Defending the Lion City... Take 2 - 2008 update

**Officer of Engineers** · 10 Jan 09,, 19:19

Originally Posted by Transient

So they have a hidde timebomb underneath every bridge?

Don't need to. I am not going to say how but the info is out there in every field manual ever published.

Originally Posted by Transient

Which bridges are you referring to?

Anyone that they want to stop you.

Originally Posted by Transient

A Malaysian guerrilla operation? Tell me how they're going to get the required ammo, how they'd organise, what training they have?

Let me get this straight. You are of the opinion that no Malaysian Officer have thought this out, read history, or practiced small unit engagement, evasion, escape, and endurance.

Originally Posted by Transient

ExcELLENT! Why need an army against Singapore when they can just blow up their infrastructure and they'd win? We'd have to send our army to protect their infrastructure from themselves! LOL.

Just like Tzar Alexander burned his own crops in front of Napoleoan. Or Saddam Hussien blowing up the oil fields. This is TOTAL WAR that we speak of.

Originally Posted by Transient

We have at least 1 heliborne trained brigade to retake the facilities if need be, so 1 regiment can be spared per facility. SOF can be inserted before hand to hinder such attempts at sabotage, probably with support from RSAF Apaches.

So you can get there before they sh!t in your water?

**troung** · 11 Jan 09,, 00:01

A Malaysian guerrilla operation? Tell me how they're going to get the required ammo, how they'd organise, what training they have?

Malaysia has already shown the ability to help organize a guerrilla war. And they have fought guerillas.

We have at least 1 heliborne trained brigade to retake the facilities if need be, so 1 regiment can be spared per facility. SOF can be inserted before hand to hinder such attempts at sabotage, probably with support from RSAF Apaches.

And Malaysian air defenses? Malaysian troops? RSAF lifting capabilities? Kuwait was able to get fighters air borne and cut up Iraqi helicopters. Wouldn't take a rocket scientist to assume where Singapore would attack either.

Moving RSAF assets in country would more then tip off Malaysia.

Singapore essentially has the same problem Israel faces - it cannot tolerate high casualties and it cannot tolerate a drawn out conflict. But then Malaysia won't have time to start a draft, and even calling upon its reserves it won't outnumber the SAF. The only thing is that the SAF cannot allow the MAF to conserve its forces for a drawn out conflict. There is no reason why the SAF needs to flatten a malaysian city. Running out of bullets is also a false premise. There is no reason to believe Malaysia won't 'run out of bullets' earlier.

Malaysia has enough people and space to decide if it has the time to start up a draft and keep any conflict going and going. If Malaysia decides to conscript up every able bodied man to punish the invaders, then what? How many coffins can Singapore take and how many times can the public ponder why hasn't Malaysia given up.

I'm sorry ideas that people will roll over an play dead did not work for Napoleon, Saddam, Hitler and so forth.

**Bigfella** · 11 Jan 09,, 00:58

Originally Posted by LongshotSNN

Doesn't seem like it's just southern Thailand, but the crossovers from Sumatra & Kalimantan (Indonesia) and Moro-Northern Sabah (S'pore), these are mainly economic migrants. As someone said earlier, Malaysia's got more than just Singapore to worry about if we were talking security issues. Doesn't mean that the politicians (Dr. M was one great example) aren't above using Islam or nationalism for cynical purposes. You have enough local UMNO politicians who regularly fart about "immigrant Chinese and Indians", such as one former Penangite official did after the DAP became the state government up there. These are the sort who will also make noise about Singapore being an upstart/in need of being taught a lesson etc.

One thing about your last sentence, gf0012-aust, is that recently in Malaysia, I've been seeing a lot of Islamisation, if you can call it that, in the past few years. Especially after Dr. M started calling Malaysia a "Muslim" country. Instances like the fatwa on banning yoga, are laughable, but taken together with off-the-radar incidences in education, Muslim converts and burial problems, a ban on the word "Allah" in Christian Bahasa Melayu media etc. I'm not sure whether it's just a series of unfortunate circumstances, or it's a mass spontaneity event (to be slightly facetious). Then again this process (if it was one) would probably still be under state control, of some sort.

