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#1 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
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Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb
Washington Post
August 2, 2005 Pg. 1 Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb U.S. Intelligence Review Contrasts With Administration Statements By Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis. The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that "all options are on the table." The new National Intelligence Estimate includes what the intelligence community views as credible indicators that Iran's military is conducting clandestine work. But the sources said there is no information linking those projects directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is that Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and mastering technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking. The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether Iran's ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal, three U.S. sources said. Still, a senior intelligence official familiar with the findings said that "it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons." At no time in the past three years has the White House attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion. Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and questioned why a country with as much oil as Iran would require a large-scale nuclear energy program. The NIE addresses those assertions and offers alternative views supporting and challenging the assumptions they are based on. Those familiar with the new judgments, which have not been previously detailed, would discuss only limited elements of the estimate and only on the condition of anonymity, because the report is classified, as is some of the evidence on which it is based. Top policymakers are scrutinizing the review, several administration officials said, as the White House formulates the next steps of an Iran policy long riven by infighting and competing strategies. For three years, the administration has tried, with limited success, to increase pressure on Iran by focusing attention on its nuclear program. Those efforts have been driven as much by international diplomacy as by the intelligence. The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in January, is the first major review since 2001 of what is known and what is unknown about Iran. Additional assessments produced during Bush's first term were narrow in scope, and some were rejected by advocates of policies that were inconsistent with the intelligence judgments. One such paper was a 2002 review that former and current officials said was commissioned by national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the possibility for "regime change" in Iran. Those findings described the Islamic republic on a slow march toward democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that process, said the officials, who would describe the paper's classified findings only on the condition of anonymity. The new estimate takes a broader approach to the question of Iran's political future. But it is unable to answer whether the country's ruling clerics will still be in control by the time the country is capable of producing fissile material. The administration keeps "hoping the mullahs will leave before Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability," said an official familiar with policy discussions. Intelligence estimates are designed to alert the president of national security developments and help guide policy. The new Iran findings were described as well documented and well written, covering such topics as military capabilities, expected population growth and the oil industry. The assessments of Iran's nuclear program appear in a separate annex to the NIE known as a memorandum to holders. "It's a full look at what we know, what we don't know and what assumptions we have," a U.S. source said. Until recently, Iran was judged, according to February testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S. officials have continually estimated Iran to be "within five years" from reaching that same capability. So far, it has not. The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon, before "early to mid-next decade," according to four sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line with recently revised British and Israeli figures. The estimate is for acquisition of fissile material, but there is no firm view expressed on whether Iran would be ready by then with an implosion device, sources said. The timeline is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect a program moving full speed ahead without major technical obstacles. It does not take into account that Iran has suspended much of its uranium-enrichment work as part of a tenuous deal with Britain, France and Germany. Iran announced yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work if the European talks fall short of expectations. Sources said the new timeline also reflects a fading of suspicions that Iran's military has been running its own separate and covert enrichment effort. But there is evidence of clandestine military work on missiles and centrifuge research and development that could be linked to a nuclear program, four sources said. Last month, U.S. officials shared some data on the missile program with U.N. nuclear inspectors, based on drawings obtained last November. The documents include design modifications for Iran's Shahab-3 missile to make the room required for a nuclear warhead, U.S. and foreign officials said. "If someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he has really good connections, he'll get that program through," said Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's nonproliferation center and served as deputy director of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction. "But that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear weapon." The commission found earlier this year that U.S. intelligence knows "disturbingly little" about Iran, and about North Korea. Much of what is known about Tehran has been learned through analyzing communication intercepts, satellite imagery and the work of U.N. inspectors who have been investigating Iran for more than two years. Inspectors uncovered facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment, results of plutonium tests, and equipment bought illicitly from Pakistan -- all of which raised serious concerns but could be explained by an energy program. Inspectors have found no proof that Iran possesses a nuclear warhead design or is conducting a nuclear weapons program. The NIE comes more than two years after the intelligence community assessed, wrongly, in an October 2002 estimate that then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and