Officer of Engineers

Do you happenned to know why VN responded only in regt and not div strength a full month after the Chinese incursion?

__________________
Chimo

Ray

Colonel,

Could you explain the Chinese concept of shi?

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

Do you have the Chinese pictogram of "shi?" I'm not sure what you mean. There's at least 3 different concepts I associate with the sound "shi."

Ray

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

I am assuming that you've studied or is studying Dr David Lai's LEARNING FROM THE STONES: A GO APPROACH TO MASTERING CHINA’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT, SHI.

The concept is essentially Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, and Surveillance, and Evaluation. You will note, Sir, two major components missing - Computers, Reconnaisance.

Like all major Chinese writings, there's the surface meaning and then there's the deep undercurrent to which the Chinese subscribe to but without being able to articulate well into words or examples.

This being said, the General Sun Tzu was a man who favoured not going into combat and would rather achieve his aims without the use of force (easiest way to take a castle is a donkey loaded with gold). However, the General was very well akin to knowing that some sort of force is always required but he prefers a show of force rather than a committement of force. If a committement of force, then it has to be a force-on-weakness and never a force-on-force encounter.

Hence, the strategm of trying to induced the enemy to move his strengths to where they are of no use while you have amassed overwhelming but extremely local superiority.

The game of GO allows such moves.

This being said, Dr Lai's article is hogwash. The one thing about board games that everyone forgets (including modern military computer games) is that you don't have to do recee. You can see the enemy's moves and he yours. You might trick him to move somewhere where you want but the pawns are obvious.

Also, Sir, The Art of War has been surpassed, even by the Chinese themselves. Getting the enemy where you want does not necessary mean their destruction (the 8th Army in Korea) and the Chinese have learned to snatch propaganda victory out of an operational disaster.

Ray

Colonel,

It maybe hogwash and it maybe that board games are not real. I agree recce is important, in fact very important, but then that is at the tactical level.

Strategic recce is through intelligence agencies, satellite etc etc, which I am sure the Chinese have kept it at the back of the mind.

I know you have strong feelings about the Chinese, but I somehow don't take them at face value. I think they are masters at deception! Chinese here means China and not the Chinese people, lest you take offence!


http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/phpBB2...=175168#175168

Have a look.

Officer of Engineers

The one area where the Chinese do excel against the Americans is HUMIT. We let them know more about us than they do about them. However, I don't think it's a weakness as much as a strength for us. We know what they know.

That being said, Sir. The real strength of strategic recee is evaluation and here, the Chinese are just as bad as we are (or just as good). We don't know enough about each other to be good judges of character.

That we don't know enough about internal Chinese politics is an understatement. However, the Chinese made some pretty big mistakes vis-a-vi the Bush Jr Adminstration also. They believed him to be a cowboy, all show and no muster. They failed miserably in predicting the Americans arming the Taiwanese.

And then failed big time to predict the Iraq War.

Sir, my problem is the internet warriors, not the PLA themselves. They have a huge hurdle in front of them and they're working extremely hard at overcoming their own problems and even trying some leap frogging solutions. The move from regiment-division-army model to battalion-brigade-corps model is extremely noteworthy and requires extreme study. I think they're making a mistake but I also think that they would learn more about brigade than anyone else.

I find those things to be of value and to be the real challenge. I don't find the interenet warriors mutterings about computer viruses and the hogwash "Unrestricted Warfare" (btw, Sir, have you read that yet?) to be of concern.

That they are Sir. They are even capable of deceiving themselves. They viewed the Korean operational disasters as victory. Their retreat from the Sino-Indo War as a lesson taught. And the pasting they got from the 79 Sino-VN War was laughable.

Sir, I don't take offence. That the PLA is a very interesting body to be studied is a given. I admire Gen Cao for being a man of vision. I admire him for taking an extremely bold move to the battalion-brigade-corps model. There's alot I can learn from the man. The same cannot be said of the two Senior Colonels who wrote Unrestricted Warfare.

Yes, Sir, I saw that thread. Has it occurred to anyone the Chinese aren't stupid enough to repeat the same mistake of attacking India?

Ray

Officer of Engineers

In the Chinese context, Corps managing 9 brigades instead of 3 division I think is really overworking the corps HQ. While some divisional assets would be shifted down to brigade, the brigade is essentially a re-enforced regiment and not a reduced division. However, most divisional assets would be shifted up to corps who would decide who should get what and where and when.

Also, Sir, the only clue as to what battalion in the bn-bde-corps model that I have is in the combat support and combat service areas (ie, engineers). The bn in the bn-bde-corps model essentially means to bolster bde and is not a standalone force that we come to expect of our battalions ... and even of our companies.

In essence, Sir, I really see the Chinese over-emphasizng bde more than anything else and I really have a hard time trying to see how a bde, even an American bde, can do all the jobs of even a Chinese division.

I'm sorry, Sir, but I did not think I was giving that impression of under-estimating the Chinese. Of their economic performance, I will leave to others more knowledgeable than me. But of their military, well Sir, I've stood guard against the Soviets and the Chinese are nowhere close to the Soviets.

As I stated, I admire the PLA Gen Cao. He's a man of vision. However, he lay out a 20 year plan and he's just start it. Therefore, even by the Chinese own admissions, they have a long, long way to go. 20 years in fact.

