Thread: Rear Area Operations

Originally Posted by kato

No prob.

Some unit designations aren't immediately clear to Germans either: the "PSV-Bataillon" is a good example, especially since you won't easily find out what the abbreviation PSV means either - it's short for Psychologische Verteidigung, "psychological defense". Even then it's not exactly clear what those guys do exactly unless you know that each battalion was running a radio station, had a company for creating and printing leaflets, and had two companies equipped with large-scale mobile loudspeaker systems (task of the battalion: strategic demoralisation of the enemy and "good news" for the own soldiers).

There were also some units where the name was intentionally "obscure" - Nachschubbataillone Sonderwaffen, "Special Weapons Supply Battalions" for example (actually pure security units), or the divisional "signals company" (... for electronic warfare).

Other units - the "Wallmeister" (demolition team), or also "Frontnachrichtenkompanie" (HUMINT recon/intelligence company) can be hard to understand because the names simply don't translate directly into English or other languages.

ha, i thought "Frontnachrichtenkompanie were, well - military correspondents. I wondered did they really expect to dispatch news stories to Frankfurter Allgemeine´s Saturday edition

Hehe. Well, in German a "Nachrichtendienst" is an intelligence service - see the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the German equivalent of the CIA.

The interesting thing about the Frontnachrichtenkompanien was that they were supposed to spy while in uniform btw. Ask some harmless questions to POWs and civilians, keeping tabs on suspect cooperators, analyzing any documents found in captured sites etc. Job was to create a Feindlagebild, showing how the enemy (or perhaps an ally) viewed the current situation. Were integrated into general recon in the current transformation, one platoon for each recon battalion and each independent recon company.

is there something on the web about the pipeline units of the era , esp. their equipment and same for NBC units?

and, bit off-topic question-
german armored brigades had ´´weird´´ composition-
Pzbrigade had 2 tank btl., 1 mech. inf. btl and a mixed btl. - 2 tank coy and 1 mech.inf.coy. PzGrenader brig. had the same set up only ratio replaced IFV-s with tanks

Why? Were they standing units, permanent Kampfgruppen so to speak?

The mixed battalions were a cadred unit - their HQ company would only be filled in wartime, and in peacetime the three combat companies were instead distributed to the other three battalions of the brigade (giving each of those a fourth combat company of their type).

In the switch from Army Structure 3 to 4 in 1980, the companies within the Field Army became smaller (switch from 3x5+2 tanks to 3x4+1) in order to become more mobile - higher command and supply component share per maneuver unit giving it more support. The "leftover" equipment from this switch was used to create a fourth maneuver battalion within each brigade.
The remaining leftover equipment was used to equip the 51st and 56th brigade at the same time btw.

There were a handful units that retained Army Structure 3 composition until 1989 (mostly because they were planned for some special combat situation that necessitated it), making them look somewhat odd - for example the tank company in 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade still having the above 3x5+2 composition, or the 72nd Territorial Infantry Regiment having 24 mortars within its battalions instead of a mortar company with 18 mortars at regiment level.

---

Pipeline Engineers were supposed to do the field work for the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS) network. CEPS was mostly built in the 50s, and essentially consisted of:

• depots near airbases and in the intended corps rear areas
• a large hub around the Karlsruhe area on the Rhine (both east and west, multiple redundant connections), where a lot of German refineries were located
• the pipelines connecting these
• several pipelines into the Benelux states and France

The pipeline engineers would have maintained and repaired this network in wartime - including in particular firefighting if a pipeline was damaged and in flames - and would have built field pipelines from the CEPS network to Army supply points to distribute fuel.
Equipment consisted of a large variety of trucks, with equipment (e.g. large fuel pumps) mostly mounted on trailers. I think the staff of each battalion had a platoon with Fuchs APCs for shuttling operations personnel into contaminated zones.

Edit, PS: CEPS is still operational. The pipeline engineer units were transformed into "Specialist Engineer Companies" in the 1990s, and integrated into "Specialist Engineer Battalions" in the recent transformation. The Specialist Engineer Battalions now handle complete field camps - building, supply etc - for the Army, e.g. operating the field camps in Afghanistan.

NBC Units

The NBC units have been using essentially the same equipment from the mid 70s till about two years ago - primarily the TEP 70 concept, which used standardized vehicles (modified 7-ton trucks, the "E-Kfz", and 5-ton trucks to carry other stuff) to create decontamination sites. Each NBC Decon platoon could probably decon a company of personnel and equipment in a 2- or 3-hour session; medical staff also examined the contaminated personnel at these sites. There were "light" and "medium" platoons - a light platoon could build two sites that both decontaminated either personnel or equipment, a medium platoon could build one large site handling both in parallel with slightly more capacity.

