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#16 (permalink) |
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Moderator
Scotch taster |
Please post the links. I will be very interested.
As for your service, I was trying to figure out the timing. You could not have possibly have enough time to rejoin your battalion from the US ... unless you were in Israel at the time.
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Chimo |
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#17 (permalink) | |
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
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Quote:
All wars lost or stalled is always blamed on the politicians and lack of will and indecision. It is nothing that is new. The political leadership gives the National Intent to the Commander in Chief (CinC) and he is to translate the political intent to the military intent. In the event, the political intent cannot be converted into the military intent, the CinC has to state so and if still forced then he either resigns or modifies the war plan to achieve as much as possible. Now, if this, which is followed universally, is what is done in Israel, don't you think that it is the fault also of the military, even if the political leadership was inept? Indecision in the battlefield is not the fault of the politician. The battefield is the sole preserve of the military. There is nothing called symbolism in battle. Nor can anyone but the military commanders be blamed for embarking on mission with 'limited amount of troops'. The troops to task is the prerogative of the commander and not politicians. I am saddened and shocked since this does speak negatively of the casual attitude displayed and the cavalier execution. Could it be overconfidence at play to only discover it is that it was misplaced? If the troops were throwing pebbles and not enjoining in battle even when the situation was nearly turning into a crisis, it is indeed a extraordinary commentary about the professionalism displayed at all levels. It borders on the ridiculous not to use combat ready units when a crisis has developed. Compare this with the Suez Crossing of Sharon during 1967. I am sure there would have been good reasons for troops throwing pebbles and not being employed and which has not been placed on the public forum. Likewise, it is not the politicians who dictate how much of water is to be taken on a mission. The illustration that Israeli soldiers on a mission had to take water off the Hezb dead does speak of the lacklustre attitude towards planning of a mission and ineptness of the military commanders at the unit and formation level. It does give a poor impression of the professionalism that is current and that there has been a degradation from the past. I have read on this forum about how the Hezbs used the A Tk msls against IDF and also the way the Hezb were painted as they were some bogeymen. It is deeply disturbing a thought that Israel could be halted by a rag tag lot. I am sure that in Israel there is some real serious discussions taking place and errors being rectified so that the next time, it is back to business as it was before the Lebanon phase of IDF's history. It is not the time to find scapegoats and fall guys or find excuses for what appears to be a real botched up affair and instead do some real honest heart searching!
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![]() "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination." I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to. HAKUNA MATATA Last edited by Ray : 05-01-2007 at 00:55 AM. |
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#18 (permalink) | |
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Regular
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however even if I am a reservist in Israel at a time of war, I have no right to join my unit by law if I did not do my yearly reserve call up time which every reservist must do to familarize oneself with new equipment, tactics, and conditioning. During Winter Break I do one week of Reservist training with my battalion. I do my 1 week per year more to catch up with my old squaddies then to run around in the mud or man a checkpoint for a few days. I don't know how it is here in the States, but in Israel the soldiers you serve with during your 3 years of active duty (ages 18-21) are the reservists you will spend the rest of your army life with for 1 week to 1 month a year until you are 45. But since Herev is a well respected Unit most soldiers go on to very established military careers in the IDF. Its a very close bond you develop with these men and living in the US I don't get to stay in touch my old friends as much as I'd like to so I make time to do my minimum reserve time every year. Even though I was in Israel at the time of the outbreak of the war, had I not done my reserve training that year I would not have been allowed to join my battalion. Many of Israel's elite forces suffered heavy casualties during the war and even Israel's Sayeret force suffered some casualties as well. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...291414,00.html All-Druse unit returns without single casualty | Jerusalem Post Best Battalion Award for 2001 Goes To Druze Volunteers Last edited by Druze : 05-01-2007 at 03:14 AM. |
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#20 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
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Druze Reply
Your comments were very welcome. Thank you. The young Israeli tanker that I earlier mentioned talked about their battalion being used to run water into rifle platoons that had exhausted themselves.
