Catalan

The autoloader on the T-64 and T-80 is different from that of the T-72 and T-90, although they all have the carousel. In that carousel each place you can put a round in is called a casette. If you look at the same page you linked and look up the Black Eagle autoloader there is nowhere that it says casette autoloader.



He didn't say it wasn't so - he didn't mention it at all. I will have to wait in order to scan in my sources.

Casette Autoloader's Baseplate Ejection System - Tanknet
T-80 & T-72 - Tanknet (second page, first post)
T-80u V.s T-90 - Tanknet

I will have to scan in hard evidence, however.



IMO, any war would have turned nuclear really quickly.

There were less than 500 M1A1s with 120mm guns in Central Europe by 1987, while 90% of Soviet armor had ERA. There were not enough helicopters, and the Soviets also had well designed and powerful attack helicopters.

No, the journals which I am talking about - since I have read them, and know exactly what they're saying - is that in the mid-80s the strategic shift had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. In 1987 nobody knew that the Soviet Union would fall only four-five years later.

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Catalan

They would be the same rounds which were shipped with the brand-new M60s which were supplied to pre-revolutionary Iran.

Catalan

If you would have linked to Fofanov's relevant page:

2A46M Autoloader: T-72 model

zraver

What vassily calls a magazine, I am calling a cassete, if you look at his diagram it winds and unwinds the chain just like a VHS or music cassette. What he calls a cassette in refrence to the T-72 is a peace of the ammuntion not the style or way the autloader works.

do you really think either Germany would have allowed Nuclear release? Do you think the USSR was ready to go down that road? By the 70's the effects of radition and nuclear winter were public knowledge and the anti-nuke movement was very powerful.

And how many hundreds of Leo's, Cheiftans, and new Challanger I tubes added to that mix? Not to mentions gobs and gobs of 105mm systems in the hands of the smaller allies.

As for attack helo's, the Mi-24 Hind barely managed to function in a low threat enviroment. How well the slow lumbering sloth could have done in skies patrolled by eagles and watched by gepards and rolands is another story. It's wire guided atgm's are a huge hindrance with massive exspoure time. The hellfire's supersonic flight time really cut down exposure.

I think your looking for "red scare", I was handed a supply of "air force" when was a kid, while dealing mostly with the air threat it did cover the ground side of things because of ALBD and deep interdiction. The tenor of the conversations IIRC was on the USSR closing the gap, not on thier huge lead in numbers which was being adressed by CFT(E) plus Gorby's unilateral withdrawl of 10,000 tanks from warsaw pact satalite countries in 1988/90.

Catalan

'Cassette autoloader' is synonymous with carousel autoloader. You can ask Vasily himself on Tank Net. Here is a scanned source. If this isn't enough for you, I don't know what is. Again, ask on Tank Net. You are wrong.

http://img230.imageshack.us/img230/9...oloadervu9.jpg



It depends entirely on the velocity of penetration of Soviet forces of the U.S. V Corps in West Germany, which during the 80s would have been pretty fast. It's a question of whether you want your country to be occupied or not. If you take a look at the papers which form our attitudes on the defensive doctrine of the era, nuclear war was one of the real possibilities.

Yes, in fact, according to their doctrine they were willing to use tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany and East Germany to guarantee a breakthrough.

Well, this is largely irrelevant given that in war it doesn't really matter what is popular. What matters is your defense. Had the Soviets broken through the U.S. V Corps there was nothing which would have stopped the Soviet Army at the time. The United States would not have had enough time to land more armor and personnel in Western Europe.

Nuclear war was a reality. I would suggest reading a book that I read last year for a thesis I wrote, but the name doesn't come to mind. I will have to look it up again.