was reconstituting his nuclear program. The judgments were declassified and made public by the Bush administration as it sought to build support for invading Iraq five months later. At a congressional hearing last Thursday, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, deputy director of national intelligence, said that new rules recently were imposed for crafting NIEs and that there would be "a higher tolerance for ambiguity," even if it meant producing estimates with less definitive conclusions. The Iran NIE, sources said, includes creative analysis and alternative theories that could explain some of the suspicious activities discovered in Iran in the past three years. Iran has said its nuclear infrastructure was built for energy production, not weapons. Assessed as plausible, but unverifiable, is Iran's public explanation that it built the program in secret, over 18 years, because it feared attack by the United States or Israel if the work was exposed. In January, before the review, Vice President Cheney suggested Iranian nuclear advances were so pressing that Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it had done 23 years earlier in Iraq. In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton -- then the administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and now Bush's temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador -- said: "If we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons." But the level of certainty, influenced by diplomacy and intelligence, appears to have shifted. Asked in June, after the NIE was done, whether Iran had a nuclear effort underway, Bolton's successor, Robert G. Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, said: "I don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian record, plus what the Iranian leaders have said . . . lead us to conclude that we have to be highly skeptical." Researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report. |
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#2 (permalink) |
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New Member
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I hardly believe Iran is or will be 10 years away from a nuclear bomb, as you or this article is totally ignoring the fact that Iran can obtain nucleur knowledge from its allies or future allies.
one dossier exchanged can mean Iran can develop a competent Nuclear bomb Tomorrow. |
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#3 (permalink) |
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Regular
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Its like i've said somewhere else. Iran has every right to develop nuclear technology for energy and defensive purposes. Iran has nothing to do with America's war against Bin Laden or whoever else. Iran used to aid the enemies of the Taliban in Afghanistan long before 9/11, the very same people America later allied with. So why this anti-Iranian stance?
Iran should not back down from developing nuclear technology.
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#4 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
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Also, as a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran is responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians through murder. Their actions run counter to US interests, and interests are the underlying factors in foreign policy. As far as the anti-Iranian stance, maybe holding US hostages for over a year and being vocally anti-American have something to do with it. Call me crazy. |
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#5 (permalink) |
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Regular
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I dont like the Iranian government or human rights abuses in Iran but still, Iran is a sovereign nation and the Americans are dreaming if they think that they can dictate to the rest of the World who can have nuclear technology and who cant.
It would be different if uranium was a resource found only in the USA but that isnt the reality. |
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#6 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
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Iran has signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty stating that they won't pursue nuclear weapons. Pursuing a nuclear weapon means that they aren't abiding by the obligations and commitments that they have agreed to be a party to. This isn't about the US dictating who can and can't be a nuclear weapons power, but rather about Iran upholding its international commitments. For some more information on the NPT, here's a link: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Doc...aties/npt.html |
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#7 (permalink) |
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Regular
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Thanks for the link. Ok, so if the current Iranian government (I assume it was Islamic government and not the Shah that signed the treaty, correct me if im wrong) cannot build nuclear weapons thats fine but i dont see why Iran cant build nuclear reactor for energy. Even Russia has helped Iran in the field, openly i might add.
Anway, say if it was the Shah's government that signed the treaty and not the Ayatollahs then is Iran still bound by that treaty or what? |
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#8 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator |
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I don't have an issue with Iran having nuclear power; however, the controversy stems from the type of reactor that Iran is building - the products of the reactor they are developing includes weapons grade material. I'm not smart on all the different types of reactors, but I do know that they could pursue a different type of reactor that would provide them with the power that they need. From the little bit that I have listened to on the radio over this subject, one of the weaknesses of the NPT/IAEA monitoring/regulations is that these dual use reactors aren't prohibited and so a country can pursue "nuclear power" that can quickly be converted to building a bomb while still being compliant with the NPT. Bottomline, Iran is playing diplomatic hardball in just skirting by the rules - enough to put together diplomatic pressure but not quite enough to be a rogue state on this issue alone. |
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#9 (permalink) | |||||
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Ubi dubium ibi libertas
Senior Contributor
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__________________
"Above all, we must realize that no arsenal, or no weapon in the arsenals of the world, is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have."
