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Old 05-31-2007, 19:26 PM   #31 (permalink)
zraver
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This is an interesting discussion. The statement above isn't historically accurate though.

Remember, Israel forgot to tell the US they were going to attack Egypt in the 6 days war. I think any Iran strike will be similar to this, because like the 6 days war, Israel would only attack Iran if the country truly believed its survival was at stake. Under those conditions, Israel would not tell the US.

Also to twist the topic a little I would pose the question...

What is the bare minimum of US Naval assets required in the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters for the US to attack Iran on Day 0. What about Day 10.

I think I know the USN answer, but I am curious what many here would think.

It takes 2 weeks for warships to reach the Gulf from the US, so consider that when talking about the minimum on day 0, and day 10.

Assets include all naval vessels and logistics vessels, including carriers, Marine ships, combatants, submarines, and logistics ships. Does not include land based forces (USAF, Army Units, SOF, Navy Based Assets in Bahrain).


Whats the objective?

is it just to take out the reactors, reactores, navy, and anti-shipping and SRBM missiles, just the anti-shipping and SRBM? Mission determines the level of force that would be required, then you modify by other consideratiosn like politics and allies. 3-4 attack subs with a couple of nuclear armed tomahawks and a larger number of anti-shipping tomahawks could denude Iran over night without touching the reactos by destroying Iran's ability to wage a tanker war. Without that she would probably have to talk or face more miltiary action at the leisure of the US.
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Old 05-31-2007, 19:52 PM   #32 (permalink)
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Originally Posted by zraver View Post
Whats the objective?
As always, it is political.

There are 9,260 news hits on google for the past month alone regarding a military confrontation with Iran. This topic is a reflection of that ongoing media discussion, as is this specific forum on WAB, so I pose the question...

What is the minimum US Navy (or allies) force required by the US to achieve a political victory to the effect of removing the Iranian nuclear weapons program that may or may not even exist, and further the political objective of 'eventual' regime change.

You do of coarse ask the right question, in my opinion anyway.
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Old 05-31-2007, 20:41 PM   #33 (permalink)
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August 15th 2007 would always be remembered as Iran's Pearl Harbor Day. That morning at 3:15 AM a B-2 Spirit Bomber that had left Missouri 2 days earlier on a "routine' training flight dropped two deep penetrating bombs severing Iran's links with its coastal regions near Bandar Abbas. At 3:16 before anyone was even aware of the event the US unleashed "Operation Earwig" a massive co-ordinated attack on Iran's cyber,phone, and electronic spectrum assets effectively blinding the country. Included in this infowar attack were spoofed messages containing contradictory orders for various units, the result was that the entire defense establishment was thrown into temporary confusion. Most Iranian airforce planes that did manage to get scrambled went running for the prized reactors or Tehran leaving the actual US targets uncovered.

The first real combat occured at 3:27 when a mk 48 torpedoe slammed into an Iranian kilo class submarine, by 4:23 Iran's magor surface and submarine combatants were sitting on the bottom of the Persian Gulf or running for thier lives. At 4:02 Cruise missiles from the submarines and USN stationed just outside the gulf began impacting on Iran's missile launch sites and coastal batteries. At 4:30 that mornin USN Seals (and unrevealed at the time SAS and ASAS) troops began taking over several platforms in the Gulf controlled by Iran.

By the time the sun came up and as USN F/A-18's loaded for anti-shipping took over the anti-shipping/ tanker escort mission it was nearly over. Iran's missiles the fast boats were finally getting into the fight but it they were firing blind and scored no hits on the tankers now doing their best to leave the warzone. Dozens of fast attack craft made piecemeal dashes into the Gulf and all but 4 were intercepted before they could aquire a target and launch, the 4 that did fire found no hits in the anti-missile and ecm rich envirment. The carriers, iran's first choice had slipped out of the Gulf unremarked a few days earlier and were now safely in the vastness of the Indian Ocean. Around noon Iran made a fatal blunder and fired a SCUD missile loaded with mustard gas at King Khalid Military City. The missile was not a solo launch it was part of a wave of missiles being sent towards the Arabian Kingdom. Most were easily dispatched by the Patriot block III's but a few incluing the mustard gas armed one got through.

Iran's UN ambassador denied the launch was authorized, even claiming it was a hoax or that the US or Israel had conducted the attack, but the US and Suadi govemrents didn't care. Causalties at the sitewere heavy despite defensive preparations, at least 256 American's had been killed or injured and a like number of Suadi nationals were also causalties. President Bush addressed America and the wold as soon as the news reached the Whitehouse. The president was on every TV station decrying the Iranian resort to WMD's, his offical comment however was so bland (I have instructed our commanders in the feild to make sure not one more Ameircan life is lost to poision gas) compared to the US reprisal that many people were actually shocked when Bandar Abbas was hit by a single nuclear armed tomahawk at 9PM that night local time. A US predator drone on station and watching transmitted the image live as the US DoD breifly took control of many of the worlds satalite based broadcasting systems which were at least partially US owned. The double whammy of a nuclear fireball over a modern American enemy and the seizure of communication satalites would have long lasting defense related repercussions. Historians would later state it was the day the clock struck twelve, a refrence to the old Cold War atomic clock.

As darkness fell on the first day of war the USAF stopped just tangling with and murdering the Iranian airforce and took the fight to Iran, After US Army AH-64 Longbow model Apaches did a repeat of the ODS corridor strikes and opened up a critcal airroute while F-22 Raptors swept the sky, F-15E strike eagles began swinging across the border to hit major military targets and transportation routes leading to Iraq. RAF and RSAF units also now joined fight and Iran began to be buried under the weight of bombs.

