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Greetings, and welcome to the World Affairs Board! The World Affairs Board is one of the premier forums for the discussion of the pressing geopolitical issues of our time. Topics include foreign & defense policy, international security, military developments, weapons proliferation, terrorism, international strategic affairs, and politics. Our membership includes many from military, defense industry, and government backgrounds with expert knowledge on a wide range of topics. Registration is fast, simple and absolutely free so why not register a World Affairs Board account and join our community today? |
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#1 (permalink) |
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Moderator
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IDF Stats
IDF Stats
Army Tanks: 3900 AIFVs: 408 APCs: 5900 SP Artillery: 855 Towed Artillery: 520 MRLs: 200 Air Force FGA/Fighters: 405 (plus about 120 in reserve) AEW: 6 EW: 37 Recon: 3 Tankers: 6 Transports: 39 Attack Helicopters: 133 AEW/SAR Helicopters: 6 Transport Helicopters: 160 SAM Forces Batteries: 29 Heavy Launchers: 79 BMDs: 3 Arrow batteries and 3 Patriot plus Hawk missiles Navy Submarines: 3 Large Corvettes: 3 Small Corvettes: 10 Coastal Patrol: 34 Amphibious Ships: 3 Landing Craft: 4 I will try and find the break down of the tanks and fighters later. |
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#2 (permalink) |
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Moderator
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Ground Forces
Tanks Merkava 1,280 M60A3 600 M60A1 300 M60 400 M48A5 250 Centurion 800 T-62 (Tiran 6) 100 T-54/55 (Tiran 4/5) 200 Total 3,930 APC/AIFVs Achzarit 200-300 M113 5,500 BTR-152 600 M3 Halftrack 500 (3,500) NagmaSho't + Nagmachon 100-200 Nakpadon 10-30 Puma 200-600 Artillery Self Propelled M109 (Rochev + Doher) 550-600 L-33 150-200 M-50 100-150 Lance 20 Towed Guns M68 + M71 50 M114 50 Mortars 60mm 5,000 81mm 700 120mm 300-500 160mm 240 Artillery Rocket Systems LAR-160 50 BM-24 (Katyusha) 30 BM-21 50 Air Force F-15A 38 F-15B 8 F-15C 16 F-15D 11 F-15I 25 F-16A 92 F-16B 17 F-16C 79 F-16D 49 F-16I 102 (50 have arrived, the remaining ones are to be delivered by 2008, latest) F-4E Phantom II 40 RF-4E Phantom II 13 F-4E Phantom 2000 55 A-4 Skyhawks (all versions) 118 Kfir (all versions) 110 Helicopters AH-64A Apaches 42 AH-64D Apaches 8 (to be delivered by 2005) AH-1 Cobras 64 500MD Defenders 30 AS565SA Panthers (shipboard) 5 CH-53 51 UH-60 Black Hawks 25 UH-1 Iroquois 55 AB-206 "Jet Ranger" 36 Bell-206L "Long Ranger " 10 Transport Planes Boeing-707 10 C-130H Hercules 22 Arava 10 Dornier Do-28B-1 15 Beechcraft King Air B200 15 Tanker/air refuel planes Boeing-707 3 KC-130H Hercules 3 Training planes Aerospatiale Fouga CM-170 80 Piper PA-18 35 Beechcraft B-80 6 Grob G-120A 20 Liaison Socata TB-20 22 AWACS Grumman E-2C 4 Boeing-707 (with Phalcon radar) 6 ELINT/SIGINT and EW/ECM planes Beechcraft King Air RC-12D 8 Arava 8 Boeing-707 3 EC-130 Hercules 2 Gulfstream-5 2 (to be delivered by 2005) Patrol planes IAI-1124N Sea Scan 3 The basis of the future development of IAF until 2008 is the order for a total of 102 F-16I fighter-bombers, with deliveries beginning in 2003. With the arrival of the first 50 aircraft, which should be delivered between 2003-2006 (the contract was signed on 14/01/2000 and is worth 2.5 billion dollars) the aging Skyhawks fleet will be retired from service, except for double-seat TA-4 version which is used in training. The second batch, 52 planes, should be delivered between 2006 and 2008, and will replace the Phantom-2000 aircraft. Meaning, that after 2008, the IAF's entire fleet of combat aircraft will be composed of F-15 and F-16 versions. The next large contract after 2008 will probably be an order of a small number (about 25-40) F-22 fighters, and only after 2012 - F-35 (JSF) fighters. Since 1999 Israel has an official observer status in the JSF program. Currently, F-15 aircraft are being upgraded to the "Baz Meshupar" standard. The work on the first prototype was completed in November 1999, and in 2000 a serial modernization begun. In june 2000 the modernization of F-16A/B received from the US in 1994-95 up to the level of the rest of IAF's F-16A/B was completed. With the arrival of F-16I, the older F-16C/D avionics will be upgraded to the same standard. The project is planned to last 5 years, with the cost of 1 million dollars per plane. In case it will be decided to install the F-16I AN/APG-68(V)9 radar on F-16C/D as well, the cost of modernization will rise up to 4 million dollars per plane. |
