Bella

Alright...Dumb question for you guys, but what the hell does RoCA mean???

Thanks!

Feanor

Republic of China Army.

Inst

The quantity of Taiwanese that defines themselves as Taiwanese is 80 percent. The politics of Taiwan, while dysfunctional, is dysfunctional from an excess of politicization, not from its lack. Would the people of Taiwan island really save their own skins when it amounts to, at best, exile from an occupied territory?

Inst

One question I still haven't gotten answered (perhaps you won't answer it?) What happened to the decapitation theory; that air-dropped or infiltrated special-operations troops could cause major damage? That was mentioned on CDF, how did it turn out? I recall it was shot down... What's the most recent analysis?

HKDan

Im also very interested in the possibility of a decapitation strike against Taiwan.
One of the things that makes it difficult to talk about is that I dont think any of us have any idea about China capability to infiltrate special forces or whether there are sleeper cells already in place like N Korea is suspected to have. Here is an article by a former Janes correspondent(the article does have its flaws and is dated), I think it was the first place that I saw the idea of a decapitation strike discussed.

TAIPEI - If China ever makes the decision to invade Taiwan it is unlikely to be a large-scale Normandy-style amphibious assault. The reality is that China is more likely to use a decapitation strategy. Decapitation strategies short circuit command and control systems, wipe out nationwide nerve centers, and leave the opponent hopelessly lost. As the old saying goes, "Kill the head and the body dies." All China needs to do is seize the center of power, the capital and its leaders.

If China decides to use force to reunify the mainland with what it terms a breakaway province, the window of opportunity is believed to be 2006. This would give China a couple of years to clean up the mess before the 2008 Summer Olympics. Most analysts estimate that China's military strength will surpass Taiwan's defense capabilities by 2005. So 2006 - the Year of the Dog - is clearly the year to fear.

United States Defense Department officials now are reexamining China's military threat to Taiwan. This rethink has caused a dramatic shift in the way many think of defending Taiwan. Traditionally, Taiwan had always feared an amphibious assault - the Normandy scenario - and its defense strategy was always designed to stop such an attack. Now with a potential decapitation strategy believed to be in the works, US defense officials are beginning to think what had once been unthinkable: losing Taiwan in only seven days.

The Taiwan takeover scenario
China's deployment of its special forces and rapid-deployment forces, combined with air power and missile strikes, is the most likely formula for successfully taking Taiwan with the least amount of effort and damage. The military acronym KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid!) is in full force here. Special forces, which blend strength with deception and flair, offer China laser cutters rather than sledge hammers for defeating Taiwan's armed forces.

An airborne assault directly on Taipei by China's 15th Airborne Corps (Changchun), with three divisions (43rd, 44th, 45th) would be the first phase of the assault, with additional paratroopers being dropped in Linkou, Taoyuan and Ilian, to tie up Taiwan's four divisions assigned to the 6th Army (North). A Chinese airborne division contains 11,000 men with light tanks and self-propelled artillery. Some intelligence reports have indicated that China was able to airlift one airborne division to Tibet in less than 48 hours in 1988. Today, China's ability to transport troops has greatly improved. China is expected to be able to deliver twice that number - 22,000 - in two days.

Taiwan's 6th Army has seven infantry brigades: 106, 116, 118, 152, 153, 176, and 178. The 152/153 Dragons and the the 176/178 Tigers are said to be the best. Also a direct assault on the 6th Army's 269th motorized brigade, 351st armored infantry brigade, and the 542nd armored brigade would be mandatory for Chinese forces.

Most of the initial fighting would be in the Zhong Zheng District, Taipei, which contains the Presidential Building, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Legislative Yuan. As soon as China's troops hit the ground they would have to deal with Taiwan's Military Police Command (MPC). The MPC is responsible for protecting key government buildings and military installations. Its personnel are the gatekeepers, holding all the keys and guarding all the doors. They are considered no-nonsense and are humorless when approached. China's airborne forces would meet immediate resistance from these Taipei forces. Regular army units, all based outside of Taipei, would take hours, perhaps days, to respond. It would be up to the MPC to hold the Chinese back until reinforcements arrived - which might be never.

Assassins, saboteurs would be prepositioned
Pre-positioned special forces, smuggled into Taiwan months before, would assassinate key leaders, and attack radar and communication facilities around Taiwan a few hours before the main attack. Infiltrators might receive some assistance from sympathetic elements within Taiwan's military and police, who are believed to be at least 75 percent pro-Kuomintang (KMT), and hence, pro-unification. Many could use taxis to move about the city unnoticed. Mainland Chinese prostitutes, already in abundance in Taiwan, could be recruited by Chinese intelligence to serve as femme fatales, supplying critical intelligence on the locations of key government and military leaders at odd hours of the night; death is the ultimate aphrodisiac.

The second phase would begin after airborne forces captured Sungshan Airport. With a secure landing strip, China would fly in elements of its 14 divisions of "rapid reaction" troops using Ilyushin Il-76, Shaanxi Y-8, Antonov 26, and Xian Y-7 troop transports, with air support from China's 1,000 bombers and fighters. China's 10 Il-76 transports can carry 130 troops apiece, though this limitation could be overcome by commandeering aircraft belonging to commercial courier and passenger airlines. China has about 500 Boeings and Airbuses from which to choose. Some of China's heavy-lift transports would bring in BMD-2 Airborne Combat Vehicles and an assortment of armored vehicles. These air-lifted troops would spread throughout the city, securing bridges and key intersections. In addition, China has 200 transport helicopters capable of carrying commandos to Taiwan.

