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Thread: Doctrine: Total Peoples Defense

  1. #1
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Doctrine: Total Peoples Defense

    The plan for Indonesia to defends itself from an real invader set on taking control of the country is to break up the army and fight a long term guerilla war. All the way back in 1950 they saw that only one nation could mount a real campaign to take them over (America) and knowing they could not build up to defeat such a threat they fell back on what they knew. Not like they were planning to fight America just that America was and is the only nation with the ability to move that many troops by sea to seriously think about invading and occupying them. Simply taking the capital and large cities would not bring an end to the war as historically control of the cities means little if the enemy runs the countryside.

    During the war for thier independence the Dutch did take Jakarta early on but were not able to control the countryside and thus the Dutch gave in and left. I would imagine in these days of by bypassing enemy units to race to the capitals you would kinda fall into doing what they wanted.

    http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...nesia/abri.htm

    "ABRI's military operations relied on a well-developed doctrine of national defense called Total People's Defense, based on experiences during the struggle for independence. This doctrine proclaimed that Indonesia could neither afford to maintain a large military apparatus nor would it compromise its hard-won independence by sacrificing its nonaligned status and depending on other nations to provide its defense. Instead, the nation would defend itself through a strategy of territorial guerrilla warfare in which the armed forces, deployed throughout the nation, would serve as a cadre force to rally and lead the entire population in a people's war of defense. Military planners envisioned a three-stage war, comprising a short initial period in which an invader would defeat conventional Indonesian resistance and establish its own control, a long period of unconventional, regionally based fighting, and a final phase in which the invaders would eventually be repelled.

    The success of this strategy, according to the doctrine, required that a close bond be maintained between citizen and soldier to encourage the support of the entire population and enable the military to manage all war-related resources. In this scenario, the people would provide logistical support, intelligence, and upkeep, and, as resources permitted, some civilians would be organized, trained, and armed to join the guerrilla struggle. In trying to attain these goals, ABRI maintained a territorial organization, run largely by the army, to support public order. This group exercised considerable influence over local decisions regarding such matters as population redistribution, the production of food and strategic materials, and the development of air and sea transportation. Armed forces personnel also continued to engage in large-scale civic action projects involving community and rural development in order to draw closer to the people, to ensure the continued support of the populace, and to develop among military personnel a detailed knowledge of the region to which they were assigned. The largest of these programs, the Armed Forces Enters the Village (AMD) began in 1983 and was to continue indefinitely. It consisted of nationwide civic action campaigns held roughly three times a year to provide assistance in planning and constructing rural and urban projects selected by local villagers.

    The Total People's Defense strategy did not apply in some of the major actions Indonesia had engaged in since independence. For example, during the Confrontation with Malaysia from 1963 to 1966, ABRI engaged Malaysian forces in guerrilla warfare without the support of the border peoples of Sarawak and Sabah; in the dispute with the Dutch over West New Guinea in the mid-1960s, ABRI fought against Dutch troops. These conflicts were fought in territory outside the effective jurisdiction of the national government where the Indonesian armed forces lacked the support of the civilian population and where the concept of Total People's Defense could not be implemented. However, because the framers of the 1945 constitution had declared these areas as naturally belonging to Indonesia, national authorities declared that these conflicts were anticolonial wars and in fact represented the completion of the war of independence begun in 1945."

    The doctrine has since been misused for example allowing the army to pick candidates running for office in the past. It more or less gave the army control of life down to the village level. Of course the problem with sending the army around the country to fight a guerilla war is after they have been broken up you would likely get a warlord problem during and after the guerilla war....
    Last edited by troung; 22 Jan 05, at 06:06.

  2. #2
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Kostrad and Kopassus
    Ryamizard Ryacudu is the commander of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Command, the backbone of Kotama (Komando Utama, Main Command Forces) and the main command force of the army. Kostrad has 40,000 well trained troops and takes the lead in fighting armed GAM units in Aceh. As a leading exponent of the mandiri wing, Ryacudu is driven by the fear of Indonesia falling apart.
    The other force in Kotama is Kopassus, the special forces with around 7,000 men. In the turbulent period from 1998 to 2000 Kopassus was widely condemned for its role in kidnappings and other serious human rights violations including torture and disappearances but in 2001 Kopassus made a comeback. For a while there was bitter rivalry between Kostrad and Kopassus officers but it seems that Kostrad has once again taken the lead in Kotama.
    In Aceh, during the DOM period from 1989 till 1998, Kopassus led the counter insurgency operations against GAM. A condition of low intensity conflict was maintained, resulting in grave human rights violations in the countryside. After a brief pause, military operations were resumed on an even larger scale in 2001, with Kostrad as the main combat force. Now, Kostrad and Kopassus work hand in hand in Aceh.
    Some new elements have emerged in dealing with the problems in conflict areas. The practice now is to use a combination of elite forces, including marines, air force commandos and Kopassus troops, against separatists or armed groups in Poso or Maluku. Together with Kostrad units, these 'joint battalions' (yongab), Brimob troops (the special command unit of the police force), are also taking part. By the end of 2001 about 50 battalions from the TNI and the police were deployed across the nation in trouble spots. While several battalions are deployed in eastern Indonesia (West Papua, Maluku and Sulawesi), most of the joint battalions are deployed in Aceh, where the TNI faces the most serious challenge.
    Another new element in the war against separatist forces is the specially trained combat intelligence units called tontaikam (peleton pengintai keamanan, security surveillance platoon). These units are trained and groomed at the Kopassus training centre in Batudjadjar and are responsible for reconnaissance and intelligence work in trouble spots ahead of military operations. The activities of tontaikam are directly felt by the population in Aceh where around a dozen people die every day. While there has been consolidation within Kotama, other TNI structures are beginning to re-emerge.
    Kotama's military operations against GAM have been quite successful. The armed wing of GAM has been pushed back to the mountains while OPM activities in West Papua are hardly noticeable. But as conflicts in other parts of the world show, military might does not solve anything and only creates more violence. The idea that GAM can be obliterated is an illusion and has only increased its popularity among the Acehnese. The death toll in 2001 reached 1,700, largely due to intensified war operations by Kotama troops.


    The territorial structure
    For some time there was confusion about the decisions of an important TNI seminar regarding the future of the territorial structure. One decision was to hand over the military territorial structure to local governments. Some far-reaching ideas were floated about abolishing military structures below sub-district level. [Gatra, 1 September 2001]. In discussions outside the TNI, academics and military watchers agreed that the military territorial structure should be gradually dismantled.
    The territorial structure functions as a shadow government, often more powerful than the regional administration. The territorial structure or koter (komando teritorial) was initially the foundation of the Indonesian army. In the early days of the young republic, military units were primarily organised in regional battalions and officers were identified by their territorial affinity. After a big overhaul in 1984, kotama forces, Kostrad and Kopassus became the backbone of the army. Financial constraints transformed the territorial commands into cesspools of criminal activities. Regional commands increasingly involved themselves in mafia practices instead of concentrating on security matters.
    The separation of the police from the TNI strengthened the view among civilians that koter had become redundant. The police are now responsible for law and order. The downgrading of the position of Kaster (Kepala Staf Teritorial, chief of staff of territorial affairs) into an assistant position at the general staff was another indication that territorial affairs would be sidelined.
    But in the end, the results were very different, with a big victory for the military. Instead of downsizing koter, the army top is determined to maintain or enlarge the territorial structure. Lt. General Ryamizard Ryacudu bluntly told a journalist: 'Like it or not, the glue of the nation nowadays is the TNI. If people want to dismantle the state, go ahead and abolish the territorial units. If the Trikora military command in Irian Jaya were dissolved, Irian Jaya would be independent' [Tempo, 7 April 2002].
    The new military territorial command in Aceh, Kodam (military area command) Iskandar Muda set up in February 2002 is the latest example of the army's determination to expand rather than downsize koter. In May 1999, Kodam Pattimura was re-established in Maluku while two other kodams, Tanjung Pura in West Kalimantan and Lambung Mangkurat in Central and South Kalimantan are in the pipeline. With the creation of new provinces, a string of new districts and subdistricts are emerging. The TNI Information Centre recently said this might lead to the creation of new district and subdistrict military commands.
    Since the establishment of kodams in Maluku and Aceh, military operations have continued in both regions, primarily by kotama forces under the command of the headquarters in Jakarta. The operations in Aceh are run by a special command called Kolakops, similar to the military operation in East Timor while operations in Maluku are in the hands of Yongab, the joint battalions.
    The real reason for the expansion of the territorial commands lies elsewhere. Firstly, finances. Territorial commands can siphon off money from the provincial budget. In particular the autonomy law can, in practice, provide more money for the regions. Regional 'projects' like offering protection for local companies or vital projects can be co-ordinated by the command through a special unit called PAM Provit (Pasukan Pengamanan Projek Vital, Troops Securing Vital Projects).
    So-called self-financing by the military can for a great part function through the local commands. Lack of funding by the state is used to justify efforts to find other sources of money. Local businesses have become more viable thanks to the autonomy law. The territorial commands can play a crucial role in these business activities. A more sinister role for commands is the recruitment and deployment of militia groups in conflict areas. Despite the disastrous experience in East Timor, the military top continue to consider militia groups as part of their security doctrine. Increasing the number of territorial commands is another example of how the military have gained leverage over civilian politics.

  3. #3
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    I'll just turn this into the all around Indonesian doctrine and structure...

    NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
    Fundamental to the understanding of Indonesian views on security is the concept of Wawasan Nusantara or "archipelagic outlook". As the world's largest archipelago, Indonesia covers an area (including the Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ) of about 10 million sq. kms., in which the seas are perceived to link the islands rather than to separate them. Hence Wawasan Nusantara "encompasses an understanding not only of the geographic unity of the nation, but also the recognition that Indonesia constitutes a single, unified political, social, cultural, economic, and defence and security entity". Secondly, given Indonesia's history of domestic unrest, great emphasis is placed on internal political stability. Given its past experience and its geographic location, Indonesia does not perceive an open attack by an outside power as a matter of primary or immediate concern. Consequently the concept of ketahanan nasional or "national resilience" forms the basis of
    Indonesian views on national security. The best way to enhance national resilience is national development - economic, political, social and
    cultural. Hence, the eradication of poverty and backwardness, considered to be the basic causes of internal insecurity, are considered to be national priorities. Thus, according to Indonesian perceptions, one of the two major threats to its security is that of internal unrest and insurgency, the other, less immediate, being the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea. Apart from the traditional threat from the Communist party (PKI), violent student demonstrations in 1973 and 1978 led to greater concern with internal security. The 1975 withdrawal by Portugal and the subsequent annexation, in July 1976, of East Timor by Indonesia as its 27th province also led to an insurgency by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN). Elements of FRETILIN resistance still remain. In
    Irian Jaya province, the Free Papua Movement (OPM), has been active since mid- 1977. Since then, there have been frequent border incidents, the most serious occurring in 1984, which resulted in 10,000 people seeking refuge in PNG. Although relations with PNG improved after the visit of Prime Minister Paias Wingti to Indonesia in January 1988, tension increased after a series of cross- border raids by the Indonesian armed forces in October and November that year. After further discussions it was announced in July 1989 that PNG would set up a consulate in Jayapura, the capital of Irian Jaya and the Indonesians would do the same in the border town of Vanimo. However, border incursions by Indonesia appear to continue - four were reported in 1990 and were said to have caused five casualties. In 1991, while the two countries have apparently failed to reach an agreement on the repatriation of border crossers, a recent report, quoting an Indonesian source (Major General Abinowo), suggests that the two countries plan to launch joint military operations against separatist
    rebels following an improvement in bilateral relations.

