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Old 11-04-2004, 00:33 AM   #91 (permalink)
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How Good Is India's Version Of The T-90, Is It Better Or Almost Equal To The Merkava?
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Old 11-04-2004, 00:35 AM   #92 (permalink)
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I Heard From Pak Soldiers That The Al-khalid Is As Strong As A Tonka Toy. The Suprising Thing Is That It Came From A Pak Soldier! He Even Admitted That The Only Thing They Posess Is Flashy Uniforms. Although He Said, Their Army Has A Lot Of Work To Do.
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Old 11-04-2004, 03:23 AM   #93 (permalink)
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Originally Posted by KONTAKT ERA
How Good Is India's Version Of The T-90, Is It Better Or Almost Equal To The Merkava?
Not a chance in hell but they're designed with different philosophies in mind, suited to different doctrines and tactics. Apples and Oranges although one-to-one, the T-90 is a coffin.
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Old 11-07-2004, 01:54 AM   #94 (permalink)
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Woah! The T-90 Is A Koffin Compared To The Al Khalid? India's Version Of The T-90 Would Turn The Al Khalid Into A Cerial Box Wouldnt It?
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Old 11-07-2004, 01:55 AM   #95 (permalink)
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Oh Wait, U Said Merkava. Wouldnt The Indian Version Of The T-90 Still Give Merkava A Beating Though? I Know It Would Lose In The End, But It Would Still Give A Pretty Good Fight. I Wasnt Talking About Russia's T-90. It Is Way Out Of Date.
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Old 11-07-2004, 01:58 AM   #96 (permalink)
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Originally Posted by KONTAKT ERA
Oh Wait, U Said Merkava. Wouldnt The Indian Version Of The T-90 Still Give Merkava A Beating Though? I Know It Would Lose In The End, But It Would Still Give A Pretty Good Fight. I Wasnt Talking About Russia's T-90. It Is Way Out Of Date.
Not worth my time replying.
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Old 11-07-2004, 04:25 AM   #97 (permalink)
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Now is a good day as any day to have a age limit.
PS. AK and Arjun are for different doctrines. But i'll put my money on the Arjun even though the AK has Era. Its only good for one hit.
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Old 11-07-2004, 04:30 AM   #98 (permalink)
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Originally Posted by dabrownguy
Now is a good day as any day to have a age limit.
PS. AK and Arjun are for different doctrines. But i'll put my money on the Arjun even though the AK has Era. Its only good for one hit.
I wonder though. I saw that you've read Col Ajai Shukla's tirade on BRF too. If he is correct, then the Arjun is overkill and maybe too much to handle for InA tankers (ie, no doctrinal and tactical development which forces them to try to fit the Arjun into a very ill-fitting T-72 role).
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Old 11-07-2004, 11:23 AM   #99 (permalink)
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I partly read Col. Shukla's tirade and it seems to me that the Arjun is a wonderful case of putting "national pride in our indigenous defence industries" before what the armed forces actually want.
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Old 11-11-2004, 18:32 PM   #100 (permalink)
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Eventually perhaps the Arjun may be inducted. IA will realize that having a heavy tank against light tanks is very effective. Expecially when those tanks are T-55s or T-72 like.
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Old 11-11-2004, 19:22 PM   #101 (permalink)
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Dabrownguy, the Pakistani Army (whom I assume you are referring to) has T80s if I recall, not T72s and T55s. Also, from what I read, Arjun is ridiculuously expensive. Now, if it proves to be an equal to the M1a2 (and India's defense budget can stomach paying enough for the gas it will guzzle being nearly 60 tons), then I will humbly accept that I was wrong. Still, what's the use of a heavy tank when from Col. Shuk;a's prices that he referenced, for the price of one Arjun, India could get 3 T90s?

It would be nice if the Arjun works as well as planned but I remain skeptical. The Vijayanta was nothing much while the LCA, though impressive sounding, keeps being delayed. Also, you say the "IA will realize....." but you do realize that the IA, being the user, is in the best position to realize what it needs, not DRDO, don't you? Also, with regards to the DRDO, I'm a big fan of private industry as opposed to a gov't run setup that will probably be rife with bureaucrats and hence corruption.
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Old 11-11-2004, 21:30 PM   #102 (permalink)
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So that everybody else know what we're talking about

Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla at Bharat Rakshak Forum :: View topic - Artillery & Armour Thread
Dear all,

Someone pointed me towards the Bharat Rakshak forum as one where there was much heartburn over my NDTV story on the signing of the JV between DENEL and BEML. I normally don’t respond to viewers but I’ll make an exception here.

I don’t know any of you and I’m not sure whether you even know each other, but let me start by introducing myself. I’m NDTV’s Defence Editor, an ex Colonel in the armoured corps, who retired after commanding Hodson’s Horse, a crack armoured regiment equipped with T-72s. I have been a tank man for 22 years and a graded instructor in tank automotives and electronics. I have participated extensively in the Arjun field trials.