Despite several major news network being present in Iran reports of the fighting had to be hand carried into a neighboring Pakistan or Russia to be delivered as Operation Earwig continued and electronic communication in or out of Iran remained impossible. The pentagon would alter call this aspect infomation channeling and control through the use of technology denial system (ICCTUTDS) and would post war set up another shadowy alphabet Agency the TCIMA (Technology and Information Monitoring Agency) to handle the mission in the future.

As dawn broke on day 2 Russia and China finally managed to push through a resolution condemming the bombing and calling for a cease fire, althoug due to iranian initiation oif the WMD exchange no belligernat was signalled out. The initial motions had been blocked by the UK which was not a combatant until the previous evening and had used its VETO. The US signalled it was willing to stop bombing as soon as Tehran agreed to comply with previous UN resolutions regarding its nuclear program. With direct communication cutoff however, the bombing continued until snailmail could relay the messages between Tehran and its UN Ambassador.

The US used this time to good effect going after the Iranian military with a vengance for all the EFP's in Iraq and the left over shame of the Hostage crisis. Once the bulk of the Iranian airdefence net went down even the piggish A-10 got into the fight expending a great deal of 30mm cannoin and mavrick missiles on suspected smuggling points that had been used to get weapons into Iraq. The US was also waiting on a very special event, and finally they got it. Iran had been faced with a difficult choice- shut down the reactors and make them vulnerable to bombing, or keep them up and running and risk poisioning Iran if the US bombed anyway. Iran wisley chose to shut them down after the nuclear exchange rather than risk national survival, and once US satalites confirmed the shutdown and cold reactors, stealth bombers swung into action and the reactors were destroyed. Once the destruction was confirmed the bombing took a pause and electronic communication was restored.

Iraq, As expected Iranian cells, thier miltia supporters and even Sunni insurgents swung into action and the bloodiest week of the war was soon under way. With most of the in theater aircraft tasked for other missions and confronted with a general uprising several small forward bases were overrun and several more were soon in a state of seige. Army losses alone for the week would top 200 killed. After the war General Patrais would say the USMC airwings, virtually the only tac-air avaible for the first couple of days had saved the US Army from its first defeat in 50 years. As heavy as US losses were, the poorly trained militia suffered worse, at least 1,500 dead in 48 hours.

World wide, the results were as expected, massive indignation and support for Iran among the Arab street and most of Western Europe. Oil prices went upward at light speed topping $345 USD after the mustard gass attack and hitting $600 once the US unleashed the nuclear genie. The double WMD attacks shocked the world and pundits were crying about the imminent global depression, but luckily there were no more exchanges, and by the time the reactors were blown the price had dropped to $278 and once communication was restored and Iran cried uncle the price began to plummet.

Postwar Iran, with a stagnant economy, rampant inflation and now a sound military defeat coupled with the destruction of billions in military technology purchased with hard earned currency the current Iranian goverment folded as Khameni called for elections in a bid to head off the fall of the Islamic regime itself. The results were only partial successful, the new president a moderate former University Proffessor was quickly able to seize on various UN mandates, public shock, and the clerics own blindness to create a nearly unassaible block that effectively locked the religious leaders out of the decision loop.

Postwar US, intially the quick victory bouyed president Bushes numbers, even with the nucelar strike America was riding high on its victory. However by the time of the elections the death count of Bandar Abbas, 178,000 of a prewar population of 350,000 was simply too much for American psyche and Barrac Obama won in a land slide. Inside the Pentagon the advocates of RMA felt justified and could rightly point to an amazing victory as technology triumphed will in the most lopside strategic campaign in history.

Postwar Iraq, hatered of America ran high, but that was not new news, however with the heart cut out of the militias both via heavy losses and a sudden lack of Iranian support and certain trepidation of taking on the Ugly American's who were now not only nuclear armed but nuclear willing created an atmosphere where politics were able to triumph and several cease fires were signed- broken- and signed again, but at least the parties were talking. AQ in Iraq already locked in a private war with the Sunni militias and insurgent groups never gave up, but was increasingly ineffective without public support.

4x Attack subs

6x Aegis class warship

2x carrier

2x B2 bomber

12x F-22

1x nuclear armed tomahawk

USAF/RAF/RSAF assets already in theater
ground combat assets already in theater

Last edited by zraver : 06-01-2007 at 05:34 AM.
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Old 05-31-2007, 22:03 PM   #34 (permalink)
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Geez, xraver, nice piece of Casey fiction, a one page thriller. As I was reading it, I got the eerie feeling that Iran is playing with fire with their nuke quest and that it will not succeed due to the playing out of a scenario much like you laid out. But I wonder if the same end can be achieved by a less intense attack, or even the imminent threat of one.
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Old 05-31-2007, 22:35 PM   #35 (permalink)
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Doubtful, the US had good strategic thinkers, they know that roight now and for several years to come the real threat from Iran is a tanker war. If the US ever decides to bite the bullet and take the hit in oil prices thats the way it will go down.
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Old 05-31-2007, 23:06 PM   #36 (permalink)
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no blowback?

no 1500+ small boat attacks?

no Revolutionary Guard SOF style strikes?

no mass attacks in Iraq?

no attack on Israel, but a chem attack against the Saudi's?

no ASuM attacks from any of the islands or platforms in the Gulf?

no minefields?