    In recent times the province of Aceh, on the island of Sumatra has also been the scene of armed anti- government activities. Although Aceh has a long history of unrest (it was one of the last parts of the island to succumb to Dutch control), the present crisis has been attributed to "an element of anti- Jakarta subnationalism, fuelled by a feeling of economic exploitation, a sense of separate historical identity and an element of Islamic militancy". The predominant reason for this anti- Jakarta feeling would appear to be economic. Following the discovery of substantial gas deposits, a processing complex has sprung up in the area as have two fertiliser plants and a paper plant. Other factories are planned. But these developments have had no beneficial impact on the Acehnese who are handicapped by the lack of education and technical training. The jobs created by this economic boom have gone to the Javanese, South Sumatrans and foreigners. This has resulted in the Acehnese looking for employment elsewhere. There have also been reports of "several" boatloads of Acehnese fleeing Sumatra for Penang in Malaysia. Although the Indonesian position is that they are economic and not political refugees, it was decided that the two countries would discuss ways of dealing with these "arrivals". The second major threat is the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea
    affecting its offshore oil platforms and its EEZ claim. Claimed by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines and Brunei, the Spratly Islands straddle the sea lines of communication between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. It can be suggested that Indonesia has a security interest given its trade relations with Japan and the fact that Indonesia is nursing its major naval base to Teluk Ratai which has readier access to the South China Sea. Although it does not lay claim to the Spratly Islands, any intensification of the dispute would certainly affect Indonesia. As a country with least interests in the Spratly's it considers itself as being in the best position to act as a mediator. Preliminary groundwork was done in January 1991 when Indonesia hosted an informal ASEAN workshop on Bali. The next move was to hold another meeting, again informally, but this time with the participation of China and Vietnam. At a four days workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea held in Bandung in July 1991, participants from ten countries, six of which lay claim to all or part of the islands 32 , agreed that: "Any territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea area should be resolved by peaceful means through
    dialogue and negotiation".

    It was also suggested that measures be taken to develop cooperative arrangements in areas such as navigation communications and safety, meteorology, maritime research with the possibility of joint resource management without prejudice to any territorial or jurisdictional claims. Other potential trouble spots include the airspace over, and the waters of, the Straits of Malacca which are the major shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. There are also other prime shipping lanes through the Indonesian islands that may be contested in a regional war. The most important of these are the Straits of Sunda and Lombok and have a particular economic and strategic significance. The Sunda Strait provides the most direct route between the US naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The deep water Lombok Strait (together with that of Makassar to its north) provides an alternative route to that of Malacca for the deep draught oil tankers en route from the Gulf to Japan and South Korea. The importance that Indonesia places on the Straits of Sunda and Lombok within the framework of its archipelagic outlook was demonstrated by their temporary closure in September 1988 for naval exercises in which live ammunition was used. This provoked controversy as well as diplomatic protests from various countries including the US, Australia, West Germany and Japan. These were based on grounds of the alleged contravention of the Law of the Sea Convention (which incidentally has not been ratified by the US). The Indonesian position on the issue was that while a "grey area" existed in this aspect of interpretation of the Law of the Sea, "the straits in question were undeniably part of Indonesia's archipelagic waters, and not in the same category for example as the Straits of Malacca". While such exercises have not been repeated since it is important to note their significance from the Indonesian perspective. In terms of military doctrine these two security perspectives require "the conventional capacity for archipelagic control as well as the ability to carry out counterinsurgency operations". While military alliances are incompatible with this concept (hence Indonesia's position as one of the founders of the non- aligned movement), some "forms of defence cooperation
    on a bilateral basis may be entered into ...". This includes, training, exchange of intelligence information, joint border patrols etc. These
    activities are routinely undertaken with the forces of other countries in the region. This has also resulted in a rationalisation of the army's territorial commands and a strengthening of the centrally controlled Strategic Reserve Command and the Special Forces Command, which have been provided with greater mobility for quick reaction to internal security problems, that is, there has been a move towards the creation of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). These changes enable conventional forces up to brigade strength to be deployed by air anywhere in Indonesia as required. In order to give the defence forces time to organise, there exists a peoples' resistance defence
    plan ( Hankamata) which entails local militias engaging and harassing insurgents. These militias have so far been led by army non- commissioned officers but these functions are now being transferred to police of similar rank and power.

    The air force and navy have also been reorganised to defend the offshore oil fields and EEZ. Attention has been focussed on the development of remote bases such as those on Natuna Besar, the Riau islands and Irian Jaya. Natuna Besar's former oil company airfield has been turned over to the air force. In the Riau group a patrol boat base and an airfield for EEZ surveillance aircraft have been established. Given the security outlook as well as the force structure of Indonesia's armed forces, it is clear that there is no move towards expansionist behaviour. The implications for Australia and PNG are clear. As Harold Crouch has observed:- Indonesia has neither the political desire nor the military capacity to subjugate either Australia or PNG, although her military capacity vis- a- vis PNG is substantial. No issue in the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Australia seems to be a potential source of serious conflict. The only potentially threatening issue is trilateral and involves PNG. The danger of conflict on the Indonesia- PNG border depends not so much on the intentions and policies towards each other of the respective governments but on the future of a non- governmental organisation over which no government exercises control. Neither the Australian nor PNG governments can do a great deal to influence the course of the OPM's development in the long run. The crucial factor lies in conditions within Irian Jaya itself. Ever since its independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea has been recognised by Indonesia as an independent and sovereign nation. Indonesia has not had any territorial disputes with PNG and its is difficult to conceive of any future claims. However, it is possible that Indonesia would be concerned (as would be Australia) if the situation in PNG degenerated to absolute anarchy or, Bougainville notwithstanding, it suffered serious secessionist challenges. So far as Bougainville is concerned, Indonesia, like Australia, has a policy of non interference. It can also be argued that with enough problems in Irian Jaya and East Timor, Indonesia has no inclination to be burdened with further political, economic and security woes. In so far as Australia is concerned, with the signing of the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 there are no major outstanding issues between the two
    countries. Relations political, economic and military have proceeded to improve steadily over the last few years. High level visits on both sides have become more frequent and have served to remove misunderstandings.

  4. #4
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    ADRI - Army of the Republic of Indonesia
    TNI AD - National Army of Indonesia

    Since the 01 April 1999 separation of POLRI, the Indonesian National Police, from ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, the army has begun to use its former name, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or National Army of Indonesia (TNI); the term is increasingly being used instead of ABRI. The ground forces are presently termed Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat.
    The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (ADRI) historically has been the dominant service, with administrative control of the armed forces resting with the army chief of staff, in 1992 a four-star general. His staff included a vice chief of staff, an inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for logistics, operations, personnel, planning and budget, security, and territorial affairs. Total army strength, which had not changed substantially during the New Order era, as of 1992 was some 217,000, not including several thousand in nonmilitary positions throughout the government.
    The chief of staff was responsible for personnel, training, administration, and logistical support of the army, but he did not exercise direct authority over the ten KODAMs, the regional commands of the army that reported directly to the commander in chief. Commanders and staff of each KODAM were responsible for administration, logistics, personnel, training, and the general welfare of assigned and attached combat units. Each Kodam was divided into successively smaller administrative units. These included the Military Resort (Garrison) Command (KOREM); Military District Command (KODIM); and Military Subdistrict Command (KORAMIL). At the bottom of the structure, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were assigned to every village in the country.
    The geographic extent of the army KODAM in the early 1990s was as follows: KODAM I, Special Region of Aceh and Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, and Riau provinces; KODAM II, Jambi, Bengkulu, Sumatera Selatan, and Lampung provinces; KODAM III, Jawa Barat Province; KODAM IV, Jawa Tengah Province and the Special Region of Yogyakarta; KODAM V, Jawa Timur Province; KODAM VI, the four provinces of Kalimantan; KODAM VII, the four provinces of Sulawesi; KODAM VIII, Maluku and Irian Jaya provinces; KODAM IX, Bali, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Timor Timur provinces; and KODAM Jaya Jakarta, the Special Capital City Region of Jakarta.
    Approximately two-thirds of the army was engaged in the national defense aspect of the armed forces' dwifungsi mission. Operations were rarely, if ever, conducted in any formation larger than a battalion. Each Korem had control of at least one battalion and one or more battalions came under the direct control of the Kodam. Army doctrine differentiated between tactical battalions, which were found in Kostrad and at least one quick reaction force battalion for each Kodam; and territorial battalions, which made up the majority of the units assigned to the ten Kodams. Each battalion had a strength of nearly 700 men, and personnel programs within a fixed staffing size called for recruitment of sufficient numbers to bring chronically understrength units up to authorized levels. Some of these forces were occasionally assigned for temporary missions to Kostrad or Kopassus.
    The army had its own small air arm that performed liaison and limited transport duties. It flew one helicopter squadron and one composite squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and small transports, such as the domestically produced CASA 235.
    Factionalism within the army leadership, once a severe problem, no longer disrupted operations in the early 1990s. Traditional divisional identification continued to have some significance, however, especially in regard to that developed in the former Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions, which covered western, central, and eastern Java, respectively, during the war of independence and the years immediately thereafter. The detachment of the Jakarta area from the control of the Siliwangi division and the restructuring of the army from a divisional basis to the territorial Kodam system diffused the powers of the divisions and eliminated warlordism.
    Most of the army personnel not assigned to combat formations were involved in carrying out the social and developmental portions of the armed forces' dwifungsi mission. Many were attached to the Kodams as support elements, performing intelligence and internal security functions, and maintaining liaison with local officials charged with implementing the government's policies. Some military personnel filled civilian government positions from national and province levels down to the district, subdistrict, or village level. A large portion of the army's territorial forces participated in ABRI civic action projects, such as the nationally directed ABRI Masuk Desa program and locally directed programs at the Kodam level, as part of their mission to promote national development. They constructed roads, bridges, and public buildings, provided medical service in remote areas, and worked to improve rural conditions. The military's civic action mission received added attention after 1983 as part of a program designed to address the problems of a perceived growing gap between ABRI and the civilian population.
    By 1992 virtually all of the army's heavy Soviet- or East European-origin equipment had been eliminated and replaced by equipment produced indigenously or purchased from Western countries. Because of funding constraints, emphasis was placed on maintenance and rehabilitation of older equipment. The mainstay of the armored force was the French-built AMX-13 light tank and AMX-VCI reconditioned armored personnel carriers, mostly acquired in the late 1970s. The nation's small arms industry supplied nearly all of the army's small arms requirements, although a substantial number of M-16 rifles purchased from the United States in the 1980s remained in the inventory. Domestically produced arms included FMC rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns made under Belgian-licensed production. Ammunition was in short supply.
    Although army recruits received their basic training in a central training facility located in each Kodam area, specialist corps training was provided at the appropriate national corps centers. NCOs were required to attend training courses and to pass examinations in their fields prior to promotion.

    KOSTRAD - Army Strategic Reserve Command

    KOSTRAD [Army Strategic Reserve Command], which has between 25,000 and 26,000 troops, supervises operational readiness among all commands and conducts defense and security operations at the strategic level in accordance with policies of the ABRI commander. KOSTRAD came into being when Indonesia was dealing with the liberation of West Irian in 1960, and was formally constituted on 06 March 1961. Initially designated the Army General Reserve Corps, its name was changed to KOSTRAD in 1963.
    Major General Suharto (later Indonesian president) was the first to be entrusted with the position of PANGKOSTRAD [KOSTRAD Commander]. It was from his position as Kostrad commander, in fact, that Suharto organized resistance to the 1965 coup. Since then the powerful post has been filled by officers considered particularly loyal to Suharto. As of 01 April 1998 Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto [Suharto's son-in-law] was serving as commander of KOSTRAD. Suharto was ousted on 21 May 1999 amid mounting public pressure and large scale violent pro-reform riots. Soon thereafter Son-in-Law Prabowo was pushed out of his position as commander of KOPASSUS and reassigned to head the army's command and staff training college in Bandung.
    During the New Order era, the KOSTRAD force has become increasingly visible. These green-beret troops have never been absent from the various military operations, such as G-30-S/PKI [30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party], Trisula, the PGRS [Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force] in Sarawak, the PARAKU [North Kalimantan People's Force] in North Kalimantan, and Operation Seroja in East Timor. KOSTRAD troops have also been relied on at the international level, as was the case with Garuda troops in Egypt (1973-78) and Vietnam (1973-75) and with those in the combined peace force in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war of 1989 and 1990.
    In 1984 the PANGKOSTRAD became responsible to the ABRI commander for the conduct of combat operations, called defense and security operations. At present, KOSTRAD has a strength of some 35,000 to 40,000 army personnel with two infantry divisions: the 1st Division, headquartered at Cilodong, West Java, and the 2d Division, headquartered at Malang, East Java. Each of the divisions contains airborne and infantry brigades. KOSTRAD also includes a separate airborne brigade; one cavalry brigade; two field artillery regiments; and several combat support and service support units.