I'm not prepared to toss the IDF's professionalism from top to bottom under the bus. Mistakes appear to have been made at each level, but it is hardly an indictment of the entire force. It was, though, an unmistakable "shot across the bow" to the IDF, particularly the shoddy preparation that many of the reservists seemed to imply with funding shortages for training, diversion of training time to operational demands in Gaza, and equipment shortages on call-up. We'll see how matters progress in the next go-around. Druze, I'd love to ask you more but it appears that you may be a tad close to the operational after-action reviews...We'll keep it that way, eh? OoE, Sir, thank you for the great links. I knew that you'd have a few tucked away! ![]()
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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski |
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#21 (permalink) | |
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
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S 2,
I think you are mistaking my critique for a J'Acuse. However, compare the Lebanon episode with the Yom Kippur War. In the Lebanon episode, the Israelis had the initiative, were opposed by only ragamuffins and NOT by Arab armies en mass. In the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis faced the Arab conventional armies in all its might and were totally surprised, with more than half their forces away from the units and at home! And yet, they not only snatched the initiative back, but gave the Arabs the hiding of their lives. Just to recapitulate the Yom Kippur War. In the early days of the war, the IDF suffered heavy losses as Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and overran Israeli strongholds, while Syrians marched deep into the Golan Heights. Israel launched its counteroffensive first against the Syrian front, and only when it had pushed the Syrians back well east of the 1967 cease-fire line (by October 15) did Israel turn its attention to the Egyptian front. In ten days of fighting, Israel pushed the Egyptian army back across the canal, and the IDF made deep incursions into Egypt. On October 24, with Israeli soldiers about one kilometer from the main Cairo-Ismailia highway and the Soviet Union threatening direct military intervention, the UN imposed a cease-fire. Much that my earlier post does appear a bit rough, but I prefer a pragmatic analysis to one which tends to nibble around the periphery or which obfuscates the reality. Most of the after action reports are not available in the open forum and to that extent I am handicapped, but prima facie, the Lebanon war has badly tarnished the image and is a little short of being a fiasco. It is unbelievable that the redoubtable IDF can be halted by rag tag tuchkus. I still can't believe it! Much that I find the IDF formidable and am enthralled by some of their campaigns, you will agree that one should not cloud one's critique because of extraneous reasons. Don't you think that one rather face the unpleasant truth and prepare, than perish because one is afraid to face the truth?! The Israelis are already finding out what went wrong and will surely come out better the next round. Quote:
The Indian Army has gone in deep into the desert and into enemy territory in the wars they have conducted and never faced such poor planning in logistics. Interestingly, we do not take water from enemy sources or their dead since there is a good possibility that the water is poisoned since water is a precious commodity in the deserts and poisoning it is the best way to slow down the advancing columns. Also, it is a rare thing if any army has fought wars at full strength and with full equipment as per the TOE or WET (as we call it). Last edited by Ray : 05-01-2007 at 18:20 PM. |
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#22 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
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Ray Reply
Brigadier,
"I think you are mistaking my critique for a J'Acuse." Not at all, sir. Your points are well-taken, if "...a bit rough...". ![]() Still, as you and I have both mentioned, the AARs are what really matter. External analysis by CSIS, Parameters, or the Washington Institute For Near-East Policy will simply have to suffice while the lessons-learned at the operational and tactical level are so relevant and sensitive. |
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#23 (permalink) | |
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Regular
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Quote:
Israel had established itself as one of the best logistical supply armies in its previous wars. For such a small country to take over so much territory in such a short time it needs a flawless ferrying of supplies so as not to impede advance. the fact that supplies were short in the Lebanon war shows that the ground units places insides Lebanon were merely symbolic and small. Engineer and supply units were not deployed correctly and when they were deployed they were lacking in numbers. battalions like mine don't use regular supplies as we are essentially on our own once behind enemy lines and we are very adept at gathering our own supplies. But you know what? Israel is lucky that this wasn't a major war, and Israel is also lucky to be sometimes to open a democracy in its post-war inquiry's in which everything will come out pubicly. |
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#24 (permalink) | |
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
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Quote:
Are you suggesting the battles conducted in Lebanon was some sort of a picnic the IDF decided to have? In war or combat, there can be nothing half way home or a lark. I can't believe that you were so short of equipment that you did not have water bottles/ jerricans/water trucks? What operations were the IDF on? What about ammunition? Behind enemy lines you are on your own without the basic essentials? The enemy is a damn fool that they did not poison the water supplies they abandoned! Doesn't the IDF advance on an axis and don't you open up an axis of maintenance? I must say you are very fortunate to have dumb Bedouin as your enemy! I have seen the Arab army personnel and I know they are pretty dumb and most importantly, very lazy! |
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#25 (permalink) | |
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WAB BOUNCER
Senior Contributor
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Quote:
And there were tank units ferrying water to exhausted rifle companies. I know because my cousin told me about it from personal reservist experience In Lebanon.
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In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158 The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea |
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#26 (permalink) | |
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
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Quote:
If tanks ferry water, then there is something terribly wrong. And it does not speak of any logistic planning at all! Please read up on the Principle of War - Economy of Effort! It is like using a Stretch limousine with outriders and sirens to ferry vagrants to the jail for vagrancy! Do forgive me, this is totally incongruent with the my idea of the dash, derring do and flamboyance of Sharon's crossing of the Suez with the Arabs shivering in their pants! My classmate from India is/ was in the IDF and his anecdotes were something totally different from the idea you all are giving me! Bedous are in the Israeli Army? As I said before, I have experience with the Arab military. I find them lazy and dumb except for the PLO. I retired too early or else I would have gone and observed the IDF first hand! What you chaps are writing is not my idea of what I have read of the IDF. Last edited by Ray : 05-03-2007 at 03:27 AM. |
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#27 (permalink) | |
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Regular
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Quote:
And my unit specifically doesn't carry water for an entire operation as we go behind enemy lines for an undetermined previous amount of time as opposed to other units. Ammunition I don't believe was much of a problem. IDF soldiers conserve ammunition well and use air strikes and their FAO whenever possible. |
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#28 (permalink) | |
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WAB BOUNCER
Senior Contributor
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Quote:
I'm not trying to justify it, sir, I'm simply saying such was the case in at least a few instances. As Druze pointed out, both Bedouin and Druze soldiers serve in the IDF, often as trackers and scouts because they are taught this from childhood. |
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#29 (permalink) | |
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Regular
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Bedouins and Druze are more crucial to Israel's national security then ever before. As young Sephardic Jews no longer speak any Arabic it is the job of native Arabic speakers to work in intelligence gathering in Israel's wide intelligence apparatus. During the war, and I'm not sure which raid it was but I believe it was Qana, an amphibious special ops unit that was sent deep behind enemy lines was apparently opened fire on after a Hezbollah road block talked to the soldiers who were undercover and noticed a strange accent. The raid is still classified so its hard to know for sure. Bedouins also served very disproportionately in Gaza during the occupation. |
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