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#4 (permalink) |
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Moderator
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You maybe right, I was just posting what it said on the site. As for losing favor, I think that as a final resolution to the conflict emerges (I should say 'if') then this trend will be reversed. Thats why I believe in the wall (although I think Bush is right to object to its course going somewhat into the West Bank, and I think the Israeli government is going to change the course to follow the gree line more accuratly).
About getting F-22s, the US doesnt decide who to sell weapons to based on public opinion. If that were true, would you be selling advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia? I really hope the majority of Americans like Israel better than the Saudis, although I could be wrong about that. |
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#6 (permalink) |
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New Member
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Yup. Saudi is a good example though as a nation that has fallen from favor....much as Isreal is now.
The IDF's tactics in dealing with the Palestinians has really hurt thier image with the soccor mom segment of society. In any case, it's a big ****ing mess that i don't see getting fixed in our lifetimes. Damned British, thanks. If it was me i would've given the Jews Puerto Rico instead. ![]() |
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#7 (permalink) |
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Moderator
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:D The Zionists would reject Peurto Rico! If the natives dont want it, why should we. hehehe
I agree, things would have been much simpler if the british had simply picked one side or the other instead of trying to appease everyone. Although they would be all to likely to look after their own interests and side with the Arabs, so I guess Im glad they didnt. |
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#9 (permalink) | |
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Burgomaster
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Quote:
After that we could lay down a pipeline that would run through Jordan through Israel to the Mediterranean so we don't have to circle the Arabian peninsula to get our oil. |
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#12 (permalink) |
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A Self Important
Senior Contributor
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"Air Force
F-15A 38 F-15B 8 F-15C 16 F-15D 11 F-15I 25 F-16A 92 F-16B 17 F-16C 79 F-16D 49 F-16I 102 (50 have arrived, the remaining ones are to be delivered by 2008, latest) F-4E Phantom II 40 RF-4E Phantom II 13 F-4E Phantom 2000 55 A-4 Skyhawks (all versions) 118 Kfir (all versions) 110" The Kfirs are in storage and only about 50-60 air frames are left. The F-16A/B are Block 15/15 OCUs The F-16C/D are Block 32/42s The F-16I are in fact F-16C/D Block 52+ And the F-4Es are likely grounded due to the UK embogro on the ejector seats. "Grumman E-2C 4" Gone sold to Mexico " The reason is that Saudis dont do maintenance. Their soldiers are ok on the battlefield but they have no real grasp of logistics and repairs and so they would run out of supplies really fast." Actuallty they can use thier equipment, we would not have these fearfull articles (written my jewish ppl) if they were to dumb to fly thier F-15C/S. and Tornado ADV/IDS. "If that were true, would you be selling advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia? I really hope the majority of Americans like Israel better than the Saudis, although I could be wrong about that." Saudis pay cash at least, I think they could get F/A-22s first. Look how inspite of the Jewish lobbys whining the Saudis got the 72 F-15S strikers (with CFT). Those are now getting the AIM-120B/C-5 and soon the JDAM so they are sure ass hell not to downgraded Think of the backlash for giving the IDF/AF the best/most costly fighter in the world and us paying for it's use on refugee camps. It is different then the F-15 sale to the IDF/AF. |
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#14 (permalink) |
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A Self Important
Senior Contributor
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"Nobodys afraid of Saudi Arabia. At least not their war machine, maybe their terrorists."