This is not to say that I know a great deal more about armour philosophy, design, ethos, operations and tactics than anyone here ever will; all I’m saying is that you may be a bit smug and premature in assuming that every journalist is a “jackass” (MT Singha), “sensationalist” (JCage), or is engaged in “subterfuge” and “double crossing” (Raju).

Furthermore, I am in first hand touch with people in the army, many of them my course-mates and buddies, who operate the systems that you all only read and hear about. I often visit the ordnance factories where equipment is manufactured, sometimes attend the trials of key platforms and in any case keep myself informed by chatting to those who are involved in trials. My views on equipment are shaped by how the equipment is shaping up, not by notions of patriotism.

For those who like to brand as “Pakis” or “Chinese” all critics of Indian weapons procurement programmes, I would only ask: who’s anti-national? People who try to ensure that 78,000 crore rupees of Indian money buys the country robust and effective defence, or those who don’t give a damn where it is spent; everything’s fine, as long as the middlemen are making money? Like RajeevT who is “praying that this deal be passed.”

Finally, I don’t need to prove my nationalist credentials in some website chatroom. I’ve already done that in live operations for India.

Now on to the issue. Why don’t we need the DENEL-Arjun hybrid SP gun?

First: India hasn’t fought a war in thirty-three years and is unlikely to fight one again soon. What it urgently needs is not an expensive, heavy SP gun that is optimized for strike corps operations in desert terrain. Instead it needs larger numbers of towed 155mm artillery that can be used anywhere along the border, including for their most likely employment task : punitive fire assaults across the LOC. The Kargil conflict (not war, a limited skirmish involving less than two divisions is not a war) illustrated the value of dual-use, towed artillery that can support both strike corps thrusts as well as mountain division operations. So a heavy SP gun is a poor choice for India to begin with.

Second: Nowhere in the world, NOWHERE, has a viable SP artillery platform been made by mating an artillery gun turret with a tank chassis. Like tank design, SP gun design is all about integration; about optimizing space, systems and electronics. Almost every system in a tank, whether NBC protective, radio, night vision, gun control, you-name-it, is spread over both turret and chassis. So when you get a turret from South Africa, having ripped out half the systems that should go into the chassis, and mate it with an Indian chassis, you are basically riveting pipes, wires, hydraulics etc all over the place without any design having gone into it. The number of things that could fail in the long run are too numerous to recount.

Third : JCage, you argued that I contradicted my own story in which some army officer “noted that the Arjun tank had cleared all trials”. Wrong. Some army guy saying it doesn’t mean that I am saying it. I have consistently argued that the Arjun tank has serious drawbacks; if you know someone in the armoured corps, ask him. The first few series production tanks handed over to the user unit have all been handed back. They all had serious problems.

Fourth : There are serious issues of strategic mobility that will dog any inter-theatre movement of the proposed SP gun. It’s not just about weight… though that will be a major problem in moving a 50-ton-plus gun across a country where many bridges are no stronger than class 40. The bigger issue is about size. The Arjun already sticks out on either side of a railway wagon which means that it cannot be taken on any line that has a platform on the side. After mating the Bhim turret, you will also have height problems, which means that the railways will have to give Over-dimension Clearance (ODC) each time the gun moves by rail.

Fifth : The DENEL gun, thanks to the single vendor situation that we have gotten ourselves into, is being sold to us at an exorbitant price. The cost of a single SP gun will be 20 crores plus. That’s a shocking price, in a country where the most modern MBT --- traditionally the most expensive platform --- comes for 9 crores. Why are we in this situation? I leave it to you.

Sixth : Your questions on artillery guns firing anti-tank rounds. Every artillery battery in the Indian army is trained to fire, with guns level, at tanks attacking their gun position. It’s called “firing through open sights”. The shell of an artillery gun has a far slower muzzle velocity than that of a tank gun (T-72, 1800 metres per second, the highest muzzle velocity in the world), but it’s considerably heavier. A 155 mm HE round ploughing into a tank at 1500 metres would send its turret flying. Even a 130 mm HE round would knock out the tank. OK, Nandai? And Singha… RAP is of no use in firing over open sights. The rocket would not kick in soon enough to make a difference to the muzzle velocity.

Seventh : Rajkatare, the Indian armed forces have a long and illustrious history of having unsuitable weaponry shoved down their throats. The Vijayanta tank is just one example. The Bofors scandal, for those old enough to have followed it, revealed that the selection can be manipulated without a problem. It was just our good fortune that it’s a great gun.

There’s more… but I shall leave it here for now. Watch NDTV; my news may not be politically correct, but at least it’ll be correct.

Best regards,

ajai
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla at Bharat Rakshak Forum :: View topic - Artillery & Armour Thread
First of all, let's separate the wheat from the chaff.

There are too many people on this website who think that the way to disagree is to denigrate. That's for amateurs. For those who want to explore an issue seriously, the only thing important is the issue itself. For others... who are in this website only because they don't really have a life... or because they are pathetic military wannabes... read what I've written anyway. You'll learn something.

