Deltacamelately

Six decades after independence India remains united and democratic and
is emerging as an important global power. Its economy is increasingly
deregulated, its GDP growth rate for 2006–07 is over 9%, and poverty has
fallen from 55% in the 1970s to 26% today. Relations with Pakistan have
improved, tempering a dangerous nuclear rivalry.

Yet problems remain. Economic growth is uneven. Agriculture and some areas
of labour-intensive manufacturing have failed to flourish. The unskilled labour
force is often poorly educated. The economy is hampered by inadequate
infrastructure, raising questions of sustainability. And economic growth is
also vulnerable to international energy vicissitudes.

Neighbouring South Asian countries still tend to interact negatively with
India—a problem exacerbated by complex internal dynamics on both sides.
Instability due to terrorism and an entrenched Maoist insurgency could
threaten economic growth. Those problems focus the nation’s attention and
resources on continental security and retard the acquisition of military power
projection capabilities.

Still, the preoccupation with continental concerns has not stopped India from
mapping out an ambitious growth trajectory for its naval and strategic nuclear
forces. To fulfil those ambitions, India will need to continue its strong economic
growth. Future Indian governments—just like the current one—will need to
balance security with the developmental needs of their people.

Despite the halting nature of economic reform, the economy has been growing
at a healthy rate. The nature of that growth—with significant expertise in
information and communications technology, computational sciences, space
technology and materials sciences—favours engagement in the revolution
in military affairs and military modernisation. India has emerged as the
developing world’s leading arms importer over the last triennium.

India will probably meet at least some of its ambitious military-strategic goals
over the longer-term, but not necessarily according to the over-optimistic
schedule it has set. By 2020 its Indian Ocean power will be significantly
enhanced. Already it regards itself—and is regarded by others—as a major
Asian player that should deal on a one-to-one basis with other significant
Asian powers.

The India–China relationship is worryingly ambivalent. On the one hand, the two countries
are engaged in an intensifying political, economic and people-to-people relationship, with
annual trade approaching US$20 billion. On the other, Indian analysts express growing
concern about China’s presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean—including its so-called
‘string of pearls’ bases. Although such claims are somewhat exaggerated, the opacity
surrounding Chinese activities in the region has not helped. The two are also competitors in
the international hunt for energy. But despite those concerns, India has been reluctant to be
cast in the role of a counter-weight to China.

India’s bilateral relationship with the US has suffered from India’s prickly politics, the nuclear
tests of 1998 and the US need to cultivate Pakistan for its war on terrorism. Still, in many
ways it is a ‘marriage made in heaven’ between the world’s most powerful democracy and
its most populous.

The relationship is driven by some deep strategic commonalities—common interests in
waging the war on terrorism, India’s strategic location on the ‘west about’ route to the Gulf
and astride key oil sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and its emerging role in the Asian
security order. The 2006 Indo–US nuclear agreement is indicative of this deepening strategic
relationship. But recent difficulties in bringing the agreement to fruition—still unresolved
at the time of writing—are also indicative of the difficult political environments on both
sides and India’s determination to maintain its nuclear deterrence capability, especially
against China.

India’s developing relationship with the US has not, however, been at the cost of its
productive exchanges with Russia, from which it derives oil and arms, or with Japan, from
which it gains capital and technology.

The improving India–US relationship is a mixed blessing for Australia. On one level, it opens
possibilities of Australia–India engagement that could not be realised during the Cold War.
But on another, it reinforces the long-standing Indian view that Australia is a pale shadow
of the US. It also risks Beijing’s discomfiture that a strategic ‘quadrilateral’ involving the US,
India, Japan and Australia might be developing against it.

Canberra’s challenge in progressing the relationship with India is therefore twofold. It needs
to find productive ways to progress the relationship that differentiate Australia from the US.
And it needs to avoid perceptions that Australia is ‘choosing’ between India and China. Both
requirements suggest a greater focus on matters of bilateral concern that are not, in the
main, military in nature.

The major issues affecting the relationship, such as trade and people-to-people relations, are
fundamentally self-directing and require only the facilitation of governments rather than
active intervention.

Economic relations are progressing well. India has about A$1 billion approved for investment
in Australia and is now Australia’s sixth most important export destination.

Australia’s role as a reliable provider of commodities to fuel the rapid industrialisation first
of Japan then of China suggests it might follow a similar path with India. Australia should
present itself to India as a reliable source of ‘clean’ energy, including through the AP-6 process,
which is gradually developing traction in India. Two key areas here will be coal and associated
‘clean coal’ technologies and the possible sale of uranium—for which India is keen.

Sale of Australian uranium to India would, however, depend on a successfully negotiated
Indo–US nuclear agreement—one that provides IAEI-like safeguards over India’s civil
nuclear program.

In the event that an India–US deal is concluded and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG)
accepts such a deal, Australia would be expected by New Delhi to supply India with uranium
for its civil program. Indeed, India is likely to interpret Australia’s position on sale of uranium
as an ‘earnest of intent’ on the wider relationship. The fact that Australia has already agreed
to sell uranium to China—which New Delhi regards as less sound on horizontal proliferation
than India—only increases the importance of the issue.

But an Australian decision on sale of uranium to India is likely to become caught up in the
backwash of our own domestic debate about nuclear energy, as well as the Australian
Government’s concerns about arms control and proliferation.

Nevertheless, subject to the Indo–US agreement and related mechanisms being satisfactorily
concluded in a way that is broadly consonant with Australia’s NPT objectives, Australia
should agree to sell uranium to India for reasons given in the body of this paper.

