Iran, Nukes, War Casualties and Assorted Accusations

**RoccoR** · 08 Feb 12,, 17:41

Double Edge, USSWisconsin, et al,

I concur with USSWisconsin's comment, supra.

Originally Posted by Double Edge

Any idea how long it takes to enrich 20% to HEU ?

(COMMENT)

It is rather complicated to compute the actual capacity Iran has at any one moment. The link to the .pdf document below explains the considerations one must take into account.

Based on the number of centrifuges Iran has demonstrated that they can bring online, the amount of power supplied, and the basic precursor characteristics we believe they have to use, this probably says it best.

Originally Posted by FEDERATION OF THE AMERICAN SCIENTISTS ISSUE BRIEF, January 21, 2011

Similarly, if Iran started with 20 percent enriched uranium as feedstock, this would substantially reduce its time to a bomb. Currently, Iran has produced about 40 kg UF6 (27 kg U) 3.5 years to produce the necessary 20 percent uranium. However, Iran could install more cascades for 20 percent enrichment (there is allocated space for a total of 6 cascades at PFEP). If all 6 cascades or 3 cascade systems are running, Iran could produce enough 20 percent material for bomb feedstock in about a year.

SOURCE: Page 16 of
Using Enrichment Capacity to Estimate Iran’s Breakout Potential
http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/IssueB...n2011_Iran.pdf

NOTE: This is based on the IAEA OSINT available at that time (one year old). There has been no significant improvements made that in the preceding open time interval that would alter this estimate by much. But remember it is merely an estimate.

Originally Posted by Double Edge

Which is the harder bit 0-20 % or the remainder.

(COMMENT)

The level of difficulty does not increase; but the amount of power and time it tasks at the current capacity does. It would take about it would take about 10 years to achieve the same quantity at 90-95% levels.

(SIDEBAR)

Our CNWDI Scientists generally snub their noise at Weapons Grade material enriched to less than 90%. However, if you are willing to accept lower yields and somewhat dirtier devices, you could probably use material enriched at the 75% levels.

Please take a moment to glance over the .pdf document link.

Most Respectfully,
R

**Double Edge** · 08 Feb 12,, 22:17

Originally Posted by Stitch

IMO, Iran is (unfortunately) smart enough to NOT do enough to bring the US into the mess; they are bucking to become THE regional power, but they won't do enough to piss-off the powers that be.

Plausible so how do they pull it off.

Their idea could be to make enough fuel for the future and secrete it away. All they need is enough time. No bomb, no test, just the raw fuel. Going on whiskey's earlier post that making the fuel is the hardest bit.

Thing is how do they account for the difference to get a green light from the IAEA. If they agree to a swap deal then they just lost what they struggled to make.

Have read articles that outright state that no feasible military option exists to deal with Iran but i'm not ready to rule out a strike just yet. Its looks unlikely but its always there in the background.

Originally Posted by Stitch

My guess is they will stop just short of forcing NATO/US to intervene.

To stop short is a killer move

**Dago** · 08 Feb 12,, 22:30

Do you guys think Iran has the capability to strike Al Shaheen Oil Field? And make the Strait of Hormuz full of black slick worse then the Gulf Of Mexico? Al Shaheen Oil Field has an output of 260,000 barrels per day.

26.605,51.932 - Google Maps

**Double Edge** · 09 Feb 12,, 01:35

Originally Posted by USSWisconsin

It depends on the capacity of the process - the output from the earlier stages is put into the later stages, so the amount of material available shrinks as enrichment level increases, if there is plenty of natural uranium, there will still be much less 20% enriched material - so theoretially it goes slower as the level of enrichment increases - due to availability of feed stock. Lighter material U235 is what is desired, the heavier U238 s collected at the edge of the drum, leaving enriched material further in, each stage enriches the material a little bit. In laser separation, a laser ablates the material and an EM field causes it to travel in a parabolic trajectory onto a collector, the lighter material travels further, and is collected further from the ablatement point.

The time it takes depends on how many centrifuges are used and how big each of them is - plus the amount of feed stock available to charge them. Laser separation operates with the same constraints.

Thx

Originally Posted by RoccoR

The level of difficulty does not increase; but the amount of power and time it tasks at the current capacity does. It would take about 10 years to achieve the same quantity at 90-95% levels.

RIght, and this is at Natanz and provided they don't kick the inspectors out of there and install more cascades or they cut that time signficantly.

As of 22 November 2010, Iran was operating 28 cascades or about 4592 machines at FEP, according to the IAEA. The ultimate capacity of Iran’s main enrichment plant is 50,000 centrifuges, so Tehran obviously has the goal of adding more machines. According to the latest report by the IAEA, only about half of the total of 54 cascades or 8426 installed centrifuges were operating. But this new total means that Iran has clearly added new machines since August 2009.