    KOPASSUS - Army Special Force Command

    The Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS), formerly called the Sandi Yudha Forces Command and KOPASSANDHA (which also means Special Forces Command), are trained in intelligence gathering, a variety of special operations techniques, sabotage, and airborne and seaborne landings. Founded on 16 April 1952, KOPASSUS was reorganized and reduced in size in 1985, and by 1992 KOPASSUS forces numbered some 2,500 army personnel identifiable by their distinctive red berets organized into two operational groups and one training group.
    Since a reorganization in June 1996, KOPASSUS returned to the organization created in 1985. The stated reason for the reorganization was to permit a development rotation with one quarter on duty, one quarter in training, one quarter consolidation, and one quarter ready reserves which can be used at any time. Along with the reorganization and increase in size, its commander, the son-in-law of the Indonesian president, was promoted to two-star rank. By the late 1990s KOPASSUS numbered some 6,000-strong, an increase in the number of troops, but below that of 1985. Headquarters at Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS had expanded to five Groups, with Group IV specifically handling intelligence operations along with the KOPASSUS Joint Intelligence Unit [SGI].
    While the "elite" corps of the Indonesian Army is the KOPASSUS Red Beret Corps with its special camouflage field uniform, there are many similarities among KOPASSUS, KOSTRAD, and other corps. Because of differences in units, however, there are individual improvisations that become special features of each corps. The KOPASSUS training package called "How to Find a Fine Fighter."
    With its headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS is considered to be an elite force that has traditionally emphasized its small size and its quick-strike potential. It has been involved in numerous military actions in response to internal Indonesian unrest. KOPASSUS units were involved in 1981 in freeing the hostages from the "Woyla," the Garuda Airline plane hijacked by followers of Imran, leader of an Islamic splinter movement in West Java. Imran forced the plane to land at the Don Muang Airport in Thailand. KOPASSUS troops to Thailand and brilliantly overwhelmed the hijackers. Around 90 troops from KOPASSUS were dispatched to Irian Jaya when a rebel group took hostages there have left the province without rescuing the remaining captives in 1996. KOPASSUS members climbed Mount Everest in 1997.
    Colonel Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law who married Siti Hediati Hariyadi Suharto in May 1983, was appointed to head KOPASSUS in December 1995. He was promoted to replace KOPASSUS chief Brigadier Subagyo Hadi Siswono, who was assigned to head the fourth Diponegoro Military Region Command.
    On 15 July 1997 it was reported that Maj. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces [ABRI] Staff and Command College, replaced Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid as chief of ABRI sociopolitical affairs. Generally heads of ABRI sociopolitical affairs are officers with territorial, socio-political, or educational experience. Rarely if ever come from the ranks of the KOPASSUS Red Berets. Of previous heads including Bambang Triantoro, Sugiarto, Harsudiono Hartas, Haryoto P.S., Ma'ruf, Hartono, and Syarwan Hamid, not one came from the Special Forces Command. With the September 1997 appointment of Yosfiah as head of the sociopolitical affairs, the three top positions at ABRI headquarters were held by KOPASSUS Special Forces officers. ABRI Commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung, who was installed in 1993, was a KOPASSUS man, as was Lieutenant General Tarub, installed in 1997. This "domination" of the upper ranks at ABRI Headquarters has never happened in preceding periods.
    KOPASSUS is associated with human rights abuses and "disappearances" which have been documented by respected human rights organizations and the Indonesian government. A number of activists were kidnapped by KOPASSUS troops in the last months of the Suharto regime, and at least 23 government critics disappeared. Nine later resurfaced and told stories of solitary confinement, interrogation, and physical abuse. One was found dead and 13 are still listed as missing. The abductions took place ahead of a general assembly, which reappointed Suharto as president for his seventh consecutive term on 11 March 1998.
    As of 01 April 1998 Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto [Suharto's son-in-law] was serving as commander of the Army Strategic Command [KOSTRAD] and Maj. Gen. Mukhdi Purwopranyono was serving as commandant of KOPASSUS. Suharto was ousted on 21 May 1999 amid mounting public pressure and large scale violent pro-reform riots. Soon thereafter Son-in-Law Prabowo was pushed out of his position as commander of KOPASSUS and reassigned to head the army's command and staff training college in Bandung.
    Armed forces chief General Wiranto set up the Officers' Honorary Council (DKP) on 03 August 1998 to probe the abduction and torture of scores of pro-reform political activists. On 21 August 1998 the Council ended its investigations of three senior officers linked to the kidnap and torture of political activists. In closed-door hearings, the Council questioned three officers from KOPASSUS, including the unit's former commander, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, son-in-law of Ex-President Suharto. Wiranto admitted that KOPASSUS was involved in the kidnappings after the probe showed the KOPASSUS command had issued orders to "uncover several movements then considered radical and jeopardizing government programs and public security." On 06 April 1999 a military court on Tuesday found 11 members of KOPASSUS guilty of kidnapping nine pro-democracy activists and handed them jail terms of up to 22 months.
    Maj. Gen. Mayjen Syahrir was appointed commanding general of KOPASSUS as of July 1998.
    Begining in early 1999 a campaign of systematic liquidation of the resistance was under way in East Timor, forcing thousands of people to flee into the jungles The operations were backed by at least a section of the Indonesian armed forces and intelligence service, notably KOPASSUS. In the countryside, village chiefs in favor of independence were systematically liquidated, and even villages considered not enthusiastic enough for autonomy were destroyed.
    East Timor resistance leader Xanana Gusmao accused a renegade "KOPASSUS old guard" of scorning Indonesia's avowed policy of curbing the violence in East Timor. Western military sources said known KOPASSUS officers were involved in attacks on the UNAMET compound in Maliana southwest of Dili, from where the UN subsequently evacuated all its local and foreign staff. In early August 1999, less than three weeks before the poll in East Timor on the territory's future, Indonesia's military commander there has been replaced by Col Muhamad Noer Muis, formerly of KOPASSUS. Most recently, Col Muis was the commander of war training in Sumatra. Jose Ramos Horta, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and a leader of the East Timor resistance, has claimed that the so-called pro-Indonesian Timorese militiamen are in fact members of KOPASSUS special passing themselves off as militiamen.
    The United States Congress developed over the past several years a compromise limiting International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to expanded-IMET, which is a human rights curriculum. However, the Department of Defense used Joint Combined Exchange and Training to train Indonesian military personnel in activities which would have been prohibited under the IMET ban, raising questions about a violation of Congressional intent.

  5. #5
    Thats me with my precious Senior Contributor sniperdude411's Avatar
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    Could someone possibly summarize this whole thing in a few paragraphs? 30 pages of 12-pt. font is a bit long for me to read in one sitting; I only got through the first 5 sentences.

    Did you write this whole thing, or what?

  6. #6
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    And I thought you were the top student in your class or something...

    Basically the army is split between garrison units (Kodam), Special Forces (Kopassus) and a strategic reserve made up of infantry, armor, artillery and airborne units (Kostrad). The largest unit of the Kodams are normally battalions. The Kodam battalions are spread across the nation to keep order and deal with local problems while the Kostrad and Kopassus deploy to deal with problems once they grow out of control.

    Plus the territorial stucture is actually rather cheap to keep running...

    ---
    A list of all Kodams....

    Kodam
    Glossary:
    • Kodam: Komando Daerah Militer (Military Territorial Command)
    • Korem: Komando Resort Militer (Military Resort Command)
    • Yonif: Batalyon Infanteri (Infantry Batallion)

    Kodam Iskandar Muda
    territory: Province Aceh
    headquarter: Banda Aceh
    • Korem 011 - Lilawangsa (hq: Lhokseumawe, North Aceh)
    • Korem 012 - Teuku Umar (hq: Banda Aceh)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 111 / Karma Bakti (Tualang Cut, East Aceh)
    • Yonif 112 / Dharma Jaya (Banda Aceh)
    • Yonif 113 / Jaya Sakti (Bireuen, North Aceh)

    Kodam I / Bukit Barisan
    territory: Provinces North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau
    headquarter: Medan
    • Korem 022 - Pantai Timur (hq: Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra)
    • Korem 023 - Kawal Samudera (hq: Sibolga, North Sumatra)
    • Korem 031 - Wirabima (hq: Pekanbaru, Riau)
    • Korem 032 - Wirabraja (hq: Padang, West Sumatra)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 100 / Prajurit Setia (Binjai, North Sumatra)
    • Yonif 121 / Macan Kumbang (Deliserdang, North Sumatra)
    • Yonif 122 / Tombak Sakti (Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra)
    • Yonif 123 / Rajawali (Medan, North Sumatra)
    • Yonif 125 / Simbisa (Kabanjahe, North Sumatra)
    • Yonif 126 / Kala Sakti (Kisaran, North Sumatra)
    • Yonif 131 / Braja Sakti (Payakumbuh, West Sumatra)
    • Yonif 132 / Bima Sakti (Bangkinang, Riau)
    • Yonif 133 / Jaya Sakti (Padang Panjang, West Sumatra)

    Kodam II / Sriwijaya
    territory: Provinces Bengkulu, Jambi, Southern Sumatra, Lampung
    headquarter: Palembang
    • Korem 041 - Garuda Emas (hq: Kota Bengkulu)
    • Korem 042 - Garuda Putih (hq: Jambi)
    • Korem 043 - Garuda Hitam (hq: Bandar Lampung)
    • Korem 044 - Garuda Dempo (hq: Palembang)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 141 / Aneka Yudha (Muaraenim, South Sumatra)
    • Yonif 142 / Satria Jaya (Jambi)
    • Yonif 143 / Triwira Eka Jaya (Natar, Lampung)
    • Yonif 144 / Jaya Yudha (Bengkulu)
    • Yonif 145 / Serong (Palembang, South Sumatra

    Kodam Jaya
    territory: Special Territory Jakarta Raya
    headquarter: Jakarta
    • Korem 051 - Wijayakarta (area: South & East Jakarta, Bekasi)
    • Korem 052 - Wijayakrama (area: North & West Jakarta, Tangerang)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 201 / Jaya Yudha (Gandaria, East Jakarta)
    • Yonif 202 / Taji Malela (Bekasi)
    • Yonif 203 / Arya Kemuning (Tangerang)

    Kodam III / Siliwangi
    territory: Provinces Western Java & Banten
    headquarter: Bandung
    • Korem 061 - Suryakencana (hq: Bogor)
    • Korem 062 - Tarumanegara (hq: Garut)
    • Korem 063 - Sunan Gunung Jati (hq: Cirebon)
    • Korem 064 - Maulana Yusuf (hq: Serang)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 301 / Prabu Kian Santan (Sumedang)
    • Yonif 310 / Kidang Kencana (Sukabumi)
    • Yonif 312 / Kala Hitam [Kujang] (Subang)
    • Yonif 315 / Garuda (Bogor)
    • Yonif 320 / Badak Putih (Pandeglang)
    • Yonif 327 / Brajawijaya (Cianjur)

    Kodam IV / Diponegoro
    territory: Province Central Java and Special Territory Yogyakarta
    headquarter: Semarang
    • Korem 071 - Wijayakusuma (hq: Purwokerto)
    • Korem 072 - Pamungkas (hq: Yogyakarta)
    • Korem 073 - Makutarama (hq: Salatiga)
    • Korem 074 - Warastratama (hq: Surakarta)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 401 / Banteng Raiders (Semarang)
    • Yonif 403 / Wirasada Pratista (Yogyakarta)
    • Yonif 405 / Suryakusuma (Banyumas)
    • Yonif 406 / Candrakusuma (Purbalingga)
    • Yonif 407 / Padmakusuma (Tegal)
    • Yonif 408 / Suhbrasta (Sragen)
    • Yonif 410 / Alugoro (Blora)

    Kodam V / Brawijaya
    territory: Province Eastern Java
    headquarter: Surabaya
    • Korem 081 - Dhirotsaha Jaya (hq: Madiun)
    • Korem 082 - Panca Yudha Jaya (hq: Mojokerto)
    • Korem 083 - Bhaladika Jaya (hq: Malang)
    • Korem 084 - Bhaskara Jaya (hq: Surabaya)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 507 / Sikatan (Surabaya)
    • Yonif 511 / Dibyatama Yudha (Blitar)
    • Yonif 512 / Quratara Yudha (Malang)
    • Yonif 516 / Caraka Yudha [Branjangan] (Surabaya)
    • Yonif 521 / Dadaha Jaya (Kediri)
    • Yonif 527 / Baladibya Yudha (Lumajang)

