Officer of Engineers, et al,
Yes, this is true. But what this says means something different.
(COMMENT)
Several points have to be made.
- First, relative to the Chinese purchase (attempt), the time frame is all wrong. This transaction was made in the mid-1980's and is covered in the 2011 NIE (supra). However, it does appear that several Chinese firms were, at one time, assisting Iran in missile technology. To what end, is still unknown. But a weapons system is so complex, that just about any research and development in that areas could be said to be applicable.
- Second, the warhead transactions of the near recent past were NOT "weaponized." This is still yet to be accomplish by the Iranians, and we don't know if the Iranians have yet, that ability or material. There are several unconfirmed rumors that the original target date for weaponization could be March 2012. But the normal testing of critical nuclear weapons design has not been detected.
- The sale of the KH-55 (Ukrainian sources) is troubling, but not as significant as a first impression might have. They are older (20 years old+), having a limited range (--- maybe 2000-3000 miles max), of a cruise missile design. The records on maintenance is dubious at best and no one is sure if they are still functional and no tests have been observed. These were transferred without a weaponized warhead (conventional or nuclear).
- The transfer of critical nuclear weapons design information (CNWDI) from Pakistan to Iran is well documented and known in US Intellligence Circles as the AQ Khan [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)] debacle (1989-2000). This is also taken into account in the 2011 NIE (supra).
- In the latter part of 2009, Iran did successfully tested a version of the BM-25 missile (1300 mile range). It was a launch system and missile guidance test with no explosive warhead. This particular version can have the range doubled by adding a booster unit. The importance of this version test is that it can carry a much larger warhead than a missile similar to the KH-55.
The importance here is that nothing new has been discovered since the publication of the 2011 NIE. Thus it would not alter the DNI summation that: “We do not know…if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
The IRGC-QF and the Iranian MIOS will continue to collect on CNWDI and purchase functional technology as it may become available. This is a normal function of positive intelligence activities; not unique to Iran. This does not mean that Iran has an active and coordinated Nuclear Weapons Program. It just means that they scavenge what has been proliferated by Nuclear Capable nations. And scavenging activities are a symptom of a non-existent or troubled program grasping at any opportunity to cobble together something.
Most Respectfully,
R



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