Big K

On 18 August 1941, an alone KV-1 (the number 864, the commander was lt.Kolobanov) was dug in and camouflaged near Krasnogvardeysk town (Leningrad area). The tank had an order to defend the road from Kinigsep. Four more KVs were ordered to defense two other roads. All tanks got double ammoloads, 2/3 of rounds were armor piercing. An offensive of 8th German panzer division was expected. Kolobanaov's KV had great hidden position in the woods on the hill, the crossroad located down there between swamps.
In the next day German motorcycle recon troops, halftrack and one light track passed by road. Five minutes later the expected column of 43 tanks appeared and filled the road. The 1st Soviet round flamed the head tank, after two more shots the 2nd tank was flamed too. Then Kolobanov opened fire on column's tail and flamed the last tank: the Germans were locked. They even couldn't note Soviet tank and opened no-target-fire. Tried to run, some tanks were immobilized in the swamp. The chaos established on the road. Soviet tankers killed 22 German tanks during 30 minutes. Then the KV was spotted by the Germans and they opened aimed fire. In spite of impossibility of German tank guns to penetrate thick KV's armor, knocking rounds made terrible working conditions for Soviet crew. One of German rounds struck the turret ring and the KV was forced to leave its trench and maneuver by whole hull for aim. Then the Soviets noted two German towed guns appeared on the crossroad. The first shell disabled one gun, but another gun managed to do one shot and damaged KV's periscope. Than that gun was destroyed too. Also ammo was almost out, and Kolobanov got congratulations via the radio and an order to go back. Already three another KVs were on the way to the battlefield, and they killed 20 more German tanks.

There were destroyed 42 German tanks total and two guns. Kolobanov's tank got 135 hits, but no one penetration.
Kolobanov was awarded with the Order of Lenin, Usov (driver) with the Order of the Red Banner.

__________________
When i say, there will be no effect but i am not willing to remain silent.
-Fuzuli

Big K

ExNavyAmerican

Interesting. Quite impressive.

__________________
"I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that His justice cannot sleep forever."
- Thomas Jefferson

Big K

KV-2.

Shamus

Interesting story Big K.The KV tanks were a very unpleasant suprise for the Wermacht.

__________________
A positive attitude may not solve all your problems, but
it will annoy enough people to make it worth the effort.

Big K

like T-34' s

ExNavyAmerican

Well, the Germans nearly won the Battle of Kursk. The Russians could easily have won that battle because their commanders knew the plan of battle before the German regimental commanders knew it! Instead, the Russians nearly lost. This story is a rare exception in a bad record for the Red Army.

zraver

The curse of the purges, it knocked Russian tactical skill backwards, and it wasn't very advanced to begin with. Also at Kursk the Gemrans had Tiger I, Ferdinands, and Panthers, nothing in the Russian arsenal could rleiably kill them from the front. Russian successes as they were occured at close range when they gave the Panzer Waffe a bear hug.

It is quite an accomplishment. Green Russian troops in average equipment led by inepxrianced officers and denied effective air cover stoped the mostly high trained panzer troops. Panzer troops who also had some of the best tanks to use, self propelled artillery, air support, and elite infantry.

Catalan

No, of course not, it just led the world in mechanized warfare!

All of which were plagued by horrifying mechanical problems, especially the Ferdinands and the Panthers. Ferdinands were almost worthless because they could be knocked-out by Soviet infantry.

At the time of the Battle of Kursk the Red Army had plenty of experienced officers. In fact, Guderian himself said in 1941 when he was ambushed by Soviet armor near Tula that he had never seen an enemy lose so much and learn so much in order to do so much damage to him. Although the Germans were at the peak of their technological advantage, many of their tanks were prematurely introduced (not that it would have been better to do otherwise) and in the end the Germans didn't come close to defeating the Soviets at Kursk (not really to your post, but to another comment on this thread).

Model was complete stopped and Manstein was moving at a snail's pace. Even assuming Manstein could have continued the advanced, the entire Red Army's Steppe Front had not been engaged in battle, and the Red Army was just about to launch major offensives to the south against Manstein's flanks - forcing the Germans to disengage. Kursk was an ambitious offensive concocted by a man who thought German superiority could defeat the Red Army, when it had already failed twice.

__________________
If you enjoy modern military history then join modernwarstudies.net!

http://i75.photobucket.com/albums/i2...bees/siggy.png

Catalan

How did the Germans almost win, and how did the Soviets almost lose? The 9th Army was entirely stopped in the North, and as I said in my last post, Manstein's offensive had become more or less a stalemate and attrition affected the Germans more than it did the Soviets. Entire Soviet fronts had not yet been engaged, and Red Army offensives in late July and early August had virtually stolen the initiative from the Germans (forcing the Germans to withdraw from the Orel Salient, the Kharkov offensive against Manstein.

