Considering a war with Iran - Page 11

Kansas Bear · 09-18-2007, 09:20 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by timhaughton

Well, I don't really have time to teach you all about the NPT, you could try reading it. There are numerous ways a signatory can be in breach of it. Read the legal brief I posted the link to to see the ways in which the US and UK are in breach of it as examples.

Just exactly which part of the US/UK MDA treaty violates NPT?

Bluesman · 09-18-2007, 09:30 AM

haughton is a moron. He believes, apparently, that a million Iraqis have been killed. Senator Reid (Dumbass, NV) believes this, too. And neither one has the slightest idea what he's talking about, either on this subject or any other.

For there to have been a million Iraqis killed in the 54 months since Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced, over 18,000 people would have had to have died every single month, some 600 a day, every single day.

That isn't even CLOSE to the reality, but these two lunatics don't really have too much use for the r-word.

Turn him off; he's nothing but static. You are playing chess with an opponent that insists on using the rules for checkers, so there is no hope of any result but your own frustration.

Treat him like he was dead.

timhaughton · 09-18-2007, 09:43 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kansas Bear

Just exactly which part of the US/UK MAD treaty violates NPT?

Woah! You just wiped out two continents! You need to be careful with your acronyms. MDA = Mutual Defence Agreement. MAD means something quite different in this context.

Quote:

The relevant part of NPT, article 1 provides that: 'Each nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices indirectly or indirectly...'

Quote:

Assertions about the importance of renewal of the MDA are not in conformity with the obligations of Article VI and the commitments made in the 2000 Review Conference. The MDA itself, as amended 1994, article 3 bis is directed towards 'improving the UK's state of training and operational readiness' (article 3 (1) (2)) and 'improving the UK's atomic weapon design, development or fabrication capability.' (article 3 (3) bis). These both imply continuation and indeed enhancement of the nuclear programme, not progress towards its discontinuation.

timhaughton · 09-18-2007, 09:46 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Bluesman

haughton is a moron. He believes, apparently, that a million Iraqis have been killed. Senator Reid (Dumbass, NV) believes this, too. And neither one has the slightest idea what he's talking about, either on this subject or any other.

I have a non-partisan, peer reviewed, scientific study to back up my numbers. What do you have? Other than significant quantities of hot air and official state propaganda?

If you're not intelligent enough to compete, stay at home.

Bluesman · 09-18-2007, 09:51 AM

Remember, guys: he's DEAD.

timhaughton · 09-18-2007, 10:03 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Bluesman

Remember, guys: he's DEAD.

Quit your whining and get a job.

**Officer of Engineers** · 09-18-2007, 10:29 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by timhaughton

Well, I don't really have time to teach you all about the NPT, you could try reading it. There are numerous ways a signatory can be in breach of it. Read the legal brief I posted the link to to see the ways in which the US and UK are in breach of it as examples.

I've read that thing in full and you obviously have not.

Quote:

Originally Posted by timhaughton

The fact remains that obtaining materials that could be preparatory to starting a nuclear weapons program is a breach.

Starting a nuclear weapons program is a breach, albeit in a different way.

But they are VERY different things.

How about operating cascades in complete secrecy away from IAEA accounting and obtaining weapons grade plutonium or did that part escape your attention?

Quote:

Originally Posted by timhaughton

Again, please substantiate the reference. Otherwise you're just some guy saying stuff.

If you can't substantiate either, shall we move on?

Your legislature says it's legal. Only your court can overrule them. They have not. This challenge was brought forth in 2004. It's now 2007. It went nowhere. Yes, shall we move on? Or is logic too strong a point for you?

And read the MDA for crying out loud, it involves NO transfer of nukes, nor even nuclear warhead designs. Warhead specifications is not the same thing. The Brits will need that info for conventional warheads as well.

timhaughton · 09-18-2007, 10:37 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kansas Bear

Quit your editing of information and post the entire paragraph(s) when ATTEMPTING to make your point.

Quote:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Seems pretty clear to me. Note the use of the semi colon to denote the two, separate, individual clauses. Could have been written:

Quote:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes:

- not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.

- not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

You ignore the semicolon in your analysis, so completely lose the original meaning. Semi colons are used to list clauses in a sentence. One could breach either of those. US and UK are certainly in breach of the first. I've only just noticed that the US could also be construed to be in breach of the second.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kansas Bear

Read correctly the treaty is stating recipent(s) as non-nuclear state(s). Not nuclear states.

No it isn't. Read correctly, you wouldn't ignore the use of the semi colon to denote the listing of separate clauses. Easy mistake to make.

