Bella

Thanks!!

xinhui

That is the same point folks at US Naval college are making on why a naval blockade against PRC will not work. They done a very detail analyst and basic agreed that internal energy production will support a prolonged military campaign while import from Central Asia will keep the economy from basic operations (not growth).

xinhui

tphuang,

Ok, enough joking around, now back business.

I have a few questions to ask you if you don't mind.

1. Why CMC decided to invest huge sum of resources in SSM warfare facing Taiwan (M9, M11, A100, WS family) instead of buying more fighter-bomber?

2. Where is the focus of PLA/PLAAF SAM defense?

3. Where are the airfields (both PLAAF/PLANAF) located facing TW?

4. How they are being trained for their expected missions as recorded from PLAdaily, China defense white paper, or from western sources such as Project Airforces, writings from Ken Allen, RAND, etc.

5. How is PLAN's latest AD ships being delayed in times of war and what role do they serve?

6. What is the PLA's own definition of Air Denial, Air Cover and Marine strike?

tphuang

they have at least 6 regiments of JH-7 series (and continuing to purchase more), they are going to start pumping out J-11BS soon, they are even introducing H-6Ks. That's quite a bit of purchase.
And they've invested a lot in SSM, but they've also invested a lot to improve their precision strike capability.
I will let you answer this one, since you already grilled me once on this.
are you asking which regiments are stationed within the combat radius of TW? Because we can look up at the plaaf orbat for this.
depending on which specific platforms/missions you are talking about. There are a bunch of PLAdaily articles out there. The air force is certainly conducting more blue vs red than past. They are trying to get more realistic with their training, but is generally more conservative with the things they try than most of the modern air forces.
are you saying that at current time, they are delaying the construction of AD ships or are you saying during war, they will be slow into action?
I'm not sure, please articulate.

both sides.

Officer of Engineers

Two words - bingo fuel.

__________________
Chimo

marklv

No, because the US will back Taiwan and WW3 will break out. China will be devastated and take 100 years or more to recover.

ace16807

In the case that China actually occupies Taiwan, the US most likely will not invade the island themselves. Open war with the PRC would devastate our economy in the short run, and it would strain US international relations beyond what we could possibly imagine. My guess is that if China actually invades Taiwan, the US well scream and yell all they want, but won't resort to military action.

Officer of Engineers

At the very least, there would be a heighten alert through out Asia and more than likely, ships would be steaming out of harbour. Whether they actually engage in combat or not would be up to the then sitting President. The likes of Jimmy Carter would probably sit back. The likes of Ronald Reagan would sink the entire Chinese fleet.

xinhui

tphuang:

First of all, happy new year.

Second of all, look at the forest, not the tree.

Ok,


JH-7 and H-6k are not what I call air superiority crafts, are they? Air superiority, that is the point of the debate right?


You see, you are looking for trees here.
The J-11BS spotted in Shangyang aircraft company is confirmed for PLAAF1st Air Division, and guess what, 1st air is stationed in Shangyang, facing DPRK, not TW.

Take 3rd division, one of the finest outfit of PLAAF with J-10 and Su-27, guess what, it is in Chengdu, not in Fujian.

Look at PLAN-AF and PLAAF units equipeed with Su-30MKK, are they stationed in either Guangzhou MR / North sea fleet, not facing TW are they?

All those performs you cited yourself have one thing in common, and it is not for Air superiority, but some a different mission, Hint, what Clinton did in 1996?


PLAN ships with AD capabilities, they are not assigned to East sea fleet facing TW, but rather to both North sea fleet (DDG115/DDG16) and South Sea Fleet (DDG 170/171)

tphuang

happy new year too.