Your story assumes Iran would surrender before it even fights. What evidence is there, anywhere, to support this? It also assumes only conventional strikes, not asymmetrical, again, what evidence is there to support this?

I think you have also failed to see what the threat is from Iran. Virtually every threat is asymmetrical, even in the form of conventional truck mounted anti-ship missiles, and do the most damage to the US by attacking the vast number of commercial (unarmed) interests in the region that directly hit the US economy.

I think the possibility of chemical attack from Iran is unlikely. Iran's leadership can only win the same way the Hezbollah leadership can win against Israel, by winning the political war fought through the media. Thus, your scenario is a complete political loss for the US without Iran making first use of chemical weapons. No one in the world is going to easily forgive the US if it performs a strike against Iran, even its nuclear program, if it results in the sort of enormous economic impact worldwide that you mention. At $345 a barrel for oil Americans would be paying somewhere around $17 a gallon. How you think that is a political victory for the United States would be an interesting feat of political brilliance, since half the US and European population wouldn't be able to afford the gas necessary to get them to their job.

That isn't simply biting a bullet, that would be biting into the Tomahawk fired in your fiction.
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Old 05-31-2007, 23:55 PM   #37 (permalink)
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no blowback?

no 1500+ small boat attacks? 1

no Revolutionary Guard SOF style strikes? 2

no mass attacks in Iraq? 3

no attack on Israel, but a chem attack against the Saudi's? 4

no ASuM attacks from any of the islands or platforms in the Gulf? 5

no minefields? 6

Your story assumes Iran would surrender before it even fights. What evidence is there, anywhere, to support this? It also assumes only conventional strikes, not asymmetrical, again, what evidence is there to support this?

I think you have also failed to see what the threat is from Iran. Virtually every threat is asymmetrical, even in the form of conventional truck mounted anti-ship missiles, and do the most damage to the US by attacking the vast number of commercial (unarmed) interests in the region that directly hit the US economy.

I think the possibility of chemical attack from Iran is unlikely. Iran's leadership can only win the same way the Hezbollah leadership can win against Israel, by winning the political war fought through the media. Thus, your scenario is a complete political loss for the US without Iran making first use of chemical weapons. No one in the world is going to easily forgive the US if it performs a strike against Iran, even its nuclear program, if it results in the sort of enormous economic impact worldwide that you mention. At $345 a barrel for oil Americans would be paying somewhere around $17 a gallon. How you think that is a political victory for the United States would be an interesting feat of political brilliance, since half the US and European population wouldn't be able to afford the gas necessary to get them to their job.

That isn't simply biting a bullet, that would be biting into the Tomahawk fired in your fiction.
1- small boats vs 2 carrier airwings and apaches out of Iraq, the tanker war proved that they can damage tankers but not sink them.

2- The RG guards may kill US soilders, or they may get stomped into the mud, but either way they wont keep a single ship or bomber out of the fight.

3- Again even a Tet style invasion suddenly appearing in Iraq depsite the USAF knocking out the bridges and rail/road hubs wont keep a single bomber or ship out of the fight

4- Iran cannot currently hit Israel with missiles, it does however target Suadi Arabia

5- Note the aegis ships I had deployed to shoot down the missiles, the missiles also need targets with no surface search radar or some other form of eyes what exaclty are the going to be aiming at? Thats why I had Iran firing blind

6- What exaclty is going to deploy the minefeilds? any surface combatant capable of mine deployment will be sunk and smaller dhows or other craft pressed into military use simply are not big enough to create mine belts. The tanker war showed mines to be a hazard when they drifted into shipping lanes becuase neither Iran or Iraq had enough ships to build true belts.

As for the rest of your post, I am sure you wanted an Iran powns the US responce but thats not going to happen. The US is called a hyper-power for a reason. How exactly are those truck mounted anti-shipping missiles going to have a major impact without guidence? I had the US conducting a complete info-grid take down for a reason, it is a capability they demonstrated during the OIF invasion. The US also demonstrated the ability to spoof orders and get inside the enemy chain of command and decision cycle via cyber and info-war strategies.

Iran might or might not be able to handle the US Army in Iraq, but Iraq is no Lebanon and the US Army is not Israel and is quite capable of handling itself. Hell under my scenerio they could simply pull into the Greenzone and watch the fireworks on the evening Pentagon breifing-I described a Navy-Airforce war.

The simple fact is Iran is in no way prepared to take on the US in a war the US picks and in a war the US dictates the nature and tempo of. The spike in oil prices would hurt and hurt bad but again the fallout would not hit until it was too late. A Modern economy has enough resilence to last a couple of weeks at any price of oil, namely becuase the contracts for oil already in transit have been signed long ago and the goverments can lock the price without costing the oil companies a dime in the short run. The US has the power to remove Iran as a player in a matter of days. Long before the pre-war oil even finishes reaching its ports of call.

As for the WMD attacks, Iran and Suadi Arabia have had scud type missiles aimed at each other for decades now, bet you didn't know that. And since those missiles are already targeted they can be fired without active guidence hence choosing King Khalid Military City for the "event." Iran used mustard gas in the Iran-Iraq war and there is no reason to assume she has dumped her chemical weapons stockpile, those missiles and WMD stockpiles are under religious control and a zealot will do anything.