Incidentally, I don't doubt there are several serious military thinkers here. And if they choose to remain anonymous, more power to them. Being a journalist, I don't have that luxury. Since my report was mentioned by name, I am defending my views under my own name... and rank… not as an anonymous contributor. And I have had to mention my qualifications as a tankman because there were some rebuttals that were so laughable (eg “that jackass doesn't know the different between a gun and a tank”) that there was a need for a bit of perspective.

Now on to the issues.

Will we fight a hot war soon? The theoretical possibility exists... but as only a remote one. Someone cited the Parakram deployment to buttress his case for the possibility of war. I would cite that same example to illustrate the unlikelihood of either India or Pakistan crossing the rubicon. Even with both armies fully deployed in 2002... bottom lines laid down and crossed... threats made that were difficult to back down from... and an immediate provocation existing (Parliament and then Kaluchak attacks)... we still didn't go to war. It would really take something for war to happen today.

But wait a minute! It's not about whether there will be war or not. War or peace, defence economics is all about hard choices. There is a budget. And being from a third world country... our budget is small. So equipment profiling is all about prioritizing, about picking and choosing, and about first getting stuff that we HAVE to have, before getting what we COULD have. And a natural corollary in such a case is to buy equipment that IS needed today before we look at stuff that MAY be needed tomorrow, about buying cheap and as far as possible about buying dual-use. That means equipment that can do the job in both proxy war and hot war.

When you buy heavy strike corps equipment, it will be usable only in a full-blown war… despite some intricate calculations I read on this site, attempting to figure out whether DENEL SP guns could get to Kargil. Anyone who’s been anywhere near those roads will tell you that 50 ton SP guns cannot reach the mountain sectors… nor perform to their capabilities if they’re miraculously transported there. So the bottom line is: when you buy a high-mobility towed gun like the Bofors-Scania combo, you can use it across the peace-war, plains-mountains spectrum. When you buy a SP gun, you have employment options that are limited in both geography and time.

Someone even made the point that we should not allow ourselves to be constrained by our limited logistics systems. I hope that was meant as a joke! Are you saying that although many of our bridges can’t take a load over 40 tons, we should go ahead and buy a 50-ton-plus weapon system so that we can make a debating point? Or should we FIRST upgrade the strategic infrastructure, a task that could easily take ten years, and then buy the heavier systems.

The point made by a discerning contributor (thank you sir!) are completely valid, on whether we would need SP guns today, even in a full scale war. There are increasing difficulties in planning deep thrusts. The reasons are simple: geographical difficulties in getting in deep, and the danger of crossing the nuclear threshold once you’re in deep. That's why even the services are looking very hard at multiple shallow thrusts across a wider area. Towed high-mobility guns are adequate for such operations. Why? Because there’s less movement, so the higher levels of protection and mobility of an SP platform can be dispensed with. In many such scenarios, for the first half of the battle, fire support is obtained from our own side of the border.

In fact, it’s debatable whether we need more tactical mobility than our BOFORS guns give, even if we stick with the old deep-thrust scenario. Never to any serious extent, in an Indian exercise, have armoured spearheads outrun their fire support, not even when the Indian army was doing 100 km on the first day and 150 km in three. What the columns outran every time was the logistics support, the tank ammunition, the water, the FOL, and the artillery buildup for the major tank battles that lay ahead. So even if big bucks have to be spent on strike corps equipment, (something that I have already disputed), it should go on high-mobility logistics vehicles that are essential today to sustain the spearheads. The fire support itself has always remained available; it will continue to remain so, even with towed platforms.

Incidentally, are you under the impression that the BOFORS-Scania lacks in mobility? I’ve seen batteries of these guns clipping between the dunes almost as fast as a T-72 column. Shoot and scoot? The BOFORS does that too. Burst fire? Three rounds in 15 seconds… too slow for you? Protection, obviously, is lower than an SP platform. But is the protection worth 2000 crores?

Much of this clouded thinking stems from a morbid fascination with sexy weapon systems, combined with a highly limited understanding of how they function in a tactical battle plan. There seems to be a belief that as long as you are pumping explosives and lead at a higher rate and more accurately than the enemy, you will win. Nothing could be further from the truth. To make a strike corps thrust yield strategic success (and anything less would be a failure), far more important than SP guns is the wherewithal for building up logistical support for the deep battle inside enemy territory. We can’t buy everything… we just don’t have the money. So if we have to spend 2000 crores, let’s not spend it on a handful of sexy looking, but largely redundant weapon systems. Far more cost effective would be spending them on battlefield transparency devices, C4I systems, and the high-mobility logistics required to sustain deep battle.

To say... hey let's get all three: towed, truck mounted, and SP, is what I call the Buta Singh approach. You don't want to think strategically; to identify likely scenarios; you don't want to make clear-cut decisions and choices. So you go for an all-scenario decision... and end up under-prepared for everything. A towed gun with a high-mobility prime mover prepares us best for our most likely scenario... which is low-intensity or proxy war... and still insures us in the event of a hot war. A SP gun will remain in the garages until there's a hot war... IF there's a hot war... and even then it’ll remain under-utilised because of infrastructural and logistical problems.

