Parihaka

I'm still holding off until I see the composition and ROE for the UN force. I suspect the worst, but hope for the best.

__________________
In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

Bluesman

Syria is saved from the brink of internal implosion and has been validated as the strongest player of the Great Game in the Levant.

Iran is magnified, as well as having virtual hegemony over Lebanon and southern Iraq and has acheived its strategic objective of diverting attention away from its still-progressing nuclear program.

Hezbollah is now no linger a state within a state; it IS the state, with greater opportunities than ever before to humiliate Lebanon's 'army' by possessing better weapons and more men.

Nasrallah will be a virtual king, now that he will dispense all the aid and rebuilding efforts, financed by the Saudis and others, to his friends and supporters, without being pressed by a feckless and duplicitous UN that will - once again - refuse to enforce its own 'demands'.

Israel has been defeated on the ground by no more than 3,000 ragtag militiamen - ARAB militiamen.

The US has allowed France to talk it into a dumbass deal that sells out an ally by promising to police the zone...and then reneging on that promise to provide troops.

The kidnapped Israeli troops have been abandoned by their country to whatever fate their subhuman captors devise for them, most likely a show trial and imprisonment, before a dishonorable 'deal' to trade them for the worst kind of terrorist scumbag criminals justly held by the Israelis.

And if anybody thinks this is the end of it, I will guarantee you that a weaker Israel will STILL have to fight a yet stronger Hezbollah, with Iranian and probably Syrian troops at their side in the next 'go'.

Bleak. Discouraging. Bitter. This is what DEFEAT feels like, people, and if we keep electing weak men, we'd all better get used to it.

Ronald Reagan and Ariel Sharon in their heyday would've done better than this.

__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell

Bluesman

Well, I used to defend Bush from all the 'liar' epithets that the unthinking Lefties (sorry, that was redundant) used to sling about with such careless abandon when speaking about the origin of the Iraq War. But there is simply no way to defend him against the charge when he says that Hezbollah has been defeated. They WON, and it was unambiguous. Nobody can preserve their credibility and claim anything else.

Parihaka

They've won a battle, they haven't won the war, and war it will be.
Nobody can suggest that Iran and Syria are going to rest on their laurels. The UN force will only serve to protect Hezbolah whilst it re-arms. Sooner or later they're going to want to take another poke at Israel, and then it is simply going to escalate into a full blown middle-east war.
I see the political divisions created by the Iraq war being split right open, and all the countries of the west are going to have to decide where they stand. I just pray to god that my own country doesn't continue on the path of easy liberalism and actually has the balls to stand up and be counted.

troung

After Action Report: Winners and Losers in the Hezbollah-Israel War

By Bill Roggio

With the cessation of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel largely holding after 24 hours, it is time to look at the likely winners and losers of the Hezbollah-Israel war. Israel spent the weekend scrambling to reach the Litani River and consolidate their positions south of the river before the fighting ended, launching an attack which amounted to too little too late. The negotiated cease fire implemented by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, has lead to a major political victory for Hezbollah, Iran and Syria,and dealt Israel, Lebanon and the United States serious setbacks.

The Winners:

Hezbollah: Hezbollah achieved what it intended to do from the outset of hostilities: fight the IDF to a draw, force negotiations and a cease fire in the United Nations, dictate the terms of the cease fire, obtain international recognition and acceptance, further erode support for Israel in the international community and remain a viable political and military force within Lebanon.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is now a man of stature in the Middle Eastern and Muslim world, and the dominant political leader in Lebanese politics. He has openly declared victory on Lebanese television. Sunni Islamist leaders, even from moderate groups as far away as Indonesia, have expressed support for Hezbollah. Imad Mugniyah has commanded an effective fighting force and stood up to the Israeli Defense Force, and survived with his military forces largely intact.

Some will argue that Hezbollah suffered a severe military loss, with an estimated 250-500 soldiers killed in southern Lebanon out of an estimated force of 1,000-2,000 active military. However, the high estimates puts Hezbollah's active fighters at around 5,000, with an unknown tens of thousands in reserve (the high estimate is 50,000 reservists with 20,000 as the median). And the argument is made that Hezbollah has now been denied southern Lebanon as a base of operation. While the Israeli military may have dealt Hezbollah a tactical defeat generally in southern Lebanon, killed a significant number of Hezbollah soldiers, degraded Hezbollah's long range rocket supplies and was able to push to the Litani at the end of the campaign, Hezbollah's military and political organization survived to fight another day. The resupply of medium and long range rockets from the Iranian and Syrian backers will begin immediately, and the Syrian supply lines into the Bekaa valley remain wide open. Hezbollah is stating it has no intention of turning over its weapons, but will “refrain from exhibiting them publicly.”