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/222 High-Tech Planes to Saudi Arabia? by Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle www.danielpipes.org September 1992 Another fight has just begun over U.S. weapons supplies to Saudi Arabia. The Bush Administration wishes to sell Riyadh 72 top-of-the-line F-15 fighters; a coalition of opponents argues against it. Both sides make good points and so it isn't obvious what's best for the American national interest. Happily, a combination of technical smarts and U.S. diplomacy can produce a way to reap the benefits of the sale while greatly diminishing the disadvantages. Sale proponents point to the deal's use in supporting the real security concerns of an important ally and the fact that it will employ up to 40,000 people over five years. When Congress blocked the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia in 1986, Riyadh purchased British Tornados. At the same time, Americans lost the influence that suppliers acquire from the training and technical support that comes with the planes. Even more is at stake today, they argue. Only one advanced fighter aircraft assembly line might survive in the shrunken post-Cold War military aerospace market. Should Congress again nix a sale to the Saudis, the U.S. aerospace industry will suffer for years to come. Israel was marginally disadvantaged because, sale proponents note, the United States would withdraw crucial technical support in a crisis if need be, something Europeans would not do. Moreover, the Tornado packs more of an offensive threat than the F-15, and is based closer to Israel than Saudi Arabia's U.S.-built fighters would be. Opponents make two excellent counter-arguments concerning the security of Israel and American technology. Saudis F-15s could do great damage to Israel, obstructing Israeli mobilization in time of crisis and attacking both civilian and military targets-including the Dimona nuclear complex. Even if the 72 new F-15s never leave the ground, their mere presence in a country which presently has only about 150 high quality combat aircraft complicates Israeli planning. Israel would have to devote many aircraft to neutralizing that force, leaving fewer assets to deal with threats from Syria and elsewhere. In short, the sale undermines Israel's qualitative military edge which the U.S. government has sworn to uphold. Further, were the planes to fall into the hands of fundamentalist Iran, Saddam's Iraq, or a revolutionary regime in Saudi Arabia, they could be used with considerable effect against a host of other American friends, including Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Turkey. WHAT TO DO? Sell the F-15s with a technical condition attached: that there be a dual U.S.-Saudi trigger on the planes that gives Washington co-control over the planes' missions. This means pre-programming the F-15's computers with codes so that they require a daily entry for the plane's advanced systems to operate. Without codes, the F-15's navigational, avionics, and weapons systems won't work; a pilot could get airborne but he couldn't navigate or fire weapons. Implanting codes is inexpensive and virtually foolproof; thousands of random numerical sequences can be loaded before delivery to Saudi Arabia-enough to last for a decade. An internal clock would, each day, prompt the computer to generate a new code; if the clock were tampered with, the computers would shut down. The code can be radioed daily from the United States to Saudi Arabia. Saudi pilots would insert the code much the same way you access an automated bank teller. The procedure would take seconds. No intrusive U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia would be required, and aircraft performance would not suffer one whit. A dual trigger wouldn't solve all problems. In a crisis-rising rhetoric, Israeli and Iranian air forces both on alert-U.S. officials might hesitate to withhold codes, and so Saudi F-15s could theoretically attack Israel against American wishes. But a dual trigger reduces the chances of this happening and insures that, at worst, it could only happen once. Codes would also make these F-15s virtually useless in the hands of a Saddam Husayn or an expansionist Iranian regime. Saudi leaders may resist a dual trigger as an infringement on their sovereignty, but there are several reasons to think their resistance might be overcome. First, if the Saudis are sincere in renouncing force against Israel, a dual trigger entails no real burden. Second, a dual trigger actually enhances Saudi security by linking the United States to Saudi defenses on a daily basis. Managed properly, the coding arrangement could send the right message to Baghdad and Tehran without compromising Saudi pride. Middle Easterners often hear whispers better than shouts. Finally, the House of Saud will probably accept the codes because it wants to do business with the United States. American weapons are better; and Washington alone can protect fundamental Saudi interests, as Operation Desert Storm so convincingly demonstrated. Indeed, the record shows that Saudis do bend to gain American security cooperation; Riyadh has previously agreed to base U.S.