It takes 1510 kg SWU to enrich enough LEU (concentration 3.5 percent) to a significant quantity (27.8 kg U) of HEU (concentration 90 percent), with a tails at concentrations of natural uranium, 0.71 percent. If Iran used its entire capacity at Natanz, it would take about 5 months to produce enough HEU for a bomb.

If Iran started from 20 percent enriched uranium, it would take less than a month to enrich enough HEU for a bomb, if the tails are set at 3.5 percent U235. This would need about 146 kg U as feedstock.

Alternatively, if material is scarce, Iran could set the tails to 0.7 percent. This scenario would require 129 kg U, and it would take a month and a half to produce the HEU.

Fordow looks more interesting,

Iran had announced plans to install 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow. This implies that the plant would have an annual enrichment capacity of 2 310 kg SWU. It would take Iran close to 8 months to produce enough HEU for a bomb at Fordow. However, if it started with 20 percent enriched uranium, it would take Iran about a month and a half to produce a SQ of HEU with a tails assay of 3.5 percent, if it had enough 20 percent enriched material as feedstock.

**Double Edge** · 09 Feb 12,, 12:33

The point of my previous questions was to understand the Israeli position. How do terms like 'point of no return' or 'zone of immunity' fit into the picture given the FAS report.

The general meaning is after Iran crosses a certain point then no military action makes sense. That is to say there is no way to prevent Iran from making more bombs or destroy whatever bombs Iran already has.

But as the FAS report indicates, making a bomb is a linear process, there has to be enough LEU, along with cascades and time to enrich to HEU. And then weaponisation has to occur. Enrichment takes time, depends on the number of cascades employed, time taken to make enough HEU for 1 bomb is five times longer to make 5 and so on.

So i do not understand at what point there is a 'zone of immunity' or 'point of no return'. Maybe once Iran has made some nukes and hidden them but otherwise before that i cannot see it.

Another question LEU for how many bombs constitutes a point of no return. 1, 5, 10, more ?

For me, 'point of no return' is reached once Iran has the required knowledge & expertise to make the fuel and weaponise. They already know how to enrich fuel, does not matter whether its, LEU, 20% or HEU. A gun type bomb isn't too hard and no test is required. The two enrichment facilities Iran has could be destroyed but they could always be rebuilt later. The FAS report already indicated that as of Jan 2011 Iran already had enough LEU for 2 or 3 crude bombs.

So i do not understand what window the Iraelis are referring to when they use the premise of 'point of no return' or 'zone of immunity' to justify an attack

**USSWisconsin** · 09 Feb 12,, 20:57

From the PDF above, now a year old - it appears that they would already have enough for at least two bombs in 2012 and the rate to make more depends on whether they are being sneaky - using the hold over/leakage at Fordrow, or going all out - using full production output at both facilities - it is different by a factor of ~10, so ~6 months per bomb with those Jan 2011 numbers in stealth mode, or perhaps a several weeks each - going all out - as long as thier feed stocks hold out. Even one bomb is significant, but to pose a real military threat would require > 10 bombs, IMO.

Keep in mind, the numbers in all this are approximate, bombs have been made with much less than 25 kg, and could be made with uranium enriched to less than 90% U235. There are many variables in the isotope separation process, the pdf does a good job of laying them out.

So i do not understand what window the Iraelis are referring to when they use the premise of 'point of no return' or 'zone of immunity' to justify an attack

Same here - this "timeline" excuse of theirs is very questionable.

**RoccoR** · 09 Feb 12,, 22:17

USSWisconsin, et al,

Yes, to an extent, this is true.

Originally Posted by USSWisconsin

... ... ... it appears that they would already have enough for at least two bombs in 2012 and the rate to make more depends on whether they are being sneaky

(COMMENT)

Not exactly. Iran has just broken the threshold of the 20% enrichment mark. You cannot make a Nuclear Weapon with 20% enrichment. Material enriched to that level is used in the production of certain medical equipment, security surveillance systems and laser enhancement devices.

What is significant about the 20% enrichment material is that it is the precursor material to start further enrichment to weapons grade. There is no evidence that the Iranians have enough HEU to make a weapon.

NOTE: There is no evidence that they have a working design for a detonator.

Originally Posted by USSWisconsin

Keep in mind, the numbers in all this are approximate, bombs have been made with much less than 25 kg, and could be made with uranium enriched to less than 90% U235. There are many variables in the isotope separation process, the pdf does a good job of laying them out.

