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04-08-2005, 08:32 AM
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#1 (permalink)
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Military Professional
Moderator
Join Date: 02-23-05
Location: Krblachistan
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Israeli Counterinsurgecy Lessons?
Hey everybody,
I'm doing a project on Israeli couunterinsurgency lessons that can be applied to the US experience in Iraq for one of my classes. My portion is to focus on lessons within the security and communications realm (vs. political, intel, economic). I've got some basic findings, but wanted to see if anybody else had ideas/good sources (there's a lot of websites that are wholly pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian, but these tend to be too biased in one direction to use as a credible source with solid conclusions) since there is a dearth of substanative material on the IDF. Any comments are welcome. Thanks.
Here's what I've got so far:
1. Israel is losing the media battle (e.g. battle of Jenin and the alleged "massacre") - lack of media embeds prevent the IDF from getting their story out first and then are in a situation where they lose the initiative to Palestinian reports, however accurate they are.
2. The IDF has had a cultural bias against officer education (they don't require bachelor degrees for commissioning, they don't have a war college, their command and staff college doesn't carry a lot of prestige); instead, they have a heavy emphasis on operational experience, which has stilted creative thinking/approaches to their COIN against the Palestinians. This bias towards operational experience has also affected units, with poor performance by units during the first intifada that were pulled from COIN training and thrown into riot scenarios, often resulting in inappropriate use of force/escalation to non-violent threats because of a lack of understanding of the ROE and/or lack of training.
3. Checkpoints and the security wall have been relatively effective at interdicting the movement of explosives/arms into Israel, but at an extremely high cost of alienating Palestinians and crushing the Palestinian economy, which has a high over dependence on Israel.
4. Israel has developed some great technologies/systems that are extremely effective during engagements with insurgents (live UAV feed to wrist mounted displays, the D9 armored bulldozer, the ability of the Merkava to carry infantryman, excellent hatch protection on their APCs [vision blocks]); however, while these are effective in battles and reduce casualties, they don't translate to success beyond the battlefield.
5. The IDF has gained some good urban operations experience, such as the necessity of having a strong linguistics capability in infantry units in order to take advantage of immediate intel possibilities (e.g. a captured insurgent radio), the need for snipers in a countersniper role to overmatch insurgent marksman/snipers, the need for assault guns (MBT gun) for precision overmatch vs. less powerful strikes from attack helos.
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04-12-2005, 10:06 AM
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#2 (permalink)
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WAB Bartender
Defense Professional
Military Professional
Join Date: 11-24-04
Location: Vacaville, CA.
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I just read a few items on this subject. One article dealt with the 10 lessons we SHOULD learn from Iraq. Another dealt with historical lessons from past guerilla tactics (which was VERY interesting). Francis Marion ("The Swamp Fox" in the American War of Independence), John Mosby ("The Gray Ghost" of the American Civil War) and Cochise (Apache Wars) were excellent leaders and very effective raiders.
But the BEST article was about one simple principle of war, and how guerilla actions stand it on its head. Usually, the simple physical principle of mass times velocity equals energy translates in martial terms as numbers and speed equals shock.
But in guerilla warfare, the dilemma is for anti-guerilla forces to avoid ceding large areas to the enemy guerillas by massing into a few large and relatively sluggish formations, or fighting a 'war of detachments', thereby allowing guerilla forces parity and sometimes superiority against a more powerful force. Also, guerilla forces are usually able to determine timing, size and tempo of actions, forcing anti-guerilla forces into a reactive posture.
I think the greatest thing we're learning from Iraq is how to balance those competing imperatives, by standing that old principle on its head, and doing the complete opposite: the SPEED AT WHICH FORCES MASS is more important than the size of those forces, or the speed with which that mass moves.
