Indo-US nuclear deal comes under sharp criticism in Congress

**Monk** · 19 Nov 05,, 16:22

Originally Posted by Neo

Thursday, November 17, 2005
By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: Congressman Gary Ackerman has suggested that India should be required to declare a moratorium on further production of fissile material in exchange for Washington’s support for a permanent seat for New Delhi on the UN Security Council.

The congressman made the suggestion at yet another hearing on Wednesday on the Indo-US nuclear agreement signed between the two countries during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington in July this year. The agreement that would require a change in existing US law has run into heavy opposition from the nonproliferation lobby and several important senators and congressmen. Congress is irritated because the White House did not consult it before signing the agreement, which is seen as having serious implications not only for the United States but other countries including Pakistan and China.

The full committee hearing held by the House Committee on International Relations heard testimony from a number of experts, including Stephen P Cohen of the Brookings Institution, Ashley J Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Prof Francine R Frankel of the University of Pennsylvania. The well-attended two-hour session was chaired by Henry Hyde, Republican member from Illinois.

Cohen, who was appearing before a congressional committee on the same issue for the second time, said the big question is how many nuclear weapons India needs. He also stressed the crucial importance of determining the size of India’s military programme in the nuclear sphere and some way of ensuring that the civilian and military components are kept separate and apart. He was of the view that if India continued to produce and pile up nuclear weapons, other states would feel threatened. He also disagreed with the view advocated by India and its supporters that New Delhi has been a responsible nuclear power. Cohen pointed out that while it was true that India had not been a “horizontal proliferator”, it had been a “vertical proliferator”.

“India’s record of horizontal proliferation - sharing nuclear technology with other states - is very good, but it showed other states how to proliferate vertically - upwards - in the face of international sanctions and export control regimes,” he said.

Tellis, whose testimony and answers to the committee were generally supportive of India, said India would never accept a cap on its nuclear production unless China accepts a cap as well. He called it an international security issue. Asked if there could be a trade-off, he replied in the negative. Ackerman wanted to know if Washington should proceed any further were India to refuse to limit the size of its nuclear arsenal. The majority of witnesses replied in the affirmative, but advised the adoption of a thorough approach. Cohen said the United States should encourage an arms control regime involving India, Pakistan and China. In any case, an indefinite arms buildup was not in the interest of any of these countries, he added.

In his opening remarks, chairman Hyde said that while the establishment of a “global partnership” between India and the United States would appear to be a momentous event, any prediction of its long-term and real-world impact cannot be cast with any confidence. “It may yet prove to be a profound initiative, but it may be destined to take its place as one more of the many routine agreements between the world’s countries.”

He pointed out that the agreement had been “hurriedly negotiated, so hurriedly that those involved in the negotiations have stated that there was no time to consult with Congress beforehand”. He recalled that the committee had already held two hearings on the “controversial provisions” on nuclear cooperation and would continue to devote its attention to the implications the agreement may have for “our security and that of the globe”. He said while “the talk of this city” was that the new alliance was aimed at offsetting the rise of China, Indian leaders had denied that there was any such goal. He said India’s role in world affairs since its independence has been a “fraction” of what it otherwise might have been. He said the assumption by India of a more active role is very much to be welcomed if it is accompanied by a commensurate expansion of responsibility for reinforcing security and stability in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean region and Central Asia, and even for the international system as a whole. Complacency, he warned, would be a mistake. “Giant India’s emergence also summons giant possibilities,” he added.

Cohen told the committee that many Indians remain leery of close cooperation with the United States and none would subordinate Indian interests to those of the United States. India would not be a dependent state and it is more likely to emerge as an “Asian France”, one that “sees the world through its own prism, not ours”. India, he said, is much reliant on Middle East oil and gas and must maintain cordial relations with most of the major suppliers, including Iran. Nor does India want to become dependent on Pakistan. The proposed gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan is not likely to materialise soon, he predicted. While being a secular democracy, he pointed out, India is also a major Muslim state. In India, domestic issues are inevitably linked with those in the realm of foreign policy, he said. He told the committee that there was a huge demonstration in Lucknow condemning India’s vote against Iran in the IAEA.

