Thread: Ask An Expert- LAND Forces.

Originally Posted by gunnut

Interesting...even at 10k to 12k, Soviet divisions were still much smaller than US divisions. The only thing I can think of is Soviet divisions didn't have as many organic support units. They relied on corp, or even army level artillery units for their fire support.

This wiki article Bobruysk Offensive - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia states that a full strength Soviet rifle division in 1944 had only 7200 men.

Smaller support units is one reason, command efficiency is another. A late war Soviet infantry divisions would be filled with Asiatics who spoke a multitude of languages led by the barest of cadres and junior officers not even half trained by western standards. This reduced the number of men that could be effectively controlled.

Soviet units in W.W. II were expected to fight until exhaustion and rarely withdrawn prior to such. An excellent example of such is the experience of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division at Kursk. A division manning the foremost fortifications opposite the II S.S. Panzer Corps, it was decimated in the initial onslaught. By western standards the division was combat ineffective after one day of sustained battle. Nonetheless it was held in line until pushed back upon the second echelon defenses where it withdrew behind that protection, reorganized (but not reconstituted) and reintroduced back into the battle in the seam which emerged between XLVIII Panzer Corps and II S.S. Panzer Corps.

The ability of a standard Soviet rifle division to sustain itself in the field was exceedingly poor during W.W.II. That changed during the post-war years and the evolution came closer to western sustainment standards though never achieving a comparable capability. This was evidenced by the retention of Soviet divisional flags in Afghanistan. There, individual replacement for casualties instead of wholesale unit or divisional swaps was the accepted norm. Of course the modest intensity of combat operations in Afghanistan allowed for this indulgence. Such wasn't the expectation for operations against N.A.T.O. forces in western Europe.

Originally Posted by zraver

Smaller support units is one reason, command efficiency is another. A late war Soviet infantry divisions would be filled with Asiatics who spoke a multitude of languages led by the barest of cadres and junior officers not even half trained by western standards. This reduced the number of men that could be effectively controlled.

Was this also the reason why Chinese Nationalist divisions were generally small compared to their western counterparts?

Originally Posted by S2

Soviet units in W.W. II were expected to fight until exhaustion and rarely withdrawn prior to such. An excellent example of such is the experience of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division at Kursk. A division manning the foremost fortifications opposite the II S.S. Panzer Corps, it was decimated in the initial onslaught. By western standards the division was combat ineffective after one day of sustained battle. Nonetheless it was held in line until pushed back upon the second echelon defenses where it withdrew behind that protection, reorganized (but not reconstituted) and reintroduced back into the battle in the seam which emerged between XLVIII Panzer Corps and II S.S. Panzer Corps.

The ability of a standard Soviet rifle division to sustain itself in the field was exceedingly poor during W.W.II. That changed during the post-war years and the evolution came closer to western sustainment standards though never achieving a comparable capability. This was evidenced by the retention of Soviet divisional flags in Afghanistan. There, individual replacement for casualties instead of wholesale unit or divisional swaps was the accepted norm. Of course the modest intensity of combat operations in Afghanistan allowed for this indulgence. Such wasn't the expectation for operations against N.A.T.O. forces in western Europe.

Sir, if you don't mind, can you elaborate on the pros and cons of the Soviet model of not reconstituting a unit in the field but rather replacing them in a whole sale fashion?

Also, how do the western militaries deem a unit to be "combat ineffective?"

Originally Posted by gunnut

The only thing I can think of is Soviet divisions didn't have as many organic support units. They relied on corp, or even army level artillery units for their fire support.

Regarding the size of Soviet divisions, both this and the organization style was considered top-notch standard in the West in the 1950s and were even written down as the standard configuration of national contributions in the European Defense Community Treaty in 1953.

The concentration at corps level wasn't in the artillery / combat support but in the real manpower-heavy support units: maintenance, supply, signals, engineers, medical. The divisions only got token forces for these in the original concept, just like with the Soviets.

Germany and France initially modeled their forces like that, and later moved to a brigade based combined-arms approach with support at division level later (Germany ca 1960, France ca 1985). The USA skipped this concept and went straight to that abortion that was ROCID aka the "Pentomic Division".

Originally Posted by kato

Regarding the size of Soviet divisions, both this and the organization style was considered top-notch standard in the West in the 1950s and were even written down as the standard configuration of national contributions in the European Defense Community Treaty in 1953.

The concentration at corps level wasn't in the artillery / combat support but in the real manpower-heavy support units: maintenance, supply, signals, engineers, medical. The divisions only got token forces for these in the original concept, just like with the Soviets.

Germany and France initially modeled their forces like that, and later moved to a brigade based combined-arms approach with support at division level later (Germany ca 1960, France ca 1985). The USA skipped this concept and went straight to that abortion that was ROCID aka the "Pentomic Division".