The NBC units had 20mm field guns (one squad with 4 guns each per company; two squads per company in Corps-level NBC battalions), which would have been used as AA guns at the decontamination sites - those were interesting targets for enemy helicopters or CAS aircraft after all (field guns were eliminated from ToE in 1996, most older staff in my unit rather bemoaned that when i served there in 1999).
NBC recon units (see below) in the Field Army used Fuchs APCs modified with onboard analysis equipment (mass spectrometer and a computer). These recon units essentially operated between the front line and the Artillery positions, and hence needed some armour since they could meet the enemy.

Essential distribution of NBC units was:

• one decon company for each unprotected combat brigade with one medium and two light platoons ([1])
• one mixed company for each division (Field Army): one recon platoon with 6 Fuchs, one medium and one light platoon
• one battalion for each Corps (Field Army): one recon company with 18 Fuchs, three decon companies with two medium and two light platoons
• one battalion for each Area Defense Command: three decon companies with (probably) two light or (possibly) three medium platoons each
• four battalions supporting US troops (not operational)
• several special NBC companies for the government bunkers

[1]: affected brigades number 23, 51 (Field Army) and 52,53,54,55 (Territorial Army). Type 6 infantry brigades did not have one.

The NBC units supporting US units were for the most part not operational due to lack of personnel and equipment (was being drawn up during 1989/1990, then cancelled) - they would presumably have assembled something out of the professional firefighting platoons of each US base in Germany though.


In addition to the military NBC units, there were also the civil protection units (specifically for NBC):

• the Civil Engineer Corps operating at a regional level:
  
  • at least one NBC platoon per district (more in cities; about 270 platoons total in West Germany, meaning 8-10 within the same area as a Regional Defense Command). Mostly NBC decon, although these generally also had a car loaded with analysis gear for recon. Handled accidents with dangerous chemicals in peacetime.
  • a similar number of platoons that could perform recovery operations under NBC conditions
• the Alarm Service operating:
  
  • 565 manned and 1,000 unmanned sensor stations throughout Germany, one every 10 km roughly (to track contamination and contaminants; they proved their capability in 1986 with Chernobyl btw)
  • a network for warning civil and military authorities with 12,000 receivers hooked up (low estimate - high estimate: 20,000)
  • a network of 65,000 warning sirens for warning the civilian population (low estimate - high estimate: 100,000)
  • 10 large bunkers as central command sites (nuke-hardened, meaning working through multi-megaton-level strategic nukes exploding in the air above)
  • 40 smaller regional command and data collection centers
• about 80 "auxiliary hospitals" that:
  
  • could operate under full NBC conditions in the aftermath of strategic nuclear bombardment
  • were equipped with or placed in an underground NBC bunker; not intended as protection against nearby explosions, just protected against fallout, large debris, fire etc (note: another 120 "auxiliary hospitals" operated without such a bunker, and were intended more for refugees)
  • were mostly spread around likely strategic bombardment targets at a certain distance (well outside total destruction zone)
  • were the civilian equivalent to the reserve military hospitals at the same size (average capacity 400 patients, about 50 staff)

These units would have handled civilian casualties. Service in these units was possible as an alternative to military service, usually in a "reservist capacity" of weekend service and call-up duty for 8-12 years (at that time; currently it's 6 years).

late edit: The civilian decon platoons were part of the THW at the time (moved there now in above list). Were transferred to firefighters in 1994, after the THW became a more general support organization in 1993 - the organization lost some other units as well in that transformation, e.g. signals and maintenance platoons.

Late PS for the map on the last page: RDCs 62 and 66 are switched. Sorry.

Kato,
i have briefly scanned the lostplaces.de (?)site and the Orbat given here are absolutely jaw-dropping. seems to me the sheer scale of preparations has not been surpassed (at least in West).
is there some sort of ´beginners guide to Bundeswehr 1950-1990´, something that covers the theme, preparations, development in depth and in layman´s terms? so far honestly speaking the best resource has been, well your posts. I´ve done site searches on the theme and your posts some time ago in Defence Talk and MilPhotos.

thanks
(in a very not-stalkerish way ) )

Originally Posted by BD1

is there some sort of ´beginners guide to Bundeswehr 1950-1990´, something that covers the theme, preparations, development in depth and in layman´s terms?

Couple hundred books on the topic out there

There's also the Cold War Forum, pretty much the same topic as lostplaces (also German speaking). Lostplaces is about the most indepth out there though.

Originally Posted by BD1

i have briefly scanned the lostplaces.de (?)site and the Orbat given here are absolutely jaw-dropping. seems to me the sheer scale of preparations has not been surpassed (at least in West).