-built aircraft halfway down the Persian Gulf coast at Dhahran, and not at Tobuk near Israel. They may bend again. Or they may not. But we'll never know unless we try and, unfortunately, when it comes to the Saudis, we rarely do try. Washington has enormous leverage in Riyadh these days; now is the time to use it. OMG the jewish lobby got the uSA to lose money on being the Saudis supplier due to their threat to Israel. see below http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0888/8808012.htm Update on Congress By Dennis J. Wamsted August 1988, Page 12 Congress's Multibillion Dollar Arms Sale Blundering Saudi Arabia's continuing inability to purchase weaponry from the United States-because of congressional kowtowing to the pro-Israel lobby-will cost domestic companies dearly. Specifically, on July 8, Saudi Arabia and Britain announced the signing of a 10-year arms sale agreement that is worth at least $30 billion and could be worth upward of $36 billion. The terms of the pact were not formally released, but Britain will now certainly supplant the US as the kingdom's principal arms supplier. As for specifics, the package reportedly includes the sale to Saudi Arabia of an additional 100 advanced Tornado fighter aircraft, jet trainers, Black Hawk helicopters and minesweepers, as well as linked servicing and construction agreements. Ironically, the new package was announced almost exactly two years after Saudi Arabia signed an initial $8.5 billion contract for the purchase of 72 Tornado fighters from Britain. Congress seems intent on forcing yet another moderate Arab nation to seek non-US weapons suppliers for its legitimate self-defense needs. The Saudi decision to turn to Britain for self-defense weaponry requirements follows years of reflexive, virtually unthinking opposition from the Congress to arms sales to the gulf kingdom. The first large-scale SaudiBritish contract in 1986, for example, was signed shortly after Congress rebuffed a Saudi bid to purchase US-manufactured F-15E jet aircraft. Since that first contract, Congress has also blocked Reagan administration proposals to sell Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Maverick air-to-ground missiles to the Saudis. The Administration's Alarm The administration was rightfully, but perhaps belatedly, alarmed by the Saudi decision. "When we deem it as appropriate and necessary to provide weapons to our allies and friends in the world, we need to be very careful before we reject them too easily," White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said. "This is a $30 billion loss that American companies might well be slightly upset about." State Department spokeswoman Phyllis Oakley was more critical: "We think it does hurt our interests. We think that our interests are better served when we can sell self-defense items to friendly Arab countries." Oakley's comments should be required reading for Israel's purported "friends" on Capitol Hill. Congress's refusal to sell F-15s to the Saudis in 1986-because of the alleged threat the planes would pose to Israel forced the gulf kingdom to purchase British-made Tornados. In the process, the Saudis secured the freedom to base the planes at its Tabuk air base in the northwestern corner of the country closest to Israel. Ironically, had the US agreed to sell F-15s to the Saudis, it would have retained some degree of control over the planes' basing. Despite the clear precedent set by the Saudis, Congress seems intent on forcing yet another moderate Arab nation to seek non-US weapons suppliers for its legitimate self-defense needs. The Reagan administration formally submitted a $1.9 billion arms sale proposal to Kuwait on July 7. As proposed, the sale would include: 40 F-18 Hornet fighter-bombers; 40 Harpoon air- and sea-launched anti-ship missiles; 120 Sidewinder and 200 Sparrow air-to-air missiles; 300 Maverick air-to-ground missiles; 400 laser-guided bombs; and duster munitions. The proposed sale is "a strong indication of the growing strength of the bilateral relationship" between the United States and Kuwait, two