I will have you note the "Pearl Harbor" allusion. The US with its satalites, electronic eves dropping and various other forms of intel including humint is quite capable of staging and keeping staged the assets nessecary to intiate a war and then unleashing those assets at will when they determine that an already vulnerable Iran is even more vulnerable. Such situations include inclement weather, a key figure going on vacation, a critical telephone exchange going down for 6 crucial hours for maintence etc the possibilites are endless and the US has the attackers advantage of picking the initial when and where to strike.

And yes, Iran will fold before she really gets into the fight, if you bothered to study US warfighting you will see we leave countries devestated. We target everything that might be of military value. Sure that water purification plant supplies the drinking water for a major city, but it also supplies the water for Garrison X "BOOM!" no more water purfication plant. Iran watched the US do this to Irag for years and the Iranian goverment does not have near the level of control Saddam did, if they let the war go on and put Iran into the stone age they will lose power. Even if they don't quit they lose the ability to fight back effectively at sea or in the air in just a few days. With US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan Iran is hemmed in with no where to go. It's obsolete Mig 29's and F-5 knock offs are no match for US Airpower, especially when they are fighting blind.
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Old 06-01-2007, 02:02 AM   #38 (permalink)
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Did some quick digging online

Navy

Iran has 3 Kilo class SSK, 2 mini subs, and less than 20 credible surface combatants all but 3 smaller than destroyer class. The 3 destroyers might or might not be active, after than they have 5 Frigates, 2 corvettes, 22 FAC (M), 362 inshore craft non-missiel armed, 2 minelayers, 3 mine sweepers None of the Iranian naval craft mount the sunburn or chinese equivalent msot using much older chinese designs. The Most potent weapon apears to be the 21" super-cativating torpedoe but with only a 7km range its effectiveness vs the USN is doubtful.

Airforce

J-7 x20, Mirage F-1 x24, F-14 Tomcat x20(seriosuly degraded performance),Azarakhsh (improved F-5 type fighter) 20+, F-4 Phantom II x44, F-5 x44, Mig 29 x75

Ground/surface strike

Shafaq x20+, Su-24 x32, Su-25 x13 plus a number of AH-1 Cobra's and the locally prodcuced knockoff.

Anti-ship missiles

C-802 (comparable to Harpoon)
HY-2 Silkworm (SS-2-N Styx knockoff)
C-701 (super light ASM paternned after the US Maverick)
TL-10 (chinese copy of the exocet)

Airdefense

iran has a large inventory of SAM's and guns that have already been beaten time and again by modern counter measures. The countries limited supply of possibly more capable systems like the Tor is extremily limited (perhaps as few as 12 systems) and most likely concentrated around the reactors.

That is supposed to take on the United States and its allies and win?

Last edited by zraver : 06-01-2007 at 05:21 AM.
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Old 06-01-2007, 04:55 AM   #39 (permalink)
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Updated my "fiction" scenerio after a bit more reflection and Galrhan's points, hope you all enjoy.

Last edited by zraver : 06-01-2007 at 05:16 AM.
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Old 06-01-2007, 09:45 AM   #40 (permalink)
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I'd be curious if others have a take.

I'm not sure of zravors sources, but they are clearly open source and outdated.

Iranian RG forces have over 1500 armed, fast attack craft with weapons ranging from .50 cal to manpods to 57mm to torpedos to mortar launchers to anti-tank weapons. While only a mild threat to a major USN vessel, they represent major threats to ABOT and KAAOT, not to mention commercial traffic in the gulf.

Iranian naval forces currently deploy 31 craft between 600 - 2500 tons that carry ASMs. There are estimated to be over 40 mobile ASM launching trucks on islands like Kish, Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands alone, with several dozen more fixed and mobile launcher locations on the Iranian coastline itself. Iran has around 400 anti-ship missiles in inventory.

Iran has the 4th largest inventory of sea mines in the world, with the majority built or purchased since 1987 (in other words, modern sea mines, not the drift mines of the tanker wars). Iran ranks 2nd on the list in NATO of countries in the threat axis by use of sea mines, behind China but ahead of North Korea. A 1997 Army College thesis paper by LCDR John G. Walker concluded that as a result of its mine warfare area denial strategy, Iran was capable of deploying thousands of modern bottom mines from as many as 5 large and 200 small vessels. In a 2006 Naval War College thesis on Iranian Sea Denial Strategy that cites that article, it points out that Iran now deploys at least 5 mini-submarines able to deploy 16 mines each per sortie, and with over 6000 dwoh's leaving Iranian ports daily for fishing, the cluttered waters of the eastern Persian Gulf combined with its shallower water makes it extreamly difficult to identify individually Iranian fast attack craft that may be deploying mines. It points out that each mini sub can be completely resupplied logistically from a vehicle the size of a large truck from virtually any port able to support a dhow.

Iran has an estimated 1300 miles of tunnels developed along its western coast hill/mtn regions for the transport of military equipment underground, with concealed launch locations along the coast. While there are certainly ways to nuetralize the known locations from the air, it requires a large number of large weapons, which means they would require sorties from either heavy bombers or a large number of F-16s/F-18s.

My point is, while none of the threats are impossible challanges, a strike on Iran that prevents an effective or sustained blowback is one of the largest logistical challenges ever faced by the US Military. The threats from RG small boats and mines, the conventional air force and navy, combined with hard to target truck mounted ASMs represent the most difficult Sea Denial strategy the US Navy has faced since Leyte Gulf in 1944, against a Naval force that exercises more often than any other Middle Eastern countries Navy.