The only NATO gun which was assured a penetration on Soviet armor was the 120mm. At the time almost all M1s in Europe were armed with the 105mm gun (source: Interview with Phillip A. Karber, Armed Forces Journal, 1987, pg. 56). There were not enough Leopard 2s produced. By 1987 1,800 Leopard 2s had been accepted by the German Army, and in 1984 there were 1,130 (Source: Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank, M Jerchel & U. Schellbacher). The Challanger's 120mm gun suffered from low-velocity using sub-caliber rounds, and the inability to use long-rod penetrators. In regards to the M1A1 Abrams production of HA+ models (improved chobham with dU) only began in May 1988. (Source: Green, Michael, Abrams at War)

All Soviet armor in Central Europe was up do date - improved T-64s, T-72s and T-80s. In fact, the majority of their new T-80s were positioned against the U.S. V Corps.

It seems as if you are comparing single Soviet systems to NATO combined arms. It's not a very accurate argument, unfortunately. I don't know much about air systems, and so I can't really argue the technical aspect, however.


No, my opinions are based entirely off what I read - various journals and other publications.

I think, if you would have read, that I specifically gave the date of 1987. Not all 10,000 tanks were withdrawn within those two years. In fact, many remained there until the fall of the Soviet Union and were incorporated into the national armies of the various rising independent entities.

But, I agree, post-1987 the situation was getting progressively worse for the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the trend was visible between 1982 and 1987, although that only means that it was progressively deteriorating. Between 1982 and 1987 there was a 4% drop in total Warsaw Pact armor (from 70,420 to 67,600), and a 12% increase in NATO armor (26,728 to 31,527). (Source: Chalmers, Malcolm and Unterseher, Lutz, Is There a Tank Gap?: Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets)

Nevertheless, the introduction of ERA was a serious strategic concern for the United States, and it can be seen within the thousands upon thousands of articles which were published on the subject asking why there hadn't been an earlier reaction. In fact, it was only until the early 90s that there were a great deal of countermeasures introduced in Europe, or in general really.

zraver

I'll stand correcte don the T-72 and the use of the correct "name" however my description of the T-80UM2's system remains accurate.

with or without ERA or 120mm guns the Soviet mission vs the US was probalby never more than a holding action. The real invasion corridor was vs the BOAR/WGr/Dutch across the North German Plains. vs the much more restricted terrain and higher troop density vs the Americans along with modern artillery sub muntions Bavaria was pretty safe.

Really, are you sure? Prove it! I mean sure they trained to fight in a WMD enviroment, and thier force structure and troop density sure seemed to be geared towards offnesive operations (armor heavy, lots of offensive engineering assets, mobile air defenses etc). But if you have an actual copy of thier war plans post it please. It is the offical stance FIS that the USSR never really wanted to attack, let alone break through.

Did the USSR really want to attack? That question is the single biggest mystery of the Cold War.

No this was irelevant. After LBJ mobalized the USN to block passage of Soviet help to Nasser in 67 the USSR knew the US wasn't kidding when it came to risking nuclear war for its allies. Kruchev reportedly told his commanders to stop mobalisation of the paratroopers becuase the American's were crazy and Nasser wasn't worth it. In fact at every turn during the cold war when the Nuclear spectre raised its head it was the USSR that backed down. They didn't risk war over Berlin, meekly accpeted nukes in Turkey, backed down in Cuba, left Nasser out to dry ect and so forth. So hwer eis the evidence that the USSR was committed to a policy of national suicide in order to reach the Rhine?

Likewise, while the US was prepared to use nukes when and where as needed, such release was in the hands of the German's on German soil.

All Soviet armor in Central Europe was up do date - improved T-64s, T-72s and T-80s. In fact, the majority of their new T-80s were positioned against the U.S. V Corps.[/quote]

First off the Chally I's gun is not low velocity and holds the world record for long distance direct fire kills. In ODS it easily penetrated T-72's in excess of 3000M. Even allowing for decreased protection of monkey models the L11A5 could still core the T-72 in excess of 2000M.

Secondly 500 Abrams, 1800 Leo's and 400+ Chieftans and Chally's backed by 3-8000 more tanks with 105's is more than a match defensively for the WGSF. The tiube fired AT-10 could not destroy either of the three big ones and that was the principle AT weapon of Soviet armor. The Missile also drastically reduced the R.P.M of Soviet tanks.