It's in the set I've sent you which you should be receiving within the week (yours and the Captain's).

You see, Sir, that's a problem. The Chinese are great revisionists. The two SrCols who wrote Unrestricted Warfare wrote that they predicted 11 Sept. I've gone back to everything they wrote before 11 Sept and could not find those predictions. Of course, there many passages that can mean 11 Sept but they could just as well mean more Somalias.

I've got retirement funds in Chinese companies. So, there is something there I have confidence in.

I have to say this, Sir. The PLA has NEVER utter a word about their performances and their capabilities. They remain one of the most secretive forces on earth. Those, including those wearing uniforms, who open their mouths are not privy to the knowledge that would allow them to make such statements, at least not with authority.

It is the internet warriors (Chinese versions of BRF) whom I have issues with.

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

I would like to add to my above. The 9 brigades that corps would be commanding are not all of the same quality and ranging in taskings from light infantry to tank brigades. Out of the nine bdes, you would only have two that is of even normal Indian Army standards as far as training schedule is concerned. The other 7 bdes are best described as garrison full time reserves, requiring at least 30 days to rev up to standards.

Anoop C

Colonel,

Similar to the PLA re-organizations that you expect will expose the limitations of the Bde, the Pakistanis have gone from the Corps-GHQ model to the Corps-Army Reserve (North, South and maybe Central)-GHQ model after they found that GHQ was overworked in the 1965 conflict. Essentially their ARN and ARS function as counterparts to the IA's Western Army Command, Northern Army Command etc.

It would be interesting to examine whether it is more risky to eliminate a command rung lower down (e.g. Bde) or higher up (Army Command). Given that most combat actions occur lower down (at the Bde and Division level), it appears that it is more risky to eliminate a rung there.

On the other hand, if the PLA works on the Soviet model of detailed control, then perhaps extensive planning and resource allocation can make up for war-time contingencies.

Could you and Brig. Ray comment?

Thank you.

Ray

Anoop C

Ray sahab,

Thank you for the comment. In full scale wars like in 1965 and 1971, is there a lot of mid-course correction at the Corps and AHQ level? Or is it the case that most operational plans are already in place at the respective Corps and Div. HQ levels, which are then put into practice? And that the role of AHQ would primarily be in advising the political leadership of the progress?

Due to the short time span of even these full scale wars, compared to WWII for instance, I assume that most operational plans at lower echelons are elastic enough to sustain themselves through the conflict. I would be grateful for some additional insight into this.

Also, thank you for your participation in BR's thread on Indo-China conflict to restore some much needed balance. It has become fashionable there to throw up one's hands in defeat, call the Indian govt. names and call in the marines at the first sign of trouble!
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Ooops, I realize that this discussion is far removed from the thread topic! We can continue this by personal mail on the forum, if you wish.

Officer of Engineers

Well, 1st off, I really don't know what the PLA is thinking. Obviously, they're thinking that the the bn-bde-corps model would work. I just don't know how they're getting over the C3 hurdles that such a system would entail.

In theory, corps could do alot of the work that div used to do. However, while there is an increase at the corps staff, it is not tripple (ie, they're not shifting all the manpower and expertise from div up to corps). Hence, alot of authority and responsibilities also got to be shifted downwards to regt/bde. However, I have not seen an increase in ranks commanding these new bdes. They're still commanded by a SrCol, same as a regt.

Also, do recall how these new Bdes were formed. They took the Hero Regt of a division and then mate it with 75% of the div's cbt spt and cbt svc assets. Essentially, these are glorified regts. They did not shift the div HQ down to the Bde.

All this points me to see corps as inheriting all of div's authority and responsibilities but at most 25% of the div's cbt spt and cbt svc assets (more like 5-10%, the rest being disbanded or some other bean counter money saving schemes).

I see some inherant problems right off the bat, namely what happenned to the DAG (Divisional Artillery Group) taskings? While there is an arguement that corps would not 3 DAGs, it is also apparent that not all Bdes got DAG support and would have to rely on its organic guns bns.

Now, the bn-bde-corps model would suggest that bde might have a guns bn attached to it, it is not organic. Corps central planning might GUESS which bde would need the cbt spt and cbt assets but do note that the Chinese still views the meeting engagement as the primary form of combat.

Then, there is a question of sufficent mass. Motor Inf Bdes don't need artillery bdes and engineers regt as support. At most, a guns and an engr bn but more likely a battery and an engry coy. Then, what's the point of guns bdes and engr regts? If you're going to divide up these assets, then what happens when you do need a DAG (guns bde) or a forced river crossing (engr regt)?

Now, I don't know the answers but it would seem logical that the PLA would have at least thought about these things. I have yet to see their answers or even attempts at finding the solutions.

Officer of Engineers

Hold me down and Call me A Mule's Uncle!!!!! *** An EUREKA moment ***

Gentlemen, there are times when just explaining things out dawns a revelation here. Just as a PLA brigade is not a true brigade but a glorified regiment, Corps is not a real corps but a glorified division.

Consider this.

WZC envisions at most a corps level decisive engagement but more likely a divisional engagement.

The CMC HQ and not corps would be in direct command of the forces in theatre.

There may be 9 bdes but only 2 are available for immediate deployment. So, if corps was to going into combat tomorrow, it would have at most 2 motor rifle bdes being with now an engr regt and a guns bde avalaible for support.