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#151 (permalink) | ||||
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A Self Important
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To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway Last edited by troung : 12-31-2007 at 04:54 AM. |
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#153 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
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BM, I suppose your argument is true and vindicated...geographical proximity apart...the terrain is also very well known to us. ![]() |
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#154 (permalink) | |
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Military Enthusiast
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#155 (permalink) |
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
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AM,
There was no problems between the Pathans and the Gangetic Indians. In fact, you should read Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore's "Kabuliwala" to understand the symbiotic relationship. Further, you could also check how many Pathans have come to India for higher education and in colleges in Gangetic India.
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![]() "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination." I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to. HAKUNA MATATA |
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#156 (permalink) |
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Military Enthusiast
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He was referring to the pullout of the troops by GoI in Sri Lanka. A rebuttal to our assertion of "staying power" by means of geographical proximity.
A good rebuttal but still at anytime, we can go back in and stay there indefinitely as long as it suits our interests. It will not be that expensive or hard as the Americans are having in Afghanistan or in Iraq. |
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#157 (permalink) | |
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Military Enthusiast
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#158 (permalink) | |
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Contributor
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Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah |
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#159 (permalink) | |
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#160 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
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blademaster Reply
We entered Iraq through Kuwait. Been there now for fourteen years. That would seem to be "staying power". Europe? South Korea? Great distances. A long time.
I'm uncertain why you'd think our re-entry to Afghanistan would pose an unusual challenge to our forces. In any case, I don't envision leaving Iraq anytime soon. Nor Afghanistan. Do you?
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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski Last edited by S-2 : 01-01-2008 at 13:50 PM. |
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#161 (permalink) |
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Military Enthusiast
Senior Contributor
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In Europe and South Korea, you had an "enabler" for your staying power, i.e., the support of the local populace. A good example would be South Vietnam. Even though you had the support of the government of South Vietnam, your presence was never really popular with the local populace and they didn't do enough to "enable" your staying power, i.e., supporting the government officials that pushed for your presence, not hiding and giving material support to insurgents, providing valuable HUMINT on the ground, etc. In South Korea, you had all three. Yeah you had student protests but that was largely confined to few areas within Seoul and never widespread. You really had the support of the local populace so if the North Koreans tried any attempts of insurgency, they would fail because the local populace would aid you in putting down the insurgency. Same thing with Western Europe. If you hadn't had the support of the local populace, you would have a very hard time staying that long in Western Europe. But the Marshall plan and the Red Menace "enabled" your staying power in Europe by influencing the local populace to support your presence.
Now, IMHO, if you don't have the local populace but you have the geographical proximity, you can overcome the obstacle of the lack of the support from the local populace because your own population will help you to do the job, i.e., they would move into those areas and settle down and put down roots and establish areas of control where you can safely put down local factories that would provide food, war supplies, etc. You get the idea. It becomes much harder as the distance increases. In Iraq and Afghanistan, I just don't see the support of the local populace because they are doing two things: They are giving material support and aiding & abetting the enemy/insurgents, they provide intelligence to the enemy/insurgents. Essentially, you haven't won the battle for the hearts and minds. Winning the battle of hearts and minds means that you have "been enabled" to use your staying power. The British Raj failed because they really never had their own support of the population in India and to do so would require very costly funding which the British masters were loathe to do so. The USSR failed because their central Asia regions were largely apathic to the Red Army's efforts in Afghanistan, such as moving into Afghanistan, building permanent enclaves with self sustained economies and local manufacturings that would provide the necessary material support and manpower for the Red Army thereby "enabling" the Red Army's staying power. A good example of using your population to "enable" your staying power would be in the Wild West frontier against the Indians. Your own population moved in, established local enclaves, provided material support, "enabled" your Federal Army's staying power and essentially crushed the Indians. Another example would be the PLA in Xinjiang and in Tibet. Look at Japan's failure in China during WWII. Look at Australia's success against the Aborogines. Look at the Boers/white people's success in South Africa, Zimbabwe before the 80s. |
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#162 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
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blademaster Reply
"In Iraq and Afghanistan, I just don't see the support of the local populace because they are doing two things: They are giving material support and aiding & abetting the enemy/insurgents, they provide intelligence to the enemy/insurgents."
I absolutely can't agree about Iraq. Not at all. One-third of the nation is solid in our presence and the sunni support has dramatically increased this year. You know that, I'm sure. "Essentially, you haven't won the battle for the hearts and minds." Let's talk about that. We haven't lost them either. Further, Afghanistan entails far more nations than ourselves so you need to account for that- good, bad, or indifferent. Neither are lost by any stretch. Our stamina is fine. Afghanistan, in particular, is something I can't imagine being abandoned anytime soon. Should Iraq continue to display the very visible improvement thus seen (and which you've ignored, seemingly) we'll likely see U.S. forces increase in Afghanistan. Now, an interesting question might entail the determination and stamina of our allies. Should they falter, though, I know India will happily provide the necessary forces to see Afghanistan join the family of nations. Last edited by S-2 : 01-01-2008 at 14:32 PM. |
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#163 (permalink) | |
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Navajo Code Talker
Senior Contributor
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U.S. Special Forces To Expand Presence, Train in Pakistan | India Defence
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Nabha Sparasham Deeptam -Touch The Sky With Glory |
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#164 (permalink) | |
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Navajo Code Talker
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