Thirdly, becuase percived doctrine and past history indicated that the Red Army would apply sustained pressure via echelons to force a breakthrough, and not re-inforce defeat the actual numbers in play at any one time are much more balanced locally to a dept of about 24-36 hours

The Hind was maybe the equal of the Cobra. However when comapring the AT-6 armed Hind to the Hellfire Armed Apache in the same enviroment it becomes clear just how limited the Hind really was. US Stingers were making short work of them in Afganistan. the air defense denisty on both sides wa smuch higher. but the US helo had better range than most low altitude soviet systems and a faster missile with less flight time.

I think, if you would have read, that I specifically gave the date of 1987. Not all 10,000 tanks were withdrawn within those two years. In fact, many remained there until the fall of the Soviet Union and were incorporated into the national armies of the various rising independent entities.

Again the numbers don't tell the whole story. Many of those tanks were satalite nation or catagor B T-55 and T-62 units, and a few T-34/85 and T-10/IS-III/IIM. Also a signifigant minority of the more Modern T-64+ tanks were in SGSF and not readily availabe for use in Germany.

It was a concern but not a great one. ERA did not protect from high velcocity cannon fire, sub munitions, FASCAM, or air lauched HVATGM's like the Hellfire and Maverick. To be sure ERA added a new dimension but it did not radically alter the way of doing business. Don't go just by articles, go by reaction. When a real threat was percived the west acted quickly.

Blademaster

How is that the biggest mystery? If USSR really want to attack, we would have heard it by now. They never attacked therefore they did not really want to attack. That offense posture is just puffing posture, to intimidate someone. It is one of the most cheapest way of ensuring that no one hits you. You puff and huff and hope to god that they don't call your bluff.

Blademaster

Catalan,

Would you please readjust the image of the gun loader? It is messing up the screen creating horizontal scrolling bar which is a pain in the ass.

Catalan

Well, by the deployment patters of the Soviet Union's best tanks, the invasion would have occurred opposite of the U.S. V Corps, given that the Soviet Union deployed their best there and achieved even higher amounts of local material superiority.


Well, I will get you the name of that book that analyzes the situation very deeply.

Well, you misinterpreted what I said. I never inferred that their strategy wasn't offensive. In fact, the use of tactical nuclear weapons can be used offensively. The idea, of course, would be to use tactical nuclear or chemical weapons in order to clear passages which where their mechanization can pass through. I will have to get you the name of that book, but there are other examples that lead to the same conclusion - such as armor that was designed to survive nuclear strikes deep into NATO territory (ob. 219 specifically for Alaska). Of course, many of these designs were just prototypes (well, most likely, most of them were) - but it shows some side to the Soviet doctrine.

I will get yo the name of that book.

Of course they didn't. What rational leader wants to start a nuclear war? What rational leader wants to bring the world to that brink? But that doesn't mean that contention plans were developed. I never said that the Soviets wanted to attack - I just said what may have happened had they attacked.

Khrushchev lost power to Brezhnev, who came close to nuclear war during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. There were important shifts in the Soviet Union's strategic thinking between the different premierships. You can't look at one and conclude a rule.

Of course not. Fortunately, most Soviet leaders were rational. But you missed the point, or misconstrued it on purpose. Read below.

I never said that the USSR wanted to invade Western Germany, in the first place. I never hinted that there were existing plans to launch an invasion. I merely supposed if there was an invasion. There are many examples that can lead to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, even if the Soviets didn't really want to. Especially, if they felt threatened. Fortunately, they never did and they decided to back out when the going went hot. But, that doesn't rule out a potential invasion of Western Europe during drastic times.

Well, more accurately, it was in the hands of NATO command in Europe. If NATO felt that the front was broken then I don't doubt that tactical nuclear weapons would have been used. I'm sure that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have led to full fledge nuclear warfare had the Soviets not stopped the invasion right there.