"The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, 'I'm from the government and I'm here to help.'" ![]() NEVER FORGET |
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Ubi dubium ibi libertas
Senior Contributor
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#11 (permalink) |
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Regular
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First off, the US has no Proof over Irans links to terrorism.
Its all speculation. The US has supported terrorism in many parts of the world. The US supported PAKISTAN in training JEHADI's to fight the commies... and turned a blind eye to Pakistan sending the Jehadis to fight in Kashmir. The US supported Saddam Hussein before he decided he didnt want to be americas lil biotch anymore. Osama bin laden and crew are a product of the CIA not IRAN. The MAJORITY of terrorists being caught in London and worldwide happen to be of PAKISTANI and Arab origin... not IRANIAN. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia --- Allies of the USA -- Are more likely to aid terrorists than IRAN. The USA has no right to dictate who can develop Nukes or not. There can be no double standards. No one country has the right to decide who gets what. The Americans use more force than any other country in the world... I remember some guys threatening to Nuke India just because I started a forum in which I pointed out that Nixon called our Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a '*****' because she tried to Intervene during the Bangladeshi(East Pakistan) Genocide - Which was also Indirectly sponsored by the USA. The "STFU-and-Listen-to-me-or-I'll-nuke-ya" Mentality is very much present in American foreign policy as well. Maybe its the USA that should give up nukes, maybe set an example for the rest of the world! Instead the USA decides to NOT Ratify the CTBT- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty! -- They want to have more tests even after having the most advanced nuclear tech in the world and over 20 000 Missiles.. its not enough! Talking about International treaties! -- Yeah right. http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolit...TBTUSA.asp?p=1 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was designed to prevent testing of nuclear weapons and hence reduce the chance of an arms race. October 13, 1999, the US Senate decided not to ratify the CTBT. |
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#12 (permalink) | |
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WAB Bartender
Defense Professional
Military Professional |
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It is dam' sure NOT speculation; documentary evidence exists in abundance. Iran is one of the GREATEST sponsors of terrorism anywhere in the world, and if you don't believe it, you are either insane or a hopeless dupe. You want to stand by that assertion, or would you like to climb down and retract it?
__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory." - George Orwell |
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#13 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
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Did the U.S. "Create" Osama bin Laden? Allegations that the U.S. provided funding for bin Laden proved inaccurate The United States did not "create" Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda. The United States supported the Afghans fighting for their country's freedom -- as did other countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, Egypt, and the UK -- but the United States did not support the "Afghan Arabs," the Arabs and other Muslims who came to fight in Afghanistan for broader goals. CNN terrorism analyst Peter Bergen notes that the "Afghan Arabs functioned independently and had their own sources of funding." He notes: "While the charges that the CIA was responsible for the rise of the Afghan Arabs might make good copy, they don't make good history. The truth is more complicated, tinged with varying shades of gray. The United States wanted to be able to deny that the CIA was funding the Afghan war, so its support was funneled through Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI). ISI in turn made the decisions about which Afghan factions to arm and train, tending to favor the most Islamist and pro-Pakistan. The Afghan Arabs generally fought alongside those factions, which is how the charge arose that they were creatures of the CIA. Former CIA official Milt Bearden, who ran the Agency's Afghan operation in the late 1980s, says, "The CIA did not recruit Arabs," as there was no need to do so. There were hundreds of thousands of Afghans all too willing to fight, and the Arabs who did come for jihad were "very disruptive . . . the Afghans thought they were a pain in the ass." Similar sentiments from Afghans who appreciated the money that flowed from the Gulf but did not appreciate the Arabs' holier-than-thou attempts to convert them to their ultra-purist version of Islam. Freelance cameraman Peter Jouvenal recalls: "There was no love lost between the Afghans and the Arabs. One Afghan told me, Whenever we had a problem with one of them we just shot them. They thought they were kings.'" ... There was simply no point in the CIA and the Afghan Arabs being in contact with each other. ... the Afghan Arabs functioned independently and had their own sources of funding. The CIA did not need