Thread: Modern Tank tactics ?

Originally Posted by tanker_jitty

well well this is what i call an absolute professional discussion. takes me back to the armor school sand model exercises.the indian context in armor tactics/ strategy can be divided into the canal and built up infested portions of the the punjab,semi desert with new irrigation canals being / already developed ,the desert and the salt pans of gujarat. our last two wars have been limited in some bde level actions and a lot of posturing. the 65 action saw the armd div of both sides loosing steam after initial gains with the punjab being priority. 71 the emphasis was bangladesh with a bde worth in action with t55 / pt 76 vs 2 regt worth of chaffe bulldogs.the armd divs of both sides kept quiet waiting for the other to play the card. however, there after the military leadership matured in the sense the post independence commisioned officers started taking over senior posts on both sides and started looking beyond punjab with the pak army making a start in 71 by having a go in the desert. gradually the canals started moving south and the green belt spread thanks to the vision of the indian leader ship of that time.i should mention that in the 70s the indian military leaders went ga ga with the isreali actions of 67 and 73 that luv have now stood in good stead for both the countries with the political leader ship again had the gumtion to stand up to the pro arab lobby and restore full diplomatic ties . i remember the bde presentations on the two wars vividly and the indian armed corps came out with plans for the first time to operate in the desert which i am sure has matured well and should stand the test hopefully.the pak army too have developed their responses keeping the depth factor in mind thus are not keen on the no first use clause. many young tank commanders dream of having a bath in the indus. in the case of india vs pak the window willbe at the best 15 days before the eu and us steps in. hence isolation, at the best investment will be the call. there will be no time for reduction as the build up will take time though the nodes closer to the border could be cleared.moreafter your response.

Sir, could you break your thoughts up into paragrpahs please.

Now if I understood you correclty at the end, the main obstacle boths sides will be dealing with are the canals (Pakistan has them as well) with any enemy having to breach them to get past them and into better terrain. I know India got past them in 65 and into Pakistan, but that was the era before ATGM's made the dismouts a true threat to tanks past 300m or so. It is also rummored the Indian "Cold Start" calls for puntive actions inside Pakistan.

The question thus becomes how? Given the similiar military traditions and similar equipment one can surmise that the application at the tactical level will be fundamentally the same for both sides. Thus how would you breach the canal? I know the text book answer, if its to big to assualt bridge and or two deep to ford/swim then push the infantry across, support them with fires and bring in the engineers with the pontoons/ferries, and bailey bridges. But this involves getting to the canal in the first place. How would you defend it, and how would you supress and then breach that defense?

[QUOTE]

Originally Posted by zraver

Sir, could you break your thoughts up into paragrpahs please.

Now if I understood you correclty at the end, the main obstacle boths sides will be dealing with are the canals (Pakistan has them as well) with any enemy having to breach them to get past them and into better terrain. I know India got past them in 65 and into Pakistan, but that was the era before ATGM's made the dismouts a true threat to tanks past 300m or so. It is also rummored the Indian "Cold Start" calls for puntive actions inside Pakistan.

The canals are not similar to the European ones. They have inbuilt defence capability.

With the induction of attack helicopters in PA, repeating the limited cross canal achievements of 1965 will become a feat in itself, apart from the ATGM density.

The Cold Start doctrine is not in the public domain and so one doesn't know its practicality.

The question thus becomes how? Given the similiar military traditions and similar equipment one can surmise that the application at the tactical level will be fundamentally the same for both sides. Thus how would you breach the canal? I know the text book answer, if its to big to assualt bridge and or two deep to ford/swim then push the infantry across, support them with fires and bring in the engineers with the pontoons/ferries, and bailey bridges. But this involves getting to the canal in the first place. How would you defend it, and how would you supress and then breach that defense?

The canals are not like what you would encounter in the European theater. It is defence oriented all the way, from one end to the other!

That is the real problem!

How do you isolate and reduce? Do you mean that you'd try to find him with a mobile group like an ACR, pin him down, then smash him with your main force and heavy weapons?

Originally Posted by Blademaster

I think that's because you and the rest of NATO and Russia and Chinese have encountered an enemy who doesn't go into the killing zone prepared by you as you want them to do. Often, enemies do something unpredictable.

The original ideas came from Tukhachevsky in the 1920s/30s. Before that time, battles were ususally between the centres of mass. Tukhachevsky switched over to centres of command and control.

Offensively, we don't care about the line units. They are to be fixed. The real battle is the reserves. Kill the reserves and you've won the battle. Mainly because the reserves also serve as the HQ protection force.