In 1987, the Navy lacked the helicopter aircraft and capability to observe enough Iranian small boats (at the time there were barely over 100), so the Army's TF 160 was deployed to launch its little bird helicopters from various warships and the Sea Base barge Hercules to provide assistance. A result of reviews from the tanker war and other changes to address small boat and mine warfare concerns has led the US Navy to develop several strategies just now coming around, including the ability for both Sierra's and Romoe's to deploy hellfire missiles, AESA radar on P-3s to provide "JOINT STARS" similar capability at sea, and a shift in focus to platforms that have resulted in the current LCS concept.

You have proposed a Naval force that includes less than 20 helicopters, around 10 fewer than the US utilized in 1987, to identify and nuetralize an Iranian small boat force nearly 15 times larger than the one in 1987. You have also accepted the near certain of economic collapse in major western nations as a strategic victory. Sorry zravor, I was hoping for a serious discussion, not a Tom Clancy novell. My bad.
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Old 06-01-2007, 11:10 AM   #41 (permalink)
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Really,

Many of those fast craft are nothing more than large jetski's with RPG's, large amount of mines still requires deployment, the magority of thier missiles are about the size of the US Maverick and designed for lightweight craft under 160 tons your line of thinking still requires Iran beign able to co-ordinate a comphrehensive campaign despite the US's well known and proven ability to take down an enemies infomation networks. It also requires than Iran be able to wage a war with the support of its population base somethign is does not have.

Nor have I assumed economic collpase, What I assume is that there is enough oil in transit to outlast the war. But hey beleive what ever you want about your Iranian super men. However one thing is clear if Iran get close to gettign the bomb then the likely hood of an uncrolled war intiiated by Israel goes sky high and that would leave the strait closed.

Now I don't have reliable figures but how many patrol type craft does the Coalition and WoT forces have and how many can the Gulf Arabs add? What is the operational range of most of thier craft? What do you feel is the minimum number of surfact combatants to keep the straits of Hormuz open? Iran may slag the Iraqi oil platforms but do they have an realistic capability of reaching the rest of the Gulf states loading terminals with enough force to do anything?

Also in may scenerio the birds are not just watching- thier feasting in a free fire zone. Hidden tunnels and truck mounted missiels increase durability but they do nothing to counter the US's massive electronic advantage, those fast boats would still be sallying out blind and heading for likely choke points a perfect spot for the US to concentrate its power for maximu effect. This isn't 1987 wher ethe US is escorting and dishing out mild reprisals this (mt scenerio) is GW Bush playing cowboy one last time.

How long do you think Iran can sustain a level of operations sufficient to keep the Gulf effectively closed? Remember that any such action also hurts them and thier shaky doemstic politcal base.

Last edited by zraver : 06-01-2007 at 11:38 AM.
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Old 06-01-2007, 11:20 AM   #42 (permalink)
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why not just drop a dozen of emp bombs? with no power nothing happens, they can,t enrich uranium by hand. plus they will have other problems to take care of.
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Old 06-01-2007, 17:02 PM   #43 (permalink)
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How long do you think Iran can sustain a level of operations sufficient to keep the Gulf effectively closed? Remember that any such action also hurts them and thier shaky doemstic politcal base.
Iranian super men? Did I insult you? Is this getting personal? It shouldn't simply because we see things differently.

The US operates around 14 armed vessels of various patrol boat classes in the region, includign Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iraq. I don't have an accurate count of allied boats, but I am unsure who would actually be an ally in any such conflict unless directly attacked by Iran.

I think you ask another good question. The key for Iran to keeping the Gulf closed is the amount of time it takes its opponents to clear threats from Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. That job is going to require boots on the ground. There are reported to be between 4000 - 8000 troops on Abu Musa alone, depending upon the source. Abu Musa is within only 25km of the only deep water channel out of the Persian Gulf able to support large super tankers, meaning the island is the answer to your question.

Finally while I am uncertain of your military background, I can tell it isn't Navy. Minesweeping is difficult anyway, and minesweeping within range of the enemy might be impossible if the minesweepers are in range. The most important part of minesweeping though is patience, because it takes time to be good at it, and it takes time to be effective at it. It took the US Navy, the Royal Navy, and other allies over 2 weeks to clear a channel through the mines in OIF to deliver supplies from sea to an Iraqi port, and that was with no threats to the mine demolition teams and a detailed map of the minefield in the harbor. Think about it, how long do you think it might take to clear mines without a map, likely under attack, and potentially with damaged ships in the area creating blockades in the only known deep water channel?

I said it before and I'll say it again, the greatest strategic challange from Iran in a strike scenario isn't the military strike aspect, it is the prevention of blowback and the logistical challange of having assets on demand to mitigate problems that result from the fog of war. The greatest tactical challange is being creative enough with the assets availble, and the inventory is enormous btw, to mitigate the problems that could be posed by asymetrical warfare, mine warfare, and island warfare on a large scale in one of the worlds most populated commercial zones at sea.

Are you going to bomb all the oil platforms? If not, how will you negate their radar systems as a targetting mechanism for anti-ship missiles?

How will you deal with the small boat problem in the Gulf? he Persian Gulf on JOINT STARS looks like a stary sky on a clear night. How will you identify each craft to seperate friend from foe?

How will you remove a disabled 150,000 ton supertanker on fire in the deep water channel?

How will you prevent the destruction of the Iraqi oil terminals?

How will you defend the oil terminals of the US allies from ballistic missile, surface, or submarine threats?

How do you respond to IRG attacks on commercial traffic in the Straits of Hormuz from UAE soil?