Up until the last 24 hours of the war, just prior to the cease fire taking hold, Hezbollah made the Israeli Defense Forces pay dearly when attempting to take towns just a few kilometers across the border. While much of the IDF's hesitation was due to political disorganization, Hezbollah gave the appearance of staving off an IDF assault, and actually can legitimately claim some tactical victories of their own. Hezbollah caused the elite Golani Brigade to retreat from Bint Jubayl, and was able to continually fire rockets from areas in southern Lebanon despite a blanket of air coverage, counter-battery artillery and the close proximity of the IDF. Hezbollah also repeatedly launched barrages of rockets against Israeli towns and cities, disabled an Israeli warship with a cruise missile and launched UAVs into northern Israel.

In this day and age of instant news and sophisticated terrorist propaganda outlets such as Hezbollah's Al Manar, the appearance of Hezbollah successfully repelling the IDF and forcing the Israeli government to the negotiating table outweighs the reality that the Israeli government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert lacked the political will to meaningfully dismantle Hezbollah's military and political leadership.

Hezbollah will now direct the full efforts of its aid organizations to rebuild the damaged infrastructure and provide for those Lebanese in need. The combination of the military victory along with the ability to care for the Lebanese in ways the State cannot will only increase their stature and support.

Iran: The 24 year old Iranian project of funding, training and arming Hezbollah in Lebanon has netted a large return. While the Israeli withdrawal form southern Lebanon in 2000 was certainly a victory for Hezbollah and their Iranian backers, the current Hezbollah victory is far more significant. Hezbollah gave the appearance of directly defeating the Israelis and forcing them to the negotiating table within one month of the onset of fighting.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the elite Qods Force have created a powerful military and political force capable of spreading the radical Khomenist agenda. The Hezbollah model is a tried and proven method of the subversive Iranian foreign policy, and will be applied elsewhere. The IRGC and Qods will study the Hezbollah-Israel war and apply the lessons learned to improve this model, as well as to incorporate the military and political lessons into their own doctrine. The IDF fights as most Western armies do, and the Israeli political vulnerabilities are also shared throughout the West.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's gambit has paid dividends, and he has successfully distracted efforts to cease the refinement of uranium and the further development of its nuclear program. "Today, we are fully mastering the nuclear fuel cycle for our peaceful atomic activities. It is a native technology... No one can take it away from us," said Ahmadinejad, who has been emboldened by Hezbollah's victory against Israel. The Western world has signaled it is fearful of confronting Ahmadinejad or his terrorist proxy Hezbollah head on. Ahmadinejad 's stature is the Islamic world will only grow over time as he demonstrates the ability to stand up to the West.

Syria: The Syrian government and President Bashar Asad paid no price, either diplomatically, economically or militarily for allowing the use of their country as a conduit for supplies to Hezbollah. At the outset of the war, the Israelis signaled there was no interest in holding the Syrians to account for their action. The rise in stature of Hezbollah inside Lebanon is a victory for the Syrians, as it allows the Syrians to conduct their illicit enterprises with the help of Hezbollah. Asad, whose stock plunged after he was forced to withdraw the Syrian Army from Lebanon over a year ago, has been buoyed by his risky gamble to support Hezbollah against the hated Israelis and Americans. "The Middle East they (the Americans) aspire to ... has become an illusion," Asad said after the cease fire took effect. Asad will be more willing to take similar risks in the future.