administration witnesses told the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in early July testimony. The two countries have developed an increasingly close military relationship since the US Navy began escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers through the gulf a year ago, according to Peter Burleigh and Edward Gnehm, deputy assistant secretary of state and deputy assistant secretary of defense, respectively. The Saudi decision to turn to Britain for self-defense weaponry requirements follows years of reflexive, virtually unthinking opposition from the Congress to arms sales to the gulf kingdom. The arms request "is a fundamental part of Kuwait's program to upgrade its deterrent capability into the next century," Burleigh told the panel, which is chaired by Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN). "Kuwait faces current or future threats from air, land, and sea from more than one direction," he continued. A similar theme was voiced by Secretary of State George Shultz in earlier testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The sale is "something of a political breakthrough" in US-Kuwaiti relations, Shultz told the panel in June. Further, he said, the sale would in no way threaten Israel, particularly since the US will not sell the extra fuel tanks to Kuwait needed to extend the range of the F-18s. Opposition Renewed Despite the administration's pleas, the sale is strongly opposed in both houses of Congress. Indeed, the very day the administration formally notified Congress of its intentions, the Senate approved an amendment formally barring the sale of Maverick missiles to Kuwait. The amendment was attached to the Senate's $14.3 billion foreign aid appropriations bill and approved by voice vote virtually without debate. The House-passed appropriations bill, which was approved earlier, does not include a similar provision, leaving it up to a House-Senate conference committee to adopt or reject the ban. Ironically, Senate supporters of the ban, notably Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) and Arlen Specter (R-PA) argued that because the heat-seeking Maverick had been excluded from a previous sale to Saudi Arabia, it should also be removed from the proposed Kuwaiti sale. It was precisely this logic that ultimately forced Saudi Arabia to turn to Britain for its desired weaponry. During the brief Senate floor debate on the issue, Sen. DeConcini asserted that even wider action was needed: "Quite frankly, it (the Maverick prohibition) does not go nearly as far as I feel is in the best interests of our nation, and that is to take a much closer look, have a debate, and, in my judgment, probably deny the sale of the F-18s to Kuwait." The Arizona Democrat added: "...a response of more and more weapons in there (the gulf region) is not in our best interests." Targeting Kuwait DeConcini's sentiments were echoed strongly by Pennsylvania's Specter. The Kuwaitis do not need the Maverick missiles, but "they do pose a real threat to Israel," he said. Further, the Jewish Republican added-albeit without a shard of evidence and without once mentioning the long-standing' categorical refusal of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to participate in a US-organized international peace conference- "Kuwait has been extremely hostile to the peace process in the Middle East." The sole Senate dissenter during the brief debate was Minority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS). Formal notification of the proposal had come just hours earlier, Dole noted, "and yet the Senate has already moved to give a definitive judgment to this complex question. Whatever you think of this arms sale proposal ... this is just no way to 'run a railroad."' Bad for Business The Kansas Republican also questioned the business acumen of his Senate colleagues in voting against a portion of the Kuwaiti sale without serious consideration. Such action prompted the Saudis to turn to Britain for their weaponry, he noted, and, given the stakes involved, "we ought to at least give some serious thought to what we're doing." Finally, Dole added, if the US refuses, Kuwait can always turn to other suppliers for similar weapons. "They are going to get equipment that is in many cases as good, or nearly as good as they can get from us; but without any controls on their use. What that can mean to the security of our friends in the region, especially Israel, is obvious." The administration, undoubtedly surprised by the unexpected Senate ac. don, issued a quick reaction the following day. "Kuwait has come to the US and asked, as a friend, for the legitimate