They are not expected to do it alone obviously. J-10 and MKKs are expected to operate as escorts.
I look at this first regiment as an experiment one. Sort of like 44th division with J-10. You want it close to SAC. Once it's more mature, you will see it in the Nanjing and GuangZhou MR.
3rd division is in Nanjing MR. J-10 is at Changxin, certainly within combat radius of Taiwan if it carries 3 external fuel tanks.
The other more recently received J-10 regiment is in Guillin in the 5th regiment. Again, not in Fujian, but certainly within combat radius of Taiwan.
I would consider any of the 3rd generation fighters in Guangzhou/Nanjing MR to be within range of Taiwan.
So in the case of the fighter bombers, 4 regiments of JH-7 (1 in 28th division and 3 in ESF/SSF) + the 3 regiments of mkk (at wuhu and changsha and Feidong) are within Taiwan range.
of course, countering US carrier groups is a large part of it. But I stated them because you asked why they haven't purchased more fighter-bombers.
051Cs went to NSF, because that fleet has long been neglected.

As the recent November exercise indicated, the SSF and ESF can certainly operate together. So I would expect the 052Cs to be involved in any Taiwan scenario to protect the fleet and also help against ROCAF planes.

The new 054As that came out first pair went to ESF and second pair went to SSF. At the current configuration, their strongest point is their air defense.

Officer of Engineers

Still the one over riding factor which you have NOT addressed nor anywhere near addressing - loiter time.

xinhui

you still don't get it.


if they are within the 'range' TW, why CMC decided not to station them in Fujiang/Nanjing MR stead? Thank about the big picture instead of looking at this and that. Why CMC place its only Tor-M1 equipped Army AD brigade in nanjing MR? and why Nanjiang MR AD units got their hands on the S-300 Before Guangzhou MR?

tphuang

I don't have the specific figure, but the one stationed in 3rd division is close enough to Taiwan that in a mission where it is escorting the 28th division JH-7A, it probably has a 1 hour CAP time. The one in 5th regiment probably will need one refuel to escort the SSF JH-7A to Taiwan + loiter.

well, Nanjing MR certainly has its own J-10, JH-7A, KJ-2000, Y-8 EW and su-30 regiment, so I would say it's the most well equipped PLAAF MR. But I'm guessing you are referring to PLA putting it's best SAMs across from Taiwan to deny ROCAF from attacking the SSM launchers?

xinhui

Here is a reading from one of the Pro, Dr Tanner.
RAND | Monographs | Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use

The book is free to download from RAND.

Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan
A Tricky Weapon to Use
Cover: Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan

By: Murray Scot Tanner

Ever since the economic relationship between China and Taiwan began to explode in the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have been concerned that China could exploit these economic ties to coerce Taiwan into making political concessions concerning the two entities’ political relationship. Taiwan and China now rely on each other for important contributions to their respective economies, and each would suffer great economic pain and dislocation in the event of a major disruption in that relationship, but Taiwan is far more dependent upon mainland China than mainland China is dependent upon Taiwan. This monograph analyzes the political impact of that rapidly growing economic relationship and evaluates the prospects for Beijing to exploit it by employing economic coercion against Taiwan. The author evaluates Taiwan’s potential economic vulnerability to efforts by the Chinese to cut off or disrupt key aspects of the cross-strait relationship and analyzes the challenges that China has faced in its efforts to convert this raw, potential economic influence into effective political leverage. The author argues that, while Taiwan’s growing dependence is a source of genuine concern, China has encountered serious problems in exploiting the economic weapon to coerce Taiwan. The monograph closes by exploring the potential impact of cross-strait economic diplomacy on U.S. policy interests in the Taiwan Strait.








Chapter One:
Introduction

Chapter Two:
Economic Coercion: Factors Affecting Success and Failure

Chapter Three:
Taiwan’s Struggle to Manage Expanding Cross-Strait Economic Ties

Chapter Four:
Economic Factors: Evaluating Taiwan’s Vulnerability

Chapter Five:
Political Factors: Converting Economic Influence into Political Leverage

Chapter Six:
China’s Economic Leverage: A Powerful Weapon, but Tricky to Use

Officer of Engineers

There are 24 hours in a day. And when was the last time any PLAAF regt practiced night time refueling over open water away from the sight of land?