Next point: Single vendor situation: we’ve always been in single vendor situations with the Russians. Okay… true... but there are three situations in which you can legitimately get into a single vendor situation: One, if the vendor is the only one offering a product. Example: Gorshkov, Phalcon. Two, if the vendor is the only one offering it at an affordable price or an irresistible TOT. Example: T-90s, Sukhois. And three, if there are strategic reasons for dealing with one vendor, like the kind of relationship we used to have with the Russians. Today, the third reason is dwindling in validity with the Russians… but one and two still remain in several cases. In the case of South Africa and DENEL... it's neither the only choice... nor do we have a Russia-type relationship with the South Africans. So to be single vendor with them is folly.

For those who believe that there were other vendors... please do examine at what stage the others (the Brits, the Czechs) were kicked out and the reasons why that happened. We wanted a 52 calibre gun at a time when many vendors hadn't upgraded from 45 calibre. They asked for a few months to produce a 52 calibre gun. Instead of agreeing and giving itself multiple choices, the MOD said no. So when it came to quoting prices, there was only DENEL in the fray. It is hard to avoid the impression that India has placed itself in a single vendor situation.

The need for indigenisation is paramount; that needs no elaboration. But at what cost? If your indigenisation plan entails whipping up autarkic arguments to accept substandard equipment, you’re doing a dis-service to both the defence forces and the DRDO. The latter has the manpower, the establishment, the skill levels and the funding required for producing world class equipment. The Dhruv helicopter is one example; even though it’s having vibration problems with its main rotor, the forces are still flying it. That’s because it has made it to acceptable levels. But accepting a product that hasn’t reached battle standards would be to condone mediocrity, already a national trait with us. The DRDO can do better; don’t be apologists for them.

Incidentally, for the contributor who cited the example of SP turrets mated with AFV chassis, no dispute, all your examples are totally valid. But none of those examples is remotely similar to what we are planning: to buy a gun turret from one country… mate it with a chassis from another country… in a factory that has had nothing to do with either the gun or the chassis. This is a totally different issue. Just to cite one issue that is already creating problems: who is responsible for warranty? In the case of performance problems, who will be responsible? You can bet your boots DENEL will blame any long-term accuracy or gun trunnion problems on the mating. Who will be responsible?

Okay guys, it was nice knowing you all. I would have loved to continue to respond to your contributions... even from the wannabes... but alas I have a job that leaves me with little time.

cheers,

ajai
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla at Bharat Rakshak Forum :: View topic - Artillery & Armour Thread
Quote:
Originally Posted by JCage
Rushed for time sir, so I'll address some of your salient points, not all.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla
First of all, let's separate the wheat from the chaff.