Cohen advised the committee that India is “hyper-sensitive” to criticism of its Kashmir policy and wants to keep major Muslim states from either intervening in Kashmir or supporting Pakistan. “It thus conducts a sophisticated balance-of-power diplomacy, hoping to counter Pakistani influence in the Gulf and to keep Kashmir out of all discussions,” he added.

He pointed out that India’s new opening to Israel has brought New Delhi important technical, intelligence and military benefits and more influence in Washington “but some in India are uneasy with it”. India will have to continuously calculate the balance between its relations with Tel Aviv and Tehran. He said India does not want to run afoul of America’s nonproliferation policies in the Middle East but its strategists have strong reservations about American nonproliferation goals and tactics. He said India would rather not have found itself placed in a situation where it had to vote against Iran (at the IAEA) and would look for a way out in the future. He told the committee that both the US and India had miscalculated the complexity of the July 2005 nuclear deal and the likely opposition. He said “our own abysmal knowledge of India and its politics contributed to this situation”.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...11-2005_pg7_45

This article and the statements contained herein are the fundamental reasons to my opposition of the nuclear deal. The deal shouldn't and cannot go through. I would prefer India continuing production of fissile material to build a massive nuclear stock pile. We have already commenced the experimantation for converting thorium to U-233 and U-235, we also have the world's largest reserves of thorium. So screw the nuclear deal.
I only want economic co-op with the US.

**Samudra** · 19 Nov 05,, 17:15

I would prefer India continuing production of fissile material to build a massive nuclear stock pile.

How much money would you commit?
As we know the expenses do not stop with the manufacture of fissile material and warheads.*Today* nobody is stopping us from reprocessing the spent fuel.Why are we not doing it ?

Is the country willing to commit itself for a nuclear arms race against China?

**667medic** · 19 Nov 05,, 17:49

Is the country willing to commit itself for a nuclear arms race against China?

Think we lost that one some time ago.....

**Monk** · 20 Nov 05,, 15:16

Originally Posted by Samudra

How much money would you commit?
As we know the expenses do not stop with the manufacture of fissile material and warheads
Is the country willing to commit itself for a nuclear arms race against China?

Whatever it takes for security.

India doesn't have to be in an arms race with China.

Originally Posted by Samudra

*Today* nobody is stopping us from reprocessing the spent fuel.Why are we not doing it ?

Can I see some link / material on this statement?

**Samudra** · 20 Nov 05,, 17:39

Originally Posted by 667medic

Think we lost that one some time ago.....

The reality is we never wanted to enter a race in the first place.

India doesn't have to be in an arms race with China

The ramifications of a rapid Indian strategic arms build up will surely be felt in Beijing.PRC will react if it feels that the current 'balance'(or the lack of it) is threatened.

We know that India never has put up a number and said thats our MND.So how many weapons we want is our choice given the fact that it is we who will decide which reactors are for military applications,although the seperation has to make sense and should not be a token seperation.

Can I see some link / material on this statement?

The plethora of statements coming out of the DAE/PMO Authorities after the Indo-US nuclear deal indicates so.They have consistently maintained that the seperation of facilities is more or less present.

An agreement signed in 1963 by the US with India assured supply of fuel for Tarapur until 1993 provided India agreed for IAEA safegaurds(which means no reprocessing?).However the agreement was terminated in 1978.

The reactors are under IAEA safegaurds even today.(

)
So we are just going to place a "Civillian Reactor" board before them I'd think.

**Ray** · 20 Nov 05,, 19:15

Sunday, November 20, 2005 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

VIEW: US-India nuclear agreement will strengthen NPT —Ashley J Tellis

There is a fear that the US-Indian agreement will open the door to other nuclear suppliers engaging in reckless transfers of nuclear technology to their own preferred partners. This is possible, but not inevitable. A great deal depends on whether the international community will join the United States in viewing India as the only country worthy of special treatment

The Indo-US bilateral agreement providing New Delhi access to the long-denied civilian nuclear technology has emerged as a contentious issue in the US Congress. But it need not be because the deal is good for both countries’ national security interests as well as for preventing nuclear proliferation.