    Kodam VI / Tanjungpura
    territory: All Kalimantan
    headquarter: Balikpapan
    • Korem 091 - Aji Surya Natakesuma (hq: Samarinda, East Kalimantan)
    • Korem 101 - Antasari (hq: Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan)
    • Korem 102 - Panju Panjung (hq: Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan)
    • Korem 121 - Alambhana Wanawai (hq: Pontianak, West Kalimantan)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 611 / Awang Long (Samarinda, East Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 612 / Modang (Balikpapan, East Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 613 / Raja Alam (Tarakan, East Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 621 / Manuntung (Tanjung Kandangan, South Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 623 / Wirabhakti Utama (Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 631 / Antang Elang (Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 641 / Beruang (Singkawang, West Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 642 / Kapuas (Sintang, West Kalimantan)
    • Yonif 643 / Wanara Sakti (Pontianak, West Kalimantan)

    Kodam VII / Wirabuana
    territory: All Sulawesi
    headquarter: Makassar
    • Korem 131 - Santiago (hq: Manado, North Sulawesi)
    • Korem 132 - Tadulako (hq: Palu, Central Sulawesi)
    • Korem 141 - Todopuli (hq: Bone, South Sulawesi)
    • Korem 142 - Taroada Tarogau (hq: Parepare, South Sulawesi)
    • Korem 143 - Haluoleo (hq: Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 711 / Raksatama (Palu, Central Sulawesi)
    • Yonif 712 / Wiratama (Manado, North Sulawesi)
    • Yonif 713 / Satyatama (Gorontalo, North Sulawesi)
    • Yonif 721 / Makkasau (Parepare, South Sulawesi)
    • Yonif 725 / Woroagi (Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi)
    • Yonif 726 / Tamalatea (Takalar, South Sulawesi)

    Kodam IX / Udayana
    territory: Provinces Bali, West & East Nusa Tenggara
    headquarter: Denpasar
    • Korem 161 - Wirasakti (hq: Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara)
    • Korem 162 - Wirabhakti (hq: Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara)
    • Korem 163 - Wirasatya (hq: Denpasar, Bali)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 741 / Satya Bhakti Wirottama (Singaraja, Bali)
    • Yonif 742 / Satya Wira Yudha (Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara)
    • Yonif 743 / Pradnya Samapta Yudha (Atambua, East Nusa Tenggara)
    • Yonif 744 / Satya Yudha Bhakti (Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara)

    Kodam XVI / Pattimura
    territory: All Maluku
    headquarter: Ambon
    • Korem 151 - Maluku Selatan (hq: Ambon)
    • Korem 152 - Maluku Utara (hq: Ternate)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 731 / Karabessy (Waipo, West Seram, South Maluku)
    • Yonif 732 / Banau (Ternate, North Maluku)
    • Yonif 733 / Masariku (Ambon, South Maluku)

    Kodam XVII / Trikora
    territory: All Papua
    headquarter: Jayapura
    • Korem 171 - Praja Wira Tama (hq: Sorong, West Papua)
    • Korem 172 - Praja Wira Yakti (hq: Jayapura, North Papua)
    • Korem 173 - Praja Wira Braja (hq: Biak, North Papua)
    infantry combat forces:
    • Yonif 751 / Vira Jaya Sakti (Jayapura, North Papua)
    • Yonif 752 / Vira Yudha Sakti (Sorong, West Papua)
    • Yonif 753 / Arga Vira Tama (Paniai, Central Papua)


    ---
    Recently 10 Raider battalions have been formed out of 8 Kodam battalions and 2 Kostrad (non airborne battalions). This was in theory supposed to provide each Kodam with a strike force yet very few areas are actually under threat almost negating that need. All 10 battalions were deployed to Aceh in late 2003 for operations againist the GAM.

    It will be interesting as the Raiders were the brain child of Ryamizard Ryacudu who was the head of Kostrad so the unit could even possibly become a full Raider division rather then have 8 battalions spread out across the nation with 2 battalions still part of Kostrad. But as things stand it is still simply 10 Raider battalions...

  7. #7
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper124.html
    THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES & POLITICS

    by B.Raman

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    Having played an active role, along with political leaders, in the guerilla war for independence against the Dutch, the Indonesian armed forces have always believed in their right to play a role in the political life of the country. In 1957, Gen.Nasution, the then army chief, articulated this belief through his concept of the need for a middle road for Indonesia between the total apoliticisation of the armed forces in Western democracies and their total involvement in politics in some of the Latin American countries. This became the basis for the doctrine of "dwifungsi", the dual function of the armed forces, which entered the statute book under Suharto in 1982. The armed forces have justified this role by projecting themselves as the only State institution with a national perspective capable of promoting national harmony. They have justified their role in the economic management of the country on the ground that the armed forces are the only segment of the State machinery with the required managerial capability. They have also been projecting the armed forces as closer to the people than the political class and the civil bureaucracy. The consequent militarisation of the State reached it zenith under Suharto in the early 1980s.Since then, in the face of public criticism, there has been a gradual dilution of the role of the army, but this process slowed down under Dr.Habibie, the interim President in 1998-99.

    Since Mr. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the President in October last, he has gradually been asserting his powers of supervision and control over the armed forces and diluting their role at the national level, while leaving their role intact at the regional level. He has reduced the number of military officers in the President's office, enforced his right to take all important decisions concerning the armed forces, reduced the primacy of the army in the armed forces by giving greater importance to the Navy and the Air Force than they had enjoyed in the past and removed from the military intelligence its responsibility for the security vetting of the public servants. He has eased out Gen.Wiranto from the Cabinet as well as the armed forces by taking advantage of the adverse report of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission against him and the army. Till now, the army has not resisted the changes brought in by Mr.Wahid because of its own unpopularity with the people, the external support for Mr.Wahid, clear Western warnings against any resistance and fears of stoppage of IMF assistance if it tried to resist the changes. Mr.Wahid's ability to continue successfully on this path would depend on his continued good health, the attitude of radical, but off-mainstream Islamic elements who are upset over the actions against Muslim officers which they view as a conspiracy by the Christian West (particularly in East Timor) and his ability to keep his family members, who are increasingly being accused of Suharto-style cronyism, under control so that his popularity does not wither away and to promote a recovery of the economy and a national reconciliation with the religious and ethnic minorities. If he fails, the military may be tempted to take advantage of the resulting situation to re-assert its dual role. (The text of the paper follows)

    COMPOSITION BEFORE PRESIDENT WAHID TOOK OVER
    The annual report on global military expenditures during 1998 submitted to the Appropriations Committees of the two Houses of the US Congress on February 19,1999, by the US State Department indicated the composition of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI--Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) as follows:
    Army--------216, 000
    Air Force--- 27,000
    Navy ------- 26,000
    Marines----- 12,000
    Police-------- 170,000
    --------------
    Total 451,000
    The report estimated the official military budget (based on a share of the State revenue and excluding revenue from military-run commercial enterprises) during the financial year 1998-99 at US $ one billion, which in terms of the pre-1997 economic crisis buying power, would come to US $ 700 million. This amount of US $ one billion amounted to 1.3 per cent of the GDP and 7.9 per cent of the total State expenditure (as against 27 per cent in the case of Pakistan).
    It commented as follows on the official military spending: "Prior to the financial crisis, officially published Indonesian defence spending, including police expenditure, had been falling in relation to GDP, from a peak level of 3 per cent in 1981 to levels of about 1.5 per cent in the 1990s. Defence spending had experienced similar decline in relation to overall government outlay. Real growth in the military budget from 1988 to 1997 paralleled the steady expansion of the Indonesian economy during that period."
    Authentic estimates of the unofficial defence expenditure, not reflected in the State budget, which is incurred out of revenue from military-run commercial enterprises, are not available. There are various tentative guesstimates, claiming that, before 1997, the unofficial expenditure amounted to about four to seven times the official expenditure.
    On April 1,1999, the Police (POLRI), which was incorporated into the armed forces by the then President Sukarno in 1964, was separated and made into an autonomous department, no longer under the control of the chief of the armed forces, but still under the supervision of the Defence Minister. After the separation of the Police, the ABRI was re-named as the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI--Tentara Nasional Indonesia).
    ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

    The army is divided into the central and territorial forces. Of the 216,000 personnel in the army, about 35,000 constitute the central forces and the remaining the territorial forces. The central forces are divided into the Army Strategic Command (KOSTRAD), with two light infantry divisions and supporting arms, and the Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS), divided into four operational groups.

    The remaining troops have been distributed into 10 territorial commands (KODAM), which are proposed to be increased to 17, covering the entire archipelago with its 27 provinces and 327 districts. While the KOSTRAD and the KOPASSUS are largely Javanese dominated, the KODAMs have a large percentage of the sons of the soil recruited within the jurisdiction of each KODAM.
    The Navy consists of the Western Fleet based in Jakarta and the Eastern Fleet in Surabaya. The jurisdiction of the Western Fleet covers the approaches to the South China Sea and the Malacca and Sunda Straits. The Eastern Fleet is responsible for guarding the approaches to the Pacific Ocean, the Lombok/Macassar Straits and other eastern Straits.

    The Air Force has about 20 squadrons, six of them fighter squadrons, meant for the protection of Java.

    A pre-1997 25-year plan for the revamping of the armed forces, with the total strength of the army to be increased to 330,000,had to be shelved due to the economic crisis. So too were plans for the acquisition of new equipment, including five German submarines to supplement the existing two aging ones. The only new programme, which has been retained, is for the acquisition of an additional squadron of Hawk multi-purpose planes, bringing the total to 40 for providing air cover to the approaches to the South China Sea and the Natuna gas fields from a new base at Pontianak in West Kalimantan, which will act in co-ordination with the existing squadron based at Pekan Baru in Sumatra.

    Apart from the shelved plans to augment the submarine strength, other deferred acquisition programmes related to the purchase of Russian fighters and helicopters, production of French artillery under licence in Indonesia and locally-ordered (from the IPTN, the indigenous aircraft manufacturers) transport and maritime patrol planes and helicopters.

    Before 1965, under Sukarno, the erstwhile USSR was the most important source of military supplies. After 1965, most of the acquisitions came from France, the US, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. At the same time, to promote self-reliance and reduce the dependence on overseas supplies, the Suharto regime under Dr.B.J.Habibie, the Technology Minister, who later succeeded Mr.Suharto as the interim President in 1998, embarked on a policy of developing a capability for the production of military equipment, including aircraft and helicopters for the Air Force. This programme has not made much progress. Hence, the TNI is still largely dependent on external sources for maintaining even its current level of operational capability, but, post-1997, does not have the funds required for this purpose.

    Even before 1997, Mr. Suharto had, in an apparent fit of anger, cancelled plans to purchase from the US, at reduced rates, the F-16s manufactured for Pakistan before the imposition of sanctions against it under the Pressler Amendment in 1990 following opposition to the deal in the US Congress due to the alleged human rights violations by the then ABRI in East Timor and elsewhere. He also discontinued Jakarta's participation in the International Military Education Training Programme (IMET) of the Pentagon.

    Since then, the only significant external military collaboration (outside the ASEAN), which Jakarta still has, is with the UK in respect of the purchase of the HAWK aircraft and with Australia, with which it signed an Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) in December 1995, at the height of regional concerns over the Chinese intrusions into the Mischief Reef and other islands/reefs in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines.

    Under the AMS, Australia had been spending annually about US $ 7 million on Australian training for Indonesian military personnel in Indonesia itself as well as in Australia, low-level joint exercises, exchanges of visits and reportedly also some material and logistic support, the details of which are not available.

    TASKS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS
    Under Sukarno, the Indonesian armed forces exhibited extra-territorial ambitions and tendencies. Reference could be made in this regard to the period of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, the description of the Indian Ocean as the Indonesian Ocean and Jakarta's reported interest in some of the islands of the Andaman & Nicobar group. There was even speculation of Jakarta's interest in acquiring a military nuclear capability.