Defensively, again, we want to deal with the rear echelons. Shatter the shaft of the spear and the spearpoint becomes that much easier to handle. The line units will still take a pounding but if the OPFOR can't reload while we still can, then their offensive punch has just disappeared.

exactly. the aim- draw out the reserves at all levels to a place of your choosing. the reaction will be propotionate to the value of the objective. a breach on a linear obstacle will be met by a local counter attack with forces ear marked at say a bde level.the aim of the defender will be to contest your breakout, slow us down, with a view to assess our strenght / objective before he starts to move his big time reserves to occupy the killing zone. a wrong assesment say not reading the intentions properly will move the army reserves to the wrong place as generally the advancing force will move over a wide front.when i said isolation and reduction i meant a static tgt say an important communication centre sensitive to the enemy forcing him to react

Originally Posted by tanker_jitty

exactly. the aim- draw out the reserves at all levels to a place of your choosing. the reaction will be propotionate to the value of the objective. a breach on a linear obstacle will be met by a local counter attack with forces ear marked at say a bde level.the aim of the defender will be to contest your breakout, slow us down, with a view to assess our strenght / objective before he starts to move his big time reserves to occupy the killing zone. a wrong assesment say not reading the intentions properly will move the army reserves to the wrong place as generally the advancing force will move over a wide front.when i said isolation and reduction i meant a static tgt say an important communication centre sensitive to the enemy forcing him to react

Plus during the initial penetration the enemyt has to decide if the attack is feint which can be handled by local reserves, or if it signafies a major action which will draw in larger formations. A wrong bet can be disasterous. If the attack is a feint and you xommit your reserves then your out of posistion to meet the real attack, and if it is not a feint but you wait to long you might not be able to contain it.

Classic exmaples of both would be the D-Day invasion where Hitler was initially convinced the landings were feint and thus delayed committing OKW's reserves. The other example is the counter attack of the 5th SS Panzer Div into the 5th Guards tank Army during Operation bagration. This attack fought from the 5th SS's railhead ended the until then unchecked charge of the 5th Guards and allowed many Germans to escape.

its been a long time. getting back to armour tactics the gulf wars brings out the latest . i am sure we have veterans in the forum from those wars to whom the following queries:
what was the frontage that the leading us armour battalions moved? did the frontage change in hours of darkness?
at what distances did the iraqis engage both with atgms/ tanks?
what is the standard relief to leading elements in hours / distance?
how were the flanks protected? physical move or areial recce?
how far behind were the lgs support echs?cross country moves?

Colonel,

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I was an Infantryman but i have always been greatful for the wonderful artillery the US Army has had since its inception (see Henry Knox). What would make our ALB doctrine viable was the absolute incredible artillery support we enjoyed.

In the Gulf and again in OIF US Army and Marine artillery was just outstanding. In every case artillery shaped the battelfield for the maneuver forces. The US didn't have to worry about Iraqi artillery because the counter battery was so devestatingly effective.

Okay before thsi becomes a commercial for the FT Sill Chamber of Commerce, my question is how good and how large is the artillery component of the Indian Army? What got me thinking was the discussion of the Brigadier about the canals.

I believe that would be your single greatest shaper of the fight.

And yet the US Army seems inclined toward minimizing artillery at the moment... trying to free up manpower for COIN and MP missions. More than a third of the rifle platoon I took to Iraq last year were 13B's and 21B (engineers) dragooned into a Cavalry unit with an Infantry MTOE and an MP mission... thus our sobriquet "Green Bastard Infantillereers"

Originally Posted by tanker_jitty

its been a long time. getting back to armour tactics the gulf wars brings out the latest . i am sure we have veterans in the forum from those wars to whom the following queries:

Not a vet, but i will try and answer those question I can.

what was the frontage that the leading us armour battalions

Depends on the missions, the USMC and 2AD breaking into Kuwait had smaller frontages than the VII's wide swing through the desert. One needed force concentration, and one needed to out flank and then curl around the Iraqi flank. It is my opinion that the battle of 73 Eastings is something those Iraqi crews who survived can be proud of. They moved to block and moved pretty fast.

did the frontage change in hours of darkness?

Not for Abrams/Bradley units, they see as well at night as at day. Infact in parts of the battlefield with the oil smoke it was midnight at noon.

at what distances did the iraqis engage both with atgms/ tanks?

Effectively 2000m was the max range. While the sagger could shoot farther in theory in practice 2000m is about as far as your going to go and hit a target. The Iraqi tanks HEAT rounds were effective at any range, but sights and gunnery skills applied a cap. Of the Iraqi formations, the regu;lar army T-55/Type 59/t-62 tanks would be lucky to hit past 1000m if the target was moving. These conscript troops simply sucked. The RG units with Asad Babil (T-72) tanks were better trained but used much older ammunition. The early Bm series of APFSDS they used were mostly a tungsten steel type used by the USSR for training once modern armors arrived on scene. These sabots were style with large fins that fit along the wall of the bore to keep the round centered when loaded. These fins induced a lot of drag and rated performance was only good to about 1500m and then began to fall off rapidly. Western rounds used a spool style sabot that left the penetrator free from touching the bore and allowed much smaller less draggy fins.

what is the standard relief to leading elements in hours / distance?

