braindead

Err , that was to me or Pioneer ?

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Triple C

Yeah. My thoughts exactly.

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What benefits the body is called medicine; what benefits the soul, discipline.
-Augustine of Hippo

Albany Rifles

Not you Braindead

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“When the gods wish to punish us, they answer our prayers.” — Oscar Wilde

Albany Rifles

One of the biggest things I remember from all of the AARs and testimony after JUST CAUSE was when GEN Thurman testified in front of Congress and had 2 stacks in front him of SOIs. The one for Grenada was about 8 inches high and was about 6 books. For Panama it was a single book for all services and was abotu 3/4 of an inch thick.

We learned well.

The former 1st COSCOM ACS, TRANS for JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD and Somalia sits about 12 feet away from me. For URGENT FURY he was in the 82d Airborne DTO. We have talked many times of what a world of difference things were between 1983 and 1989.

I also know that the lessons from URGENT FURY and the CTCs were hammered into us all during the 1980s.

Say what you will but no one is a bigger critic of the US military than the US military...you should read what we say about ourselves in our AARs. If you read those you would think we couldn't defeat the Grand Duchy of Fenwick!

S-2

A.R.'s comments about the period between 1982-88 are on the mark. There's a lot from that period AND Vietnam that fell into the final product during JUST CAUSE.

Remember that we've retained a near-parochial perspective to the Caribbean, and Central/South America. We maintained a strong presence, possessed lingual skills, and had a good intelligence and logistical infrastructure. We also had a need for near-term focus.

Grenada, Cuba, Haiti, El Salvador, Nicarauga, Colombia, Peru, and Panama (w/it's canal) posed threats of various orders of magnitude in the region. As such, we obviously maintained and made great use of our Panama facilities. We also maintained a very close and active relationship w/ the Honduran army during this period.

7th I.D. (Light) spent a ton of time in Honduras during the mid-eighties. There absolutely was a silent war along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border then. Our national guard brigade was round-out and later maintained a close training relationship w/ that division. We always had people going south. 7th I.D. seemed like they had a brigade rotated in on a near-constant basis.

It was a small-unit, light infantry/SOF laboratory.

Still, I chose 1988 for one reason. We happened to go into battle about 20 years ago. That encompasses, from there forward, damn near every soldier and marine on service now.

That's a massive culmulative knowledge base that's spread across a variety of infantry-related disciplines and skill-sets. Not only that, but those skills have been repeatedly LFXed and refined with real targets/objectives. Air-assault, airborne, special forces, marine infantry, mechanized infantry, light infantry, SEAL/amphibious operations, etc.

All in combat anywhere between desert and jungle and from sea level (offshore oil-platforms) to 11,000 ft.- and usually under fire. Multiple tours.

So. If you look at the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, who in the infantry hasn't seen battle- again and again?

That was my thought on twenty years. Panama works perfectly to start the ball rolling for this generation of infantrymen.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

Rifleman

S-2,

Understood, I just brought up Grenada for one reason: the gaggle at Point Salinas airstrip.

Evidently it was quite a choke point and it took too long to build up combat power with the airlanding operation.

For the benefit of those who don't know (I know that you do know, S-2), airlanding operations in Panama did not begin until the entire Ranger Regiment and a brigade combat team from the 82nd had jumped. Six infantry battalions, plus support. Using a big airborne operation for the rapid buildup of combat power was the lesson of the boondoggle at Point Salinas.

A scattered night drop may not seem ideal but the initial confusion has worked to the attackers advantage as often as not. I thought I'd throw that out there for all the folks who are always saying, "Why not just land the planes and walk off as a unit?"

Let's see, this was a thread about Bradleys, wasn't it?

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"Aim small, miss small." - Benjamin Martin in The Patriot

S-2

"A scattered night drop may not seem ideal but the initial confusion has worked to the attackers advantage as often as not."

The only way airborne stays in business is by making a virtue of self-inflicted wounds.

LGOPS rule.