Same here - this "timeline" excuse of theirs is very questionable.

(COMMENT)

Yes, this may very well be important. But in order to enrich a quantity of material to even marginal level of weapons capable material, you need to start with many time more of the 20% material.

No ones timeline estimates are perfect; even the Iranians. It is a starting point. But before the component parts of a weapons are fabricated, the weapon is assembled and fueled, there are very distinct indicators that will tell us exactly where the Iranians think they are in the process.

Most Respectfully,
R

**Officer of Engineers** · 09 Feb 12,, 23:01

Originally Posted by RoccoR

NOTE: There is no evidence that they have a working design for a detonator.

Yes, there is. Chinese and Pakistani nuclear warhead blueprints via AQ Khan.

**USSWisconsin** · 09 Feb 12,, 23:27

Originally Posted by RoccoR

USSWisconsin, et al,

Yes, to an extent, this is true.

(COMMENT)

Not exactly. Iran has just broken the threshold of the 20% enrichment mark. You cannot make a Nuclear Weapon with 20% enrichment. Material enriched to that level is used in the production of certain medical equipment, security surveillance systems and laser enhancement devices.

What is significant about the 20% enrichment material is that it is the precursor material to start further enrichment to weapons grade. There is no evidence that the Iranians have enough HEU to make a weapon.

NOTE: There is no evidence that they have a working design for a detonator.

(COMMENT)

Yes, this may very well be important. But in order to enrich a quantity of material to even marginal level of weapons capable material, you need to start with many time more of the 20% material.

No ones timeline estimates are perfect; even the Iranians. It is a starting point. But before the component parts of a weapons are fabricated, the weapon is assembled and fueled, there are very distinct indicators that will tell us exactly where the Iranians think they are in the process.

Most Respectfully,
R

Please take a moment to glance over the .pdf document link.

this pdf is dated Jan 2011 - it gives the separation rates and quantites of 20% feed stocks in Jan 2011- these are the evidence I am referring too - there is no such thing as a 20% barrier, it is just a number - they have had a year since this - with those rates, they could have enough 90% HEU for two SQ's

If more material is
wasted, the time to produce the HEU will be shortened. It takes about 1 300 kg UF6 enriched to 3.5
percent as feedstock to produce a SQ of HEU at 90 percent, with a tails assay of 0.7 percent, the
concentration of natural uranium. About 1 200 kg UF6 would be required if the tails assay was 0.45
percent or the current estimated waste concentration at FEP. According to the most recent PIV data,
Iran has accumulated over 3 tons UF6 of LEU, which would be enough to produce 2 crude nuclear
weapons.

The Fordow enrichment plant is a well-protected facility, located in a tunnel in the mountains near Qom
and in close proximity to an Iranian military base equipped with air defenses. These characteristics
make it less susceptible to an air strike and, therefore, a more convenient location for breakout than
FEP, despite its smaller capacity. Iran had announced plans to install 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges at
Fordow.29 This implies that the plant would have an annual enrichment capacity of 2 310 kg SWU. It
would take Iran close to 8 months to produce enough HEU for a bomb at Fordow. However, if it started
with 20 percent enriched uranium, it would take Iran about a month and a half to produce a SQ of HEU
with a tails assay of 3.5 percent, if it had enough 20 percent enriched material as feedstock.

This is all pointing to them having enough fuel, of course we don't know for sure - what whe do know is what is possible - given what we know they have
They have bomb designs - things are very different today than they were in the open liturature about nuclear weapons (pre 1970's) - many limiting weapons design factors of the past no longer exist with todays technology.
There are many factors here (like how much separation work was successfully completed in the last year) - and we only know some of them, but what we do know - does not rule out a couple bomb quanties of WG HEU.
No one is saying that this constitutes a nuclear asenal - it is what it is - a couple 25 kg rings of HEU in cans? possibly a pair of pits? somewhat less likely a couple 20 KT devices?
They aren't tested, if they are going to use a gun assembly system - they could probably skip a test, but only have one 15 KT device.

**Double Edge** · 10 Feb 12,, 00:41

Originally Posted by USSWisconsin

Same here - this "timeline" excuse of theirs is very questionable.

Israel's 'narrow view' of Iran threat 'frustrating White House' | Daily Telegraph | 09 Feb 2012

The Israeli concern is with Iran's plans to move the majority of its uranium enrichment facilities into underground bunkers near Qom, where they would be protected from air strikes by several layers of granite. Whether or not this justifies a pre-emptive strike is provoking debate with their US allies.

The Israelis are suggesting not that LEU will be secreted away and be unaccounted for but rather the entire enrichment facility which presumably would be used to enrich to HEU away from any peering eyes.