It's not a low-velocity gun per sé. However, it is rifled. Rifled guns fire APFSDS at much lower velocities than smoothbore guns, and rifled guns also limit the length of the penetrator. These are the major reasons why the Challenger 2 is being fitted with Rheinmetall's 120mm L/55 smoothbore.

Long range penetration during the Gulf War didn't require high velocity given the targets they were engaging (a T-55).

In ODS it easily penetrated T-72's in excess of 3000M. Even allowing for decreased protection of monkey models the L11A5 could still core the T-72 in excess of 2000M.

I think you should take your own advice and stop looking at numbers. The general disparity in number was 2+:1, in favor of the Soviets. The general disparity. I think that you, of all people, should understand that forces might be congregated in different fashions. Local superiority might have been much greater.

It seems that many NATO commanders at the time were not too sure that they could stop the Soviet Army if there was an attack without the use of nuclear weapons. This view is somewhat given in Richard Simpkin's Tank Warfare (I think on Amazon you can purchase a copy for $500, if you're interested).

Well, you could be right, but it's not insured that they would have used their tank launched CE missiles. According to Soviet Gains in Armor/Antiarmor Shape US Army Master Plan, by Robert R. Ropelewski, the Soviet 125mm APFSDS at the time could penetrate all Western tanks except the Challenger and the M1A1HA, which was not deployed in large numbers at the time, until the very late 80s.

They aren't specifically for the reason you stated. The material superiority of the Soviet Army allowed them to increase the number disparity in any sector of the front which they wished to achieve a local breakthrough. This has always been historically proven in all campaigns of the Red Army and Soviet Army during and after the Second World War. For example, the general number disparity on the Eastern Front in 1944 was around 2:1, yet the Red Army was able to achieve local numerical disparity of ~3:1 in some areas.


Actually, all T-10s and heavy tanks had been withdrawn to the East. There were definitely no heavy tanks in Central Europe during the 80s. AFAIK, the ~800 T-34s still in use in the Warsaw Pact were not active service. All Soviet armor was up to date, and this was 7,000+ tanks (the Soviets alone had more armor than all of NATO in Central Europe). Poland had already begun producing their own T-72s with their own ERA (Erawa) and nations like Bulgaria were also getting large amounts of T-72s to replace their T-55s.

According to information I have, most T-64s were in Central Europe.


Well, you are making hasty generalizations. The Hellfire II was introduced in 1992 to defeat Soviet ERA. There were no tandem warhead Hellfires before then deployed, at all. Like I said, according to U.S. documents 80-90% of their anti-tank weapons were rendered ineffective. The first round designed to defeat Soviet ERA was the M829A3 which was not yet designed (they were on the M829).

It didn't always react quickly. It took them around 7 years to widely deploy countermeasures against ERA on wide basis. These articles aren't stupid, and they have also noted historical trends of the slow response time of the West to respond to WP threats.

There are historical precedents.

zraver

or the USSR could have been terrified of the latest generation of US Super tanks. offnesives are dictated by terrain, not kasernes, and the terrain says Northag not Centag.

really? you said= Yes, in fact, according to their doctrine they were willing to use tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany and East Germany to guarantee a breakthrough. vs I never hinted that there were existing plans to launch an invasion. I merely supposed if there was an invasion

Thats just one of several hims and haws you made when you make a pint and get called out on it, admit it. Don't try and say you really said something else when your words are there for anyone to read.

Not really, your obviously well read but perhaps not as well as you think. Typical deployment is based on frontages. Generally accpeted wisdom called for MR or tank battalion deployments to be either 1 up 2 back recon by death. or 2 up 1 back. effectively removing from 1-2/3rds of the regiments fire power during the intial critical opening volley. This tactics was a left over from WW2 allowed formations to develop the fight. However modern war is so violent that it no longer works. The US has gone to air scouts with a tank wedge leading as an example.