Longshot,

While this is sort of off topic (and sort of not) I'm curious to get your perspective on the state of UMNO & the BN in particular. I suppose the relevance here is that Malaysia's potential to pose a threat to anyone obviously depends on its internal politics.

With UMNO now getting about 30% of the vote nationally & about to appoint a controversial scion of political royalty as leader do you think UMNO can hold the BN together & hold on to power?

Alternatively, can it even hold itself together? Are the tensions between various groups in the party such that another bad election result might see infighting cripple the party?

I'm also curious about the relationship between some of the more radical Malay nationalists & Islamic fundamentalists such as PAS. While PAS is currently part of the opposition, can you see a potential realignment of elements supporting PAS with some of the more extreme edges of UMNO?

Along the same lines, what are the chances of parts of the BN (indivdual members or even parties) defectin to Anwar Ibrahim? He talks a good game, but can he back it up - might there be some sort of 'tipping point' where a handful of defections begins to unravel the BN - or is he just full of hot air?

I know I've asked a lot here, so do the best you can. Because the situation is so fluid in Malaysia at the moment there is a lot to ask,

**Transient** · 11 Jan 09,, 02:54

Don't need to. I am not going to say how but the info is out there in every field manual ever published.

So every field manual out there shows how to compress time?

Anyone that they want to stop you.

Going by this I could claim we can drop their bridges and stop them. Any bridge we want.

Let me get this straight. You are of the opinion that no Malaysian Officer have thought this out, read history, or practiced small unit engagement, evasion, escape, and endurance.

No, I'm saying that civilians organising a guerilla operation when in SAF occupied territory isn't going to be easy.

Just like Tzar Alexander burned his own crops in front of Napoleoan. Or Saddam Hussien blowing up the oil fields. This is TOTAL WAR that we speak of.

If only they'd hire you as their military advisor. You could persuade them to destroy themselves should war break out. We would appreciate it.

So you can get there before they sh!t in your water.

It'd be very much like them to do that, but that's why we have newater?

)

Malaysia has already shown the ability to help organize a guerrilla war.

Which got put down.

And Malaysian air defenses? Malaysian troops? RSAF lifting capabilities? Kuwait was able to get fighters air borne and cut up Iraqi helicopters. Wouldn't take a rocket scientist to assume where Singapore would attack either.

Malaysia has limited air defenses (mostly limited to VSHORADS), and the reasonable assumption is that RSAF has control of the airspace that close to Singapore. So long as the RSAF learns the lessons of Karbala, the Apaches should be safe from suffering a similar incident. RSAF lifting capabilities? More than enough for 1 regiment at a time. 2 can be carried without the need to transport too many heavy equipment.

Malaysia has enough people and space to decide if it has the time to start up a draft and keep the conflcit going and going. If Malaysia decides to conscript up every able bodied man to punish the invaders, then what? How many coffins can Singapore take and how many times can the public ponder why hasn't Malaysia given up.

Draft? How long do you think they'd need to train the required numbers involved?

**Officer of Engineers** · 11 Jan 09,, 03:04

Originally Posted by Transient

So every field manual out there shows how to compress time?

What the hell are you talking about?

Originally Posted by Transient

Going by this I could claim we can drop their bridges and stop them. Any bridge we want.

If you can reach them.

Originally Posted by Transient

No, I'm saying that civilians organising a guerilla operation when in SAF occupied territory isn't going to be easy.

So you just think the Malaysian military is incapable of organizing such a feat.

Originally Posted by Transient

If only they'd hire you as their military advisor. You could persuade them to destroy themselves should war break out. We would appreciate it.

Now this confirms it, you have absolutely no respect for the Malaysian Officer corps. Thus far, instead of telling me where my thinking is wrong with in regards to their thinking, you have been trying to portray them as incompetents.

Originally Posted by Transient

It'd be very much like them to do that, but that's why we have newater?

)

Icing on the cake.

Originally Posted by Transient

Draft? How long do you think they'd need to train the required numbers involved?

30 days.

**sunnyamy** · 11 Jan 09,, 09:51

Originally Posted by gf0012-aust

Actually, from my own experience, I'd regard the modified Sing subs as on a par if not superior to any of the sth east asian middle asian countries. The only countries north of them with superior capability are the japanese with the Oyashios.