The Losers:

Israel: From the outset of the war, I argued that time was against the Israelis, that they must be prepared to strike quickly, deep into Lebanon, lest international opinion and a sophisticated media campaign force the Israelis to quit the battle before striking a mortal blow to Hezbollah. By tracking the statements of senior political leaders (Olmert, Peretz, Peres) and IDF Chief of Staff Olmert, it was clear the government did not have a unified strategy or the political will to defeat Hezbollah. At first, the government assumed air power and a limited buffer zone of 1-2 kilometers would be sufficient to destroy Hezbollah's political and military capacity. This then morphed into a 6-8 kilometer buffer zone, with a beefed up air campaign, then into an incursion all the way up to the Litani river. At no time was Hezbollah's infrastructure in southern Beirut or the Bekaa Valley considered as targets of a ground campaign. All along, it assumed air power would substitute for boots on the ground. The Israeli government was dead wrong: Hezbollah is well armed, trained and stocked in Lebanon, and it could not be defeated by air power alone.

Hezbollah has done what no Arab military has done since the creation of the Israeli state: fought the Israeli Defense Force to a virtual standstill. While the IDF has the capacity to defeat Hezbollah militarily, the Israeli government was unwilling to muster the political will to pay the price to forcefully engage Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and failed to meaningfully engage Hezbollah deeper inside Lebanon. Hezbollah strongholds in southern Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley were attacked by air with limited success. With the exception of the daring commando raid in Baalbek, these Hezbollah base were immune to the attention of IDF ground forces.

Hezbollah started the war by attacking an Israeli outpost and capturing two Israeli soldiers. The Israelis stated the war would not end without the release of the Israeli soldiers and the destruction of Hezbollah's capacity to launch missiles into Israel. Neither of these objectives have been achieved via the cease fire.

While the Israeli government touts United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 as providing for the security of the Israeli nation, the resolution lacks teeth. Security in southern Lebanon will be the responsibility of 15,000 troops from the Lebanese Army, and a beefed up UNIFIL mission of up to 15,000 international troops. Currently no nation or group of nations has stepped up to provide the troops for this mission. The Lebanese Army is terrified of Hezbollah's military strength, and there is little chance of standing up to Hezbollah after successful opposition to the IDF. The UNIFIL troops in southern Lebanon were ineffective prior to this war. Hezbollah built their network of bunkers under the watch of the UNIFIL troops with no repercussions.

The internal debate within Israel itself demonstrates how the Israelis perceive who won and who lost this war. The Israeli government is in damage-control mode. Prime Minister Olmert's speech to the Knesset was less than inspiring, focusing on the mistakes made and the need to investigate what went wrong militarily. Elements of the IDF are said to be enraged by the lack of political will to fight Hezbollah. And there is talk of the Olmert government falling on a no-confidence vote or the formation of a national unity government. These aren't the words and actions of a victor.

The Israelis have essentially kicked the Hezbollah problem down the road, with the hope the international community will resolve it via resolutions and international peace keepers. Hezbollah will rearm and apply the lessons learned from this conflict. The aura of the IDF's invincibility on the battlefield has suffered a serious blow, and terrorist groups will be emboldened to strike at Israel yet again.

The Cedar Revolution: The supporters of democracy within the Cedar Revolution have been dealt a setback in their attempts to create a consensual, peaceful government in Lebanon. The elevation of Hezbollah as the predominant military and political force inside the country bodes ill for those looking to put the days of civil war and armed militias behind them. And as long as Hezbollah exists and is supported by the Syrian and Iranian backers who long for the destruction of the Israeli state, the risk of war within Lebanon remains a very real possibility. The nation remains a proxy battleground for Iran and Syria for as long as Hezbollah remains armed and continues to threaten the Israeli state.

The United States: By the mere mention of Hezbollah in UNSC 1701, and a willingness to negotiate an end to the fighting while Hezbollah remains a viable organization in Lebanon, the United States government has elevated the status of Hezbollah from a terrorist group to a non-state entity worthy of negotiations. Hezbollah, which killed 241 U.S. Marine in the Beirut barracks bombings in 1983 and a host of other terrorist acts against the U.S., is a designated terrorist entity according to the United States. The desire for peace in Lebanon has overridden a golden rule of United States foreign policy: do not negotiate with terrorists.

Nation-States: A dire precedent has been set with the cease fire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel. Non-state actors and terrorist groups can usurp the power of a state, essentially declare war against a sovereign nation, and not pay the consequences for their actions. The behavior of the United Nations, which purportedly is interested in respecting the sovereignty of states, shows there was more interest in preserving Hezbollah and restoring peace at all costs than the legitimate security concerns of a nation-state. If a sovereign nation cannot be allowed to defend its territory against non-state actors, and in fact be vilified for doing so, terrorist groups will only be emboldened to take such actions in the future.