What this effecitvely means is that a regiment starting out with a nominal 3-1 edge (in manuver units)over its US Army counter part battalion drops to 2-1 after the intial volley. In reality because of diffeirng force structure the ratio is even lower with 6 x 11-13 tank companies taking on 3x 14 tank companies 66/72 vs 42 or about 1.5 to 1. Adding to this already bad situation is the fact that NATO is fighting hull down. Often Local supority in terms of real deliverable fire will favor the defender not the attacker.

take some time and study the air land battle doctrine with an emphaiss on deep interdiction

Catalan

Which super tanks are you talking about? There were almost no M1A1HAs deployed to Central Europe in 1987. Most were M1s and early M1A1s. Most were armed with 105mm guns. I don't know what you're talking about.

In regards to the most obvious avenue of approach for the Soviet Army it has generally been accepted that it would have been at the Fulda Pass. Interestingly, NATO intelligence reported that the three armored armies opposite of NORTHAG were completely composed of the latest T-64s, while the two armies opposite of CENTAG were fully converted to T-80s. Primary armor used by satellite states was the T-72.

Right, but you questioned Soviet willingness to use nuclear weapons in general. I never mentioned anything about their willingness to do so. I mentioned their willingness to do so in the event of a full scale war in Western Europe.

I know what I said. Please don't put words in my mouth, or accuse me of arguing something I did not argue, when you either chose or honestly did not understand what I said. Or at least, you argued a red herring.


I don't know what expertise you have - for all I know, you might have some. But, generally, it has been accepted that the Soviets congregated firepower in specific areas to achieve local material superiority far larger than general material superiority along the entire front. It was a tactic which was developed during the Second World War (see: David M. Glantz, When Titans Clashed).

There is no doubt that the Soviets operated in echelons since the Second World War, but this never reduced their local superiority. It enhanced their local superiority - well, at least according to everything I have read. And I far better trust my published sources than anybody on this forum. Although not all Soviet tanks of any given sector will engage at the same time, the same remains true for the defense. Of course, a smaller defensive army might be able to engage a larger proportion of their material at any given time, but the sheer amount of material presented by the Soviet Army would mean that they do not have to match the proportion of engaged material to still achieve overwhelming material superiority in the local sense.

I have - I actually own most guides published in the late 80s and early 90s by the U.S. Army.

zraver

M-60, M-60A1,M-60A2 Starship, M-60A3 TTS, MBT 70 project, M1 Abrams the US wasn't exaclty sitting still in the realm of tank development. The T-64/72 didn't evolve out of thin air.

I was a tanker

That beign said tactics devloped during 1944-45 could not deal with 14 aimed shots overy 6-7 seconds each with a 90% hit rate at 2500m. a range Soviet guns could not hit back at using APFSDS. What this means (as was proven in ODS) is that an MBT company can rip a regiment apart in under a minute.

The Germans never had ballistic computers. You keep misisng just how violent tank wafare got after it digitized in the 70's. Old style tactics became completely useless. Smoke screens, lower profiles massed units all staples of the drive to Berlin became assets of NATO with its ability to see through smoke shoot on the move, and hit farther and faster than the Soviets. Add in things like volley fire, wiping the regiments security screen early, air attrtion, FASCAM and other tools to attrit and channel attacks and the masses of Red tanks simply could not exist in anywhere near the numbers the Soviets felt they needed.

again deployment of the T-80 is not indication of intent, but could be reactionary to the Abrams. The Fulda Gap is not a good avenue of attack. yes it is fairly wide and aimed at Frankfurt but it had to attack across good defensive terrain and through the strongest army in western Europe. While WGSF would have attacked through it to pin the US Army. The weight of attack would go North. The terrain was wider, flatter, aimed at the North Sea Ports, vs an alliance with confusing goals and command directives and more outdated equipment levels. It is also closer to Soviet territory along the Baltic and has a higher density of terrain capable of using rough strips for aircraft (unsure on actual airfeild density).

Officer of Engineers

Well, this is the 1964 version

Plan of Actions of the Czechoslovak People’s Army for War Period

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