The battle was lost strategically for the Germans from the start, and almost lost tactically, as well. By then the German Luftwaffe had lost irreplaceable losses in the Mediterranean, and the Red Air Force had grown beyond the night fighters of late 1942. By the time of Kursk the German Luftwaffe could only guarantee local superiority if enough aircraft were put into the operation.

Officer of Engineers

Strategically, it would have bought the Werhmacht time. Had Von Manstein collapsed the final line, the Red Army would have no choice but to retreat.

__________________
Chimo

Catalan

But there was no chance of strategic victory, in the first place. There was really no final line - the Red Army's Steppe front had not really engaged the German Army at Kursk, which included another 600,000 men. Assuming Field Marshall Manstein would have been able to continue the offensive, and say that he had penetrated even another 10 kilometers (a lot, referencing total penetration by Army Group South, and even more when referencing against the penetration of the 9th Army of Army Group North, which was beginning to lose what it had gained) it would have meant that he would have had less forces to move south against the Soviet august offensives near Kharkov (which he was unable to defeat, anyways) and would have ended in a greater loss of forces during Manstein's retreat West.

And why do you conclude that the Red Army would have been forced to retreat? Of course, had the Germans won (not a very likely conclusion) they would have closed the Kursk salient, but they had no further ability to widen the offensive and increase the ambitions. The Germans lacked the manpower and logistics power to even complete Kursk successfully!

The tedious situation of the German Army was apparent with the Soviet Orel operations against Army Group North (a salient created by the Kursk salient and the form of the frontlines at the time), which forced Army Group North to withdraw (which would have doomed Kursk even if Manstein continued the offensive) - this offensive was conducted by a totally separate front. Army Group South, on the other hand, not only had to fight against the elements of the Veronezh and Central Fronts in the Kursk salient, but the Steppe Front which was prepared to engage German forces around Kursk, but the Southwestern Front, as well - which fronted the entirety of Manstein's southern flank.

A really good book that I read a while ago is The Battle of Kursk, by David M. Glantz. I have a few other books on Kursk alone, but none come close to the detail that Glantz provides.

Officer of Engineers

I've read it but my point remains. Von Manstein would have bought time. The Red Army only planned for a maximum of 60 days of combat. Whether or not there were other forces to play with does not eliminate the fact that this current plan has failed and no other plan was there to take its place ... which was realistic since no one knows for sure what the lines were to look like after 60 days of combat.

After that, Zuhkov would have to spend time to probe the lines, re-evaluate, re-group, and then to re-commit. The closest example of this would be Operations Mars and Uranus in which even though Von Manstein won his engagements, he was forced to withdraw to consolidate his lines which in turn delayed Zuhkov's advances.

Catalan

Well, yes one could make a very good educated guess based on the penetration Manstein had been able to achieve during the actual days of advance and the fact that his advance had ended in stalemate. Furthermore, given that the Steppe Front had not entered combat yet, one could also surmise that in the end Manstein's spearheads would have been overwhelmed and stopped again - the Red Army had just too many reserves prepared to save the salient.

The point also ignores the fact that the Red Army had been preparing for secondary offensives in other sectors simultaneous to the battle. Had Manstein extended his forces more and wasted lives trying to gain little ground he would have been far more susceptible to the Red Army's offensive at Kharkov (which he was forced to withdraw from anyways). meaning his ability to make a fighting withdrawal West would have decreased substantially.

No plan had 'failed', given that the 9th Army to the north had been stopped, defeated and pushed back - and then almost eliminated at Orel. And Manstein's Army Group South was advancing at a snail's pace, and the Germans had lost even local air superiority as the battle progressed - to the Red Air Force.

Operation Uranus was launched prior to Manstein's arrival as commander of Army Group South. Operation Mars was launched against Army Group Center at Orel, and has nothing to do with Manstein who at the time was an Army commander in Army Group South. Manstein was awarded command of Army Group South after the disaster of Uranus, and he launched Operation Winter Storm on December 12th - although it successfully opened a small portion of the Soviet overstretched line for about a week, it was later closed by the Red Army without Paulus escaping. What bought Manstein time to reform Army Group South in preparation for the Soviet spring offensives was the fact that it took the Soviets a month thereafter to reduce the Stalingrad pocket.

Operation Mars was a complete failure, but has nothing to do with von Manstein. Operation Mars failed because it was far too ambitious of a plan without proper intelligence. But the example is not even close to Kursk - two completely different situations.

Zukhov would have done the same as he did at Kursk, given that Kursk was a defensive operation, while Mars and Uranus were offensive operations. Furthermore, the main counterstrokes of the Red Army in the summer of 1943 was not in the same sector as the defense (Kursk) - the two principle counterstrokes were on the flanks of the German Army, which is why had the German Army continued to expend manpower on Kursk it would have made Soviet operations around Orel and Kharkov even easier. At the time when Manstein was pushing to continue the offensive at Kursk he did not foresee a Soviet offensive around the Kharkov area - for him, it was a complete surprise.