There wasn't the war was over to quick. The US still practices passage of lines but has not had to actually do it in decades.

how were the flanks protected? physical move or areial recce?

depends on the unit. VII corps had a French armored division on its flanks, the the USMC/2AD had allied Arab armies to the sides.

how far behind were the lgs support echs?cross country moves?

What level of log support? the 20 level support is just a few KM behind the advance with some elements like the jump TOC and wreckers within a km or two at the farthest. Also for units like the 101, they might be a log unit in advance of the main drive with air delivered fuel bladders.

"The US still practices passage of lines but has not had to actually do it in decades."

I think 1st Cav opened the breach for 1ID. From there Tilelli was racing to catch the fight. Also 2ACR passed through 1ID later.

"...what is the standard relief to leading elements in hours / distance?"

Good question. I'm unaware of a doctrinal time/distance equation but would expect most commanders attack with elements echeloned or in trace from squad to brigade.

Close enough that direct-fire overwatch can effectively engage downrange of the lead elements for starters...? Sufficient stand-off to avoid decisive engagement...?

Originally Posted by zraver

Not for Abrams/Bradley units, they see as well at night as at day. Infact in parts of the battlefield with the oil smoke it was midnight at noon.

Thanks for the flashback. P.S. Our night site is (was) our primary site.

The frontage varied on terrain. (Yes, the sands of those deserts, as well as the simple geology, sometimes presented significant terrain features.) I'd say the average front for my BN was between 3 & 4 Km.

I can't remember my unit being shot at by an ATGM. Stand-off for tanks (& most of what my unit saw were RGs in T-72s) for them was around 1500 m. (Almost all of our shots were longer. )

Yes, Recce can make or break a fight. But 2 other key issues that I have not seen addressed here are 1) speed & 2) preparedness. I know most would simply assume these to be "properly addressed in any good battle plan," but any good planner/XO & First Sergeant will tell you that these are issues near & dear to their hearts in any operation.

Yes, Artillery is indeed still the "King of Battle"--in some cases. The reason 13B et al are being pulled into dismounted platoons is for the very reason you addressed--we are fighting a COIN fight now. Not ALL Artillerists have been pulled, but when the fight is so close, personal & not readily apparent, the more rifles in the mix is better. Why kill a fly with a sledge hammer?

& of course, as always, military units move on their stomaches. Outrace your logisitics, & you're almost certain to fail. (Of course, 1AD tried to take this too far, having their Commander call for a "REST, Rearm & Refuel" stop (for over an hour) just after we over-ran that first Iraqi log site/ oil tank farm--in the heat of a moving, open-field Mechanized battle...) We DID perform refuel & rearm operations eventually, though. I ended up splitting my unit in half--"A" continued moving at a slower pace forward while "B" took on fuel & ammo. Then "B" caught up to us (with fueler & ammo trucks trailing). & then "A" rearmed & refueled--catching up to "B" immediately afterward to continue to movement. Took us less than 20 minutes--but it was something we trained on prior to deployment.

There are many factors that go into "deciding" which tactic to utilize when fighting a mechanized battle. METT-TC, for the win, anyone?

P.P.S. We, at company-level, were not as well informed of our enemy as some tend to think. Yes, we were given the general "they're dug in along the Kuwait/ Saudi border with tanks," but that was about it. We had been training to fight the Soviets in T-72s in Europe, & our deployment training did little to prepare us for operations in the vastness & differences of that desert region. (When I asked my unit S-2 for maps in-country, since I was unable to acquire any covering our area of operations prior to deployment, he handed me a single sheet of standard map-sized paper. It was indeed a standard military map, but it merely consisted of a big grayish-brown square, with only one contour line waving through it--& a grid pattern printed over top of that. When I asked him for the rest of the sheets, he informed me that "they all looked the same anyway." Heck of a way for a scout to go into battle! I'm just glad we all had brought along our lensatic compasses!)

Originally Posted by S-2

"The US still practices passage of lines but has not had to actually do it in decades."

I think 1st Cav opened the breach for 1ID. From there Tilelli was racing to catch the fight. Also 2ACR passed through 1ID later.

"...what is the standard relief to leading elements in hours / distance?"

oops, the quote abut relief had me thinking defensive passage. Korea then being the last example I can think of.