and necessary tools to provide for its own defense and to share with us the defense of the vital Persian Gulf. Congress has repeatedly asked what the gulf states are doing for their own defense." The answer, at least from Kuwait, the statement continued, is that it wishes to do more, and wishes to work with the US. Despite this expressed preference, "some in the Senate apparently wish to reject this request and have Kuwait turn elsewhere. " A Lack of Debate The lack of debate over the Senate-approved ban dearly demonstrates the fear generated by the pro-Israel lobby, orchestrated by the American/Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), particularly during a US election year. The prohibition was attached to an appropriations bill, normally reserved solely for the allocation of funds. However, the Kuwaiti missile ban involves no money-it is solely a policy matter. Interestingly enough, later the same day the Senate hotly debated a proposal to strike down the District of Columbia's requirement that city employees live within city borders. A proposal by the four Virginia and Maryland senators to modify the requirement was strongly opposed by Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA), who chairs the DC appropria tions subcommittee. "This is, indeed, legislation on an appropriations bill of the most blatant form," the Iowa Democrat charged. The proper means of dealing with this issue, he told his colleagues, would be to refer it to the proper authorizing committee. "That is the proper action to take...I assume that they would give it due regard and bring the bill out on the floor for debate." Similar arguments could easily have been made against the proposed Maverick missile ban, which dearly involved attaching policy-specific legislation to an appropriations measure. Where Israel is concerned, however, legislative norms become meaningless. The Congressional Outlook True to precedent, congressional opposition to the Kuwaiti sale became evident even before it had been formally proposed. In a letter to Secretary of State Shultz in late June, for example, 20 senators-including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-111) and a number of other staunchly pro-Israel senators such as Daniel Inouye (D-HI), Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN), and Paul Simon (D-IL)-expressed concern about "the numerical and symbolic quality of this arms sale package." Similar concerns were voiced in the House, where 43 members signed a letter organized by Rep. Larry Smith (D-FL), perhaps the most outspoken pro-Israel member of the 100th Congress. "We believe that a sale of this nature is not in the long-term interest of the United States," the representatives wrote in a letter to President Reagan in late June. The letter also questioned the administration's overall regional arms sale policy. Having failed to prevent the sale's formal proposal, which has become an increasingly popular tactic of the pro-Israel lobby, attention has now shifted to attempts in both the House and Senate to block the sale outright. Specifically, a joint resolution of disapproval is likely to be introduced in both houses. However, it is unclear whether this joint resolution will be used as a bargaining tool, or whether an all-out effort will be made to derail the $1.9 billion sale proposal entirely. Two things, though, are certain: precedent supports the administration, since never before has Congress enacted such a resolution over presidential objection; and-Britain would undoubtedly step in to supply the market abandoned by the US. Dennis J. Wamsted is a free-lance writer specializing in the US Congress and Middle East affairs. "the F-16Is are NOT C/Ds." Their F-16C/D Block 52+ models. Thats the model with the CFTs. It's like how the IF-16D is a F-16D Block 32/42. |
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#15 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
Moderator Scotch taster |
What's left unsaid in all of this is the reliance by the Saudis on mercs...I mean instructors. Those aircrafts are maintained by BAE, not the Saudi AF.
In my time in Kuwait/Saudi right after the war, you couldn't tell the difference btw a Saudi tank and an Iraqi tank. Both were rusting in the desert. Only difference is that you can tell an Iraqi tank was burned. I have absolutely no confidence in Saudi combat capabilities. Their weapons discipline is attrocious. Discipline in general is lacking. Their training consists of getting some people to the right place though not necessary the right people and not necessary on time.
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