    But, under Mr.Suharto, the Indonesian armed forces became almost totally inward-looking, with the priorities assigned to the following tasks:
    * Protection of internal stability and security, with the two main sources of threat, as identified by the military, being the communists and the religious and ethnic separatist groups. Communism as a continuing threat to internal security is no longer highlighted, but the armed forces are still nervous over the possibility of a resurgence of communism by taking advantage of the widespread popular dissatisfaction caused by the economic crisis and of what the military perceives as the weakening of state authority due to too rapid political liberalisation.
    * Surveillance over Indonesia's vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and archipelagic waters.
    *Protection of its immense natural resources, on and off-shore, from illegal exploitation by Indonesian nationals and foreigners.
    Indonesia does not identify any foreign country as a threat or a potential threat. It does not have any territorial dispute with any country except Malaysia in respect of sovereignty over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan, off East Kalimantan. After a failure to solve the issue bilaterally, the two countries have agreed to jointly refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for adjudication.
    Indonesia's relations with China have further improved since the normalisation of the diplomatic relations in 1989 and Jakarta doesn't speak of China as a potential threat. But, in its defence thinking and planning, China is far from its mind due to the following reasons:
    * Presence of a large ethnic Chinese minority and their crucial role in the Indonesian economy.
    * Fears of a conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea overflowing into Indonesian waters. This should explain the discreet behind-the-scene role played by Jakarta under Mr.Suharto to promote a peaceful solution to the conflicting claims of sovereignty even though Indonesia itself is not a claimant.
    * Existence of past Chinese maps showing parts of the Natuna gas field area as falling within Chinese territorial waters. Beijing has not formally laid any claim to any part of this area, but, at the same time, has evaded repeated Jakarta requests for a clarification, if not a repudiation, of these maps.
    Though President Abdurrahman Wahid has taken steps for a further improvement of Jakarta's relations with China and has spoken of the important role which India, Indonesia and China could play in this region, the subterranean worries about China still remain.

    DOCTRINE, CONCEPTS AND MINDSET
    To understand the "dwifungsi" (dual function) role of the armed forces, one has to keep in view certain doctrines, concepts and arguments, which have figured from time to time in debates inside and outside the military. These could be summarised as follows:
    * National Perspective: The military is the only State institution capable of viewing problems from a national perspective. Politicians and others tend to view them from personal or partisan angles. Gen.Sudirman, the first Commander of the Indonesian army, said in 1947: "The governments may change every day; the army remains the same."
    * National resilience: To keep an archipelagic State like Indonesia with its different religious and ethnic groups united and stable, political, social and economic harmony is essential. The military is better placed than other institutions to promote such harmony.
    * The Doctrine of Total People's Defence: Keeping in view the archipelagic nature of the State and the present strength and composition of the armed forces, the military would not be able to counter an external aggression only through conventional means. The response has to be a mix of conventional and guerilla fighting. To be able to mobilise the people in different regions to participate in such guerilla fighting, a close association of the military with the people during peacetime is required. This would be possible only if the military is actively involved in administration and community management in the provinces. The concept of the military remaining within barracks during peacetime does not apply to Indonesia--particularly not to the provinces and districts.
    * Better managerial capability: Being, in the military's perception, the most well-trained, well-managed and well-motivated institution of the State, the military has personnel with better managerial capability than the civilian bureaucracy to manage industrial and other business enterprises, particularly in key sectors of the economy such as oil and gas, mining etc
    * Better local knowledge: Military officers are posted for long periods in the provinces and districts, tour widely and interact closely with the people even in remote areas. In contrast, the Jakarta-based civilian bureaucrats rarely travel in the interior and even the members of Parliament representing interior districts remain confined to Jakarta and go to their constituencies only during the election campaign. As a result, the military has a better knowledge of the ground conditions all over the country and of the problems of the people than any other section of the administration.
    The critics of the military and the advocates of the abolition of the military's dual role use the following arguments:
    * The armed forces were partly to blame for the widespread mismanagement, lack of accountability, cronyism and corruption which contributed to the economic collapse of 1997.
    * The blatant violations of human rights in East Timor, Aceh, Ambon and other regional areas and the aggravation of the feelings of alienation of the people in different parts of Indonesia and of social disharmony even in Java were due to the lack of effective political and civilian control over the military.

    ORIGIN & EVOLUTION OF "DWIFUNGSI"
    Unlike India and Pakistan, which inherited from the British a hard core of well-trained, well-motivated and experienced civil and military bureaucracy, which was further built up after independence, Indonesia inherited from the Dutch colonial masters no legacy of a well-oiled political, civil and military infrastructure and traditions of apolitical governance. The founding fathers of its independence had to build up almost from scratch a military and administrative system through trial and error. This aspect has to be kept in mind while discussing the origin and evolution of "dwifungsi".

    The other aspect to be noted is the role played by the founding core of the officer class of the military in the freedom struggle against the Dutch after the defeat of the Japanese. They got used to a role in political and administrative policy-making in association with the political leaders of the independence struggle and insisted on retaining this role even after final independence.

    The Japanese Army surrendered on August 16,1945. Two days later, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia and the setting-up of a Republic. The Dutch refused to recognise it and attempted to re-assert their control over the territory. Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the formation of the new Republic's army on October 5,1945, consisting of Indonesians who had served in the pre-world war Dutch colonial army and the Japanese occupation forces and political activists close to Sukarno and Hatta as well as to the communists. The Japanese-trained Gen.Sudirman took over as its Commander.

    The new army embarked on a guerilla warfare against the Dutch. In 1948, clashes broke out between troops loyal to Sukarno and Hatta and those sympathetic to the communists. The former defeated the latter. In December, 1948, the Dutch arrested Sukarno and Hatta. Thereafter, the new Indonesian army took over the responsibility for the administration of the areas liberated from Dutch control and for the political guidance of the struggle against the Dutch, who finally agreed to recognise Indonesian independence the next year.

    The history books taught in the military training institutions overplay the role of the military officers in putting an end to the Dutch rule and underplay that of the political leaders.

    Attempts by the parliament of the new Republic to make the military subservient to political and civilian control led to a demonstration by a group of army officers led by Dutch-trained A.H.Nasution outside the presidential palace on October 17,1952, in protest against civilian meddling in the internal affairs of the military. Sukarno rejected their demand for a dissolution of the parliament and the Nasution putsch failed.

    However, the two spells of martial law -- the first between 1957 and 1963 to deal with separatist movements and the second in 1964 to deal with the conflict with Malaysia-- saw Sukarno conceding gradually the military's demand for an active role in political and economic decision-making. In 1957. Gen.Nasution, then the Chief of Staff of the army, formulated the view that professionalisation of the military did not mean its total apoliticisation. He called for a middle way for Indonesia between the total apoliticisation of the military as in Western democracies and its total involvement in politics as in certain Latin American dictatorships. This formulation became the basis of the concept of "dwifungsi".
    The same year, after the failure of the members of Parliament to form a coalition government, Sukarno, with the support of Gen.Nasution, proclaimed a return to the 1945 Constitution, which had provided for representation for functional groups in the parliament. The military was declared as a functional group and given parliamentary representation. Thus was born the dwifungsi concept, which under Mr.Suharto, was put on the statute book in 1982.

    The policy of large-scale nationalisation of plantations, oil, mining and trading companies introduced in 1957 saw an increase in the military's role in economic management too, with many military officers being appointed to head the new public sector companies.

    Between 1965 and 1998, Indonesia passed through two kinds of dictatorships. For about 20 years, it was the dictatorship of the military as an institution, with Mr.Suharto acting as its guiding spirit. From the middle 1980s onwards, there was a gradual transformation of this into the personal dictatorship of Mr.Suharto, as an individual with a civilian facade, ruling with the help of a mix of military loyalists, civilian technocrats and businessmen close to the armed forces.
    The first phase saw priority being given to internal security and political stability and more than half a million people were killed and an equal number imprisoned on suspicion of being communist sympathisers. Of the half a million rounded up, only about a thousand were formally tried before a court of law in a sham judicial process. The rest of them did not have the benefit of even this sham process and were kept under illegal detention till the late 1970s, when the military regime started releasing them. Even after their release, they were kept under surveillance and debarred from employment in any office or enterprise connected with the Government. Their identity cards showed them as former security suspects, thereby creating difficulties in their getting jobs even in private enterprises. They were reduced to third class citizens.

    At the height of the militarisation of the administrative structure in 1980, about a half of the Ministers in the Cabinet, 75 per cent of the Secretaries-General in the various departments, 60 per cent of the Directors-General, 84 per cent of the Secretaries and 75 per cent of the provincial Governors were officers with a military background, most of them serving.

    Even while thus almost totally militarising the administration, Mr.Suharto tried to give the façade of a civilian democracy to his regime. While retaining the title of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, he resigned as the chief of the ABRI, nominating handpicked officers to exercise administrative and operational control over the military.

    To serve his dual purpose of strengthening the civilian façade of his regime and, at the same time, retaining a watching brief for the military in the political, economic and social management of the country, he promoted the primacy of the officially-floated GOLKAR party, which worked under the guidance of the territorial commanders, strictly regulated the functioning of the other political parties allowed to participate in the elections to the People's House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or the DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or the MPR), which is the highest constitutional authority and elects the President and Vice-President, and reserved a certain number of seats for the armed forces and the police in the DPR and MPR under powers entrusted to him by the MPR to nominate up to 20 per cent of the total strength of the DPR.

    After a gap of 15 years, the first elections to the DPR were held in 1971 and Mr.Suharto was unanimously elected as the President of the country and his nominee as the Vice-President. Under the pretext of simplifying the party system, Mr.Suharto allowed only three parties to function--the GOLKAR, which was formed by merging the various functional groups, the People's Development Party (PPP), formed by the merger of four Muslim political parties and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), formed by the merger of five nationalist (followers of Sukarno) and Christian parties.

    As initially constituted, the Golkar had three components---the military, the civil servants and the civilians. The military officers, serving as well as retired, formed the most powerful component at the national and regional levels, with Mr.Suharto himself designated as the Chief Supervisor, with powers to suspend or dismiss the central executive board.

    The critics of "dwifungsi" used to sarcastically refer to the GOLKAR as the political wing of the ABRI. In the face of their criticism, the 1978 Congress of the GOLKAR decided that while both serving and retired military and civil officers could become members, only retired officers could hold party positions. The critics, thereupon, started ridiculing it as the retired Generals' party. Despite this, the party, with the support of the administration, managed to secure over 60 per cent of the vote in every general election.

    Finding no political space for themselves under the carefully-controlled party system, critics of the military and "dwifungsi" started floating non-governmental organisations (NGOs), ostensibly to take up social issues such as workers' welfare, women's welfare, environmental issues, etc, but really to articulate their dissatisfaction with the lack of democracy and accountability under the Suharto regime. The country saw a mushrooming of about 7,000 NGOs, 2,800 of them located in Jakarta alone.

    In the face of this, Mr.Suharto started changing the emphasis from internal security and political stability to people's welfare. To project his dictatorship as welfare-oriented and no longer purely security-oriented, and to further strengthen the civilian façade of the Government, Mr.Suharto discontinued the practice of appointing a large number of military officers as Cabinet Ministers, drastically reduced the percentage of officers with a military background in the various government departments and correspondingly increased the percentage of civilian bureaucrats occupying key positions at the decision-making level. While thus diluting the visible role of the military at the national level, he did not do so at the regional level.

    Towards the end of the 1980s, there were signs of differences inside the armed forces over the wisdom of continuing with "dwifungsi"and over what many secular-minded officers looked upon as Mr.Suharto's new tendency to court the new Islamic elements making their appearance in different parts of the country and contesting the primacy of the PPP as the only legally-permitted Muslim party.
    Nasution, the original author of the "dwifungsi" concept in 1957, was one of the first to express the view that the time had come to review it. In the early 1990s, a group of 50 retired military officers and former politicians, which came to be known as the Petisi 50 Group, became increasingly vocal in its criticism of the political style of functioning of Mr.Suharto.

    In 1987-88, differences erupted between Mr.Suharto and Gen. Benny Murdani, a Catholic, who was the chief of the ABRI, after the latter criticised the activities of Mr.Suharto's family and allegedly tried to make the armed forces more independent of the President.Gen.Murdani was transferred as Defence Minister, from which post he was removed in 1993.

