Triple C

The M-113 can't stop 14.5mm, if it could even stop the 50 cal. Many of it was torn to shreds in Vietnam by mines... soldiers were so terrified they would rather rode on the top of the M-113 in the open.

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Stan187

granted these 113s are a bit updated, but still, they are no stykers, and the stykers are no abrams.

ok, enough with saying the obvious

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Shek

'The Bradley, upside down, was on fire. Seven died'

'The Bradley, upside down, was on fire. Seven died' | Iraq | Guardian Unlimited

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zraver

gavin, Stryker, Bradley, MRAPS, or even an Abrams your underbelly will never bee tough enough to withstand a charge powerful enough to flip a 40 ton vehicle.

Stan187

How much explosive would it even take to do that? It seems like it'd have to be an exhorbitant amount..

Shek

EDIT: Sorry, didn't have time to add my comment earlier. I just wanted to post this article as an example of the fact that the insurgents (for a long time now) build the IEDs bigger. Low-hanging fruit (light skinned HMMWVs) no longer exist, and so every bomb is bigger.

The main fix isn't building bigger vehicles (although it doesn't hurt), as that's a reactive strategy. You need a proactive strategy as outlined in posts #5 and #6 in this thread, Cultural Anthropology.

mudshark

As if nobody in major Ops never even heard of Stalingrad! Yeah I know "some" polititians have the reins...But, You DON"T stick armored units in an urban environment unless totally supported by foot troops. Now this brings up the question ,what are you trying to achieve,first what is the objective? My gathering is that we are trying to show the populace that we are in charge. Hardly. Maybe we are in charge of the basketball court that the troops setup in the perimeter,nothing more really.
Second how are you going to achieve your objective? So far its been by roadside check points and armored forrays. As we already see here its not working. The armored vehicles we have deployed for the mission are just targets to be taken whenever the insurgents want. The answer to this dilema is not a technilogical one. A different method to keep peace is truly needed.
It just burns me up to see are troops used as police and not the mission they are trained for...
The Stryker,great for armored mobile warfare,modern,somewhat armored,designed to get a force where it is needed real fast,reliable,man it even looks awesome,but it is not a police cruiser.

Shek

Sorry, but you're way off track in most of your post. The Stryker is ideal for the COIN environment, and it is NOT designed specifically for mobile armored warfare. Next, by design, the Stryker force is an infantry-centric organization, and not an armored force, so you're wrong there as well. Next, care to talk about Jenin 2002, Baghdad April 2003, Fallujah November 2004? Armored forces can operate extremely well in an urban environment, even without dismounted forces in close proximity, when you don't have an AT missile threat.

mudshark

Yes I am "off track"LOL, But the Stryker is designed for Armored mobile warfare. Yes they are infantry by design ,but they inherit the flaws of armored troops in an urban environment. This is proved true on a daily basis. Sorry, you are missing the BIG picture my friend. Baghdad and Falluujah are still unsafe,except for the basketball courts in the troop bases. As for armored forrays the 16th panzer and the 3rd Inf (mot) proved that YOU can get in there(urban areas),but try to get out,successfully...
Nobody in control seems to have learned from history...

Officer of Engineers

Wtf?

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zraver

Guess

he never heard of Hue, Stevastopol, Berlin, Manila etc.

Shek

Yes, you are way off track.

Wrong. The Abrams and Bradley are designed for armored, mobile warfare, which implies fighting another armored force in high intensity combat. The Stryker, on the other hand, is designed to be optimal in the low- to mid-intensity spectrum. It is mobile, and it has medium armor, but if it were to face an armored threat, then it would fight in a mobile fashion. It'd have to advance in a plodding fashion, bounding dismounted infantry to find, fix, and destroy the armor threat prior to advancing the Strykers.

Wrong. The Stryker units are as good as the tactics and strategy employed by the units themselves. They provide more protection and mobility than other vehicles, while still maintaining at its core, an airborne infantry company worth of dismounts (with the extra firepower and situational awareness to boot).

Wrong. Also, you are comparing apples and oranges here. The Strykers are a precious asset in Iraq, proving themselves time and again as the most versatile and flexible units in Iraq. Too many examples and not enough time, but your weak assertion is easily refutable.

You seem not to have learned history, as you are trying to conflate counterinsurgency with high intensity conflict. The root of our problems in Iraq stem not from armor, but from strategic myopia exhibited by both civilian and military leadership. It is only now, four years into this thing, that we are executing a nationwide, population-centric, counterinsurgency campaign.

Wraith601

You do realise that Shek commanded a Stryker company in Iraq don't you? You're in way over your head here.

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mudshark

I figured it was something like that,and it wasn't too hard to figure out either. I don't mean any disrespect to the good Captain or the wealth of experience and knowledge of the pertinent subject,but I don't see anything of what he preaches bear good fruit. Like I first mentioned the problem isn't the vehicle,but the startegy that is in play. Come on we are losing troops EVERYDAY,and X 10 that in civilians. By the time I'm done writing this another few will be gone. Sorry if I don't understand the way the Army wants to deploy the Styrker,but face it the job "ain't a gittin done!". Don't get me labeled as a defeatist wrongly,but sometimes you just have to get rid of the overabundance of testosterone, stop beating your chest, admit the situation and find a different way. Napolean once remarked in one of his ealier battles (Marengo?) "This battle is lost,we must now start a new one..."I'm not exactly a REMF either...

Shek

And what do you propose that I am preaching?

To the contrary, you came in talking against armored forces in the urban environment, which by implication is part and parcel with your vision of the strategy. This conflation is part of the specious reasoning that you've demonstrated thus far.

More specious reasoning, as you apparently conflate the vehicle with strategy, again. Vehicles are tools, not strategy. Now, they can lead to improper strategy (if you've got a hammer, the problem begins to look like a nail), but that isn't the causal issue here with OIF. It stems deeper in the way that officers were educated post-Vietnam. The system that set us up for success in Desert Storm has had the opposite result in OIF.