The issue for the sings is sub detection, and again, they purchased systems capability off of Israel and Australia a few years back just for that purpose.

North of australia, they and the japanese are the most wired up submarine force in the region.

gf0012-aust, I feel no shame in telling you that I know very little about navies and even less about submarines. However, I am willing to learn and have made an effort to at least read up on internet sources.

In my internet searches, I have found an article on Singapore's submarines written by Mokhzani Zubir and published by the Maritime Institute of Malaysia called "SILENT KILLERS IN SHALLOW WATERS: SINGAPORE’S DEADLY SUBMARINE FLEET".

Currently, Singapore operates 4 Challenger or Vastergotland class submarines (which are close to 40 years old) and have 2 second hand AIP capable Vastergotland-class submarines on order (to enter RSN service in 2010). From the way you describe Singapore's submarines and from the article by Mokhzani Zubir, I get the impression that the Malaysian navy is really worried about this 'relatively new' capability for the RSN. Last year, RSN's navy news also announced that a second Singapore submarine commander had passed his Perisher course conducted by the Swedish Navy. So only 2 of our 4 submarine commanders have completed their advanced training.

Mokhzani Zubir said:

"The procurement of the Vastergotland submarines is in line with Singapore’s defence philosophy: to destroy the enemy/aggressor with swift and decisive victory, that is to give the aggressor ‘a knock-out punch in round one.’ The Vastergotland-class submarines will definitely strengthen its pre-emptive deterrent capability against any possible enemy especially within the region.

Singapore’s territorial water is too small, shallow and congested for the submarines to patrol around the island but they are crucially needed to provide seaward defence and protect the sea lanes of communication, the blood veins of Singapore’s survival.

The primary roles of the submarines are to crush enemy’s sea blockade and allow sea denial during crisis or war. With its stealth capability, the Vastergotland-class submarines can suppress enemy surface ships. Further the subs present lethal ambush threats to warships. With its silent underwater maneuver, the submarines could handle frigates or destroyers without much danger of being detected. Another crucial role of these stealth submarines is to provide protection to the Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) during deployment of troops...

It is a known fact that to hunt and detect a submarine effectively requires another submarine. For now, Singapore’s submarine fleet reigns supreme in underwater warfare, ‘unchallenged’ by other Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, without submarines, Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability is limited. But Indonesia has confirmed the purchase of four new submarines from South Korea at a cost of USD270 million each and expects delivery in 2008. And Malaysia will receive two Scorpene-class submarines from France in 2009...

Further the Scorpene will multiply the Royal Malaysian Navy’s Anti Submarine Warfare and this would challenge Singapore’s supremacy in underwater warfare capability. The procurement of the Scorpene has tilted the military power parity scale previously dominated by Singapore...

For the first time in history, Malaysia will posses the ability to wage underwater surprise attack. Indeed, with its high ability to elude detection thus blunders the enemy’s intelligence, the Scorpene submarines would provide Malaysia with an element of strategic surprise. This would leave the adversary wondering when and where the submarines will strike.

Clearly the strategic surprise element will provide a force multiplier effect to Malaysia’s capability in waging conventional warfare. Singapore’s limited maritime power projection capability will be threatened by Malaysia..."

Why are the Malaysians so worried about Singapore's second hand submarines (besides the fact that the RSN has more submarines), when they are going to have brand new ones?

Aren't the 2 Malaysian Scorpene-class submarines brand new? Are the RSN submarines in a different class from the Scorpene-class?

From what I understand, the larger the submarine, the easier it is to implement 'acoustic management measures'. So I would understand that the larger Colins class (from my over simplified point of view) is a different class, from Singapore's and Malaysia's submarines. Is this true?

**gf0012-aust** · 11 Jan 09,, 10:05

Originally Posted by sunnyamy

Why are the Malaysians so worried about Singapore's second hand submarines (besides the fact that the RSN has more submarines), when they are going to have brand new ones?

The subs have been modifed a few years ago. It's not only the sub technology which is important. Singapore also purchased under license a few other detection capabilities a few years ago.

As far as I'm aware (and I was on the contractor side of the house), that tech was only made available to 4 other partners. 2 of them drive nukes.