**Officer of Engineers** · 09-18-2007, 11:10 AM

Let's read Article I your way.

Quote:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes:

- not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.

No nuclear warhead is given. No nuclear warhead design is given. Only warhead requirements for certain delivery vehicles are given be those warheads conventional or nuclear but those designs remain British. Not a violation.

Quote:

- not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Now, here's your objection

Quote:

Assertions about the importance of renewal of the MDA are not in conformity with the obligations of Article VI and the commitments made in the 2000 Review Conference. The MDA itself, as amended 1994, article 3 bis is directed towards 'improving the UK's state of training and operational readiness' (article 3 (1) (2)) and 'improving the UK's atomic weapon design, development or fabrication capability.' (article 3 (3) bis). These both imply continuation and indeed enhancement of the nuclear programme, not progress towards its discontinuation.

Since the UK is a nuclear weapons state recognize under the NPT, then such transfers are legal under the NPT.

S-2 · 09-18-2007, 11:26 AM

Mr. Haughton,

"I have a non-partisan, peer reviewed, scientific study to back up my numbers. What do you have? Other than significant quantities of hot air and official state propaganda?"

Could you provide a link to this study, please?

**Officer of Engineers** · 09-18-2007, 14:24 PM

It has become clear that Mr Haughton has not even read his own brief.

NPT's Article 1 is NOT in violation in accordance with the brief already presented. Paragraphs 24 -28

Quote:

# The relevant part of NPT, article 1 provides that: 'Each nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices indirectly or indirectly...'

# A number of commentators have argued that the MDA does not violate the NPT, article 1. The MDA, article V (B), is on its face in conformity with article 1 in that it states that 'there will be no transfer by either party of atomic weapons' (but makes no mention of nuclear explosive devices). The NPT has no definition section so neither 'nuclear weapons' nor 'nuclear explosive devices' are defined. The article may be seen as permissive rather than prohibitive in that it lists only what is not allowed. In the words of Dean Rusk: 'The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.'

# Dean Rusk asserted that the NPT 'does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles, or delivery systems, ... so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results.' (Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' 90th Cong. 2nd Session, 5-6 (1968)).

# The drafters 'intended to exclude nuclear delivery and military propulsion systems' and to limit the term 'nuclear weapon' to 'only one aspect of nuclear weapons capability, namely the warhead or bomb.' (M. Willrich, 'The Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World politics', 77 Yale Law Journal (1968) 1447, 1464). Article 1 does not prohibit the transfer of delivery systems such as missiles or aircraft that are merely capable of being equipped with nuclear warheads, nor the transfer of a nuclear reactor intended to provide the propulsion system for a submarine. This interpretation adopted by the US 'has not been challenged, at least publicly by other parties to the NPT.' (J. Woodliffe, 'Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation: The Legal Aspects', in I. Pogany (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 1987, 84, 89). This comment was made in 1987 before the Review and Extension Conference 1995 and the Review Conference 2000. It raises the question whether other states parties are bound by this interpretation through their acquiescence and failure to protest. The failure to get any final document agreed in 1995 that incorporated objections to the interpretation of article 1 raised in the draft report from Main Committee 1 (Bundle, Tab 1, p. 25) is consistent with that view.

# Assistance that does not amount to actual direct or indirect transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices (depending upon the interpretation given to those words) does not therefore contravene the wording of article 1. The prohibition in article 1 on nuclear weapons states assisting, encouraging or inducing the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices applies only to non-nuclear states. 'This leaves open the possibility that nuclear-weapon states could "assist" each other in ways that do not amount to transfer, again leading commentators to suggest that article 1 is not breached by the MDA.' (M. Willrich, 'The Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World politics', 77 Yale Law Journal (1968) 1447, 1477).

The main objection is Article VI

Quote:

# However, obligations under the NPT, article VI, need also to be considered. Article VI states: 'Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control.'

# Article VI is the 'only treaty provision in which NWS have undertaken a legal obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament agreements.' (M. Marin Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Future', in L. Boisson de Chazournes and P. Sands, eds), International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, 1999, 375, 388). 'It is important to note that the NPT is the only existing international treaty under which the major nuclear powers are legally committed to disarmament.' (T. Rauf, 'Nuclear Disarmament: Review of Article VI', in J. Simpson and D. Howlett (eds), The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1995, 66,67). It is 'the single most important provision of the treaty, however, from the standpoint of long-term success or failure of its goal of proliferation prevention'. (E. Firmage, 'The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', 63 American Journal of International Law (1969) 711, 732).