The preparations took 30 years - essentially, the planning for the late 80s Bundeswehr was done in the early 60s (for completion in the early 90s), they only adapted it later on.

There's a lot where the preparations didn't meet the planning at all though, especially in civil protection (for sheer scale), host nation support or certain infrastructure preparations (e.g. emergency airfields). Corners were cut to save costs, procurement was riddled with corruption and old friend networks - there were really major procurement scandals every 5 years or so it seems. There were also the NATO-level problems - Germany had two entire French Corps available and no planning for how to use them.

Originally Posted by kato

Couple hundred books on the topic out there

i´m aware of the sheer amount of the info, i asked a little pointers - little time and money can be spared for this interest

There's also the Cold War Forum, pretty much the same topic as lostplaces (also German speaking). Lostplaces is about the most indepth out there though.


The preparations took 30 years - essentially, the planning for the late 80s Bundeswehr was done in the early 60s (for completion in the early 90s), they only adapted it later on.

There's a lot where the preparations didn't meet the planning at all though, especially in civil protection (for sheer scale), host nation support or certain infrastructure preparations (e.g. emergency airfields). Corners were cut to save costs, procurement was riddled with corruption and old friend networks - there were really major procurement scandals every 5 years or so it seems. There were also the NATO-level problems - Germany had two entire French Corps available and no planning for how to use them.

i thought the French corps were strategic reserve of sorts?

ISTR that all this was achieved in relatively limited budget (as in % of GDP), right?

you speak of problems in procurement and implementing the plans, but all in all was it considered robust enough system? would it have worked? over at the Tanknet people who served there mentioned that they might have serious problems getting their units moving in what must have been the mother of all traffic jams in , say 1984. Add the demolitions teams blowing stuff up at the same time, slowing the movement even more etc.

the military infrastructure i guess was in reasonably good condition, and maintenance standards were bit higher than in this side of Europe. At least some mil./civ.def. infrastructure quality was such that it was more threat to the users in this side.

it´s the numbers of that era that are impressive.
Red Army in Soviet Socialist Republic of Estonia had in 800 locations 1565 military objects, covering 87147 ha.( equaling to 2% of country´s territory), they had here around 122000 servicemen (roughly equaling to 10% of republic´s population).

Most important were locally based 144.MRD (cat C) and 4 regiments of 23. Guard´s Missile Division + spt. units, 14.Air Defence Division (S-200, S-125, S-75, later S-300), 3 Mig-23 interceptor regiments, radar networks, 1 Su-24 regt., 1 Tu-16/22M regiment. in addition to this there was parts of Baltic Fleet, list of which i don´t have at the moment.

Originally Posted by BD1

i thought the French corps were strategic reserve of sorts?

The 1st French Corps were eventually (roughly) assigned the protection of the strategic three-state point between France, ADC 4 and ADC 5 - the main hub area of the German pipeline network, and one of three strategic evacuation points across the Rhine (the second was held by the Canadian Brigade, the third would probably have fallen to the 54th Territorial Brigade). The 2nd French Corps was assigned (roughly) to the Trier area, effectively protecting REFORGER bases there.

Originally Posted by BD1

ISTR that all this was achieved in relatively limited budget (as in % of GDP), right?

Roughly 3% of GDP, pretty consistently.

Originally Posted by BD1

all in all was it considered robust enough system? would it have worked?

The expectation was that any Verteidigungsfall (defense case) would have been preceded by a Spannungsfall (increased tension period) of at least two weeks. This period was enough to call in the reservists, to get the five REFORGER divisions into Germany, to impound and repaint trucks for the territorial units, and to stock the bunkers with perishable stuff from the supply depots.

Under that assumption it would have worked.

For any shorter period - well, Germany and the USA had about 50 Pershings deployed in Germany ready to launch at Eastern Europe within a couple minutes at any time (with another 130 waiting), and if nothing else was available, one or more Nike batteries would have been taken off the air-defense grid and launched its nukes at troops crossing the borders.

It was mostly Allied units in Germany that had the problems - especially REFORGER. Their prepositioned gear was highly centralized, basically just sitting there waiting for a preventive area bombardment; it also was never complete, i've read some US Army reports that account for up to 30% missing equipment of certain types at some of these depots. And the high centralization led to the mentioned traffic jams - you really couldn't expect an entire division to sortie from a single depot concurrently, and that's what REFORGER tried to attempt.

Originally Posted by BD1

the military infrastructure i guess was in reasonably good condition, and maintenance standards were bit higher than in this side of Europe.

Let's just say that all maintenance standards went waaay down after 1989. :P

It's mostly the civil protection infrastructure that wasn't up to par. Most bunkers were still leftovers from WW2, with new-built nuke-hardened bunkers at most housing 200,000 people. The government-sponsored private bunker building program (concept borrowed from the USA to save costs) amounted to next to nothing in the end. And the civil protection units used leftover army equipment from the 50s.