China might encounter opposition from Taiwan's new rapid deployment force. The newly created Aviation and Special Forces Command (ASFC) has united three aviation helicopter brigades, the 601st, 602nd, and 603rd, with the 862nd Special Warfare Brigade under one command. The 862nd is Taiwan's elite paratrooper brigade and modeled after the US Army Rangers. The helicopter brigades are made up of a combination of CH-47SD Chinook transport helicopters, AH-1W SuperCobra attack helicopters, OH-58D Kiowa armed observation helicopters, and UH-1H Huey transport helicopters.

Taiwan also has some noteworthy smaller commando units. There are two Marine Corps units: the Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrol (ARP) and the Special Services Company (SSC). The army also has two: the 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) or "Army Frogmen", and the Airborne Special Services Company (ASSC). The ASSC is a new unit modeled after the US Delta Force. ASSC recruits from the 862nd and performs counter-terrorism and other special missions. The question of whether these forces could, or would, be moved into the conflict area in time is another matter.

Except for special forces and the marines, it is unlikely that the rest of Taiwan's infantry brigades scattered across the island would do much. As the saying goes, "It's not the size of the dog in the fight, but the size of the fight in the dog that matters." Taiwan's military is rife with lethargic and ineffectual troops just begging for their 20-month tour of duty to end so they can go back to their girlfriends and jobs. Many call Taiwan's youth, including its young soldiers, the "strawberry generation" because they are soft and spoiled by the good life. US military officials visiting Taiwan often complain that the military's boot camps are too lax. The military appears more afraid of angering the parents of the conscripts than confronting a Chinese invasion, say visiting US soldiers. One politically correct legislator recently complained to Asia Times Online, "Taiwan has to do something about violence in the military." The correspondent reminded him,

VarSity

The whole Para drop into Taipei seems a bit iffy to me, after all we do have these things called Interceptors with these magical sticks called Missiles, and I am guessing a cargo plane full of Para's is a fairly easy thing to hit.

I could be wrong here but again China's main problem seems to be delivery of troops, especially due to the fact air superiority would be hard to achieve. I am sure I read somewhere that Taiwan know their runways will be knocked out, and have plan's in place (well rehearsed plans) to use civilian roads to keep its planes in the air, and whilst I know this is going to lead to a severe degradation in their capability, its going to keep them flying, especially to intercept the first wave of planes, which would need to include these Para's if this plan was going to work.

HKDan

[quote=VarSity;445604]The whole Para drop into Taipei seems a bit iffy to me, after all we do have these things called Interceptors with these magical sticks called Missiles, and im guessing a cargo plane full of Para's is a fairly easy thing to hit.[quote]

LOL, it does take quite a leap of imagination to get to the point where PLA paras are coming down over Taipei.

Officer of Engineers

Eighty-one platoon level actions does not a division make. The problem with that theory ... and with all those other small unit action theories is battle momentum and sustainment. Platoon level actions simply is not big enough nor last long enough to be a bother than any single division.

Any good leader, once seeing section and platoon action all over the place will realize that he cannot handle them all ... so he won't. They're not the centre of mass of the assault. He'll send an overwhelming force, a single battalion, to deal with them one by one while maintaining his centre of mass against the real threat - the amphibious landing.

It all comes back to this point. There are scenarios in which the PLA could take a port or a runway but there are no scenarios in which the PLA could keep a port or runway.

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Chimo

HistoricalDavid

Even a very costly Pyhrric victory?

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HD Ready?

Officer of Engineers

They could lose the entire invasion force and the pain would not be felt, even within the PLA. 30,000 troops does not diminish the 1 million man strong ground force. They can tell 30,000 grieving mothers that their sons died reuniting China. They have no chance against 30,000 angry grieving mothers when they have nothing to show for the lost of their sons.

ace16807

To get enough transports over Taipei in the first place is rather difficult. Nor do I think it would take days for troops to respond to an airdrop like that. However, I agree Taiwan's military is lax at this point in time. However, at this point of time, an invasion from China is unlikely, hence why many of the conscripts are so laid back about it. I think what you gave was a bit too ideal in the side of China.

BudW

Air drop on air field maybe,then bring troops by plane in, would that work in Tiawan?

Officer of Engineers

Two regiments worth.

zraver

I am not a professional China watcher, but I have not noticed China building the type of transport, amphib, and SEAD capacity to invade Taiwan. I don't think either China really wants or expects a war. Both seem content to let time and money solve the problem.

One thing I keep looking for is China to begin building WiGE/GEV type transports to provide an over the horizon high speed landing capacity. Without the ability to get a lot of troops, light armor with heavy anti-tank capability and supplies inland quickly an invasion is doomed even if the government is wiped out and Taipai seized by the paratroopers. GEV's like the Caspian Sea Monster offer the best route for this because they are above seamines, below SAM's and to fast for AshM. Plus China has several small GEV designs already so we know they have the technology.

Tarek Morgen

Would an (attemped) naval blockade of taiwan not be more realistic then an outright invasion? Even a short one could cause heavy damage to an export-oriented economy like taiwans.

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uh I might be wrong