Interested Observers

al-Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa: The lessons from the Hezbollah-Israel war will also be studied by al-Qaeda and the assorted Palestinian terrorist groups. These groups have trained with Hezbollah in the past and will likely have access to Hezbollah's 'after-action report.' Hezbollah skillfully used a combination of military strength and political acumen to force the Israelis to the negotiating table. Hezbollah's military tactics will be of particular interest, including the organization of military units and the use of anti-tank missiles to defeat Israeli armor. And the ease at which the Israeli government buckled under internal and international pressure will be studied intensely.

__________________
To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

troung

Mounting protest among Israeli army reservists who served in Lebanon against the military and national leadership

August 21, 2006, 8:22 AM (GMT+02:00)

A group of hundreds of officers and men of the crack Alexandroni Brigade hurled charges against the Chief of Staff, Lt. Dan Halutz at a meeting in Hadera. One carried a banner with the motto: You prevented us from winning.

Halutz received them after signs of mutiny appeared among the brigade’s reservists – the first ever staged by a complete Israeli combat unit against the high command.

Brigade officers signed a letter in which they warned that if their willingness to fight for their country continues to be trampled on, there will be no one left to fight the next war. They spoke of a deep crisis of confidence and alienation between the officers and soldiers of the brigade and its commanders, the northern command and the general staff. The reservists repeated the grievances of other units that they were sent into battle without appropriate equipment, food or water. Worst of all, their orders were confused, contradictory and unrelated to what they found in the field. Tactical intelligence data was missing throughout the campaign, forcing them to fight blind.

Last week, the brigade’s commander, Col. Shlomi Cohen, called the protesters “impertinent” and threatened them with court martial.

When the chief of staff promised that every complaint would be thoroughly investigated, one of the participants at the showdown burst out: “Who needs an inquiry – government or judicial? The Lebanon fiasco is so glaring that it cries to heaven. We all know where responsibility lies - in the military and national leadership. They should all resign and not hide behind some probe else the crisis of confidence in the army will deepen.”

In contrast to the chief of staff, the Chief Infantry and Paratroop Officer, Brig. Yossi Maimon, admitted: We have sinned. He confessed to a deep sense of responsibility for failing to better prepare the army and reserve units for battle. “Notwithstanding the heroism the army demonstrated in combat, we are left with a strong sense of missing out,” he said.
http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=3149

troung

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...293666,00.html

Officer: IDF conceptually failed in last 6 years

IDF getting ready to have officials testify before committee of inquiry. Naval forces examine how missile boat was hit off Lebanese shores, where four soldiers died. 'It was a conceptual failure of all senior officials in force in last six years,' says a senior official

Hanan Greenberg Published: 08.21.06, 01:05

In the upcoming days, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will decide on the nature of the committee that will inquire on the actions of senior officials in the second war on Lebanon. Until it is established, and in light of the work already done by the committee of inquiry led by Lieutenant General (res.) Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, IDF units are preparing for the tough questions.

The Navay commanders, among other officials, will be asked to offer explanations. The force played a central role in the war when it imposed
a closure on the beach of Lebanon, and at the same time attacked Katyusha rocket launchers and long-range missile launchers. However, the force made headlines on July 14 in light of more tragic events. On that same evening, the Navy's missile boat was hit from a missile that was fired from the beach and killed four crewmembers. This event will be remembered not only for the death of the soldiers but also for the many questions that were raised, and the change in the navy's perception.

Threat that became reality thought for years to be impossible

The attack of the missile boat put the naval forces into high gear, and in an interview with ynet, a senior officer described that evening as "a turning point." Other sources in the force did not hide the fact that a C-802 missile hitting the ship located at 16 kilometers from the beach took them by surprise. That surprise could have been avoided had there been a prior thorough investigation, as was requested for a long time before the war broke out – and not just in the naval forces.

"Its' inconceivable," the senior officer said. "The failure is not of one officer or another on board the ship, but goes far beyond. We're talking about a conceptual failure on the part of all the officers during the last six years. We never imagined that such a threat was even possible, this was impossible in our eyes," he stated.

One of the direct results of the missile boat incident was a change in the Navy's basic assumption, according to which – from now on – any weapon that the Iranians posses is likely to also be in the hands of Hizbullah.