Albany Rifles

(LGOPs = Little Groups of Paratroopers)


After the demise of the best Airborne plan, a most terrifying effect occurs on the battlefield. This effect is known as the rule of the LGOPs. This is, in its purest form, small groups of pissed-off 19 year old American paratroopers. They are well trained. They are armed to the teeth and lack serious adult supervision. They collectively remember the Commander's intent as "March to the sound of the guns and kill anyone who is not dressed like you" - or something like that.


I always had a vision of the movie "Gremlins"...except in BDUs!

The corrollary is LBMPs (Little Bunches of Mech Pukes) running around with LAWs and DRAGONs looking for enemy armor to shoot at. Not as stealthy as LGOPS but they make MUCH bigger booms!!!!

(See, I brought it back to Bradleys!!!!)

S-2

"(See, I brought it back to Bradleys!!!!)"

Nice try. Not yet.

"This is, in its purest form, small groups of pissed-off 19 year old American paratroopers. They are well trained. They are armed to the teeth and lack serious adult supervision. They collectively remember the Commander's intent as "March to the sound of the guns and kill anyone who is not dressed like you" - or something like that."

I love it and it's wrong.

That nineteen year old now-



...is composed, more mature, and purposeful like never before. They won't just "kill anyone who is not dressed like" them. They're professional in ways that paragraph above can't possibly convey. I know the spirit in which it was intended but these guys now are really earning their pay in ways I don't think either of us could ever imagine.

Offered with the greatest of respect, dude.

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ofogs

Before I did my first night mass tac, I had thought that statement was an exaggeration. Now, I would say it only scratches the surface of the confusion on the ground. It's dark, there's a LOT of heavily laden people at different points of performance, and even with modern navigation equipment there's always people landing way off. Somehow, everybody gets it sorted out and accomplishes the mission. Good times.

ACUs now . . . I was one of the last holdouts and there are still people who give me dirty looks for it.

Triple C

I hope this isn't a thread hijack but S-2 brought it up.

When was the doctrine of fighting from the within the armored infantry transport elaborated? And how is that supposed to work in theory?

I came across a couple of passing references to how the German army in WWII toyed with the idea of using panzergrenadiers in halftracks to provide intimate small-arms fire support to the panzers without dismounting. The drive to Moscow pitted halftracks against well entrenched Russian troops and the tactic was abandoned as impractical.

If anyone has any information or documentation of how fighting from the inside of armored carriers please let me know.

Stan187

Well I'm not giving you the complete answer that you're looking for, but I'll give you one piece of the puzzle. Post-WWII, the Red Army did not integrate that German lesson of the impracticality of troops fighting without dismounting from armored transport. True, the Soviets did expect a different environment, possibly NBC, so the troops needed to stay inside. However, even in non-NBC environments they were expected to stay inside and shoot unless there were some serious prepared defenses to overcome.

When the Syrians tried this in 1973, their armored transports got chewed up, all hands still inside. It was tragic mistake. True, they were attacking the same prepared positions that you were supposed to dismount for, so they did not quite apply what they were told by the Soviets. Either way, the idea proved quite unworkable again. Yet as has pointed out again and again, by the 80s, Soviet mech infantry in Afghanistan still had loadbearing of ancient design from the 50s and 60s, and they quickly found it unworkable because they had to dismount and patrol further than a few hundred meters from their transports. Either way, the lesson has been learned again and again, dismounts are called dismounts for a reason. Whether these lessons were always internalized in a timely manner, as you can see, is a different matter.

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fitz

1Lt. Mike "Sparky" Sparks

S-2

I'd support Stan 187 insofar as the Soviet Army increasingly tried to exploit this principle of close armor support by mechanized/motorized infantry through progressive vehicle designs. Clearly the BTR-152 didn't attempt to move things forward but the BMP/BMD designs specifically tried to accentuate a perceived advantage and exploit it.

There's no rule. Times best to stay mounted and others where you'd best unass at quick-step. A couple of mechanized infantry commanders here who'd (I think) support this. As such, while not a sound doctrinal approach, it's clearly a tactical consideration under any given circumstance.

No sense ever limiting your options.

TopHatter

D'oh!