After reading about the "pentomic" division organization, I can't help but see the resemblance of the current modular division setup to that concept. Am I missing something here?

You have to remember the purpose of the pentomic division battle groups. It was the idea that conventional units could fight on a battlefield with nukes being tossed around. Hell we gave atomic weapons in the hands of battalion commanders!!!! It was an attempt by the Army to stay relevant during the budget battles between USN/USAF in the nuclear build up of the 1950s.

"Sir, if you don't mind, can you elaborate on the pros and cons of the Soviet model of not reconstituting a unit in the field but rather replacing them in a whole sale fashion?"

In short, plug and play. The Soviet model was geared towards offensive operations. As such, resources weren't allocated towards decimated units. They had their chance and either failed or fell on their sword achieving a penetration. Their time had passed and a new unit echeloned behind them would now attempt to exploit their success.

Second echelon forces would not be committed to certain defeat against rock-hard defenses but be diverted to breakthrough points. The Soviets emphasized reinforcing success and punishing failure in every way imaginable.

Failure? You could expect remaining committed to battle if for no other reason than to hold enemy defending forces in place. There, you'd be fought-out while attempting to hold the defenders attention away from the exploitation point elsewhere.

The obvious con is the waste to painfully-acquired battle experience-both generally and specific to the terrain and enemy being faced. Further, it sapped units of valued leaders at all levels of command.

"...Also, how do the western militaries deem a unit to be 'combat ineffective?'"

A.R.'s ballywhack. As a Brigade S-4 it would fall to him and the Brigade S-1 to compile the requisite status reports from battalions and separate companies to determine current combat power. Those reports would shape the Brigade C.O.'s input to the Division commander and staff.

Originally Posted by gunnut

Was this also the reason why Chinese Nationalist divisions were generally small compared to their western counterparts?

I am guessing this may play a role but the nationalist Chinese are not my area.

Originally Posted by S2

[B]

In short, plug and play. The Soviet model was geared towards offensive operations. As such, resources weren't allocated towards decimated units. They had their chance and either failed or fell on their sword achieving a penetration. Their time had passed and a new unit echeloned behind them would now attempt to exploit their success.

Much smaller technical base to start with plus the way the USSR allocated manpower. A soviet tank battalion's maintenance unit was 1/4th the size of the US unit on paper and closer to 1/5 or 1/6th in reality. Sustaining individual divisions in combat simply wasn't possible. Its a lot easier to train tankers than it is too train mechanics. The inability to sustain divisions in combat also affected how the Soviets moved what are divisional level assets in the West to the corps level. The Soviet tank division had 32 howitzers assigned in support, this is only about half what a US division could call on. But at the corps and army level the Soviets had entire artillery divisions.

Originally Posted by zraver

The Soviet tank division had 32 howitzers assigned in support, this is only about half what a US division could call on.

The 1953 EDC layout also called for four battalions of artillery (plus one ADA), i.e. at least about what the US division had.

By doctrine we used to consider a unit combat ineffective if it had taken more than 20% casualties and wa down to 40% on ammo and fuel. The unit would hold in place and reorganize. Key leadership positions would be filled, equipment would be redistributed and key weapon system manned. That was the doctrine. We actually knews we were in it for the long haul, no pulling back or out of the line....hold with what you had.

That is why the the AirLand Battle doctrine stressed mission orders and distribution of commanders intent to the lowest level. This helped assure that even chopped up units which had a fighting spirit knew what they could do to contribute. Now this was a Cold War mindset.

At various times in our history a unit would fight until it was practically wiped out. This is especially true of Confederate units in the ACW. By 1864 many Union regiments were down to 200 - 300 men; Confederate brigades could be as small as 350. Part of the problem was that units only received personnel replacement if they recruited them. This changed with World War 1 when it was centralized personnel replacement and rose to high art in World War 2....with mixed results.

Originally Posted by Albany Rifles

We actually knews we were in it for the long haul, no pulling back or out of the line....hold with what you had.

Mmm. Both Germany and France abandoned this around 1916 because it simply doesn't work once you're stuck in position for the long haul. Cycling divisions back and forth between front line and reverse positions was what was developed then, and what worked quite fine.

"...The Soviet tank division had 32 howitzers assigned in support, this is only about half what a US division could call on...."

36 2S3s in two battalions plus a BM-21 rocket battalion. MRDs possessed three battalions of 2S3s plus a rocket battalion. Very comparable. In some instances, those howitzer battalions were boosted to 24 guns. U.S. armored and mechanized infantry divisions didn't see 24 gun D.S. battalions until the Corps 86 structure came down. Heretofore it had been 3 eighteen gun D.S. battalions with a 12 gun 8" battalion in general support. U.S. divisions looked to Corps Arty to augment their fires.