Someone even made the point that we should not allow ourselves to be constrained by our limited logistics systems. I hope that was meant as a joke! Are you saying that although many of our bridges can’t take a load over 40 tons, we should go ahead and buy a 50-ton-plus weapon system so that we can make a debating point? Or should we FIRST upgrade the strategic infrastructure, a task that could easily take ten years, and then buy the heavier systems.
This is invalid. By the time one upgrades the infrastructure and only then proceeds to purchase eqpt, the eqpt will be delayed and obsolete. What is needed is simultaenous work on 2 fronts- gradual induction and gradual upgrading of the infrastructure.
Oh please! Are you writing in from Germany... well, this is India. We all know what is needed... but it might help to touch base with practical realities once in a while. Let's take a realistic view of how many bridges and roads would need to be upgraded... and how long that would take in view of our annual Border Roads budget and capabilities. And yes, its easy to say BUT, OH GOD, IT'S OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AT STAKE, but fortunately not everyone in decision-making positions believes that India is so threatened that we must divert our resources from education, healthcare, water and internal security... and start building Class 70 bridges in the border regions so that our newly acquired SP guns can have a smooth ride to the war that is just around the corner.
Quote:
Originally Posted by JCage
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla
Incidentally, are you under the impression that the BOFORS-Scania lacks in mobility? I’ve seen batteries of these guns clipping between the dues almost as fast as a T-72 column. Shoot and scoot? The BOFORS does that too. Burst fire? Three rounds in 15 seconds… too slow for you? Protection, obviously, is lower than an SP platform. But is the protection worth 2000 crores?
The point is whether the Bofors- Scania can follow the Strike Corps everywhere, if that were the case why do we have tracked tanks and not wheeled ones.
And yes, the IA is in the big boys league now and needs NBC protection like never before.
Dear Sir, You don't need tracked guns just because we have tracked tanks. Hint: how come everything in the strike corps is not tracked? We have our logistics on wheeled vehicles, we have a lot of our radars and command posts on wheeled vehicles... all equally threatened targets. Tanks need to be tracked because they have to maneuvre under direct enemy fire, sometimes even against the grain of the country. Guns can follow the easy going from one gun position to another. Simple really. The reasons for having tracked and armoured SP guns are very different.
Quote:
Originally Posted by JCage
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Suhkla
For those who believe that there were other vendors... please do examine at what stage the others (the Brits, the Czechs) were kicked out and the reasons why that happened. We wanted a 52 calibre gun at a time when many vendors hadn't upgraded from 45 calibre. They asked for a few months to produce a 52 calibre gun. Instead of agreeing and giving itself multiple choices, the MOD said no. So when it came to quoting prices, there was only DENEL in the fray. It is hard to avoid the impression that India has placed itself in a single vendor situation.
Sure and what happens then? Their systems cant be put on the T72, so its the Arjun chassis. So how is that better than the Bhim which you lambast on the grounds of "ne'er before been done"? The world over nations are using the best available and matching it with what they have. The Jordanians are using the Falcon turret to upgrade their Brit tanks..should they give it up because they are mixing two different systems?
I fear if the IA did not approve the Bhim, then why is the staff pushing for it? The Bhim cleared the trials- and these include reliability and NBC trials.
Sorry, can't give you the explicit reason why sections of the brass are pushing for the Bhim (though there is one), so I'll just point you along a line of thought: in every purchase, there's a profit.
Quote:
Originally Posted by JCage
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla
The need for indigenisation is paramount; that needs no elaboration. But at what cost? If your indigenisation plan entails whipping up autarkic arguments to accept substandard equipment, you’re doing a dis-service to both the defence forces and the DRDO. The latter has the manpower, the establishment, the skill levels and the funding required for producing world class equipment.
DRDO is also human. They cant be made to jump trhough hoops for year after year and that too on the basis of promises which never materialize. As the CAG would put it - its a waste of the taxpayers money.
The Israelis and the Brits both perfromed telescopic induction, the Chally 2 and Merks which met most but not all of the GSR's were inducted and then improved in subsequent production batches, with upgrades being performed on the prior ones. The IAF did the same with its Jaguars and now the Su30MKI. Why cant the Army do the same? It need not order 1000 Arjuns overnight, merely placing an order for 124, and having them imrpoved whilst the production run goes on is feasible. But the present approach of gold plating the tanks and endlesstrials is as ineffecient as it gets. The Army had no problems with inducting the T90S's and then dismissing the teething problems as minor errors...but when it comes to the Arjun, similar leeway is ne'er around. What of the failed Refleks tests, the thermal imager failures, the initial engine overheating...
You can't compare apples and oranges. There is an acceptable level of failure and an unacceptable level. It's pointless discussing this endlessly: one would have to go into the issues of armour philosophy and armour design... if you believe that a good engine, a good gun and good armour plating equals a good tank, thank you but I'm not even getting into that.
Quote:
Originally Posted by JCage
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla
The Dhruv helicopter is one example; even though it’s having vibration problems with its main rotor, the forces are still flying it. That’s because it has made it to acceptable levels. But accepting a product that hasn’t reached battle standards would be to condone mediocrity, already a national trait with us. The DRDO can do better; don’t be apologists for them.
This is incorrect, there are no serious/ vibration/ issues hampering the present Dhruvs. The vibration problems were corrected as of a year back itself. HAL developed a new passive vibration control system, an updated Mark and installed it on the Dhruv. Furthermore, Army aviation also took the normal practice of flutter weights on the rotors to minimize vibration.
The ALH is also receiving the custom modified active vibration control system, so there are no issues of vibration as you note.
May I note that the present Dhruvs went to Chile and just completed the entire hot and high jig. The vibration problems are passe.
This is not incorrect. There is still a vibration problem with the Dhruv rotors. The DRDO acknowledges it, the Air Force acknowledges it, the army and the navy have refused to accept more deliveries, the aerobatics team that performs with the Dhruv acknowledges it. It's only some contributors on Bharat Rakshak who seem blissfully unaware of this. This no longer surprises me... you guys were not even aware that the first batch of Arjuns have not been accepted by the army. Did you all read the Outlook magazine today? DDM we might be called... but at least we live in the real world.
Quote:
Originally Posted by JCage
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla
Incidentally, for the contributor who cited the example of SP turrets mated with AFV chassis, no dispute, all your examples are totally valid. But none of those examples is remotely similar to what we are planning: to buy a gun turret from one country… mate it with a chassis from another country… in a factory that has had nothing to do with either the gun or the chassis. This is a totally different issue. Just to cite one issue that is already creating problems: who is responsible for warranty? In the case of performance problems, who will be responsible? You can bet your boots DENEL will blame any long-term accuracy or gun trunnion problems on the mating. Who will be responsible?
And what of the new vendors? Where will they install their turrets? On the T72? On the BMP? We are back to square 1.
The only option is to bind Denel by contractual provisos.
Where will who install their turrets? It seems I haven't been able to put across the foundation of my argument. My basic argument is to not buy new turrets at all. Thank you.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla at Bharat Rakshak Forum :: View topic - Artillery & Armour Thread
Quote:
Col.Shukla
Dear all, please call me ajai... now that I've become a DDM... I don't stand on formality.
Quote:
Again and again you refuse to address the specifics while interspersing facts with your opinions.
Wrong sir... you just don't want to recognise the facts... because it seems it would interfere with your perception of Bharat Mata as this newly blossomed superpower... and our DRDO scientists as the modern day Manhattan Project pioneers!
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You claim that the "first batch" of Arjuns have not been accepted into the Army. But you refuse to say when and why they were "rejected." The news reports clearly say that the 5 production Arjuns were rolled out of HVF, Avadi last month and are undergoing trials. Do you have any specifics about what happened at the trials and what if any problems were found? Instead, all we here is rehashing of 5-10 year old complaints. You quote anonymous IA people as saying there are problems, but rejected someone quoted by you on the record as saying that many of the old problems were corrected.
Sir, you are clutching at non-existent straws in your last flailing attempts to imbue with a veneer of respectability... the Arjun... that baby of bastardised concepts... fathered by a generation of defence glossies... and deliverd by the incompetent midwives of the DRDO. The acceptance of the first batch of Arjuns was a staged drama... since the date had been fixed in advance... Pranab had to accept the tanks... even though they were nowhere near what the Army would accept.
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It is time for you to put up or withdraw the claims.