    This was followed by a purge of Murdani loyalists from the armed forces and the Intelligence and Strategic Centre (BIAS), set up by him, which was re-organised and renamed as the Military Intelligence Unit (BIA). The number of Christians in the Cabinet and the DPR was reduced. Amongst prominent Christians removed from influential positions were Mr.Radius Prawiro, who was Co-ordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry, Mr.Adrianus Mooy, who used to be the Central Bank Governor, and Mr.Johannes Sumarlin, who was the Finance Minister.
    While thus diluting the role of the Christian officers in the civilian and military bureaucracy, Mr.Suharto, at the same time, gave a lift to a number of officers who were considered to be "santris" (strict Muslims) as distinguished from the secular-minded "abangans". Amongst the "santris" thus favoured by Mr.Suharto during this period were Try Sutrisno, who later on became the Vice-President in 1993, despite Mr.Suharto's preference for Dr.Habibie because of the insistence of status quoists in the military, Feisal Tanjung, who became the chief of the armed forces, and Hartono, who became the army Chief of Staff.

    Before the 1992 elections, Mr.Suharto performed "haj" for the first time and started calling himself Muhammed Suharto. Earlier, in 1990, he had also encouraged the formation of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) by Dr.Habibie.

    While thus courting the newly-emerging Muslim political elements in order to keep them on his side without letting their emergence affect the 'Pancasila" ideology, which stresses belief in one God, a just and civilised humanitarianism, a united Indonesia, democracy guided by wisdom, consultation and representation and social justice for all Indonesian nationals, he also tried to make some concessions to the critics of "dwifungsi" by having Mr.Harmoko, a civilian, elected in 1993 as the GOLKAR Chairman defeating retired General Soesilo Soedarman, who was backed by the status quoists in the military. Mr.Suharto also reduced the number of seats reserved for the military in the two Houses from 100 (20 per cent of the total strength of the DPR) to 75 in 1997. After Mr.Suharto's resignation, this was further reduced to 38 (slightly less than 8 per cent) in June 1999.

    UNDER Dr.HABIBIE
    Dr. Habibie, who took over as the President after the resignation of Mr.Suharto on May 21,1998, in the face of unrelenting student demand for his resignation, massive street riots on the issue and deepening economic crisis, stopped exercising the powers of the President relating to appointments, promotions and transfers in the armed forces and let Gen. Wiranto, the Defence Minister and chief of the TNI, handle this power, thereby once again strengthening the position of the TNI chief.

    However, Dr.Habibie's interim term saw some genuine reforms such as a dilution of the restrictions on the right of other political parties to contest the elections and fixing the tenure of the President and the Vice-President to two five-year terms.

    In the face of unrelenting demands from the critics for the abolition of "dwifungsi", the military seems inclined to accept the abolition of reservation of seats for the armed forces in the Parliament from the year 2004. However, in statements made before his suspension by President Wahid, Gen. Wiranto laid down the following conditions:
    * No interference of the political leadership in the internal affairs of the armed forces. (Meaning all powers regarding appointments, promotions and transfers of senior officers would be exercised by the chief of the armed forces).
    * No interference by the armed forces in the political process.
    * No attempt to isolate the armed forces from the people. (This is interpreted to mean that while the military is reconciled to further dilution and ultimate abolition of its dual function at the national level, it is not yet prepared to accept it at the regional level).
    In the June, 1999, elections to the DPR, 48 parties contested as against only three in the past and parties advocating political reforms defeated the GOLKAR, with Mrs.Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party (Struggle) emerging as the largest single party with 153 seats in a House of 500.The final results were as follows:
    1.The Indonesian Democratic Party (Struggle) and its allies --- 153
    2.The GOLKAR party and its allies --- 120
    3.The United Development Party (PPP) and its allies --- 58
    (Military-supported Islamic elements)
    4.The National Awakening Party of President Wahid & allies --- 51
    5.The National Mandate Party of Mr.Amien Rais and its allies --- 41
    6.The Crescent Star Party and its allies --- 13
    7.The Indonesian Unity and Awakening Party & its allies --- 12
    8.The United People's Sovereignty Party & its allies --- 11
    9.The Love the Nation Democratic Party & its allies --- 3
    10. Reserved for the TNI and the police --- 38
    Of these, serial Nos. 1 and 2 are secular-minded parties (273 out of a total of 500), S.Nos 3,4 and 5 are moderate Islamic parties (150 out of 500) and serial Nos, 6 and 8 are Islamic parties of unknown origin and background (24 seats). Nothing much is known about the parties at S.Nos. 7 and 9 (15 seats).
    UNDER PRESIDENT WAHID
    Mr.Abdurrahman Wahid, who was elected as the President on October 21,1999,had initially not much freedom in choosing his Cabinet, having to accept the nominees of the parties which supported him and of Gen. Wiranto, who himself was designated as the Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs.
    He has devoted the first few months in office to diluting the role of the armed forces in politics at the national level by taking the following action:
    * For the first time since Mr. Djuanda, another civilian, served as Defence Minister under Sukarno, President Wahid has appointed Mr.Juwono Sudarsono, a civilian, as the Defence Minister. A former Professor of Political Science in the University of Indonesia, he had served as the Environment Minister in the last Cabinet of Mr.Suharto and as the Education Minister in the Cabinet of Dr.Habibie. He also used to be the Vice-Chair of the National Defence Institute, a think tank funded by the TNI. Mr.Juwono told the press after taking over that he had told the senior military officers "they could no longer collect expensive toys, such as those owned by some outlandishly rich Generals."
    * Mr.Wahid has sought to reduce the primacy of the army in the TNI by appointing a naval officer (Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto) as the chief of the armed forces (TNI) and air force officers as the chief of the military intelligence (Air Vice-Marshal Ian Santoso) and as media spokesman (Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo) of the TNI. These posts have traditionally been held by army officers. President Wahid removed the previous spokesman, Maj-Gen Sudrajat of the army, following two controversial remarks by him in his media briefings. In one, he said that Mr.Wahid would have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the TNI, while, in the other, he said: "Political reconciliation is needed, but this nation will remain anti-communist."
    * He suspended Gen.Wiranto from the Cabinet because of the allegations of human rights violations by the TNI in East Timor made by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission.
    * He has insisted on exercising his prerogative of making senior appointments, promotions and transfers in the TNI. He is reported to have already shifted about 70 senior officers.
    * He has started an exercise to ease out the supporters of Gen.Wiranto and other status quoists from key positions in the army. He has already reportedly appointed Major-Gen. Agus Wirahadukusumah as Commander of the KOSTRAD and Lt.Gen. Djamari Chaniago as the Chief of the General Staff. Both of them were reputed to be critics of Gen.Wiranto and strong advocates of the abolition of "dwifungsi". Strongly criticising the military's involvement in business enterprises, Maj-Gen. Agus has said in an interview:"Who backs and supports the discotheques, brothels and narcotics rings, if not the military or police? An embarrassing fact is that the military has lost the trust of the people."
    * He has reduced the number of military officers in the presidential office from 35 to 15 and imposed restrictions on the type of correspondence that they could see.
    * He has indicated that when the Government's finances improve priority would be given to meeting the requirements of the Navy. As against this, he is reportedly contemplating a reduction in the strengths of the KOSTRAD and the KOPASSUS.
    * He has reportedly removed from the military intelligence the responsibility for the security vetting of Government servants. However, it is not yet known to which department he has now entrusted this task.
    At the same time, President Wahid has avoided any action to dilute the military's role in the regions. He seems to be concentrating first on easing out the military from its dual role at the centre.
    REASONS FOR LACK OF RESISTANCE FROM TNI
    Despite periodic reports of unhappiness in the military over his actions and rumours of a possible coup by disgruntled officers, the TNI seems to have accepted his decisions without much resistance, though Gen.Wiranto was initially refusing to quit. President Wahid's success so far in having his decisions enforced, though often in an erratic manner, could be attributed to the following reasons:
    * Domestic public opinion continues to be strongly against the TNI and the matter has been made worse by the recommendations of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission for detailed investigation of the responsibility of the army in general and Gen.Wiranto in particular for the human rights violations in East Timor. There have been similar serious allegations against the TNI with regard to its handling of the dissident movements in other regions. This has put the TNI totally on the defensive and Mr.Wahid has skillfully taken advantage of this.
    * External support for Mr.Wahid's actions from the US and the European Union (EU) countries. During a visit to Jakarta, Mr.Richard Holbrooke, the US Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, said on January14, in an indirect reference to reports of a conflict between Mr.Wahid and Gen. Wiranto: " What we are watching is a great drama, a struggle between the forces of democracy and reform and the forces of backward looking corruption and militarism." Subsequently, he reportedly told American journalists that he had his statement cleared by the Indonesian political leadership before issuing it. His blunt warning against a return to militarism in Indonesia went home loud and clear to the TNI leadership.
    * The Indonesian economy is not yet out of the woods though its GDP has for the first time since the 1997 collapse recorded a miniscule positive growth rate of 0.2 per cent. The problem of outstanding corporate debt (over US $ 70 billion) is yet to be sorted out. The economy may take another nose-dive if the IMF suspends its assistance because of any military coup. The TNI and its individual senior officers have been badly affected by the economic crisis and they do not want to provoke another crisis by their unwise actions.
    The unusually tough stand taken by the US President, Mr.Bill Clinton, against the military regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan on the question of return to democracy is partly motivated by fears of any leniency towards the Pakistani regime on this issue being misread by the TNI leadership, thereby encouraging them to move against the elected government of Mr.Wahid.Similarly, Washington is likely to be concerned that if the IMF assistance to Pakistan is resumed despite the coup, fears of a discontinuance of the IMF assistance to Jakarta may no longer act as a disincentive to the status quoists in the TNI.
    PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
    Would Mr.Wahid be able to tame the TNI and keep it confined to its professional tasks? The answer to this would depend on the following factors:
    * His health. Though he has recovered from his stroke of last year, his vision has been badly impaired and his health seems to be delicate. In the event of any unfortunate incapacitation, the military may not be prepared to accept from Mrs. Megawati what it is prepared to accept from Mr.Wahid, thereby leading to a clash between the political leadership and the military.
    * For how long does Mr.Wahid's reputation for his personal integrity last? Because of his visual impairment, he is dependent on his children and brothers and other trusted aides for scrutinising his official correspondence and recommending action. He depends more on oral than on written communications for decision-making. His dependence on them for carrying out his responsibilities has already triggered off rumours of nepotism and cronyism and interference with the due process of the law against bank loan defaulters close to his family. Such rumours and perception could corrode his reputation, thereby depriving him of the moral high ground, which he presently enjoys.
    * The attitude of the Islamic elements outside Mr.Wahid's Nahdlatul-Ulama organisation which have already been accusing him of a witch-hunt against Muslim military officers. Organisations such as the Defenders of Islam, which have considerable vocal power without much public support, have been projecting the investigations of the Human Rights Commission against Gen. Wiranto and others for the TNI's excesses in East Timor as a conspiracy against Muslim officers by international Christianity.
    * Mr.Wahid's success in restoring the economy and controlling the religious and ethnic tensions. If he fails leading to serious disorder, the TNI would be only too tempted to take advantage of it to move against him.

    (20-5-00)

  8. #8
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    http://www.indonesia-house.org/dbind...soldier%20.htm
    Territorial Structure

    One topic in defense strategy debate is one about the existence of territorial structure. Territorial structure, in the first place, was used in guerilla war-strategy. Because of unavailability of comprehensive weaponry, the appropriate defense strategy at the time was doing guerilla war. That is the reason why Nasution then divided the troops, especially the TNI AD, into 7 TT (Territories).

    These Territories were meant to do guerilla war in the wartime without depending themselves to orders and provisions from the headquarters. TNI troops are comprised from infantry regiments in different numbers, depending on the strategical value of the respective region. Principally, the soldiers summoned are people from the ethnic groups abide the defense region.

    Beside that, territorial structure is created in a parallel way according to the structure of civil governmental hierarchy. In the level of center government, there is TNI Headquarters. In the level of provinces, there is Kodam, in the districts or municipalities there are Korem and Kodim. In the level of villages, there is Koramil, even in the level of villages there is Babinsa or Bintara Pembina Desa (Village Trainer Officers). In the wartime, the TNI commander in each structure will seize the leadership in his region. The war itself is defined as Semesta War: not only war using weapons, but also war in terms of ideology, economy, social, and culture.

