Stan187

Here is an interesting article I came across in research for a powerpoint presentation for European Military History class:

Toward Combined Arms Warfare: a Survey. . .

opinions?

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Druze

Very interesting details their Stan. Some of the battles of 1967 Six day war are still studied today in military schools around the world.

In 1973 Israel became complacent with the "Bar-lev Line" which were fixed fortifications along the Suez. Ariel Sharon who was monitoring the build up of Egypts Missile Umbrella shield between 1968-1973 recommended surgical strikes to wipe out the SAM sites before they were operational as they were moving Eastward to the point where they would encompass the East side of the Suez as well which would prevent the IAF from providing cover for its troops located along the Bar-Lev Line. The Israeli administration not only didn't listen to Sharon but removed him from active duty and at the request of Ben-Gurion perhaps his last political request, he persuaded the Chief of Staff to make a Reserve Armored division that was to be commanded by Ariel Sharon only in time of war. Sharon studied the line and it was this studying that allowed him during the 1973 war to cross the canal and actually deploy his forces in Africa on the West side of canal. This crossing of Sharon's reserve division cut off the entire Egyptian 3rd Army from its supply line. Once that happened Egypt contacted their Soviet Allies to push for an immediate cessastion of hostilities between the two sides before the trapped Egyptian third army was completely destroyed. The destruction of an army that size might have been the biggest rapid destruction of a modern large army in 20th century history.

Israel's three biggest mistakes in 1973

1) Unwillingness to act on solid intelligence
2) over-reliance on armor which resulted in more Israeli tanks then usual being destroyed by Egyptian "Sagger Squads" and the Anti-Tank missile infantry unit was introduced to the world
3) not destroying the umbrella shield on the west side of canal before it became operational.


However while Israel suffered major air losses as a result of Soviet SAM's as did American pilots in Vietnam. Rather then change Israel's focus on air superiority at all costs, Israel implemented the Drone diversion tactic in the 1982 Bekaa Valley campaign in which almost no aircraft were shot down an to SAMs and were able to take out Syria's entire Air Defense network in 24 hours. This was also the introduction of the Drone aircraft as a neccesity for air superiority as Israel sent in hundreds of Drone Aircraft to "light up" Syrian anti-Aircraft batteries which then allowed for Israel's manned aircraft to come in and wipe out the entire Air defense system while its radars were focused on the drones. This method gave modern Jet pilots the superiority that they had lost in Vietnam and the 1973 October/Yom Kippur war. It was implemented much the same way by American and British pilots in Desert Storm.

Druze

Here is a good link to look at the battle of Abu Ghelia in 1967 which was meticulously planned and executed to near perfection and involved I believe three forces from three directions. It is mandatory studying in most tank courses in military schools around the world.


http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/downlo.../key_chap4.pdf

Stan187

As far as tank battles the best read always seems to be about the Golan in 73.

Catalan

I have that PDF in book form - one of the originally published pamphlets for the U.S. Army. If you're interested, there is a version that was re-written for a general audience currently being printed by Kansas University Press. Same author, same title.

If you look around the same site you'll see other great PDFs of the same type, including some by David M. Glantz.

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lazybastard

going through it now. Excellent read. Especially considering the lack of serious examinations of WWI era organizations.

Druze

The stuff of legends surely.

Stan187

Is the general audience version supposed to be better?

And yeah, ever since I found that site a few days ago I've not seen the light of day

Catalan

I'm not sure - I never bought it, given that I basically have it. This is the 'civilian' version:

Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century

Apparently it is 'revised' and 'expanded'.

Stan187

Hmm, thanks Catalan, I'll take a look.

aktarian

About point 1. It was also Israeli complacement and not willing to believe intel that indicated Arabs are about to attack. E.g. "The Concept" was taken as measure for all and Israel refused to deviate from it.

to add a bit. Point 2 is Israeli abandoning combined-arms principle based on success of armor in 1967. No organic infantry which forced improvisation (using airborne troops to act as infantry support). While Israel is good at improvisation (they have to be) relying on good results of it is not a good planing.

point 3. good point but IMO it was Israeli beleif that they could take it out if war starts.

Well, drone concept/SEAD was something that had to be done to combat Syrian defences. after 1967 war Arabs realised that they will not be able to match Israeli pilots and Israeli tankers. So they adopted asymetric approach, SAMs to fight Israeli planes and ATGMs to fight their tanks. In 1982 Syrians still had large quantities of SAMs. Israelis simply had to find a way to deal with it. If they destroyed Syrian airforce (like in 1967) that would still leave SAMs. so what worked in 1967 wouldn't in 1982.

The drone concept itself is not that different than early SEAD/Wild Weasel. Only instead of manned plane acting as bait Israelis used drones. Safer and cheaper.