the Afghan Arabs, and the Afghan Arabs did not need the CIA. So the notion that the Agency funded and trained the Afghan Arabs is, at best, misleading. The 'let's blame everything bad that happens on the CIA' school of thought vastly overestimates the Agency's powers, both for good and ill." [Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001), pp. 64-66.] Al Qaeda's number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, confirmed that the "Afghan Arabs" did not receive any U.S. funding during the war in Afghanistan. In the book that was described as his last will, Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, which was serialized in December 2001 in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Zawahiri says the Afghan Arabs were funded with money from Arab sources, which amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars: "While the United States backed Pakistan and the mujahidin factions with money and equipment, the young Arab mujahidin's relationship with the United States was totally different." "... The financing of the activities of the Arab mujahidin in Afghanistan came from aid sent to Afghanistan by popular organizations. It was substantial aid." "The Arab mujahidin did not confine themselves to financing their own jihad but also carried Muslim donations to the Afghan mujahidin themselves. Usama Bin Ladin has apprised me of the size of the popular Arab support for the Afghan mujahidin that amounted, according to his sources, to $200 million in the form of military aid alone in 10 years. Imagine how much aid was sent by popular Arab organizations in the non-military fields such as medicine and health, education and vocational training, food, and social assistance ...." "Through the unofficial popular support, the Arab mujahidin established training centers and centers for the call to the faith. They formed fronts that trained and equipped thousands of Arab mujahidin and provided them with living expenses, housing, travel and organization." (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), GMP20011202000401) Abdullah Anas, an Algerian who was one of the foremost Afghan Arab organizers and the son-in-law of Abdullah Azzam, has also confirmed that the CIA had no relationship with the Afghan Arabs. Speaking on the French television program Zone Interdit on September 12, 2004, Anas stated: "If you say there was a relationship in the sense that the CIA used to meet with Arabs, discuss with them, prepare plans with them, and to fight with them -- it never happened." Milt Bearden served as the CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989, where he was in charge of running the covert action program for Afghanistan. In his memoirs titled "The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB," Bearden says the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, Egypt, and the UK were "major players" in the effort to aid the Afghans. Bearden writes: "[President Jimmy] Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had in 1980 secured an agreement from the Saudi king to match American contributions to the Afghan effort dollar for dollar, and [Reagan administration CIA director] Bill Casey kept that agreement going over the years." (The Main Enemy, p. 219) From 1983 to 1987, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf was in charge of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which ran Pakistan's covert program to aid the Afghan mujahidin. In his book The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, Brigadier Yousaf confirms the matching U.S.-Saudi arrangement, stating: "For every dollar supplied by the US, another was added by the Saudi Arabian government. The combined funds, running into several hundred million dollars a year, were transferred by the CIA to special accounts in Pakistan under the control of the ISI." (The Bear Trap, p. 81) Bearden makes it clear that the CIA covert action program did not fund any Arabs or other Muslims to come to the jihad: "Contrary to what people have come to imagine, the CIA never recruited, trained, or otherwise used Arab volunteers. The Afghans were more than happy to do their own fighting -- we saw no reason not to satisfy them on this point." (The Main Enemy, p. 243) Marc Sageman worked closely with the Afghan mujahideen as one of Milt Bearden's case officers, from 1987 to 1989. In his book, Understanding Terror Networks, he writes: "No U.S. official ever came in contact with the foreign volunteers. They simply traveled in different circles and never crossed U.S. radar screens. They had their own sources of money and their own contacts with the Pakistanis, official Saudis, and other Muslim supporters, and they made their own deals with the various Afghan resistance leaders. Their presence in Afghanistan was very small and they did not participate in any significant fighting." (Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 57-58.) The Central Intelligence Agency has issued a statement categorically denying that it ever had any relationship with Osama bin Laden. It stated, in response to the hypothetical question "Has the CIA ever provided funding, training, or other support to Usama Bin Laden?": "No. Numerous comments in the media recently have reiterated a widely circulated but incorrect notion that the CIA once had a relationship with Usama Bin Laden. For the record, you should know that the CIA never employed, paid, or maintained any relationship whatsoever with Bin Laden (emphasis in original)." In summary: U.S. covert aid went to the Afghans, not to the "Afghan Arabs." The "Afghan Arabs" were funded by Arab sources, not by the United States. United States never had "any relationship whatsoever" with Osama bin Laden. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Arab backing for the "Afghan Arabs," and bin Laden's own decisions "created" Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, not the United States. Created: 14 Jan 2005 Updated: 14 Jan 2005 |