1. What, according to you is the status of the 5 Arjuns recently rolled out of Avadi?

2. What are the specific problems, if any?
See, the problem is that you think that tank problems can be reduced to something as simple as "a final drive leakage", or "a main bearing worne out". The Arjun suffers from all these and many more symptoms... but you might like to concentrate instead on the disease. The disease is that the tank has been designed by people who have little or no experience of working on tanks. In every country that produces any kind of respectable tank... the designers are life-time tankmen... mostly civilian... but nevertheless, people who have spent their whole working lives designing and working on tanks.

So when our Indian scientists believe they can import seventeen kinds of sub-systems... slap them together... and produce a world class tank, they are not even going to get off the starting blocks. Have you ever been in a T-72? The subsystems are so tighty packed together.... lego like... that you can barely get a finger in between them. The result: at 1000 metres on level ground, you can barely see the T-72. In the case of the Arjun... you can play hide-and-seek inside the tank in between the phoren sub-systems. The result: when you lay your tank gun on an Arjun 1000 metres away... you really have to make a decision: which part of the tank shall I hit? It looms like the now extinct World Trade Centre... and so... like the World Trade Centre... it is doomed to extinction.

Hello... all you website denizens! Of those claiming that my objections are all 5 years old... is there anyone who can assure me that the height of the Arjun has been reduced? No, alas, it hasn't. And while all of you may be highly impressed with its world class subsystems... those of us who have to go to battle in it... are more concerned with fundamental design drawbacks that will cost us our lives... drawbacks that are the hallmark of the Arjun. The outlook that says... let's build a really big dabba... into which we can fit every possible sub-system that we buy.

Are you all aware that the MTU engine that the Arjun has had for a zillion years is going off MTU's assembly lines? And that MTU is now asking a fancy price for newer engines? No, you're probably not. And having heard it... many of you will jump up and wave your tiranga jhandas and say, "YIPPEE... now we'll have an Arjun with an even better engine... now we're really going to beat up Pakistan in that next war in the early 2200s". But those of us who are paying for it... and those of us from branches of the army that are going into combat daily without helmets and BPJs... are going to ***** about white elephants.
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3. How do you balance that with on the record statements by COAS Gen. Vij such as this one
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On the Army's outlook towards Arjun, the Indian-built Main Battle Tank, Gen.Vij, who has commanded a strike corps, said that the tanks were now deployed along the border and were found to be good. ``Troops which are using Arjuns are happy with their performance,'' he said.
And what is General Vij supposed to say? "Guys I know this is going to get me into serious trouble with the Defence Ministry and could even interfere with my chances of a governorship, but I have to tell the truth; the Arjun is a lemon".
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As to Outlook magazine, I refuse to take any report seriously when it claims that the IN procured Barak missiles because of delays in the Dhanush project. When one cannot distinguish between a SAM and Ballistic Missile, one loses credibility. There is no mention of the dozens of DRDOs successes or the fact that most foreign products too have teething troubles and other issues well after induction. When you ignore facts and distort others to suit your agenda, such as the Outlook piece, you cannot be taken seriously.
And I suggest that you remember one thing. That someone who is not infatuated with the categorisation of hardware has more brainspace available for understanding the larger issues behind defence planning. He may not know the difference between a SAM and a ballistic missile... but he's talked to a great many people... including, if you've read the article, Dr Aatrey... and General Shankar Roychowdhury.

Go out there and talk to some of the DRDO top men who have retired recently. The same people who have made a career of defending the Arjun, hammer it when a monthly pay packet no longer clouds the truth.
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Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla at Bharat Rakshak Forum :: View topic - Artillery & Armour Thread
I’m happy to note… that after the fulminations over my last post, a certain tone of sanity and questioning has crept into the forum. Thank you, those who can rise above the negativity.

I know my last post was furious. There’s a reason. I didn’t post in this forum because I love BR; I’m here because my story was questioned and I believe that each one of my viewers deserves a response. But I quickly found that the tone of the questioning was smug and superior and came from a small cabal of flag-waving BWTs whose ignorance was matched only by the sheer volume of their posts.

But I think I’ve gone wrong; I’ve ended up giving more respect than I would have liked to these elements… by responding to their posts, and I’ve brushed aside those who are asking genuine questions.

