Agnostic Muslim

As I understood it, of concern was the alleged transfer of the "Bomb" to Pakistan by the Chinese, the resulting shift in regional dynamics, and your argument that a reversal of that transfer could preclude certain steps being taken by India that might elicit an incremental response from China.

I am addressing the possibility of changing the dynamics from the direction they would appear to be moving in as well, but by focusing on the issue that made Pakistan a willing "counterweight" to begin with - which is the hostility and lack of normalization between India and Pakistan.

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Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah

Officer of Engineers

There is nothing alleged about it. The Lybians gave you away. We have Pakistani notes by AQ Khan himself of Chinese lectures on Chinese warhead designs. The sooner you admit this, the better we are all off.

Of all people, I am extremely disappointed in you. You rather deal with illusions than with facts.

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Chimo

Agnostic Muslim

You are reading to much into my use of one word OoE. I am not really interested in engaging in a discussion over what weapons systems we have are Chinese and which are "indigenous". It doesn't matter to me. We have what we have.

It is merely my habit to try and not make absolute statements. In the context of this discussion I am in fact accepting the premise that the Chinese gave us "the bomb", and given your reputation as an avid China watcher, I won't contest your assertion.

Ray

One should understand the US attempt to forge an alliance of US - India - Singapore - Australia - Japan in this context.

One should not look at defence systems in isolation.

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"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Deltacamelately

Sir,
Some ammendments, the Indian ABM system's evolution was definitely Pakistan centric. But, the system can be tweaked enough to serve against invading Chinese missiles as well. Fact.
However, I have to agree with Zraver on certain points. His posts are quite candid, honestly.
India and China’s bilateral relations generate a classic military security dilemma involving proliferation of military technologies, arms race and the interplay of national policies for defense and deterrence. Since 1962, each side is amassing large quantity of conventional, missile and nuclear weapons, which highlight that both sides cling to their policies of strategic competition and the enduring primacy of military security.
The military security is primarily about the interplay between the actual armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states on the one hand and their perceptions of each other’s capabilities and intentions on the other.There is a lack of trust and no constraints at all or only weak/limited constraints over the development and procurement of conventional, missile and nuclear weapons.
Presently, missiles systems remain an integral component of India and China's nuclear doctrines. New Delhi has successfully tested nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles, inspite of the AFs insistance on use of Crafts instead of BMs. Since,07, India has also carried out series of ABM system tests and announced confidently to deploy these missiles within three years. This development would be a destabilising variable both in a Indo-Pak strategic environment as well as Indo-China strategic environment. Agreed, China has also been purchasing and manufacturing the art of ABM weaponry, but missile defense systems is not part of its technical level of strategy till date.
New Delhi effort to accomplish ABM systems in the near future is a move to assert its military superiority in South Asia. According to the strategic calculations, the ABM system is a part of an overall integrated defensive and offensive capability that functions to enhance India’s offensive capability by weakening that of its adversaries, here read Pakistan first and then ..... Theoretically, the ABM will provide India a decisive first strike capability, that is, in a confrontation New Delhi will launch a preemptive strike on its opponents’ strategic assets and then use the ABM system to minimise the damage from a retaliatory strike. Something in stark contradiction with its NFU doctrine. The Indian scientific backwardness, however, frustrates their indigenous military buildup, especially in the development of missiles. After realising that it could not achieve mastery in the missile technology indigenously in the near future, New Delhi approached the foreign missile suppliers. In this context, the Indians have established congenial relations with the US, during the last decade. Importantly, in an effort to speed up development of ABM system, India has been receiving technical information from the US and had also sought its nod for purchasing the Israeli-US upgraded Arrow missile system (Sir, something to ponder as WHY?)
Moreover, the Indo-Israeli defense cooperation has also boosted India’s Agni project. Here is where I endorse Zraver's POV, New Delhi ABM systems endeavours would let loose an offensive-defensive arms race between India and China, which undermine the strategic stability in Asia. The history of strategic competition between New Delhi and China and deterrence theoretical discourse reveals that if the former acquires missile defense systems, the latter would feel that its counter strike capability may be insufficient and therefore its deterrence credibility is threatened. As a result it would engage in acquiring additional missiles or develop missile defense systems to restore the MAD equation, which is imperative for deterrence stability or strategic stability guaranteeing peace between the two. The more one amasses, the more the later is forced to amass and get poorer. India won't thus be an absolute gainer economically.
To conclude, the mastery and deployment of ABM systems would shift the strategic balance between India and China to the former’s advantage and it would assume a more aggressive posture in its dealing with the latter. Such an environment compels China to develop more robust deterrence. A modified Chinese nuclear response to changes in its relationship with India would inevitably raise the strategic temperature between belligerent neighbours. Accordingly, more aggressive and unstable nuclear relationship would emerge in South Asia, South East Asia and the entire Pacific aand IOR as a result of the offensive-defensive missile proliferation in the region.

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I am the DARK that Rise to Kill..And Soar to Redeem!

Officer of Engineers

Major,

That is all fine except you have not consider one single known fact. The Chinese have mastered using conventional missiles in a 1st strike role and not nukes. As I stated, those 1400 missiles aiming at Taiwan are conventional, not nuclear. How many interceptors can you build in such a short time as compared to the Chinese moving their missiles?