    One logical reason why the territorial structure of the TNI is preserved is because, from the point of view of the New Order Regime, the potential threat is internal. To make sure that full control over potential threats exists, the territorial structure is preserved. Of course, territorial structure needs generous fund.

    The problem is, when the cash is deficient, in terms of budgeting, the existence of territorial structure of TNI is a waste of money. Until now, there are approximately 140,000 soldiers taking up territorial structures [5] . Nevertheless, 60% of them, or about 80,000 – 90,000 personnel, are soldiers in conditions insufficient for war [6] . Positions in territorial structures make soldiers as bureaucrats handling administrative problems or regional issues. As bureaucrats are not prepared to fight in war, TNI personnel do not need steadfast regular exercise.

    The situation is different from the combating squads like Kopassus and Kostrad that keep on having combat training. Kostrad has about 32,000 personnel, and Kopassus has 6,000 personnel. Because of limited number of soldiers that are ready to fight, the combating squads like Kopassus and Kostrad or Brimob are always in the confrontation area such as Aceh or guarding horizontal conflicts such as in Maluku.

    If it is only to keep security, 80,000 soldiers are too expensive. The cost of education spent for soldiers is more expensive than education for police officers. If it is only for security and not for combating needs, would not it be better if they are converted to the police? And by cutting down the number of soldiers, there will certainly be efficiency. The amount of regular cost the state has to spend will be far less. And then efficiency can improve the salary of soldiers and erase the deficit in the military budget [7] .

  9. #9
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    Dwifungsi, or "dual function" refers to the Indonesian military's previous role (ie during the Suharto era) as a major force in both national security and civilian life. It's seeds were first sown in 1958 by Army Chief of Staff Major General Abdul Haris Nasution during a National Military Academy speech where he described the military as having a two-fold purpose in the life of the Indonesian state - a military one and a socio-political one. He said:

    We do not and we will not copy the situation as it exists in several Latin American states, where the army acts as a direct political force. Nor will we emulate the Western European model, where armies are the dead tool [of government].

    --------------------------------------------------------

    In the line of fire
    Facing a sceptical public, Abri has to talk harder to justify its political role. JUN HONNA listens in.

    Over the last two years Abri has faced intense debate over its political role as defined in the doctrine of dual function, or dwifungsi. The doctrine states that Abri has not only a conventional state security role but also, more controversially, a role in politics.

    The media did much to bring the 'dwifungsi problem' into public discussion. When Abri's appointed parliamentary seats were reduced from 100 to 75, they described it as a necessary step for democratisation. When army chief Hartono declared that all Abri members were cadres of the ruling party Golkar, they vigorously debated the (loss of) Abri neutrality. When defence minister Edi Sudradjat claimed that, regrettably, many thought of Abri as a tool of the rich, they interpreted it as a sign of dwifungsi misconduct.

    Seminars

    Perhaps reflecting the growing critical mood, more than ten formal seminars were held the year before the last election in 1997 to discuss the future role of Abri. One controversial seminar at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lipi) in February 1997 suggested that Abri should totally withdraw from parliament by 2007. This gave the impression that dwifungsi had become an open topic for public discussion. But was it a signal of the diminishing role of Abri? If not, what does the growing dwifungsi debate imply?

    Abri views the trend with suspicion. At an air force seminar in May 1996, Tamlicha Ali, head of Abri's general planning section, claimed the current dwifungsi criticism was being used by certain groups to discredit Abri, and could lead to national instability.

    The next month, an army seminar complained that some people still questioned Abri's twin role, wishing to end it and hence to change 'Pancasila democracy'.

    At a private Surabaya seminar in November 1996, Hartono warned of the influx of liberal thoughts into Indonesia as a result of globalisation. He said criticism of dwifungsi was based on a different framework of thinking. In Abri terms, 'different' thinking can easily be interpreted as thinking opposed to the official ideology Pancasila.

    Abri has long linked criticism of the regime with political instability. But in the recent debate Abri faced criticism from many more directions. They were sometimes attacked by civilians in the government, sometimes by students with political aspirations, and sometimes stabbed in the back by old buddies.

    Intellectual retirees

    Abri's response to its critics, meanwhile, has become more dogmatic. Retired Lt-Gen Hasnan Habib challenged this dogmatic response at an Abri seminar held in September 1996 to formulate input to the national policies for 1998-2003. The seminar had concluded that criticism of dwifungsi was due to a mistaken view that saw a dichotomy between civilian and military affairs. Abri saw this as a western way of thinking. However, Hasnan asserted it was not the dichotomy that was being questioned, but the excesses of dwifungsi itself.

    Pressure from other retired generals followed. Two months later retired former army chief General Rudini spoke at a seminar held at Abri's staff command college. In his paper entitled 'social legitimacy of Abri's sociopolitical role' he suggested a need to renew the dwifungsi conception, and said Abri representation in parliament was unnecessary.

    Another intellectual retiree, Maj-Gen Z A Maulani, insisted at the army staff command college on the same day on the need to redefine dwifungsi, and for Abri no longer to take sides in labour and land conflicts. Taking sides would undermine the virtue of dwifungsi, he argued.

    On another occasion, Abri commander Feisal Tanjung, reflecting the critical mood, admitted it was ironic that the very success of dwifungsi encouraged its criticism.

    These highly respected retired officers were never labelled as 'too westernised', as were some civilian activists voicing similar opinions. But this is not to deny a general dissatisfaction among active Abri leaders towards outspoken retired officers. Many still in service supported Suharto's accusation that outspoken retirees were being inconsistent. In the aftermath to the Jakarta riot of July 1996, Feisal said some of them were not loyal to the nation and encouraged current political unrest.

    Talk too much

    Growing 'vocalness' of former Abri leaders has contributed to the opening up of the dwifungsi debate today. In the late 70s and early 80s the critical campaign was somewhat dominated by certain retired soldiers, such as A H Nasution, Ali Sadikin, Dharsono and Sumitro. But after a generational change in the mid-80s, the number of retired officers increased dramatically. In the 90s, many academy-educated officers entered the non-active sector and started to back the intellectual campaign for dwifungsi reform.

    In tandem with this, the intellectualism of current officers has provided fertile ground for the debate. One military leader of the 80s notes it as a pull-factor: 'Today's officers talk too much'.

    This is a real dilemma for Abri. Facing increasing demands for democracy, today's 'intellectuals in uniform' think it necessary to promote dialogue with society, to explain the future utility of dwifungsi. But the dialogue may itself legitimise the critical approach being brought into the public debate. It is in this context that Abri seeks a new format for dwifungsi legitimation.

    Such an attempt was made at the army seminar mentioned above. 'Empowering political infrastructure' became Abri's official slogan. It defined dwifungsi as a tool for promoting wider communication between the state and society.

    But can Abri share civilian language? Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim, an intellectual officer who now commands Abri's intelligence body, implied there are officers who speak civilian political language. Unlike typical Abri rhetoric that dogmatically reiterates the state ideology, Zacky asked Hasnan Habib in the Surabaya seminar about a possible shift in the balance between authoritarianism and liberalism. As an example, he mentioned 'successful' South Korea. Zacky was at that time an assistant to Hartono, who had denied the advent of liberalism a few hours before in the same room. In the mid-60s, Zacky was a student activist.

    Progressive

    On the other hand, some civilian commentators have no time for Abri at all, with or without civilian language. As if representing the 'empowered' society, columnist Christianto Wibisono argued it was a myth to see dwifungsi as part of Indonesia's uniqueness. Rather he saw it as a feature common in many 'praetorian' military regimes. He was challenging Abri's customary use of cultural relativism in explaining dwifungsi.

    So too the Lipi seminar and its report proposed the total demilitarisation of parliament by 2007. This 239-page book was probably the first systematic collection of civilian assessments of dwifungsi, approaching it from various perspectives. It was also the most progressive proposal ever made by a governmental organ. Though the immediate feasibility of the proposal still seems to be low, many civilian elites expect it to be one of the guidelines in the lobbying process of post-Suharto political transformation.

    Perhaps feeling the need to prevent the debate going out of control, Abri held another seminar at the national resilience institute (Lemhanas) two months after the Lipi seminar to disseminate a 'correct' interpretation of the future of dwifungsi.

    One of the more popular officers, Lt-Gen Hendropriyono, admitted the need for reorienting and redefining Abri's political role, given the erosion of traditional values within Abri in the face of globalisation. But he emphasised that dwifungsi should remain, because it was aimed at democratic practice.

    Redefined

    Abri's recently established interpretation now runs thus. Dwifungsi can be redefined. The principles remain, but its implementation can be flexible, and it is directed to democratisation.

    Yet at the same time, the current dwifungsi language is full of dichotomies. While it says 'don't dichotomise between civilian and Abri', it does dichotomise between the west and Indonesia, between the principle (dwifungsi) and the practice (posting officers to non-military jobs - kekaryaan), between Abri as a sociopolitical force and Abri as a defence force, between Abri as an institution and Abri as a citizen, and so on.

    The debate itself, of course, does not reflect the reality. Democratic activists say cynically that this opening up of a previously taboo discussion does not mean an end to repressive operations by the security apparatus. Many think that even if the dwifungsi concept changes, the territorial structure will remain, so Abri's political role will not diminish.

    However, this does not deny the change in political communication. The 'openness' debate in the early 90s at least expanded the scope and depth of legitimate demands on the regime, which in turn gave a support base to reformers within the regime. Given the reality that, as elsewhere in the world, the pace and degree of democratisation are primarily determined by the regime elite, there is no reason to stop giving support to the potential reformers.

    Can the current dwifungsi debate be incorporated in this process of change? One 'inside' player says optimistically: 'It is like the previous debate about openness. Once it starts rolling, the system can not find a legitimate reason to stop it'.

    Recent critics, as if to prove the truth of this prediction, have employed a new method. They criticise the results of dwifungsi, without criticising dwifungsi itself. The Lipi seminar insisted that its proposal was not to reject dwifungsi but to reform the political structure resulting from kekaryaan.

    This tactical borrowing of Abri language, which distinguishes the principle of dwifungsi from its practice of kekaryaan, shows that civilian elites have now started to reinvent the dwifungsi language in order to criticise dwifungsi. How it develops in real politics is still uncertain. Some at least expect it to erode Abri's monopolistic interpretation of dwifungsi over the previous three decades.

  10. #10
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    KASSPSPOL - Sociopolitical Affairs Section
    The armed forces (ABRI) are organised on a 'territorial basis' in units over the entire country roughly parallel to government structures, acting as local agents for the central security system. The function of Indonesia's military, which has over three decades been closely linked with politics, is now taking on more of a defense function and less of a social function involving the military in all aspects of Indonesian life. With the commitment of the Indonesian Armed Forces to carry out the redefinition and reposition of its "dual function" [dwifungsi] in the future, the post of chief of the Sociopolitical Section has been replaced by that of the chief of staff for the Territorial Section.

    Under the doctrine known as Dual Function, the military assumes a significant sociopolitical as well as a security role. The unique element of dwifungsi is the military's second role as a social-political force. This very broad charter formed the basis by which military personnel were assigned throughout the government to posts traditionally filled in other countries by civil servants or politically appointed civilians. Most prevalent of these assignments for active-duty and retired military officers were as provincial governors, district heads, legislative members, numerous functionaries within civilian governmental departments, and as ambassadors abroad.

    The Indonesian government cannot properly be characterized as military in nature. Not all top national, provincial, regional, and district jobs are held by the military and the number of military personnel assigned to dwifungsi civilian positions at all levels of the government was probably fewer than 5,000 officers in 1992 and had declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992, approximately half of the country's district heads (bupati) and one-third of the twenty-seven provincial or region governors were military officers. Still, under the dwifungsi doctrine, legitimizing its performance of both military and nonmilitary missions, ABRI became a dominant factor in the political life of the country and has acted as a major executive agent of government policies.

    The armed forces' economic role had its beginnings early on in the National Revolution period (1945-49). That role was stepped up in 1957 when military personnel were assigned managerial or advisory positions in Dutch enterprises and agricultural estates nationalized by the government. This involvement in commercial enterprises projected the military, especially the army, into a new sphere of activity through which it acquired entrepreneurial expertise, a vast patronage, and a source of personal enrichment for many. The military's role in national economic life greatly expanded under conditions of a rapidly deteriorating economy during the Sukarno era in the 1960s.

