Brigade, as well as tenacious Regional Forces and Popular Forces to the east, had succeeded in slowing the momentum of the massive North Vietnamese invasion. With assistance from U.S. and Vietnamese tactical air forces, they provided the resistance that delayed the enemy until enough reinforcements could be brought up to halt the offensive.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vie...hapter8.htm#b6

master_fx · 05-06-2006, 20:57 PM

i say t-55

Hindle · 05-12-2006, 15:24 PM

Well i love Russian armor,i just hate to read where Soviet T-54s 55s or 72s get beaten in the middleeast,however i know that this is becouse the Soviets built their tanks with low standards,but they can be modified to take more punishment and they can be upgunned,their excellent ballistic desings don't need improvement though

04-24-2006, 15:46 PM	#18 (permalink)
kNikS *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 09-17-05 Location: Belgrade, Serbia Posts: 786 Country:	Agreed too. But I wouldn't complain if I had any of them as a part of my force. One correction - IIRC South Vietnamese had a regiment of Pattons and they were fighting good but they were all destroyed. Not exactly "came ahead". Also there are numerous factors that should be included with these conflicts... There is also huge list of improvment packages for T-55 - FCSs, gun launched ATGMs, all sorts of added armor like ERA, new engines... They are more or less in the same class. And such comparisons are always pointless - tank is a tank untill it is in similar class with its oponent and the sole statistics and characteristics on paper are certainly least important. __________________ For King and Fatherland ~ Freedom or Death

05-06-2006, 20:57 PM	#23 (permalink)
master_fx Regular Join Date: 04-15-06 Posts: 30	i say t-55 __________________ Global Defense Forum

05-12-2006, 15:24 PM	#24 (permalink)
Hindle Regular Join Date: 05-12-06 Posts: 26	T-55 vs M-48a3 Well i love Russian armor,i just hate to read where Soviet T-54s 55s or 72s get beaten in the middleeast,however i know that this is becouse the Soviets built their tanks with low standards,but they can be modified to take more punishment and they can be upgunned,their excellent ballistic desings don't need improvement though

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04-24-2006, 11:33 AM	#16 (permalink)
RepublicanGuard Banished Join Date: 03-04-05 Posts: 73	Id rather be in a JS3 than either the M48 or T-55 during that war. Not if the enemy was 200 meters or less though, JS3 turret speed sucks. I think the russians still have 30 of these beasts in reserve.

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