The question again is why a deadline.

Will Israel Attack Iran? | NY Times Magazine | Jan 25 2012

He warned that no more than one year remains to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weaponry. This is because it is close to entering its “immunity zone” — a term coined by Barak that refers to the point when Iran’s accumulated know-how, raw materials, experience and equipment (as well as the distribution of materials among its underground facilities) — will be such that an attack could not derail the nuclear project. Israel estimates that Iran’s nuclear program is about nine months away from being able to withstand an Israeli attack; America, with its superior firepower, has a time frame of 15 months. In either case, they are presented with a very narrow window of opportunity. One very senior Israeli security source told me: “The Americans tell us there is time, and we tell them that they only have about six to nine months more than we do and that therefore the sanctions have to be brought to a culmination now, in order to exhaust that track.”

This seems to be based on the development of the Fordow plant which is supposed to have come operational in 2011.

But is Fordow already operational and does the IAEA have access to Fordow ?

The FAS report does not indicate that this is so, in fact they use the performance data from Natanz to estimate what Fordow can produce.

But last Nov's IAEA report says..

24. During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174 centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electrical lines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.

25. The Agency continues to verify that FFEP (Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant) is being constructed according to the latest DIQ provided by Iran. As previously reported, although Iran has provided some clarification regarding the initial timing of, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FFEP at an existing defence establishment, additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility.

26. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.

So its unclear whether Fordow is up and running today and until that happens IAEA accounting will be pending.

Therefore it seems the Israeli premise is based on how long it would take for Fordow to become operational and start enrichment.

But will there be addtional enrichment plants ?

27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this Iranian year.

In August 2011, Dr Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to build new enrichment facilities during the next two years. Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.

As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.

If there are more plants coming up then this deadline is going to be a moving one.

So what is the thinking here ?

if Fordow is stopped then its harder for Iran to open more plants ? Hmmmmm..

**RoccoR** · 10 Feb 12,, 16:21

Officer of Engineers, et al,

Yes, you are correct in that the AQ Khan Network did provide some CNWDI on detonation.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Originally Posted by RoccoR
NOTE: There is no evidence that they have a working design for a detonator.

Yes, there is. Chinese and Pakistani nuclear warhead blueprints via AQ Khan.

(COMMENT)

Detonators for Nuclear Weapons are not as interchangeable as the are with conventional explosives. Changing the percentage of the HEU material also changes the requirements of the detonator.

We do know that Iran was doing some computer simulations related to detonator design. But we have no reason to believe that an actual working detonator, matched to their particular weapons design. That is (worst case scenario) --- if they even have a prototype design for the weapon.

To date, we have no idea where the Iranians are in there Project Management of a Weapons Program, if they even have a weapons program. What we have seen, relative to the detonator, is that they are not beyond the virtual simulation or the symmetry requirements.

Most Respectfully,
R

**USSWisconsin** · 10 Feb 12,, 16:54

Originally Posted by RoccoR

Officer of Engineers, et al,

Yes, you are correct in that the AQ Khan Network did provide some CNWDI on detonation.

(COMMENT)

Detonators for Nuclear Weapons are not as interchangeable as the are with conventional explosives. Changing the percentage of the HEU material also changes the requirements of the detonator.

We do know that Iran was doing some computer simulations related to detonator design. But we have no reason to believe that an actual working detonator, matched to their particular weapons design. That is (worst case scenario) --- if they even have a prototype design for the weapon.

To date, we have no idea where the Iranians are in there Project Management of a Weapons Program, if they even have a weapons program. What we have seen, relative to the detonator, is that they are not beyond the virtual simulation or the symmetry requirements.

Most Respectfully,
R

Here we are getting into OppSEC stuff - I can say, modern tech has changed things, I won't elaborate - but the problems with detonators described in open literature describe 1950's computers and electronics - what has changed with electronics and computers since then?

**Dusty1000** · 17 Feb 12,, 17:59

Notably, the IAEA report summarises:

53. The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.

So anything that definitely relates to nuclear weapons in the report, must have been prior to the end of 2003.

In addition to Leon Panetta's recent statements:

U.S. intelligence agencies assess that the Iranian leadership has so far not decided to build a nuclear weapon.

"They are keeping themselves in a position to make that decision, but there are certain things they have not yet done and have not done for some time," Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said at the same hearing without providing details.

World News - Iran 'unlikely' to provoke conflict, US official says

This conforms to previous assessments. Adm. Dennis Blair, Obama’s former director of national intelligence, told Congress in March 2009, “We judge in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities” but that Tehran “is keeping open the option to develop them.”