You dismissed my question with a JDAM and a Tomahawk. Thanks, but I'm actually looking for a more thoughtful discussion. I think the strike scenario can be achieved without blowback or political defeat, but I think it is going to require assets like, Marines, which most people outright dismiss in the Iranian strike scenario.

On your last point, I believe a US attack on Iran could solve their domestic political problems, not enhance them, if not done the right way politically.

Some history, because history always matters.

Operation Earnest Will

or Operation Preying Mantis:

Quote:
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This post contains copyrighted material, which is reproduced under the Fair Use Provision of Title 17, U.S.C. Section 107, and is posted for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. This material is posted without profit for the benefit of those who, by accessing this post, are expressing a prior interest in this information for research and educational purposes.



Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute 66 (May 1989)
© 1989 United States Naval Institute
The Surface View: Operation Praying Mantis

By
Captain J. B. Perkins III, U.S. Navy

For the escorts of Battle Group Foxtrot, preparations for the 18 April 1988 Operation Praying Mantis began in the southern California operating area ten months earlier. From this first underway period as a unit, the Battle Group Commander, Rear Admiral Guy Zeller (Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three) had insisted on a rigorous set of exercises to prepare for the upcoming tour on station in the North Arabian Sea (NAS). Initially, the ships drilled hard at interpreting rules of engagement (ROE) and at devising means to counter small high-speed surface craft (e.g., Boghammers) and low, slow-flying aircraft-both of which abound in and around the Persian Gulf. We later added exercises stressing anti-Silkworm (an Iranian surface-to-surface missile) tactics, boarding and search, Sledgehammer (a procedure to vector attack aircraft to a surface threat), convoy escort procedures, naval gunfire support (NGFS), and mine detection and destruction exercises.

We practiced in every environment-in the Bering Sea during November, throughout our transit to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and on station in the NAS. During the battle group evolution off Hawaii in January, we executed a 96-hour Persian Gulf scenario, with a three submarine threat overlaid. We conducted live, coordinated Harpoon missile firings in southern California and off Hawaii, dropped Rockeye, Skipper, and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) on high-speed targets off Point Mugu and Hawaii and drilled, drilled, drilled. By late March, each ship had completed dozens of these exercises, and we were considering easing the pace and working on ways to make the exercises more interesting, as the day approached when the Forrestal (CV-59) battle group would relieve us. Such philosophic discussions ended abruptly when the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) hit a mine on 14 April.

Four battle group ships en route to a port call in Mombasa were turned around, and the USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) and USS Bagley (FF-1069) raced north, refueled from the USS Wabash (AOR-5) and steamed through the Strait of Hormuz at more than 25 knots to join teammates, the USS Merrill (DD-976) and USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8) . They, and their Middle East Force (MEF) counterparts, the USS Simpson (FFG-56), USS O'Brien (DD-975), USS Jack Williams (FFG-24), USS Wainwright (CG-28) , USS Gary (FFG-51), and USS Trenton (LPD-14) repositioned at high speed as the plan was developed. In the NAS, the USS Enterprise (CVN65) closed to within 120 nautical miles of the Strait of Hormuz. Her escorts, the USS Reasoner (FF-1063) and Trurtun (CGN-35), were stationed to counter the potential small combatant threat in the Strait, and the air threat from Chah Bahar.

Table 1 U.S. Naval Order of Battle

OTC: Commander Joint Task Force Middle East

(Embarked on the Coronado) Battle Group Commander:

ComCruDesGru Three (Embarked on the Enterprise)

SAG Bravo:

OSC: ComDesRon Nine (Embarked on the Merrill)

USS Merrill (1 SH-2F)

USS Lynde McCormick

USS Trenton (1 SH-60B)

MAGTF 2-88 (4 AH-IT, 2 UH-1, 2 CH-46)


SAG Charlie:

OSC: CO, USS Wainwright

USS Wainwright

USS Bagley (1 SH-2F)

USS Simpson (1 SH-60B, I UH-60)

SEAL Platoon


SAG Delta:

OSC: ComDesRon Twenty Two (Embarked on the Jack Williams)

USS Jack Williams (2 SH-2F)

USS O'Brien (2 SH-2F, I UH-60)

USS Joseph Strauss

CVW-11 CAP/SUCAP Support

On 16 April, I flew with Lieutenant Commander Mark "Micro" Cessnock -- my one-officer "battle micro staff"- from the Enterprise to Bahrain at the direction of Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East (CJTFME). Rear Admiral Anthony Less, to assist in planning and executing the response. We were joined on the flagship, the USS Coronado (AGF-Il), by the MEF Destroyer Squadron Commander and began working on the plan with the CJTFME staff and other players. The objectives were clear:


Sink the Iranian Saam-class frigate Sabulan or a suitable substitute.

Neutralize the surveillance posts on the Sassan and Sirri gas/oil separation platforms (GOSPs) and the Rahkish GOSP, if sinking a ship was not practicable.

There were also a number of caveats (avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage, limit adverse environmental effects) to ensure that this was in fact a "proportional response."


It was a long night, but by 0330 on 17 April we had developed a plan. We formed three surface action groups, each containing both battle group and MEF ships, that were to operate independently but still be mutually supportive. Surface Action Group (SAG) Bravo was assigned Sassan (and Rahkish), SAG Charlie, Siril, and SAG Delta, the Sabalan. The Gary was our free safety, a lone sentinel on the northern flank protecting the barges. Each SAG commander had an objective and a simple communications plan to direct our forces, to coordinate if required, and to report to CJFTME.