# India, Brazil, Scandinavian states, Canada, the then UAR and Germany 'brought strong pressure upon the Co-chairmen to obtain some statement within the treaty concerning nuclear disarmament.' (E. Firmage, 'The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', 63 American Journal of International Law (1969) 711, 733). The August 1967 draft included reference to 'cessation of the arms race' in its preamble. An earlier version of Article VI was included within the body of the Revised Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 18 January 1968. Sweden in particular insisted on strengthening Article VI by broadening the commitment of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to seek disarmament agreements. In the GA debate on the draft treaty further objections were made to the lack of 'tangible commitment to nuclear disarmament by NWS (for example by Brazil, India). Article VI was further revised before its inclusion in the adopted Treaty. (E. Firmage, 'The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', 63 American Journal of International Law (1969) 711, 716-721).

# The drafting history is important as it shows the linkage between the commitment of non-nuclear states to non-proliferation and the obligations on nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament. Article VI was an integral part of the NPT package, not just an 'add-on'. Its importance to the objectives of the treaty is indicated by the Preamble, paras 8-12. These include the 'intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race' and 'to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.'

# The 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not lead to the 'specific commitments towards genuine nuclear disarmament within a concrete time frame' sought by a number of non-nuclear states leading to the conclusion from one commentator that in 1995 'it ceased to be a tool for nuclear disarmament.' (M. Marin Bosch, 'The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Future', in L. Boisson de Chazournes and P. Sands, eds, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, 1999, 379, 383).

# However the Final Document of the Review Conference 2000 (without the leverage of non-nuclear weapon states in threatening non-extension) reiterated the importance of the commitment to disarmament in a number of its statements. For example in its Review of the operation of the treaty the Conference noted the overwhelming majority of States entered into their legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons 'in the context, inter alia of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapon states to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.' (Bundle, Tab 6, p. 3). Further the Conference reaffirmed that the 'strict observance' of the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.

# The Review Conference also agreed practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement NPT, Article VI: Step 6 'An unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI'. Step 9: Steps by all NWS 'leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability ... increased transparency by the NWS with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities ... concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.' (Bundle tab 6, p. 18).

# Thus the importance of Article VI to the objects and purposes of the NPT is shown both by the negotiation history of the NPT and by the reaffirmation of its significance by the 2000 Review Conference. The Review Conference also emphasised that strict observance of the NPT is required, that is observance with both the letter and spirit of its articles.

# In addition in 1996 the ICJ in an Advisory Opinion unanimously asserted that:

There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control.
(Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ Rep. Para. 105 (2) (F)).

# In the view of one commentator the Court has broadened the scope of Article VI from being just a 'code of conduct'. Marin Bosch states that 'The Court recognises that the provisions of Article VI... go beyond mere obligations of conduct - to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith - and actually involve an obligation of result, i.e., to conclude those negotiations.' (M. Marin Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Future', in L. Boisson de Chazournes and P. Sands, eds), International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, 1999, 375).

# Assertions about the importance of renewal of the MDA are not in conformity with the obligations of Article VI and the commitments made in the 2000 Review Conference. The MDA itself, as amended 1994, article 3 bis is directed towards 'improving the UK's state of training and operational readiness' (article 3 (1) (2)) and 'improving the UK's atomic weapon design, development or fabrication capability.' (article 3 (3) bis). These both imply continuation and indeed enhancement of the nuclear programme, not progress towards its discontinuation.

# Similarly, in his Message to Congress on the renewal of the MDA, President Bush wrote 'that the United Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces... I have concluded that it is in our interest to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force.' (Bundle, Tab 3). It is noticeable that the only reference to compliance with the law in this statement is to statutory, not treaty, law.

# This statement for the partner in the MDA is indicative of the UK's position that is supported by statements from the UK. For example the Strategic Defence Review, New Chapter July 2002 states that 'The UK's nuclear weapons have a continuing use as a means of deterring major strategic military threats.' (Bundle tab 1, p. 18). The vital importance of the MDA for the advancement of the UK's nuclear weapons programme and has been recognised in the UK. Statements referring to how it has enabled 'significant advances in several areas of research' and how joint activity under the Agreement is to the 'benefit of the nuclear weapons programme on both sides of the Atlantic' are on the AWE website. (Bundle tab 1, p. 15). Another conclusion states that 'Together with the support of data and technical exchanges under the US/UK 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement ... the United Kingdom was able to put warhead systems into service with far fewer nuclear tests than any other Nuclear Weapon States.' (Experimental Hydrodynamics, Discovery Issue 5, AWE July 2002, bundle tab 1, p. 16).