On the tactical level, we put this concept into operation by assuring that we only arrive at the contact point with mission-tailored combat forces (not all the nice-to-have support stuff), and with precise timing to guarantee that we don't do anything to telegraph our punch, like a helicopter hovering for 'one last look'. Planning is great, rehearsal is great, and recon just prior to execution is great, but NONE of that is worth compromising surprise, so if it will, go without it. Terrorists holed up in a 'safe house' ain't Warsaw Pact tank divisions, so stop fighting 'em like they are. If you get a tipper that is specific enough to act on, DO SO, and don't wait until you know what color wallpaper is in the spider hole.
Operationally, the same dictum is operable. If you intend to clear Fallujah, DO NOT put it in Iraqi Stars and Stripes; and marshal troops no earlier than 24 hours before you are able to tell your commander that there is now no easy way into or out of Fallujah. This is VERY tough to do, but the Marines proved it can be done, but it takes FOCUS AND ENERGY to adhere to your timeline. If a single rifle company starts cutting roads even six hours too early - that is, before you anticipate that you can cut ALL of 'em - you will watch as the rats start looking for boltholes, and they'll find 'em. You'll clear Fallujah, capture/kill grunches of Bad Guys...and their leaders will be looking at the smoke and dust in their reaview mirrors as they drive away laughing.
There are some other aspects to this 'anti-principle', as well, but it's a fascinating new look at what it means to attempt to get inside the decision/action lop of a VERY agile and cunning enemy. As trained military professionals, we tend to over-emphasize PROCESS; amateurs are far more results-oriented, with minimal comittment to processes they never learned and have no attachment to. They do not 'staff' decisions; they MAKE decisions, on the spot, with whatever imperfect and incomplete information they have. Sometimes incorrect, at least those decisions are timely, and SPEED is the dominant battlefield requirement (Principle #4 in the article below).
__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell
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04-12-2005, 10:07 AM
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#3 (permalink)
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WAB Bartender
Defense Professional
Military Professional
Join Date: 11-24-04
Location: Vacaville, CA.
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A quibble here and there, but most is right on:
Quote:
Armed Forces Journal
April 2005
Pg. 34
A Grave New World
10 lessons from the war in Iraq
By Ralph Peters
Drawing rigid lessons from the military experience of the moment is foolhardy. The human capacity for mischief plays havoc with doctrinaire analysis. Yet, our military establishment and, especially, its civilian leadership fell prey to a worse temptation: Clinging to a vision of war as they wished it to be, while the dimensions of conflict changed in ways that mocked their cherished plans.
We need to be wary, but we can't refuse to learn. We must do our best to harvest the enduring lessons from our recent military campaigns, while winnowing out the case-specific issues. Thereafter, we must be merciless in amending our doctrine, our procurement programs, our force structure and, above all, our mentality - if we are to lessen our risks in the grave, new world around us.
Ten lessons from Iraq seem incontestable:
1. Technology still can't win wars by itself. Does anyone remember "shock and awe," the farcical concept deskbound theorists sold to civilian Pentagon cadres who lacked military experience? The air campaign that was supposed to defeat Saddam Hussein's regime overnight and prove that ground forces were obsolescent (if not obsolete) was a contractor's fantasy that rapidly became a decision-maker's embarrassment.
Nothing worked as planned. Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of hardware couldn't persuade a determined opponent to quit. An enemy whose mentality had not even been considered shrugged off our sound-and-light show.
We found that precision weaponry, for all its virtues, could be too precise, failing to inflict sufficient pain to create an atmosphere of catastrophic defeat. We preened about "network-centric warfare," but its proven masters aren't our service technocrats. The innovators have been the ragtag terrorists who exploited the Internet, cell phones and the global media far more effectively than we performed with extravagant, irrelevant technologies.
2. Land warfare still demands ground troops. The paradox of the high-tech 21st century is that the security problems we face are overwhelmingly of flesh and blood, arisen from a rage of souls in failing civilizations. And it still takes human beings to solve human problems - especially during conflicts in that most daunting of human creations, the city.