But sadly, there’s a reason why I can’t answer many of the questions that have been raised.

I can’t possibly explain in an email the philosophy of tank design and the concept of mechanized warfare. It would just be too long; so you’ll just have to read about it elsewhere. And I urge you to do so, because if you’re not clear on these basics, you CANNOT understand the important issues just by reading up on equipment capabilities. Equipment forms just one of the building blocks of warfare in general, not even the most important one.

It has taken me twenty two years in an armoured regiment and a lifetime of professional reading and study to crystallize my views on mechanized warfare. Calm down, those of you who are instantly on the defensive because you think I’m saying that only army (and that too, only cavalry) officers can understand mechanized warfare! Few people that I’ve met understood mechanized operations better than my professors in London, all civilians with glasses and heads shaped like eggs. But it had taken them a lifetime of reading and studying to get there. Perspectives from outside the fishbowl are indeed required; but they need to be educated viewpoints.

So don’t wait for me to explain these issues on Bharat Rakshak. Instead, read Liddel Hart, Fuller, Manstein and Tukhachevsyi. And you can never understand why the Arjun is the wrong tank if you only see it in terms of the capabilities of its sub-systems.

You want me to quote experts and cite articles to support my views! Honey, that won’t happen. Why? Because, with all due modesty, I am the expert.

Let me continue in this bashful vein. There are few people writing who have the qualifications…. practical, professional or academic… that I do. And as the Defence Editor of NDTV, there are practically none who have the access to information that I do. Just as an example, I spoke off the record about the Arjun problem with the army chief, General Vij yesterday morning. He invited me to the trials in December and I’ll be there for my fifth Arjun trials. Many of the fishbowl peerers will no doubt dismiss this as a far-fetched fantasy; but for me, it’s just another day at work; It’s not about me; it’s about the job that I do.

You are all faithfully quoting his statement that it is a normal event for tanks to go back into the factory after being released by a Defence Minister!! No, honeys, it's not normal... but then what can the Chief say in an open forum. It was my question... and we spoke about it later. But I suppose when you say, "quote someone", you want the face-saving verbiage that Gen Vij has to spout to the mikes. When I speak, it is informed by the off-the-record conversations that take place later. Savvy?

So who on earth shall I cite to support my views? Name me a name please! You can dismiss my views as unsupported and arrogant. Too bad; I have a lot to be arrogant about.

Now for some clarifications :

Try not to see any criticism of the Arjun as a plug for the T-series. It’s not a one-versus-the-other. I don’t think it was a great idea to get the T-90, even though we got it at a great price. Instead, I would have retro-fitted the T-72 fleet, ageing though it is, with better night-vision systems and radio sets and GPS equipment. I would have used the money saved to strengthen the weaker links in our strike formations.

Though, as I said earlier, I favour bringing the mountain formations up to scratch first. It’ll cost much less and translate into strategically tangible results immediately.

Secondly, please don’t delude yourself about the invulnerability of a heavy tank. A TOW missile fired from an attack helicopter will defeat the armour of any tank in the world. An APFSDS or APDS round fired from 1000 metres from a 120 or 125 mm gun will defeat any non-reactive armour in the world. And for those who are already jumping off their seats and shouting, “that’s where you’re wrong; we’ll fire at 2500 metres and get him first”, please consider the statistics. Over 90 per cent of tank versus tank engagements in the last two wars with Pakistan took place at ranges under 900 metres. I don’t know what your view of border geography is; mine tells me that with the development of areas along 90 per cent of the border regions since then (southern Rajasthan/Sind is the only exception) engagement ranges are not going to get any longer.

If you see every view that’s different from yours as a manifestation of the “Russian lobby”, you’ll just remain stupid and uninformed. Most of us who are serving on Russian equipment curse the Russians. They produce cramped, low-tech equipment… but it just happens to work for us Indians. I wish Indian soldiers were so much in love with our Russian equipment; In fact, they are only too aware of its failings; but the DRDO has failed to provide them with any viable alternative.

The question of which GSQRs were not met in the Arjun. Clearly, not many of you are interested in how the GSQRs were formulated. A pack of uniformed BWTs (any similarities are purely coincidental) who subscribe regularly to foreign defence equipment glossies kept amending the GSQRs over the years… as the glossies grew glossier and glossier. And the DRDO (who subscribed to the same glossies) kept ordering in two sub-systems for each one they developed and packing them into the dabba they had made.

Today it’s a moot question who has made a bigger monkey of the other: the DRDO or the WE Directorate. But one thing is clear: if the tank enters service in any sizeable numbers (someone asked why 124? Because after the bargaining was over, the army said it could accept only those many without seriously eroding its armoured capabilities) the users will be the biggest monkeys of all. It’s not about meeting the GSQRs; because the GSQRs are seriously flawed. And I’m not going to, either as a user or as a defence analyst, accept into service a tank that meets deeply flawed GSQRs. (In fact, the Arjun doesn’t even do that).