And does India dare to use nukes in retaliation for a conventional attack?

Also, again, it is a matter of physical orientation. If the interceptors are aiming north, it's not going to do much go if the missile is coming from the south.

And I disagree that ABM systems are not part of Chinese strategy. The ONLY threat from North Korea are its missiles.

kuku

1400 missiles being moved around sounds like a lot of missiles being moved around.

How massive will this movement be in terms of opposing forces surveillance lighting up?

A situation demanding such a movement will be very serious.

What will be the status of the operational nuclear warheads on both the sides in such a scenario? (in terms of being loaded on available missiles and ready for launch.)

What will be the ability of the surveillance platforms (radars) looking into the oppositions territory to pick up missile launches for such missiles?
I assume that to have any sort of a ABM shield you need to pick up the launch of the ballistic missiles first?

What will be the response in such a situation, will the defence forces wait for the warheads to explode and see if they are nuclear or conventional or pass on orders to launch the available missiles while they still have time? or will the time available be too short to do anything about it?

Damn thinking of these things makes me feel really weird (scared).

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cheers

Officer of Engineers

Anybody not asleep should noticed it. It would take a minimum of two years to move that many missiles.

As of right now, China is assumed to have 200 operational warheads and India around 120.

There is another issue not considered here. Available nukes in other forms. We do not know if the Chinese are keeping nukes in component form, ie all the parts are there and they just have to put them together but another 100 warheads would be extremely easy for the Chinese to keep around.

Now, let's talk about putting the factories out to full capacity. The Chinese can add 300 warheads a year. They've got the fissile materials already.

And let's face it, they've already got the missiles.

India? She will be lucky if she can get the fissile materials for 5.

Thinking this through, I do not think that this will add to the American-Japanese-Russian unease at all. Going back through my notes, at one time, China was assumed to have 1000 warheads with the longest time, she was assumed to have 300-700 warheads with around 400 to be average assumption. In other words, we have lived with the thought of a larger number of Chinese nukes before.

In short, I see no way for India to shift the strategic balance in her favour. None. The Chinese have a way too much of a head start. They have the working weapons factories. They have 4 SSBNs (1 experimental, 1 operational, 1 on trials, and 1 near completion). They have an operational ABM system. The size of their fissible stock dwarf even India's wildest dreams. And they have the rockets just waiting for nukes.

The interceptors will have to be launched-on-warning.

All nuclear powers have a nuclear launch-on-impact doctrine. It is too dangerous to do anything else.

Welcome to my world. The job of nuclear weaponeers is to burn babies alive.

Tarek Morgen

is this the reason everyone was/is so keen on "second-strike-capaticity"? That this "launch-on-impact doctrine" might prevent them from launching their "normal" retaliation?

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uh I might be wrong

Officer of Engineers

Old saying.

If you've got 5 nukes, you're a power. If you've got one nuke, you're a target.

Sumku

I guess this correctly sums it up. The more Nukes you have, the more powerfull you are.

All the more reason then for India to go ahead with the Nuclear Deal.

kuku

A two year build up seems like a very long time.

1200-1500 operational nuclear warheads seem like enough to blow dear Home.
Operational ABM system, S-300 variants?
Which S-300 variants have the anti IRBM(3000-5500 km) ability(hardware and software).
Any news of test of this ability and its effectiveness.

It will be a long time before the nuclear warheads will be able to even reach all of china.
- Agni-3 will start to be inducted by 2010.
- The technology demonstrator ATV nuclear sub will come finish construction by 2009-2010, then comes the part of sea trials and fielding a decent ranged missiles so the 3-5 boats might take upto 2015-2020.
It will take a long time to reach a nuclear deterrence level.

However that scenario is for nuclear powers, isnt it.

With such odds stacked against 120-200 operational nuclear weapons to 1200-1500, wont a salvo launch automatically trigger the release on all available nuclear weapons while they stand?
Once a nuclear impact has occurred it seem to be highly unlikely that any weapons will be left to be fired around. Or that anyone will be left to fire them.
Its a scary world this world of yours, a war one looses no matter what happens.

Druze

I think Israel is the 1st or 2nd largest weapon's system dealer to India. There are many Israeli/Indian joint think tanks on regional policy and cooperation now. Extensive counter-terrorism training between the two nations.

I think the United States may also pursue certain policy with India through Israel as result of not trying to cause to much rift with Pakistan. Consdering the post 9/11 world the bilateral relationship of the US and India doesn't seem to be as strong as one would think despite the major mutual interest both nations show on so many regional issues.

Blademaster

Ramping up production will solve the problem of low numbers of missiles. Training is another thing which China is facing problems too.

As for fissile materials, you are wrong about that. IIRC, India has two military fast breeder plants solely for the production of nuclear warheads. Sometimes back, there was a study saying that India has enough fissile material to generate 5,000 warheads.

Sumku

Correct. The Study was done post 1998 and had Put India just behind US and Russia and almost on par[if not ahead] with China as concerns the stockpile of Fissile materials. I will paste the link sometime afterwards, first lemme find it