Australia’s commitment to the relationship will also be judged by its attitude to Indian
membership of APEC, which should be supported. In view of Australia’s chairmanship of APEC
in 2007 and the lifting of the moratorium on new members in 2008, the issue is pressing.

Another area of common interest between India and Australia is the Indian Ocean,
particularly the northeast Indian Ocean (NEIO). Both countries have powerful reasons to
focus on the NEIO. India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands take its territory to within 90 nautical
miles of Sumatra. The country is severely affected by the drug and gun smuggling and
terrorism generated in and around the NEIO and by the natural disasters associated with it.

The NEIO is also important for Australia. Australia has a strong interest in the stability of the
countries surrounding the NEIO, especially Indonesia. Several issues that trouble Australia
originate from or pass through the region, such as illicit drug importations, illegal migration
and terrorism. Oil for Australia’s key trading partners—Japan and China—passes through the
Malacca Straits choke point.

In relation to the NEIO and wider Indian Ocean region, a number of areas of cooperation
could prove fruitful including oceanic research, SLOC and shipping security issues,
environmental issues and marine pollution, terrorism, and transnational crime. The
venue might also provide opportunities for closer military cooperation, including on the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—in which India has expressed cautious interest, and the
so-called ‘Thousand-Ship Navy’ (TSN) initiative.

Underlying many of Canberra’s decisions about its relationship with India will be an
awareness that the Asian regional security order is entering a difficult phase. The regional
great powers are all hoping to shape the emerging regional security architecture. India will
have a large role to play in the establishment of that architecture. And Australia will want
that role to be a stabilising and positive one, where India’s great potential is devoted to
building a more secure region.

Canberra should strive to maintain an independent voice in its approach to New Delhi
on these matters. India is currently basking in its emergent large power status and the
relationship with Australia is not its top priority. But the relationship has a promising future,
and it is likely that the two countries will move towards some form of closer partnership in
the coming decade.
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
What can be the possible status of Australia in the Asian context vis-a-vis the two regional bulwarks...China and India ? A facilitator...or a competitor?

__________________
I am the DARK that Rise to Kill..And Soar to Redeem!

gf0012-aust

Good god, that was some of the biggest drivel to ever come out of ASPI.

When they can't get basic info correct (it was Australia who pushed hard and lobbied to get India into APEC), then the rest of the analysis becomes a little suspect.

Deltacamelately

Nobody should deny this. However...the matter is about the future standing of Oz...its strategic desires. Whether it wants to continue troting under the US shadow(No Offence)...or whether it wants to play an independent and strategic role....competing with China and India.

gf0012-aust

what US shadow? we have the same level of access to US technical resources and security as the UK - we have a higher level of access than any other NATO member (except UK) and yet we're supposed to be in a shadow??

we're already independant - if you haven't noticed Aust and the US have had philosophical disagreements over a number of issues - the Aust PM's approach during GW1 was reciprocated by the USGovt during East Timor. Both countries enjoy the diplomatic brevity of quid pro quo

why in gods name do you see any issue of competition between Oz, India and or China? Our prime interest is in ensuruing that the US, China, India and Japan don't end up shooting each other.

Its a nonsense article written by someone who's certainly never gone through the academy - and certainly had no experience at the diplomatic corp level (even as a junior grade officer)

it's a foolishly constructed document designed to get attention.

You need to see some of the other rubbish that ASPI have generated in the last 6 years to understand the degree of contempt I have for them.

Blademaster

I have to say that your views are, indeed, refreshingly. Lately I have come across many views from Australia that tended to be slanted toward leftist and somewhat downright hypocritical such as the call for India to cut back on their energy use. WTF was that!? That was such an asinine suggestion considering the energy use on a per capita basis for India is less than 1/20th than Australia per capita basis.

gf0012-aust

Australia has a population that would fit into Mumbai - India has more millionaires than the total australian population - her economy has grown exponentially and apart from the hiccup of 97, is obviously in a position to boom as the income dynamics change.

Any discussion about energy and power generation needs to be realistic.

I can understand the moral impetus that drove the creation and structure of NPT, but I regard NPT as a deeply flawed requirement in light of current issues.

Deltacamelately

I have full respect for the view point held by you or any other average Oz national...but there seems to be a disconnect vis-a-vis the Govt. Foreign Policy... Australia at times did supplant queer suggestions with regards to India's energy needs as well as its craving for nuclear fuel.

Officer of Engineers

Major,

Why should the Australian government, any government, make more sense than the Indian government?

__________________
Chimo

Ray

Because they are Holier than Thou?

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

gf0012-aust

Before I comment, can you clarify whether you're joking or serious. If the latter then I personally regard it as offensive.

National politics must always be considered through various prisms. An inference of moral superiority is not one of the conceptual calipers that I'd use to measure up Australian foreign policy. Esp during the 60's and 70's where we had our own nuke weapons development program in play.

National political decisions are complex beasts of burden. There are far more parameters that lead to the end product.

Officer of Engineers

A wink and a smiley was included.

Deltacamelately

Seems humour elements are scarce nowadays.Neways...The initial debate was somewhat about the Oz Govt. future projection...what strategic positions it envisages and aspires for itself vis-a-vis a ressurgent China and India in the Asian context. I greatly appreciate your personal viewpoint that one should dessist from riding the high moral horse while in the process of quantifying foreign policy priorities and rationals....however I would like somebody to educate me in this ...... Was it only the moral phoenix that compelled the Oz Govt. to freeze its Nuclear Weapon Program? Were there some other variables? What does it mean to a common Oz national when people talk of Aus being under the US Nuclear Umbrella? Has this anything to do with the implicit suggestion of Oz walking under the US shadow? One wonders...and wonders more...