I have no idea when they will get new subs, but the modified "mini collins" (vastergotlands) are more than a match for a Scorpene (IMHO).

It's not an issue of how old the subs are, it's what inside that counts, it's training and it's systems coherency.

**gf0012-aust** · 11 Jan 09,, 10:15

Originally Posted by sunnyamy

From what I understand, the larger the submarine, the easier it is to implement 'acoustic management measures'. So I would understand that the larger Colins class (from my over simplified point of view) is a different class, from Singapore's and Malaysia's submarines. Is this true?

it's an odd concept, but in actual fact, IMO larger subs are easier to manage acoustically (post build). a sub is basically an underwater transducer, with the right tech you can make them acoustically "quieter" because you have a bit more lattitude to influence hull changes, internal changes and shape management. It's a bizarre concept because one would think that more real estate = more transmitting surfaces. But, even so, small subs are hard to detect.

Collins is closer in "vehicular" comparison to an Oyashio.

Scorpenes are closer for absolute comparison against a Kilo (nicknamed "Kelvinators" after a popular but noisy refrigerator in our part of the world)

It is an urban myth btw that nukes can't shut down enough and be as quiet as a conventional.

**sunnyamy** · 12 Jan 09,, 03:05

Originally Posted by gf0012-aust

It's not an issue of how old the subs are, it's what inside that counts, it's training and it's systems coherency.

gf0012-aust, many thanks for explaining things to me. I find that a lot of the information about defence matters are technical in nature and as a layman, I find it hard to understand.

As such, I try to glean information from sources that are easier to understand.

I know that Singapore's weapons purchase process is well internationally respected (for being corruption free and technically competent) and very much focused on capability development for the SAF (and SG's ability to integrate with other existing platforms) rather than just a narrow focus on the platform itself.

Reading your posts in different forums, I have learnt more about the reasons for Singapore's approach to platform purchases that I could from 'official' sources. For that, I thank you.

**Officer of Engineers** · 12 Jan 09,, 03:13

Originally Posted by sunnyamy

Reading your posts in different forums, I have learnt more about the reasons for Singapore's approach to platform purchases that I could from 'official' sources. For that, I thank you.

You've got to explain that one to me.

**sunnyamy** · 12 Jan 09,, 03:48

In starting this thread, I was using it to bounce ideas with fellow WAB forum members. One of my concerns was to find an appropriate analogy to help other people understand Singapore and it's defence posture. I think that at this point of the discussion, I am ready to unveil one of my ideas.

In terms of our defence posture, think of Singapore as a colony of honey bees (rather than the more popular 'poisoned shrimp' analogy). Our primary goal is to gather honey (which is a good analogy of our approach to the international economic order via the signing of free trade agreements). The hive exists because of the bees. The value of the hive is in the honey produced. And the hive is worthless without the honey bees (there are no natural resources in Singapore). The value of Singapore in the international economic order cannot be explained by strategic location alone. If it were, Batam, Singapore's next nearest island neighbour could easily grow to be an international port or a regional financial centre. The reason for Singapore's economic success has to lie with the people (and that is why I don't like people who blindly criticize Singaporeans for being 'followers' or 'sheep' as it were).

This hive exists because of the industrious worker bees (with Singaporeans being the worker bees). Now the key thing is that every worker bee has a sting and by itself is weak. When a bee stings another animal, it dies. The hive's defences is formidable only because it is a collective defence mechanism. The use of the hive's defences are a last resort defence.

If Singapore's neighbours are good bee keepers, they can continue to enjoy the honey. If they are a marauding troop of monkeys, intent on destroying the hive to get at the honey, they will be stung.

As much as most people like honey, nobody really wants a bee hive in their living room.

Originally Posted by sunnyamy

IV. Must Assume No Surprise Attack by Singapore

IMHO, Singapore is very unlikely to ever attack Malaysia first (unless Malaysia engages in acts of war). I would assume that Singapore would only go to war in the event that we were the victims of a sneak attack (the 1973 Yom Kipper War scenario).

In a scenario, where Singapore is attacked, I must presume that Malaysia would have launched a barrage of fire from their Astros II MLRS system and long range artillery at all of Singapore's air and naval bases. So the element of surprise would be on Malaysia's side and that Singapore the city would suffer serious serious civilian casualties as the Astros II MLRS system has a poor CEP compared to tubed artillery.