Nobody says the Arjun hasn’t fulfilled a role; it has. It has given preliminary training to our DRDO scientists about the issues involved in producing a world class MBT. It has gotten them out of their labs and into the field during trials. And it has created a bank of knowledge that will go into the world class MBT that India could one day produce. But the Arjun is not that MBT and forcing it down the throats of unwilling users (just to justify the expense of development) will only stiffen institutional resistance to future products. Let the Arjun be categorized a “technology demonstrator” or some other face saving label and let it be displayed in tank museums as India’s first attempt towards MBT superpowerdom.

Wyu, you conclude that I “expected the Arjun to fill a T-72/T-90 role”. Could you tell me… what is a “T-72/T-90 role”? In the Indian context, there are no separate roles for different types of tanks, other than grouping the remaining Vijayantas with infantry formations because their mechanical unreliability renders them unsuitable for fast moving, deep-strike mechanized operations. Even the recce regiments use the T-72… so the Arjun will indeed be doing the same role that the T-72s/T-90s. If you are aware of any doctrinal developments in this regard, I would be grateful for the knowledge.
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Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla at Bharat Rakshak Forum :: View topic - Artillery & Armour Thread
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Originally Posted by JE Menon
What's BWTs?

I seem to have missed the latest on BR Lingo.

>>My question is, can't we just curse the DRDO and use their equipment because it "just happens to work". I get the feeling what you are saying is that people eventually get used to what they have no choice but to use. Or have I misread you?
u've misread me entirely. The point I'm making is that the Russian equipment works... even with our low-tech drivers and gunners... even with our low-grade maintenance backup... the Russian equipment works. That's not true for the Arjun.
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Originally Posted by Raju
Well JE that's exactly the point. Since we have grown so used to cursing the Russians, let us for a change curse DRDO and try to keep more forex in our pocket. Ofcourse nothing significant initially, but since it is a DRDO project they would be expected to indigenize w/e they have not, thus far.
Sadly you're in a world that's gone by long ago. Today, we can comfortably spend forex for a more suitable and cheaper piece of equipment, rather than on an expensive dud that doesn't work. Just to illustrate the pricing, a T-90 costs us around 8 crores... an Arjun around 22 crores. And once MTU gives us the newer more expensive engines... that price will rise further. So for the cost of an Arjun, you'll get around three T-90s. I suppose you've heard of the Lanchester Equation....?
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Originally Posted by Raju
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Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla
But sadly, there’s a reason why I can’t answer many of the questions that have been raised. I can’t possibly explain in an email the philosophy of tank design and the concept of mechanized warfare
Well that seems pretty convenient, since it escapes you the hassle of condensing w/e are the core points you use in a 'specific' argument.
No sir. What is convenient is that it would save you the hassles of going out there and reading something more than equipment specs.
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Originally Posted by Raju
It is still not clear to anyone on this forum...both the 'flag waving jingos' or the 'flag saluting moderates' as to what exactly is your issue with the Arjun ?? Is it doctrinal, operational, profile, electronics or armor ??
All of the above. Go back and read my earlier postings please.
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Originally Posted by Ajai Shukla at Bharat Rakshak Forum :: View topic - Artillery & Armour Thread
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Originally Posted by WYu
Ajai,

My knowledge of the T-72, indeed Soviet doctrine, came from my time at the Fulda Gap. I am a combat engineer by trade. Like you, I spent my career studying mech warfare but I went back alot futher than you to General Stonewall Jackson and his calvary ideas during the American Civil War.
Hi wyu,

Great to know there's someone here who's read a bit. Stonewall Jackson is of course essential reading for any tactical tank commander. Feint, outflank, raid... that's the name of the game isn't it? But you will seriously misunderstand Indian strike corps operations if you compare them with the echelonned attacks of the Warsaw Pact forces. That was a very specific context that has no bearing with we plan today.
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Originally Posted by WYu
Soviet tanks were not meant to go tank-against-tank. Killing tanks is the artillery's job. If tanks do meet in battle, then the Soviets were not interested in killing them. They only want to fix them in place so that a follow on echelon would kill it.

Soviet tanks were in fact designed to kill infantry. Their doctrine is to shell us for hours, if not days, on end and while our nerves are still shaking, to face a calvary charge by their T-72s. If by some miracle, we held them back, we would have faced a bayonet charge.
Killing tanks is the artillery's job??... that was only for the Soviets. The kind of battlefield superiority in artillery that they had... we can't even dream about. So for us... it's all about classical tank operations: using minefields to channelise enemy tank columns into a killing zone... and then taking them on with attack helicopters, aircraft and tanks.
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Originally Posted by WYu
In fact, during my time, the Soviets kept the T-34 around simply because by the time the T-34 made its appearance on the WWIII battlefield, nothing superior would have surivived.
Hmmmm... maybe we should get the Arjun!
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Originally Posted by WYu
NATO's tank desgins obviously spring from a different need. We could not allow one tank force to get by us and into our rear. That's our death knell. Thus, the superiority of fire and the superiority of protection.
And let's not forget... NATO defence was predicated heavily on attack helicopters. Today... in the British Army... attack helicopters have officially replaced the tank as the base for mobile operations. They're just highly mobile airborne combat groups.
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