Shek

Hezbollah

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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

m1tch311

The hezbos are Shias? idk that. Though they were mainly funded by syria or is that hamas?

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My RIGHT as an American to PWN!!

Parihaka

Iran.
Here's a commentary from the time of the last Israel/Hezbollah war.
Mahmoud Sabit at PostGlobal: PostGlobal on washingtonpost.com

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In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

m1tch311

thanks intresting

S-2

Forgotten here is that the Alawites, though a shia minority, are the controlling element of Syrian power and have been well-established since Hafaz al-Assad.

Nothing is easily understood here.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

citanon

Without knowing much about naval operations, it's not obvious we would lose an entire carrier group since these were able, in theory, to handle a Soviet air strike group back in the day and should have greater capabilities today from cooperative engagement and improved sensor, weapons, aircraft, etc. Granted, the Gulf area is highly constricted geographically.

Also, why does even 1 carrier have to remain inside the Gulf with air operations running from Iraq, Kuwait, and possibly Saudi Arabia? Iraq would have limited say in the matter, Kuwait and the Saudis are both driven to counter Iranian attainment of nuclear arms.

Not saying you are wrong. Just looking for enlightenment.

S-2

Zraver's working on the assumption that G.C.C. states won't allow offensive ops from their soil. As such, the initial air campaign would largely be carried by off-shore carrier-based aircraft.

You suggest otherwise.

A nation's input matters. Should Iraq decline to permit offensive ops, as example, I'd hope we'd honor that decision. Once Iran reacts, we'll likely have all the authority and permission we need to operate from G.C.C. Saudi/Iraqi bases. Probably not beforehand.

I don't know that a carrier group needs to remain in the gulf to sustain maskirovka and I'm unsure that we need three carrier groups. How many carrier aircraft will it take to provoke Iran into observable action that will justify the use of G.C.C. bases, as example? If we are assured that all bets are off at that point and we'll have free use of these facilities following any Iranian retaliation, then our initial effort may be quite small- only sufficient to demand a forceful and obvious response by Iran.

citanon

I think the trouble with trying to provoke an Iranian response to justify full blown offensive operations from nearby states is that Iran's response would not only have to be forceful, and obvious, it would also have to be immediate and non-defensive. Unless offensive operations were sustained and effective, Iran could opt not to play that game and instead choose to ramp up insurgent activity in Iraq and Afghanistan in retaliation while seeking to strike at US support and escort ships and other targets of opportunity directly related to the striking groups. Israel's fight against Hezbollah last year and past NATO operations against Serbia seems to cast doubt on the ability of a pure air campaign to force Iran into strategic concessions, especially if the Iranians hunkered down and used political means to hamper US operations. In the present political climate, the ultimate duration of such a campaign in the absence of rash Iranian response is also likely to be short.

On the US side, even without explicit permission for offensive operations from their soil, presumably USAF tankers, support craft and defensive combat screens could allow one or two carrier groups positioned outside restricted waters of the Persian Gulf to sustain a higher tempo of offensive operations than they could alone. These could act in conjunction with long ranged bombers flown from outside the Middle East. With aid of the regional Combined Air Operations Center coordinating assets, maybe this could be quite seemless. Would such an operation do enough damage to Iran to force an immediate reaction?

Also, the CAOC is a fixed target at a fixed location. Could the Iranians seek to limit US air operations tempo via political means, then use the opportunity to attack that location with a concentrated ballistic missile strike? (I realize that this is not necessarily consistent with the hunker-down plan.)

Finally, would Israel initiate a new war against Hezbollah in coordination with US action?

snc128

which Hezbollah you are refering to? because there are many... and to let you know, they arenot completely shi'a or sunni or even completely consist of muslims!

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citanon

I guess, on the offensive side, the central questions for US planners are: What are the key pressure points and red lines for the Iranian leadership? What are the pillars of long term Iranian regional influence? Militarily, what are the most effective and sustainable means of attacking them?

snc128

no, Alawites are not a shi'a minority, nor the ruling power in Syria is Alawites. they call themselves Fallah,their sect in Turkey is named as Nusayri. and these Nusayris consider themselves as Alawite but has hardly relationship with Alawites.

Oscar

Are they considered as being sunni or do they constitute a completely distinct entity from the two main branches of Islam? I was talking of the Assad family.

snc128

Alawites are not a such big group even in Turkey (though mainly exist in Anatolia) but some of them consider themselves as Shi'a falsely,some of them say Alawism has nothing to do with Shi'a sect and they are just muslims and so on.

S-2

"Sunni Muslim 74%, other Muslim (includes Alawite, Druze) 16%, Christian (various denominations) 10%, Jewish (tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo)"

For what it's worth from the CIA Factbook on Syria.

Many seem to believe that they represent both the leading edge of Syrian power as well being a shia sub-sect comprising about 12% of Syria's population.

S-2

Citanon,

It's fair to assume that any operation against Iran will ultimately target it's nuclear facilities to achieve destruction or compel enforcement. Doing so means a sustained campaign. Level of tempo is less important to some degree, provided our lassitude doesn't permit the additional hardening/concealment of key targets.

Any air campaign will likely attack immediate and near-term threats while establishing and maintaining both general air supremacy as well as transit corridors for further raids. ADA networks, naval facilities, airbases, IRGC/al-Quds facilities all represent viable first-order targets. So too gulf islands deemed a threat to shipping. These will likely be occupied.

Failure by Iran to respond will lead to it's eventual dismantling in any case. They'll respond and it'll be apparent, I'm sure of that. As to transparency, we won't need much to justify going full-bore.