Would you agree - with my thoughts?

That is why in setting up the scenario for Defending the Lion City (regardless of its defects from a military perspective), I chose to place emphasis on the reaction to hostilities and not the initiation of hostilities.

This is because I cannot imagine Singapore wanting to start a war, as a furtherance of a foreign policy objective. That is an option available for a Superpower (like the US) or a large regional power. As pointed out by ANZAC, Singapore is a 'mirco'-state, similar in size to Melbourne.

What sort of invasion threat is Singapore to anyone? If the Singapore army is mobilized (an army full of citizen soldiers), economic activity in Singapore will grind to a halt very soon.

However, with Singapore's current defence capability: Is it still a suicide pack defence posture (poison shrimp)? I leave that for you to ponder.

Originally Posted by sunnyamy

V. Limited Options for the SAF

Singapore would also need to mobilize its reserves (our standing forces are very small) and we only have enough resources (ammo/POL/etc) to fight for 3 weeks.

The SAF, would then in that scenario must advance at least 100 km into Malaysian territory on the first day to protect Singapore from the 18 x Astros II MLRS launchers. This will not be easy, with the MAF's SAM coverage and ability to engage in a delay battle - given their armoured force and the initially contested air-superiority battle (in the first 6-12 hours at least).

For Singapore to achieve a "swift and decisive victory" - the SAF's forces would need to be able to:

(a) destroy the Malaysian air force completely (in 1 day);

(b) destroy most of the 18 x Astros II MLRS (and the other 18 launchers on order);

(c) engage and inflict a big loss on the MAF in decisive battles (in a conflict lasting 3 weeks); and

(d) be a position to threaten KL before Malaysia would call its allies (Russia and Pakistan) in the UN for help.

IMHO, a "swift and decisive victory" is achievable - but at what price?

Would you agree - with my thoughts?

So I would like to direct you to my original questions:

(1) IMHO, a "swift and decisive victory" is achievable - but at what price?

(2) Would you agree - with my thoughts?

**sunnyamy** · 12 Jan 09,, 04:22

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

You've got to explain that one to me.

I'm going to resort to an analogy again (in a forum, that can be viewed by all). Think of Singapore's actual defence posture as an elephant and that is being revealed, in parts.

So a layman observer like me, is like a blind man, feeling that elephant. When I touch the trunk, it feels like a snake, but it is not. When I feel the skin, it is rough like sand paper, but it is not. And so on...

I am told by other observers that gf0012-aust not only understands Singapore's defence posture, but he has the conceptual tools to analyze it (so, they recommend that I read what he says carefully, as the 'informed' observers are not able to tell me directly, what the elephant is capable of).

If you want to know something specific, I reply via PMs rather an via a 'public' forum mode.

**Officer of Engineers** · 12 Jan 09,, 04:31

Originally Posted by sunnyamy

(d) be a position to threaten KL before Malaysia would call its allies (Russia and Pakistan) in the UN for help.

And here lies the rub. Would you carry out the threat? Would Malaysia tolerate the loss?

**Officer of Engineers** · 12 Jan 09,, 04:33

Originally Posted by sunnyamy

I'm going to resort to an analogy again (in a forum, that can be viewed by all). Think of Singapore's actual defence posture as an elephant and what is being revealed in parts.

Actually what I am confused about is that your official positions don't explain enough for you nor even allow you the basis for further research. Surely your procurement decision cycles are open to review and criticism.

**sunnyamy** · 12 Jan 09,, 04:45

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Actually what I am confused about is that your official positions don't explain enough for you nor even allow you the basis for further research. Surely your procurement decision cycles are open to review and criticism.

The procurement decision cycles are subject to feedback and review within the military chain of command.

Given that every Singaporean male serves NS and I'm told that their feedback (given at every in-camp) is taken very seriously and the restructuring occurs typically within a 2 year decision cycle.

Bear in mind, every Singaporean male, at some level, brings their individual subject matter expertise to the SAF. There are processes in place to harness that expertise (it is not perfect but it exists) and these processes are not a suitable subject for open discussion.