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#14 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator |
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As far as the NPT goes, Iran has ratified the treaty and become a party to the treaty regime. That means that they are obligated to the treaty. |
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#15 (permalink) |
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New Member
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In summary: U.S. covert aid went to the Afghans, not to the "Afghan Arabs." The "Afghan Arabs" were funded by Arab sources, not by the United States. United States never had "any relationship whatsoever" with Osama bin Laden. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Arab backing for the "Afghan Arabs," and bin Laden's own decisions "created" Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, not the United States. -EndQuote This summary isn't precise. In fact, the first and third are downright inaccurate. US Covert aid was to the Mujahadeen fighters against the soviet backed communist government in Afghanistan. The US actively lobbied Saudi Arabia and other gulf arabs to finance these mujahadeen fighters with American weapons. To do this, they told horror stories of atheist commies burning down mosques and banning Islam. The Saudis, followers of a strict form of Islam called Wahhabism, and other gulf arabs donated more than money, they sent mujahadeen fighters of their own -with American encouragement. Afterwards, when the Soviets withdrew and Afghanistan turned into Chaos, various factions warred for control of Kabul. The Iranian sponsored faction, led by Hekmatryar was in strong contention. It was American policy to prevent this at all costs. They teamed up with Pakistan, a major ally in the Afghan conflict, to sponsor a new group. This political faction was called the Taliban. With American iintelligence and weapons (measured in the minimum judged necessary -the pentagon did not want a repeat of the Stinger missiles falling into the wrong hands) paid for with illicit opium production helped the Taliban slowly but surely drive Hekmatryar back to Iran. They eventually controlled 90% of Afghanistan. A strong ally of the Taliban, who are followers of a very strict form of Wahhabi Islam, were Saudi guest fighters. Particularly Osama bin Laden and his privately funded army of mujahadeen fighters. The US approved of bin Laden at first, because he suited their goals. When the Taliban began persecuting Shiite muslims, the US turned a blind eye. But when Bin Laden started setting up terrorist camps and distributing instructional videos on how to hijack airliners the US started to complain to the Taliban. The FBI didn't at first consider him a real threat, the terrorist CD was considered 'amateurish' and contained 'nothing new' (these are actual FBI words). It wasn't until the Embassy bombings in Africa that the US made serious attempts at his life. That was when the US first took al-Qaida seriously. What's amazing is the US continued to support the Taliban even though they were clearly sheltering Bin Laden. 9/11 was the wake up call America desparately needed. The insane threat analysis that did not comprehend the extant of Bin Laden's danger and the misplaced priority in supporting the Taliban (with their extensive drug trade connections) were the worst homeland security decisions in American history. America blindly supported the taliban because they were anti-shiite, and therefore anti-Iran. The US policy followed the old adage: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The stupidity of that adage is the failure to consider the enemy of your enemy may be an even bigger enemy. Since 9/11, America has fixed their mistake with the taliban. But Al-qaida, and bin Laden, have proven far harder to fix. At least without lavish terrorist training camps they are somewhat disorganized. But they have learned to blend into various host countries. A terrorist organization is much like a criminal organization, taking full advantage of fake passports, smuggling routes, and corrupt law enforcement. It doesn't help bombing a pashtun village loyal to the Taliban when an al-qaida sleeper cell is leasing a loft in Lower Manhattan through underworld ties. A serious attempt to protect the homeland from terrorism requires a serious attempt to fight organized crime. As the vast poppy fields in Afghanistan attest, the rise of international terrorism is intimately linked with the rise of the international drug trade. Sadly, America is turning a blind eye on the drug trade in Afghanistan. In return for overthrowing the Taliban, the people are allowed to grow opium. We are returning to the policy of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Oh, how history repeats itself... |
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