Soldiers and Marines, grudgingly marshaled in theater, had to win Operation Iraqi Freedom the old-fashioned way, fighting along road and river lines, through sandstorms and ambushes, then climaxing the land campaign with bold thrusts into Baghdad. They proved, yet again, that muscle and mind still trump metal and microchips. And in counterinsurgency efforts, technology plays a useful, but distinctly secondary role.
3. We need those ground troops in sufficient numbers. Mass is back. Calculating how cheaply military operations can be conducted simply makes them less likely to succeed. Numbers still matter, so if you got 'em, use 'em. Our Army and Marine Corps are too small for our inescapable global roles. Yet, Iraqi Freedom was supposed to pave the way to a cut of two to three Army divisions. Now the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is struggling to prevent a temporary (and still far from adequate) increase of 30,000 in Army end strength from becoming permanent - in order to preserve funding for Cold War legacy systems. OSD's first loyalties appear to be to the defense industry, rather than to our national defense.
4. Speed is the dominant battlefield requirement. In the 1980s, officers spoke of "operating inside the enemy's decision cycle." Today, our forces must "operate inside the media cycle."
The hostile global media, led by al-Jazeera, won the First Battle of Fallujah. Our Marines did everything expertly and by the book. But the book called for deliberate urban operations, which gave the media time to muster world opinion against us and break the nerve of key leaders.
We won the Second Battle of Fallujah because we used overwhelming force, we didn't shirk from doing what was necessary - and we did it fast. The full-bore operation was over in less than a week.
Our armed forces will never again face a single opponent on any battleground. We will always be confronted with a third "combatant" at whom we can't return fire: the media. The only way to win is to speed the kill.
5. The enemy must be convinced of his defeat. Because we deployed too small a force to Iraq, the ground campaign that brought us Baghdad failed to result in a conclusive victory. The Sunni-Arab heartlands of Iraq - the source of support for Saddam Hussein's regime - never felt the agony of war. Many a Sunni-Arab town or city hardly saw an American soldier or Marine for months after we believed we had won decisively.
Our enemy didn't feel defeated. He felt tricked, betrayed and shamed. Compounding our problems, we worried not only about friendly casualties, but about enemy casualties during combat operations - we didn't want to hurt Iraqi feelings. As a result, our technical knockout fostered the rise of a resistance.
The enemy who doesn't suffer may raise his hands above his head, but he won't surrender in his heart. Our enemies and their supporters must be broken down to a sense of utter hopelessness.
6. The details of combat operations must be left to military professionals. This is a lesson we just can't seem to learn. Ideology may get you into Baghdad, but it will not get you back out.
We're blessed to have an apolitical military. Attempts to use it for partisan purposes, rather than for our nation's strategic requirements, pervert the institution's essential values. Afraid that the projected costs would be so high it would be difficult to "sell" toppling the Iraqi regime to Congress and the American people, the civilian leadership in OSD refused to allow our military to prepare for a full range of contingencies. Detailed planning for an occupation of Iraq was forbidden. Everything was supposed to happen by magic.
The ideologues got their war, but the result was a great thing done very, very badly. Every American casualty that was suffered during the invasion and the subsequent occupation lies at the feet of the inexperienced civilians in OSD who refused to heed the advice of those who had dedicated their lives to uniformed service.
7. Occupations have fundamental requirements. Presence matters. Occupations are manpower-intensive. The defeated population must see their occupiers at virtually every turn. There is no such thing as occupation-lite. You must begin with a crushing weight of numbers to psychologically disarm a population shocked by the failure of their national regime. And you must impose martial law immediately.
Martial law has nothing to do with capricious brutality. Rather, it assures the population that their persons and their property will be safe, even though their world has collapsed around them. Martial law only penalizes those who seek lawless advantage or who intend to continue resistance: criminals, insurgents and terrorists.
Everything we hope to achieve during an occupation stems from the rule of law. And while you can loosen restrictions quickly, if the situation warrants, it's almost impossible to tighten up controls after you have permitted social chaos and rampant criminality to flourish.