Read more: The US needs to leave Iran alone | The Daily Caller

New York Times (Jan. 15) that “three leading Israeli security experts—the Mossad chief, Tamir Pardo, a former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, and a former military chief of staff, Dan Halutz—all recently declared that a nuclear Iran would not pose an existential threat to Israel.”

Then, a few days afterward, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, in an interview with Israeli Army Radio (Jan. 18), had this exchange:

Question: Is it Israel’s judgment that Iran has not yet decided to turn its nuclear potential into weapons of mass destruction?

Barak: People ask whether Iran is determined to break out from the control [inspection] regime right now . . . in an attempt to obtain nuclear weapons or an operable installation as quickly as possible. Apparently that is not the case.

What the US and Israel fear is the unmasking of their lies about Iran

The Iranian embassy in Canada says:

All Iranian facilities are under 24 hour IAEA camera surveillance and the agency has had the unprecedented 4000 man/day inspection of these facilities.

http://www.iranembassy.ca/Images/Ira...f%20Canada.pdf

And there is some indication in the press that this is the case, for example:

In an underground chamber near the Iranian city of Natanz, a network of surveillance cameras offers the outside world a rare glimpse into Iran's largest nuclear facility. The cameras were installed by U.N. inspectors to keep tabs on Iran's nuclear progress

Iran's Natanz nuclear facility recovered quickly from Stuxnet cyberattack

According to this article, cameras are still to be installed at Fordo:

http://news.monstersandcritics.com/m...ormuz-blockade

One must wonder what all the fuss about nuclear weapons is.

**RoccoR** · 18 Feb 12,, 00:03

Dusty1000, et al,

Yes, to this extent, I agree. But now is the time to be even more vigilant.

Originally Posted by Dusty1000

One must wonder what all the fuss about nuclear weapons is.

(COMMENT)

References:

Originally Posted by RoccoR

.

29 Jan 12, 11:57 Post #37
Originally Posted by RoccoR

.

29 Jan 12, 15:26 Post #40
Originally Posted by RoccoR

.

30 Jan 12, 12:52 Post #50
Originally Posted by RoccoR

.

30 Jan 12, 18:22 Post #54

As the IAEA still has some information and data to discuss and review, IMO we still do not know and should be cautious in any judgment. I still have some reservations as to the intentions. I am sure that in the forth coming weeks, there will be more information released that will answer some outstanding questions and address some of the more critical issues.

Certainly, we should reduce some of the saber rattling that has dominated the topic for the past several weeks.

Just My Thought,

Most Respectfully,
R

**Double Edge** · 18 Feb 12,, 18:57

Iran-United States Confrontation: Strategic Losers Both | SAAG | Feb 12 2012

The United States has been a strategic loser in that initial hostile attitudes should have given way to a realistic strategic assessment that a rapprochement with Iran was a strategic imperative for the United States.

What comes to mind is the parallel of US policy of normalization of relations with China. If the United States could indulge in normalization of relations with China despite the fact that China had been involved in a war with the United States, there was no reason for the United States not to normalize relations with Iran when Iran was not involved in a war with the United States.

Had the United States politically reached out to Iran in good time, the United States with a strategically cooperative Iran in tow could have achieved political stability in the Gulf Region, ensured the security of Israel, and through Iran, the United States could have achieved strategic, political and economic access to Central Asia.

In short, a political reach out to Iran by the United States would have been a significant game-changer for the stability and security of the Gulf Region. Such a wise US move would not have created a strategic void for Iran and thereby bringing in Russia and China in Gulf Region power-play.

Iran too has been a strategic loser in its confrontation with the United States, in that Iran stands impeded by the United States to emerge as the natural strategically pre-eminent power in the Gulf Region. The stark strategic reality for Iran is that it cannot emerge as the pre-eminent regional power in opposition to the United States or inspite of the United States.

It cannot be forgotten that the United States and Iran have had a long history of strategic and security cooperation pre-1979. Iran till then was the main pillar of the United States security architecture in the Middle East. Iran was also being built-up by the United States as the dominant naval power in the North Arabian Sea.

Both the United States and Iran have now in 2012 to cut their strategic losses as once again the United States needs to outsource regional security to the naturally regional pre-eminent powers, which in the case of the Middle East happens to be Iran.

United States and Iran in a mutually cooperative strategic relationship would have put into place a significant 'game changer' on the strategic landscape of the Middle East. It would have had far-reaching strategic ramifications globally. China's present strategic intrusiveness in the Middle East endangering US interests would have been limited.

Regrettably, this could not emerge and both the United States and Iran have lived with the consequences.

One can always wish...

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