"Anything that used to be considered illogical became logical. This needs to be understood – a terror organization came into possession of a 700 kilogram missile, 80 meter long and that carries 50 kilograms of explosives. How do you even smuggle something like this?," he explained.


Senior officer: I failed in preparing troops for war

The Navy is not the only IDF branch where talks of last years' failures have begun to surface. On Saturday, outgoing infantry and paratroopers officer, Colonel Yossi Hayman, surprised his audience when he said in a ceremony on the occasion of his retirement: "Part of the time we were guilty of the sin of hubris, and I'm a part of this… some of us speak with pathos and use confusing terms, which cover up for military ignorance and a lack of professional understanding… this while our enemies improve, get stronger and more professional."

Colonel Hayman did not hesitate to claim personal responsibility for those failures. "I feel the heavy responsibility on my shoulders. I failed in better preparing the infantry for the current war, the compulsory and reserve units. I failed to prevent the erosion of the various companies."

Ray

Stalemate.

Though the Hizbs have won morally since they have held the invincible for 30 days.

Unfortunate, but nevertheless true!

The real winner, however, is Troung.

He is having a field day by churning out posts, as they come out hot from the Press, rooting for his favourite team!

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

troung

Last update - 02:56 22/08/2006


ANALYSIS: Policing in Gaza has blunted IDF fighting abilities

By Ze'ev Schiff, Haaretz Correspondent

One of the main conclusions of the war against Hezbollah will be the
fact that the fighting abilities of the ground forces deployed by the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon have been blunted by years of police action in the territories.

Most units, in their training and operations, followed fighting doctrines of police forces and not of standing armies. Hezbollah trains, fights and is equiped as an army, utilizing some of the most advanced anti-tank missiles and other weapons.

The character of the IDF - known for its blitzkrieg methods, encircling
movements deep inside enemy territory, and the ability to bring about a quick and decisive conclusion to the fighting - has been spoiled by years of involvement in operations that tied it down, emotionally and politically.

This included missions to stop terrorist cells, dealing with suicide bombings, the use of light weapons for the most part, and closures and sieges imposed on large population centers. Many of the IDF's reservists operate alongside the Shin Bet security service personnel to carry out arrests of wanted Palestinians. Battalions of reservists stood guard over Palestinians in detention centers.

In many ways, the IDF became the standing army of the Shin Bet. This is not the army that Israel knew in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 or the 1982 Lebanon War, which were both followed by a public commission of inquiry. Many of the advantages and operational qualities of the IDF have been lost over the years because the army has been fighting the wrong war  from a military point of view.

It would have been better, for example, had the war against the Palestinians been handled by the Border Police, allowing the regular army and its reservists to train for a different type of warfare.

It turns out that many of the commanders in Lebanon learned their trade in the fighting in the territories, and they thought in terms of fighting the Palestinians. The "Palestinian model" guided the way IDF units fought the bloody battles at Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbail. The units entered the battle and withdrew, similar to the way they operate in the Gaza Strip.

The IDF was also surprised in Lebanon by the amount of anti-tank missiles
fired by Hezbollah. The immediate reaction in the territories is to take cover in the closest home. In Lebanon, many soldiers were killed when anti-tank missiles penetrated walls behind which IDF troops had taken cover. Two weeks into the fighting, a specific order went out on how and where to take cover.

In Lebanon, soldiers fought in bunkers just like the Americans in Vietnam. A Hezbollah prisoner, who was part of an anti-tank missile team, said that during their training, they were allowed to fire as many as 15 anti-tank missiles. These are very costly, and the IDF doesn't even dream of such training, even though the experience is invaluable.

Another example is the deployment of the Golani Brigade from the Gaza Strip to Lebanon. It turns out that this excellent fighting force lacked officer expertise in coordinating with artillery batteries, something that they don't have to do very often in their policing duties.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/753186.html

troung

Hey I report, you decide...

troung

Another OP-ED...

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...294340,00.html

22 August, 2006
Hizbullah was better
Hizbullah fighters fought more effectively than IDF soldiers Published: 08.22.06, 16:58

The balance sheet of the second Lebanon War certainly does not point to an IDF victory. Even in points, it's closer to a loss than to an achievement, when taking into account the home front's extended suffering.