Originally Posted by BD1

it´s the numbers of that era that are impressive.

Seen compared to the population, the German setup was surprisingly low in numbers actually.

The active Bundeswehr amounted to about 0.85% of population in 1989, the reserves amounted to about 1.30%. Add about 0.65% active in the various civil protection outfits, with about another 0.50% wartime reserve/growth.

Rough land usage was 250,000 hectares by the Bundeswehr and 200,000 hectares by allied troops (together about 1.8% of West-German territory).

Originally Posted by BD1

you speak of problems in procurement and implementing the plans

Basically it was several separate problems:

1. Corruption permeated especially the early big projects. Notable ones were the HS30 (10,600 ordered, production canned after 2,300) and Starfighter (the usual 30% loss rate in just 10 years peacetime operations, without the right Bakshish Germany would probably have bought Mirages instead). Such corruption schemes were a constant in German defense procurement, the last big case opened before the end of the Cold War was against the producers of the Leopard 2 in 1988.

2. Systems acquired under 1. - but also others - usually weren't combat-worthy either. Or not exactly valuable in combat, e.g. the HS30 was prone to break down due to being completely undermotorized - and you couldn't repair the engine in the field, because it was only accessible from underneath. Or e.g. the Hotchkiss TT6 was way too loud for a recon vehicle, and had this little problem that when running in reverse gear it could have been overtaken by a vintage 1917 Mk I tank.

3. Plans were rearraigned to fit financial needs - not with the explanation "we can't buy more" but with "see, these systems are so much better now, we can cut their numbers". Affected in particular the Navy, where initial 1960s plans called for a 200-vessel navy to combat the Baltic Fleet essentially (was cut to about 150). As a whole, the Bundeswehr was actually supposed to be even bigger according to original planning - it only eclipsed at 90% of its planned size.

Originally Posted by BD1

i´m aware of the sheer amount of the info, i asked a little pointers - little time and money can be spared for this interest

There's a book list of references used within Dragoner's OOB pdfs.

If anyone's interested, i've mapped out the units for an example rear area.

KMZ file for Google Earth

The shown area (RDC 61) corresponds to the rural Regierungsbezirk of Schwaben - chosen because it's rather "representative". Total area is 10,000 km², population currently about 1.8 million.
In wartime, RDC 61 would be a rear staging area for II Corps (Corps HQ is actually west of RDC 61, main staging area is east of it), as well as hosting several airforce bases. It contains a rather wide mix of base types - active bases, army schools, mobilization bases, depots with mobilization units, pure depots - so it's somewhat interesting.

It also gives a good hint at the fact that the rear area security units were not exactly oversized (about 8,000 men in this RDC), given what they had to protect.

Might be interesting for some people.

Originally Posted by Mihais

And if the Reds came through Austria?How long were the Austrians expected to last?Such a move would have thrown the IInd Korp out of its Danube defenses anyway.

Originally Posted by kato

Austria had "Key Zone 35" protecting the south side of the Danube Valley about 50 km east of the German border. Near impossible to march through without nukes.

Gotta correct myself on my answer for this question a bit - we didn't entirely rely on Key Zone 35.

The southeastern border towards Austria, going south from the Danube, is formed by the Inn and Saalach rivers for the first 110 km, which, like the Danube would have formed a natural barrier. The above units guarded the 220 km long zone between the Saalach and Lake Constance.

The remaining border to Austria was protected on the German side, when you look at the actual stationing of troops - the 1st Mountain Division had seven infantry battalions, one mechanized battalion (PzGrenBtl 222) and a tank battalion (GebPzBtl 8) stationed along the "open" part of the border. The western edge was protected by parts of the 96th Area Defense Regiment with its three infantry battalions, although by the time WarPac troops reached that II Corps could easily have rerouted one of the heavier units stationed as reinforcement (e.g. the 28th, 29th, 55th and 65th Armored Brigades) towards such an advance.

Stumbled across this randomly: FM 90-14 Rear Battle, 1985.

Not too indepth, but explains tasks and operations. Appendix A (page 82+) broadly outlines German forces for such tasks, given as an example of a rear area force. Includes a couple tables to explain fundamental differences in US and German approach.

Originally Posted by BD1

kato, is the Orbat you referring to the Dragoner´s Bundeswehr OOB 1989 or is there an somew bit simpler (and in english) version?

Dragoner has released "Part 3 - Luftwaffe" of this yesterday btw. 750+ pages now and still 3 out of 8 parts to go...
(to be fair, those three are short ones)

Available for download @ Literatur