It's also essential to involve the local population in the reconstruction of their own country. Turning Iraq into a looting orgy for U.S. contractors was exactly the wrong thing to do: It inflated expectations beyond the possible, while failing to engage a worried, needy population.
It is always wise to place as much responsibility for recovery on local shoulders as possible. By immediately hiring local contractors and co-opting the local sources of power by exploiting their greed, we would have saved billions, moved faster and put hundreds of thousands of young Iraqis to work - instead of leaving them unemployed and embittered. The repairs might have been inefficient and payrolls certainly would have been padded, but that would have worked to our advantage.
Put people to work and keep them busy. Get the delinquents off the street corners. When complaints arise that the power isn't on or the taps remain dry, you can point to the local entrepreneurs you paid to provide for their compatriots.
Devolve onerous responsibilities as quickly as possible, while maintaining a monopoly on power. Besides, the Iraqis knew how to repair their own infrastructure. For all of our technological prowess, we didn't.
8. Military intelligence is broken. Despite some fine tactical improvisation, it's undeniable that our military intelligence services, as presently configured, are incapable of providing the intense, incisive and imaginative support combat commanders require. The reason is simple: We trusted technology and slighted the human factor.
Our intelligence system remains better suited to fighting the absent-without-leave Soviet Union than it is to the ultra-human struggles in which we have found ourselves - and which will dominate our military future. Why did we place technology above people? Because the human factor is troublesome, undependable and frustrating.
But human talent is nonetheless indispensable. Satellites can't peer into the human soul. Computers can't predict what an enemy will do impulsively. Nor will any machine do so in our lifetimes, despite the extravagant promises of the apostles of technology.
I recall visiting Fort Huachuca, Ariz., in 1984. A lieutenant colonel assured me that, by the 1990s, intelligence hands like me would be obsolete. Artificial intelligence was going to solve all of our problems. He was wrong, of course. But his promises have been replaced with other, equally foolish claims.
If we were forced to discard every technical-collection system to which we have enslaved ourselves, but could replace the hardware with more skilled analysts, agents and interrogators, we would be far more successful. Certainly, technology can help us. But there is no substitute for talented, trained and dedicated human minds fixed on our enemies.
9. Language skills and cultural knowledge are vital combat multipliers. A single officer fluent in the local language and aware of cultural nuances can be far more valuable to our military than entire squadrons of F/A-22s.
If there is any single factor our military services neglect that could enhance our strategic and tactical performance, it's the command of foreign languages. How can we "know our enemies" if we don't know what they're saying?
Although valuable, current foreign-area-officer programs and hasty pre-deployment courses barely scratch the surface of our needs. Officers should be required to develop at least a rudimentary ability in one high-threat foreign language, and superior skill levels should be rewarded handsomely. This goes against our thinking about what an officer should be, but we are going to have to change our thinking as the world changes around us.
A battalion commander forced to rely on a local-hire translator is no longer the most powerful figure in his or her battalion. We will never penetrate our enemy's local codes unless we can enter his mindset, and language skills are the indispensable key.
The reply I got from one four-star general that "OPMS won't support language training for officers" was fodder for satire. If the Officer Personnel Management System isn't giving us what we need, then we need to change the system. And wartime is the one time when we can do it.
To their credit, the Marines are shaping an ambitious language-skills program. The Army must make a similar commitment. Languages are weapons.
10. The three crucial types of operations in which our forces will engage are strategic raids, punitive expeditions and full-scale invasions, followed by occupations. Forget the self-imposed rule that "if you break it, you own it." While our extended presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq makes sense, we can't reconstruct every troubled society on earth. And some (think Somalia) will be so fundamentally hostile to our values that we can only punish them and leave.
While the forms of conflict are complex, ever-mutating and never fully predictable, we can project the need for brief strategic raids that strike finite targets, then leave; longer punitive expeditions that engage a more complex enemy, reduce his capabilities, then leave; and full-scale invasions, some of which will be followed by occupations.