# These statements make it clear that the MDA is important to the UK's ongoing nuclear programme. It is strongly arguable that this is not in accordance with the obligations under Article VI or the assertion of the 2000 Review Conference to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

Of which a number of other judgements and treaties (and not just the NPT and the MDA) were brought forth as examples of violations when no clear material breach has been found.

In other words, the intent to disarm is not supported by the MDA and not in spirit with the NPT to disarm.

This is laughable and deserved to be ignored as done by the British courts.

**Parihaka** · 09-18-2007, 18:50 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by timhaughton

Where is it written. Please substantiate this.

Sure, it's called Hague IV. As regards individuals, states create laws, not individuals. Show me a country that upholds the right of individuals to make war upon their or an external state.

**Parihaka** · 09-18-2007, 18:51 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by timhaughton

Can you substantiate this too?

See above

JAD_333 · 09-19-2007, 00:09 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by xerxes

The Iranian conservative sides says the following:

Strictly speaking of the governments and not people, I say we (Iranians) cannot trust the Americans, nor the British and the Russians. This is not purely based on the past British/Russian imperialism or the 1953 affair with Mossadeq, but based on the simple fact that two nations with diverging political views and aims cannot follow the same line in their forgien policy. Back in the days of the Shah, it was understood between the US government and that of the Shah, that the Gulf was Iran's area of influence, which worked well for the Americans after the departure iof the Brits and it worked aswell for the Shah who had ambitions to expand his aura further.
regards...

I will let JAD decide if these views are leftist, liberal or rightist or paranoist.

Thanks for your views.

The question of trust between Iran and the US is a non-issue, IMO. Iran can trust the the US will always act in its best interests and I would imagine the US expects Iran will do likewise. The friction currently existing between the US and Iran is due to a clash of interests. It's not in the interests of the US for Iran to dominate the Gulf region, and domination is clearly Iran's ambition. The easiest and quickest way for Iran to achieve domination is to possess nuclear weapons, and there is a large body of evidence indicating that is Iran's goal. The US and its allies will not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Iran is understandably upset that it is being pressured to yield its soverienty in this matter. But Iran must recognize that its ambitions are too large. If it persists in stalling a resolution to
the nuclear issue, it will be forced to resolve it.

If I may ask, were you a supporter of the Shah?

If your position is considered conservative, what would the liberal position be?

cheers

timhaughton · 09-19-2007, 03:59 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by S-2

Mr. Haughton,

"I have a non-partisan, peer reviewed, scientific study to back up my numbers. What do you have? Other than significant quantities of hot air and official state propaganda?"

Could you provide a link to this study, please?

The original Lancet study can be read here.

Further work has been done by:

Iraq Body Count
Just Foreign Policy

The original figures were for about 655,000 as of June or July last year if memory serves. The JustForeignPolicy figures use an odd kind of extrapolation technique to get their figures of just over a million deaths, personally I don't like their technique and wouldn't put great stock in it. I think the number is probably closer to 750,000 than a million. But what's a quarter million Iraqis?

09-18-2007, 09:30 AM	#152 (permalink)
Bluesman WAB Bartender *Defense Professional* *Military Professional* Join Date: 11-24-04 Location: Vacaville, CA. Posts: 7,387 Country:	haughton is a moron. He believes, apparently, that a million Iraqis have been killed. Senator Reid (Dumbass, NV) believes this, too. And neither one has the slightest idea what he's talking about, either on this subject or any other. For there to have been a million Iraqis killed in the 54 months since Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced, over 18,000 people would have had to have died every single month, some 600 a day, every single day. That isn't even CLOSE to the reality, but these two lunatics don't really have too much use for the r-word. Turn him off; he's nothing but static. You are playing chess with an opponent that insists on using the rules for checkers, so there is no hope of any result but your own frustration. Treat him like he was dead. __________________ "The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory." - George Orwell

09-18-2007, 11:26 AM	#160 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Portland, Oregon Posts: 2,110 Country:	Houghton Reply Mr. Haughton, "I have a non-partisan, peer reviewed, scientific study to back up my numbers. What do you have? Other than significant quantities of hot air and official state propaganda?" Could you provide a link to this study, please? __________________ "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski Last edited by S-2 : 09-18-2007 at 11:28 AM. Reason: Correct the spelling of Haughton's name

09-18-2007, 09:51 AM	#155 (permalink)
Bluesman WAB Bartender *Defense Professional* *Military Professional* Join Date: 11-24-04 Location: Vacaville, CA. Posts: 7,387 Country:	Remember, guys: he's DEAD.

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