The July 18, 2005 agreement, many critics assert, would undermine the global non-proliferation regime and ultimately American security. At the first hearing on this subject on September 8, 2005, Congressman Henry J Hyde correctly noted that among the critical questions surrounding this agreement was whether its “net impact on our non-proliferation policy is positive or negative”. On October 26, 2005, at the second hearing on this issue, four out of the five witnesses empanelled by the House Committee on International Relations affirmed the conventional wisdom that such a deal weakens non-proliferation rather than strengthening it.

Contrary to these gloomy prognostications, the president’s new agreement with India is actually a bold step that will strengthen the non-proliferation order for many decades to come. Far from being a freebie for New Delhi, it represents a considered American strategy for integrating India into the non-proliferation regime, which India has not been part of since the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968.

The NPT was intended to prevent global proliferation by compelling all non-nuclear weapon states to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions as the price for enjoying access to civilian nuclear technology. This trade-off worked for most countries and represents a profound diplomatic accomplishment. For a variety of political and philosophical reasons, however, India chose not to sign the NPT and went on to build both a large civilian nuclear infrastructure and a nuclear weapons stockpile based mainly on indigenous expertise. Thus, the restrictions on nuclear commerce that the United States orchestrated since 1974 progressively lost their relevance as far as India was concerned. In effect, India became an exceptional case regarding nuclear weapons and non-proliferation.

Nevertheless, New Delhi established through this entire period an exemplary record of controlling onward proliferation. India’s commendable non-proliferation history, however, is owed entirely to sovereign decisions made by its government, not to its adherence to international agreements. As a result, any unilateral change in the Indian government’s policy of strict non-proliferation could pose serious problems for American security.

This concern has acquired particular urgency in the post-9/11 era because of the incredibly sophisticated capabilities present in India today and because India remains at the cutting edge of research and development activities in new fuel cycle technologies. Bringing New Delhi into the global non-proliferation regime through a lasting bilateral agreement that defines clearly enforceable benefits and obligations, therefore, not only strengthens American efforts to stem further proliferation but also enhances US national security.

The president’s accord with India advances these objectives in a fair and direct way. It recognises that it is unreasonable to continue to ask India to bear the burdens of enforcing the global non-proliferation regime in perpetuity, while it suffers stiff and encompassing sanctions from that same regime. So the president proposes to give India access to nuclear fuel, technology, and knowledge in exchange for New Delhi institutionalising rigorous export controls, placing its civilian reactors under international safeguards, and actively assisting the United States in reducing proliferation worldwide.

In other words, he offers India the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for transforming a unilateral Indian commitment to non-proliferation into a formally verifiable and permanent international responsibility.

This deal, obviously, does not imply less US commitment to maintain through intense diplomacy in the months and years ahead the vitality of the NPT regime, which remains critical to American national interests. Extraordinary problems justify extraordinary solutions. The international community has long recognised India’s anomalous position in the NPT framework. Consequently, three out of the five legitimate nuclear weapon states have welcomed the Bush-Singh agreement and even the exception thus far — China — has been silent rather than opposed. Despite this fact, many fear that the agreement could undercut the basic bargain of the NPT and lead several current non-nuclear weapon states to seek those same benefits now offered to India.

This concern must be taken seriously, but it is exaggerated. For starters, there is no international pressure to re-negotiate the NPT from either its nuclear or its non-nuclear signatories. Further, those non-nuclear weapon states that joined the regime and continue to remain members in good standing did so because the treaty emphatically serves their national interests.

If anything, these countries should join IAEA Director-General Mohammed El Baradei in applauding the Bush-Singh initiative, because an India that undertakes binding international non-proliferation obligations promotes the security of non-nuclear weapons states as much as it does that of the United States. Not surprisingly, then, many non-nuclear weapon states such as Canada and Australia have endorsed the agreement.