Such operations demand an expeditionary mentality in every service, but that's only a return to our military heritage. From the "shores of Tripoli" to the Army's campaign against the Moros, from our frontier days to clandestine special operations, we've known how to fight, win and, when appropriate, leave.
Certainly, there will be times when we wish to extend a helping hand to the opponent we knocked down. But some enemies should just be left lying there. Empires, even postmodern ones, need to be able to tell the difference.
Ralph Peters is a retired U.S. Army officer. The author of 20 books, including the forthcoming "New Glory," he has experience in 60 countries on six continents. This article is the first in a series on 21st-century warfare. In subsequent issues, the author will develop the themes summarized here.
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07-13-2005, 07:07 AM
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#4 (permalink)
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Bandaid
Military Professional
Join Date: 10-04-04
Location: India
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skek,
Brig.Ray sir and myself can help you out, with the Indian army experience. It would be add to your studies. Ask specifics and I shall do my best to help out.
__________________
Cheers!...on the rocks!!
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07-24-2005, 02:59 AM
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#5 (permalink)
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New Member
Join Date: 07-24-05
Location: Monterey, CA
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As regards intelligence in an insurgency, I would suggest that the Israeli experience in Lebanon, more so than Palestine, holds some solid lessons for the US. Try to find a copy of Intelligence and National Security, Autumn 2001 - the article is titled "A Reach Greater than the Grasp: Israeli Intelligence and the Conflict in South Lebanon 1990 - 2000".
But, as regards Palestine, this article is also worth the read: "One Size Fits All": Israel, Intelligence, and the Al-Aqsa Intifada |
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07-24-2005, 03:28 AM
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#6 (permalink)
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401 Ikvot Habarzel
Military Professional
Join Date: 08-07-03
Location: Ra'anana, Israel
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Quote:
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1. Israel is losing the media battle (e.g. battle of Jenin and the alleged "massacre") - lack of media embeds prevent the IDF from getting their story out first and then are in a situation where they lose the initiative to Palestinian reports, however accurate they are.
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Israel can't embed reporters, due to the Censor's need to overlook everything before it's reported. The same applies to foriegn reporters.
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2. The IDF has had a cultural bias against officer education (they don't require bachelor degrees for commissioning, they don't have a war college, their command and staff college doesn't carry a lot of prestige); instead, they have a heavy emphasis on operational experience, which has stilted creative thinking/approaches to their COIN against the Palestinians.
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Israel can't make a Bachelors degree a requirement, since all Israeli's join the service at 18-19 years of age, which doesn't leave much time out of high school. All Israeli male serve for three years and get out as a Staff Sgt. If you wanna become an officer, you have to go through OCS, sign on for another year, and you're commisioned as a Segen Mishne, or Second Lieutenant. Israel doesn't have a War College per se, but it does have many studying and training facilities, and unfortunately, due to Israel's unique geographic location and geopolitical situation, experience is more important than education in most cases. The cases where it doesn't is what they try to cover in OCS.
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4. Israel has developed some great technologies/systems that are extremely effective during engagements with insurgents (live UAV feed to wrist mounted displays, the D9 armored bulldozer, the ability of the Merkava to carry infantryman, excellent hatch protection on their APCs [vision blocks]); however, while these are effective in battles and reduce casualties, they don't translate to success beyond the battlefield.
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What success beyond the battlefield is needed? We're not trying to sell APC's on the civilian market.
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5. The IDF has gained some good urban operations experience, such as the necessity of having a strong linguistics capability in infantry units in order to take advantage of immediate intel possibilities (e.g. a captured insurgent radio), the need for snipers in a countersniper role to overmatch insurgent marksman/snipers, the need for assault guns (MBT gun) for precision overmatch vs. less powerful strikes from attack helos.
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These have been around since way before the beginning of the Second Intifada. In fact, some of the things you state here on your list have been S.O.P. for near twenty years, if not more.
If you have specific questions, I'll try to help. I'm joining the IDF in a week and I have friends who have already been in for quite a while.
__________________
You're a naughty girl, go to my room!
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