Both GOSPs were to be attacked in the same fashion: we would warn the occupants and give them five minutes to leave the platform, take out any remaining Iranians with naval gunfire, insert a raid force (Marine reconnaissance unit at Sassan/SEALs at Sirri) on the platform, plant demolition charges, and destroy the surveillance post. Colonel Bill Rakow, Commander of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 2-88, and I developed a plan to coordinate NGFS and Cobra landing zone preparatory fire and discussed criteria for committing the raid force, which included the possibilities of die-hard defenders, secondary explosions, and booby traps.


At first light, as SAG Bravo approached the Sassan GOSP, the Trenton began launching helos, including the LAMPS-Ill from the Samuel B. Roberts, which we used for surface surveillance. The GOSP appeared unalerted as we came into view from the southwest and turned to a northerly firing course -- our gun target line was limited by a United Arab Emirates oil field three nautical miles south of Sassan and a large hydrogen sulfide tank on the northern end of the GOSP. H-Hour was set at 0800; at 0755, we warned the Sassan GOSP inhabitants in Farsi and English.

"You have five minutes to abandon the platform; I intend to destroy it at 0800."

This transmission stimulated a good deal of interest and activity among a growing group of Iranians, milling about on the roof of the living quarters. Several men manned their 23-mm. gun and trained it on the Merrill about 5,000 yards away, but many more headed for the two tugs tied up alongside the platform. One tug left almost immediately, and the other departed with about 30 men on board soon afterward. The VHF radio blared a cacophony of English and Farsi as the GOSP occupants simultaneously reported to (screamed at) naval headquarters and pleaded with us for more time. At 0804, we told the inhabitants that their time was up and commenced firing at the gun emplacement. This was not a classic NGFS mission; I had decided on airbursts over the GOSP to pin down personnel and destroy command-and-control antennae, but to avoid holing potential helo landing surfaces.


At the first muzzle flash from the Merrill's 5-inch mount 51, the Iranian 23-mm. gun mount opened up, getting the attention of the ship's bridge and topside watchstanders. The Merrill immediately silenced the Iranian gun with a direct hit, and encountered no further opposition. After about 50 rounds had exploded over the southern half of the GOSP, a large crowd of converted martyrs gathered at the northern end. At this point, we checked fire and permitted a tug to return and pick up what appeared to be the rest of the Sassan GOSP occupants. Following this exodus, the Merrill and the Lynde McCormick alternated firing airbursts over the entire GOSP (less the hydrogen sulfide tank), and we watched the platform closely for any sign of activity but saw none. As this preparatory NGFS progressed, Colonel Rakow and I selected 0925 as the time to land his raid force. In a closely coordinated sequence, the ships checked fire, Cobra gunships delivered covering fire, and the UR-1 and CH-46 helos inserted the Marines via fast rope. It was a textbook assault, and I caught myself stopping to admire it. Despite some tense moments when Iranian ammunition stores cooked off, the platform was fully secured in about 30 minutes, and the demolition and intelligence-gathering teams flew to the GOSP. About two hours later, 1,500 pounds of plastic explosives were detonated by remote control, turning the GOSP into an inferno.


Meanwhile, the fog of war had closed in periodically. First, a United Arab Emirates patrol boat approached at high speed from the northwest. We evaluated it as a possible Boghammer-a popular classification that day. It could be engaged under the ROE, but we just identified it and asked it to remain clear. Later, we reconstituted SAG Bravo and headed north to attack Rahkish GOSP, for no ship had yet been located and sunk. A Cobra helo crew, our closest air asset, evaluated a 25-knot contact closing from the northeast as a warship. This quickly took shape as a "possible Iranian Saam FFG," and the Merrill made preparations to launch a Harpoon attack. We then asked for further descriptive information and ultimately for a bull number. The contact turned out to be a Soviet Sovremennyy-cIass DDG. The skipper, when asked his intention, replied with a heavy accent, "I vant to take peectures for heestory." We breathed easier. Shortly after that, SAG Bravo was instructed to proceed at full speed to the eastern Gulf, in response to Boghammer attacks in the Mubarek oil field. That ended our participation in the day's fireworks.


At the Sirri GOSP, the sequence of events began essentially the same way they did at Sassan. SAG Charlie gave warnings on time, most of the occupants departed on a tug, and the Wainwright, Bagley, and Simpson commenced fire about 0815. Sirri was an active oil-producing platform, however, and one of the initial rounds hit a compressed gas tank, setting the GOSP ablaze and incinerating the gun crew. Thus, it became unnecessary to insert the SEAL platoon.


With the primary mission accomplished, SAG Charlie patrolled the area. About three hours later, they detected the approach of an Iranian Kaman patrol boat, which the Bagley's LAMPS-I identified as the Joshan. As the patrol boat closed, the SAG commander repeatedly warned the Iranian that he was standing into danger and advised him to alter course and depart the area. When his direction was ignored, the U.S. commander requested and was granted "weapons free" by CJTFME. He then advised the

Joshan:

"Stop your engines and abandon ship; I intend to sink you."

After thinking this communication over, the Joshan 's CO apparently decided to go out firing and launched his only remaining Harpoon. The three SAG Charlie ships, now in a line abreast at 26,000 yards, and the Bagley's LAMPS simultaneously detected the launch and maneuvered and launched chaff. The Harpoon passed down the Wainwright's starboard side close aboard (the seeker may not have activated) and was answered by a volley of SM-1 missiles from the Simpson and the Wainwright. Four missiles fired; four hits. An additional SM-1 (a hit) and a Harpoon (a miss, probably resulting from the sinking Joshan's sudden lack of freeboard) were fired, and the patrol boat was eventually sunk with gunfire.