Finally, with regard to worries about other NPT non-signatories demanding similar deals to the one that Bush and Singh have just brokered, it is worth noting that India currently remains the only outlier worthy of such unique treatment. Although India, Pakistan, and Israel have not violated any NPT obligations by developing their nuclear deterrents, New Delhi alone meets the following criteria that justify international cooperation: It has proven mastery over various nuclear fuel cycles, which must now be safeguarded in the global interest.

It has an exceptional non-proliferation record, despite having been a target of the international non-proliferation regime. Most importantly, it has enormous energy needs that cannot be satisfied without access to nuclear fuel (and to nuclear power more generally), if it is simultaneously expected to help mitigate the problems of climate change and environmental degradation.

Two other arguments often surface in the debate over proposed US-Indian nuclear cooperation. The first is that it would exacerbate the problems posed by Iran and North Korea. This claim must be rejected since the only thing common to these three cases is the word “nuclear” — nothing more.

Iran and North Korea violated their NPT obligations; India did not. This simple fact ensures that whatever the issues relating to accommodating New Delhi may be, they ought not to be mixed up with those of managing regimes that have consistently cheated on their international obligations and then repeatedly lied about it.

The second argument contends that the US-Indian agreement will open the door to other nuclear suppliers engaging in reckless transfers of nuclear technology to their own preferred partners. This is possible, but not inevitable. A great deal depends on whether the international community will join the United States in viewing India as the only country worthy of special treatment.

At present, an emerging agreement on this issue is in the works and the prospects for a consensus are bright because India is a democratic state, has not violated international agreements and has exhibited responsible custodianship of its nuclear assets. In any event, the administration is committed to working with its international partners to reach closure on this issue and, hence, it ought not to be assumed that the understanding with New Delhi will automatically open doors to other nuclear suppliers engaging in emulative arrangements.

On balance, there are many reasons why Congress should support the president’s historic civil nuclear agreement with India. It would be unfortunate if the legislative branch overlooked the fact that strengthening the global non-proliferation regime is clearly one of them.

Ashley J Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and served in the US Department of State as senior adviser to the ambassador at the Embassy of the United States in India. He is author of India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture. This article appeared in YaleGlobal Online (www.yaleglobal.yale.edu), a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission. Copyright (c) 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...-11-2005_pg3_7

**Neo** · 20 Nov 05,, 19:38

Originally Posted by Monk

This article and the statements contained herein are the fundamental reasons to my opposition of the nuclear deal. The deal shouldn't and cannot go through. I would prefer India continuing production of fissile material to build a massive nuclear stock pile. We have already commenced the experimantation for converting thorium to U-233 and U-235, we also have the world's largest reserves of thorium. So screw the nuclear deal.
I only want economic co-op with the US.

Please, excuse my ignorance but how feaseable is the use of thorium?
Why isn't India going ahead with this?

**Monk** · 21 Nov 05,, 17:01

Originally Posted by Neo

Please, excuse my ignorance but how feaseable is the use of thorium?
Why isn't India going ahead with this?

it is a technology which has to be mastered. India is in the learning curve and hence India has already begun. it is feasible when you happen to have the World's largest reserves of the substance. It is sort of like converting coal to oil, it costs around $42-$45 a barrel to do so. it is costly when a barrel of oil costs less than $30 but is definitely useful when the same commodity costs $70. India can develop the know-how on all these issues and also has the natural resources but lacks the most important thing "Political Will". The greatest failing of India is its governance.

**Neo** · 21 Nov 05,, 19:05

Originally Posted by Monk

it is a technology which has to be mastered. India is in the learning curve and hence India has already begun. it is feasible when you happen to have the World's largest reserves of the substance. It is sort of like converting coal to oil, it costs around $42-$45 a barrel to do so. it is costly when a barrel of oil costs less than $30 but is definitely useful when the same commodity costs $70. India can develop the know-how on all these issues and also has the natural resources but lacks the most important thing "Political Will". The greatest failing of India is its governance.

Where does India stand now in the long run of mastering the technology?
Which countries have converted thorium sofar to produce energy?