Indeed, in light of the relative UN good Security Council resolution we received, and possible positive future developments in Lebanon itself, we were not defeated. However, what happened to us is very similar to the defeat suffered by the American military in Vietnam and Iraq, and to the one suffered by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the Russians in Chechnya.

I covered some of those wars. I saw from up close how guerilla fighters overcame the most powerful, modern armies in the world because they knew how to fully utilize their intimate familiarity with the war zone and the local population's support.

Yet this isn't the only reason. The guerillas won also because they received unlimited material, planning, and moral support from a patron country or countries.

Another reason: Guerilla fighters consistently avoided a head-on clash with overwhelming air and ground forces and were not embarrassed to run away and hide when needed.

Finally, the guerilla fighters were more highly motivated than their opponents and willing to sacrifice their lives.

Israeli arrogance
Regular armies stood helpless in the face of guerillas because they failed to formulate an effective combat tactic that would neutralize the "hit and run" advantages of the Vietcong and Mujahideen, and because military units on the ground lacked real-team tactical intelligence that would allow them to take advantage of their superior fire power.

The final straw that led to the militaries' defeat was the heavy losses they suffered without being able to reach a phase where the end of fighting could be seen on the horizon. This is almost precisely what happened to us in Lebanon.

There's plenty of arrogance in the common perception around here that the failure in meeting the ground offensive's objectives was entirely the result of the failures of the political echelon and senior commanders to properly utilize the army.

This argument underestimates the enemy's capabilities and advantages and assumes that had we taken determined decisions and the logistical operation had worked smoothly, we would have won.

This is not the case, however. In my estimate, the ceasefire prevented an even greater ground offensive fiasco. Even if it's unpleasant, we must admit the fact that the IDF did not achieve victory not so much because of the failed conduct of its leaders, but rather, because Hizbullah was more effective and determined.

Hizbullah's intelligence better
The Shiite organization developed and implemented a combat method that takes maximal advantage of its natural advantages as a popular militia that operates within its natural habitat. Hizbullah also designed its future battlefield through an intimate understanding of IDF vulnerabilities.

The group prepared in a manner that allowed small cells to take cover and than appear at the time of their choosing equipped with anti-tank missiles, which enabled them to hit tanks and homes used by IDF infantrymen as cover.

More significant even was the tactical intelligence information gathered by Hizbullah members before, and particularly through, the fighting.

Their information was of better quality than that possessed by the IDF simply because Hizbullah's information gathering was undertaken through the use of eyes and binoculars on the ground in proximity to our forces, and not through pilotless drones and other sophisticated means, which failed to identify, in real-time, rocket launchers and small Hizbullah cells moving from one bunker to the next.

Hizbullah made sure each cell of fighters was able to gather intelligence independently, both for the purpose of accurate rocket attacks (by watching Israeli television reports) as well as for the purpose of fighting IDF troops inside villages (by using observers.)

IDF troops, on the other hand, walked around the villages as if they were blind, because the tactical information gathered before the war was not shared. Moreover, while in the villages, intelligence forces did not gather information methodically.

Frustration can lead to reform
We should also acknowledge the following reality: Hizbullah commanders and fighters were willing to sacrifice their lives in order to complete missions, while IDF commanders and cabinet ministers were virtually panicking every time they received casualty reports and attempted to prevent human losses as if this was the military objective.

A large part of the contradictory, changing orders relayed to troops resulted from this syndrome. At the end, because of the desire to avoid casualties, we suffered even more losses.

We must be merciless in admitting that Hizbullah succeed because it fought more effectively than the IDF in a mountainous area and through a total willingness for sacrifice. When facing those factors, the IDF has no proper combat tactic, just like the Americans and Russians, which would allow it to successfully respond to a super-guerilla featuring the characteristics and equipment of a modern army.

However, failures are also an opportunity. Deep frustration gives rise to an authentic, powerful demand for fundamental reforms. There's no point in fixing minor flaws here and there.

What we need is the total enlistment of the State of Israel , both in terms of finances and thought process, so that the IDF quickly develops and implements operation combat methods, unique combat means, and effective tactical intelligence that ensures different results in the next round.

Commando

Sad for the Israeli army. The insurgents across the middle east are stronger. And it is evident, if the USA does not support the Jewish state militarily in future wars, they may cease to exist.