SAG Charlie had still more opportunities to modify the Iranian naval order of battle when an F-4 made a high-speed approach just prior to the sinking of the Joshan hulk (SAG Bravo also detected approaching F-4s, but those dove to the deck and departed as they reached SM-1 range). The Wainwright is SM-2 equipped. As the F-4 continued to close, ignoring warnings on both military and internal air defense circuits, the SAG Commander fired two missiles and hit the Iranian aircraft. Only the pilot's heroic efforts enabled the Iranians to recover the badly damaged aircraft at Bandar Abbas. At this point, SAG Charlie was through for the day, as well.

For SAG Delta, it had been a frustrating night and day of following up intelligence leads and electronic sniffs as they tried to locate the Sabalan. Various reports had held her in port or close to Bandar Abbas with engineering problems. The tempo picked up when the U.S. civilian tug Willy Tide and a U.S. oil platform were attacked by Iranian Boghammers near the Saleh and Mubarek oil fields. The Joseph Strauss provided initial vectors that assisted the A-6s in locating and destroying one of these high-speed craft and chasing the others onto the beach at Abu Musa Island. Following this successful tactical air engagement, an Iranian Saam-class frigate, the Sahand, was discovered proceeding southwest at high speed toward the Mubarek and Suleb fields, perhaps as part of a preplanned Iranian response to the GOSP attacks. Another CVW-11 A-6 detected her when it flew low for a visual identification. Pursued by antiaircraft fire, the A-6 evaded and reattacked with Harpoon, Skipper, and a laser-guided bomb. This brought the Sahand dead in the water as SAG Delta closed on the position at high speed. The Joseph Strauss conducted a coordinated Harpoon attack with the A-6's wingman, achieving near-simultaneous times on target in the first-ever coordinated Harpoon attack in combat.

Although this was the SAG's final participation in the day's attack on Iranian forces, their location in the crowded waters of the Strait of Hormuz-closest to the Bandar Abbas naval base and airfield-led to several tense moments. Reports of Iranian Silkworm antiship missile firings and the apparent presence of targeting aircraft caused the SAG to fire SM-1 missiles at suspected air contacts and in several other near engagements. Because of the concentrated effort of both Battle Group Foxtrot and SAG Delta assets--with special credit going to the E-2C and F-14 aircrews-however, there were no blue-on-blue or blue-on-white engagements. These results reflect an extraordinary degree of discipline on the part of ship and air crews, as well as a bit of good luck, in this area jammed with so many oil platforms, neutral naval and merchant ships, small craft, and civilian aircraft.

As the sun set on 18 April, all objectives of Operation Praying Mantis had been achieved. There were no civilian or U.S. casualties, and collateral damage was nil. The Iranian war effort had been struck a decisive and devastating blow. Tactics and procedures that had been honed over the previous nine months had been dramatically validated, but a number of lessons were (re)learned which should be reviewed by commanders in future "proportional responses" of this sort. They include:

KISS: Keep It Simple, Stupid. Simple plans, with clear objectives and a minimum of interdependence and rudder orders from higher authority are most effective.

Force Integration: Pairing up disparate forces (e.g., at least one MEF and one battle group ship in each SAG; co-locating SAG and MAGTF commanders) is essential in a joint-or multiple task group-operation.

Surface Surveillance: Air assets, fixed wing and helos, are essential to force protection, targeting, and battle damage assessment. Visual identification is almost always required; especially in areas with high white and blue shipping densities.

"Proportional" responses: Classic contingency plans do not contain such options and should. The order to respond will leave little time to plan and collect intelligence.

Linguistic support: The Farsi linguist was indispensable; both in communicating with the Iranians and in gleaning intelligence from clear radio circuits.

GOSP destruction: This was not classic NGFS since the goal was to clear the platform, not destroy it. Their distinctive construction makes shooting off platform legs a non-starter and a waste of ammunition (we fired 208 rounds total at both Sassan and Sirti). Airbursts were effective for this mission but mechanical time fuse ammunition was in short supply.

Warnings: Warning an armed GOSP-or worse, a warship-prior to opening fire may register high on the humane scale, but it clearly ranks low in terms of relative tactical advantage. We should rethink this requirement.

Missile performance: SM-1 in the surface mode worked very well (five fired; five hits), which is better than my earlier experiences. With its high speed, it should be the weapon of choice in a line-of-sight engagement. Harpoon performance was good, and its use as a "stopper' '-even at relatively short range and in proximity of other shipping-was validated.

Fog of war: Karl von Clausewitz was right; it is always there. Commanding officers need to think through, talk through, and exercise in as many scenarios as possible with their watch teams. There is no cookbook solution to the problem of deciding when to shoot and when to take one more look first.

Most of us believe in the deterrent value of sea power and hope that by such strength we will successfully avoid conflict. Should deterrence fail, however, and hostilities occur, each of us wants to be there to act swiftly and decisively. Such was the opportunity presented to the ships and aircraft of Battle Group Foxtrot and the Middle East Force on 18 April 1988, and their crews did themselves, and all Americans, proud.
zravor, I have not assumed nor implied you to be ignorant or idiotic. I would appreciate if you would show me the same courtesy in this discussion.
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Old 06-01-2007, 23:23 PM