    Left largely to their own devices to find support, local military units secured their needs by operating business enterprises, levying unofficial "taxes," smuggling, and other methods suggested by their own resourcefulness and available opportunities. Although not the only state institution to engage in commercial enterprise in order to generate extrabudgetary income, the armed forces certainly were the most energetic and successful. Commercial activities under the various territorial commands commonly included the use of military trucks to transport passengers and freight for hire. Military-owned companies operated in the open market, much as any private company. For example, the Dharma Putra Foundation, a holding company connected with the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD), included a film company, an airline, and the Volkswagen assembly franchise.

    The armed forces also influenced the economic policies of the Suharto regime through their ties with its most important economic technocrats. Many believe the military-technocrat alliance provided one foundation of the Suharto regime. By the early 1990s, in fact, the so-called "Berkeley Mafia," continuously augmented as successive generations of bright youths sought training in the United States, had directed Indonesia's economy for more than thirty years.

    In late 1982, the dwifungsi principle was placed on firm legal ground when the old 1954 defense law was replaced with a new one expressly stating that ABRI is both a military and a social force. The new law, unlike its predecessor, confers formal legitimacy on the wide-ranging powers exercised by the armed forces in the name of preserving and strengthening national resilience. The government's sanction of dwifungsi recognized the need for ABRI's continued influence in the basic national infrastructure so that national development would buttress national defense.

    ABRI's involvement in the national life included the assignment of both active-duty and retired military personnel to civil administrative and policy positions. Gradually, as stability came to the economic sector, military personnel withdrew from the economic policy-making area, and by 1980 all active-duty personnel had left their positions in non-defense- related economic enterprises, although they remained active in military-owned and -managed businesses. These businesses were primarily in the sectors of plantation agriculture, timber cultivation and harvest, and transportation. Retired military officers continued to run some nationalized firms and militaryowned enterprises, although they frequently hired civilian managers.

    Members of the military are allotted 75 unelected seats in the Parliament (DPR), in partial compensation for not being permitted to vote. The military occupies numerous key positions in the administration and holds an unelected 20 percent of the seats in provincial and district parliaments. The other 85 percent of national and 80 percent of regional parliamentary seats are filled through elections held every 5 years.

    The largest and most important of the recognized political parties has been GOLKAR, a government-controlled organization of diverse functional groups. During his tenure, President Soeharto strongly influenced the selection of the leaders of GOLKAR, of which he was the senior leader. GOLKAR has eliminated the Board of Patrons through which Soeharto previously had exerted control over the party. With the assistance of the armed forces, President Habibie backed the successful candidacy of the new GOLKAR General Chairman, who is also the State Minister/State Secretary, one of the most powerful positions in the Cabinet.

    GOLKAR traditionally has maintained close institutional links with the armed forces. Following Soeharto's May 1998 resignation, the armed forces stated publicly that they would no longer be involved directly in the affairs of GOLKAR or back the ruling party in future elections. Despite this statement, the armed forces played a prominent role in the victory of President Habibie's candidate for GOLKAR Chairman in July 1998 over a former minister of defense. In December 1998 Armed Forces Commander Wiranto publicly announced that the armed forces intended to remain neutral during the election.

    On 15 July 1997 it was reported that Maj. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces [ABRI] Staff and Command College, replaced Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid as chief of ABRI sociopolitical affairs. After Suharto resigned the new President, B.J. Habibie, announced his cabinet and swore them in on May 23, 1998, with Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah serving as Minister of Information. The Indonesian army's most decorated soldier, Yosfiah commanded the special forces unit blamed for the deaths of five Australia-based journalists in East Timor in October 1975. In 1978 while a battalion commander in Timor he is alleged to have killed Nocolao Lobato, then leader of the East Timorese resistance movement FRETELIN.

    Generally heads of ABRI sociopolitical affairs are officers with territorial, socio-political, or educational experience. Rarely if ever come from the ranks of the KOPASSUS Red Berets. Of previous heads including Bambang Triantoro, Sugiarto, Harsudiono Hartas, Haryoto P.S., Ma'ruf, Hartono, and Syarwan Hamid, not one came from the Special Forces Command. With the September 1997 appointment of Yosfiah as head of the sociopolitical affairs, the three top positions at ABRI headquarters were held by KOPASSUS Special Forces officers. ABRI Commander Gen. Feisal Tanjung, who was installed in 1993, was a KOPASSUS man, as was Lieutenant General Tarub, installed in 1997. This "domination" of the upper ranks at ABRI Headquarters has never happened in preceding periods.

  11. #11
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    The military, no longer named Abri but TNI after the police were split off recently, claim they exercise a 'dual function' (dwifungsi) - in external defence and in domestic politics.

    'The army does not have an exclusively military duty but is concerned with all fields of social life', says a seminal 1965 army document.

    One scholar points out that it actually has only a single function: maintaining national stability.

    Everything else comes second. Stability is a political concept, not a military one. Dwifungsi turns the army into a political party with guns. It blesses organised political violence.

    Dwifungsi is not written into the constitution (the name itself only goes back to a law of 1982), but the concept behind it has a long history. Already during the struggle against the colonial Dutch in 1945, the armed forces developed a suspicion of civilian politicians, whom they thought were corrupt and divisive. Whenever they have had to knuckle under to civilians, they have done so reluctantly.

    After General Suharto, one of their own, became president in 1967, the army moved to strengthen its political role in three ways. First, it sat soldiers on a big block of seats in parliament, unelected. Second, it seconded thousands of soldiers to key positions within the bureaucracy - from governors to village chiefs.

    Third, and most important, the army elaborated a military bureaucracy that paralleled the civilian one at every level of government from the nation's capital to the village. 'Socio-political' officers trained in intelligence spent their days interfering in everything they thought was 'political'.

    When Suharto resigned in May last year, part of the public's anger against him was also directed at this heavy-handed military interference in politics. The military responded by releasing some of their seats in parliament and pulling soldiers out of civilian jobs.

    General Wiranto, who commands the armed forces, promised recently that the doctrine of dwifungsi will be 'phased out'. But so far the true heart of dwifungsi remains intact, namely the parallel military bureaucracy with its myriad intelligence officers.

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    ---

    Dual functions

    The ideological justification for a military involvement in the economy came from the dwifungsi or dual function enshrined as the guiding principle of army ideology since the 1950s. Dwifungsi proclaims that the army should not just protect Indonesia's borders, but should also be the driving force for national development in the broadest sense, including economic and political policies.

    Dwifungsi grew out of a belief that only a strong military could unify the 250 ethnic groups and disparate territories that make up Indonesia, and that a truly national institution like the army was needed to safeguard the nation's integrity. Politicians only act for selfish or constituency interests, the generals argued, possibly with some justification. Former armed forces chief and defence minister Haris Nasution, an early architect of dwifungsi ideology, used it to justify his signing of a 1980 petition criticising Suharto. He wanted the military to have political influence and a referee function, but became a staunch critic of day-to-day military intervention.
    Last edited by troung; 28 Jun 05, at 09:07.

  12. #12
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    THE KOPASSUS-MILITIA ALLIANCE

    The arrest of ten Kopassus soldiers by INTERFET forces is proof of the overwhelming involvement of this elite force in the terror and violence in East Timor during the past two decades. The two weeks of violence that ravaged East Timor after the results of the referendum were announced was the responsibility of Kopassus and their proxies, the militia gangs.

    Much has been written about the Kopassus/militia alliance and its role as a killing machine but nobody, perhaps not even the armed forces (TNI) leadership in Jakarta, imagined that it would descend to such a level of barbarity. In just two weeks, these murderous bandits had driven virtually the entire East Timorese population from their homes, killing hundreds or perhaps thousands of defenceless people. This can only be understood in the context of the structural relationship between the militia forces and their evil masters, the Kopassus elite troops.

    Kopassus and East Timor

    The involvement of Kopassus, the elite red-beret force, in East Timor started before the invasion. General Benny Murdani who planned the invasion was a senior officer of RPKAD as Kopassus was then known. Its role intensified as it became apparent that the resistance was far stronger than had been anticipated and it would take longer than expected to subjugate the East Timorese. Kopassus became the key player in the war against the East Timorese.

    The average territorial soldier is not trained for the type of war needed to counter a guerrilla force like Falintil, the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance. Specially trained combat forces like Kostrad, the army's strategic command, and Kopassus were needed. Since 1975, every Kopassus soldier and officer has served, often repeatedly, in East Timor. During the eighties and mid-nineties, a tour of combat duty in East Timor was the stepping-stone for an officer's career prospects. Everyone who reached the top was an East Timor veteran, in most cases with a Kopassus background. By the early nineties the armed forces HQ was stuffed with high-ranking Kopassus officers.

    East Timor as training ground

    Kopassus soldiers are known to be tough. One initiation rite is to travel from the north coast to the south coast of Java armed only with a knife, survival training that is modelled on SAS in the UK and the Green Berets in the US.

    After the invasion, East Timor became the training and battle ground for Kopassus which sustained many casualties in encounters with Falintil. A retired TNI general recently estimated that ten or eleven thousand Indonesian soldiers have fallen in battle which explains why Kopassus have behaved with such brutality in East Timor.

    Even in calm periods, serving in East Timor has been comparable to doing service in a war-zone. Every East Timorese was regarded as a suspect; the culture of violence was more extreme than anywhere else though lately the situation in Aceh has moved in the same direction. After serving in East Timor, soldiers are psychologically de-briefed before returning to normal duties in Indonesia. Such brutal treatment, while used occasionally in Indonesia, is what the East Timorese have always had to endure.

    Up to the early eighties the basic Kopassus credo was never to take prisoners: all captives were tortured, interrogated and killed. Until very recently, Kopassus had its own interrogation centres throughout East Timor. These SGI centres were regarded as chambers of horror by the East Timorese. It was only after the 1983 talks between the East Timorese resistance forces and the Indonesian military that Kopassus reluctantly agreed to hand their captives over for detention and trial.

    The dual command structure

    The TNI leadership created a special command structure for the military occupation of East Timor. Combat operations were handled by Kostrad and Kopassus under orders from Jakarta while the territorial structure, as elsewhere in Indonesia, came under the regional command.

    The special combat structure came into being soon after the invasion. In 1976 a special command called Kohankam was set up; its name changed in 1984 to Koopskam and in 1989 to Kolakops. In 1993 Kolakops was dissolved but its functions were secretly transferred to Kopassus Group 3.

    The combat structure has always been dominant though operational strategies have changed. In the first fifteen years of the occupation TNI launched many large-scale military operations to obliterate the guerrillas but Falintil has survived, thanks to its deep roots in society and its strategy of mobile guerrilla warfare, maintaining no permanent base. For many years East Timor was the only place where Indonesian troops and Kopassus soldiers could practise their combat training.

    By the early nineties the resistance had developed a strong urban base known as the clandestine front, consisting mainly of young people. They took many actions against the forces of occupation, frequently attracting world attention. Gradually, the command structure switched, combating not only the guerrillas but also the urban resistance. The clandestine network also spread to several Indonesian university cities.

    The main thrust of Kopassus operations is counter-insurgency. Everyone is seen as a potential target, the people in the bush as well as civilians in the towns. Creating militia forces was a logical consequence of this strategy, to get Timorese to fight Timorese.

    Kopassus Groups 3, 4 and 5

    Initially Kopassus consisted of three groups. Groups 1 and 2 were predominantly combat troops similar to combat troops anywhere in the world. Group 3 came into being in 1963, with additional training in counter insurgency, including interrogation techniques and torture methods. The SGI centres in East Timor were attached to Group 3. Increasingly the two lines of command in East Timor were headed by commanders from Kopassus' Group 3, with many lower-level territorial commanders also coming from the same force. In other words, Kopassus represented the core of the army of occupation.

    After Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, became Kopassus commander in 1995, he increased the strength of Kopassus to 7,000 troops by 1998, almost double its earlier size. Prabowo's prowess as an elite force officer reached his peak in the closing years of the Suharto era, a period of huge labour strikes and demonstrations as pressure gre for Suharto to stand down. To deal with the growing unrest, Prabowo established Groups 4 and 5, most of whose members were recruited from Group 3. Group 4 and 5 members were trained in German anti-terrorist methods, Prabowo being one of the few Indonesian officers to train with the prestigious GSG anti-terrorist squad in Germany. One distinctive feature of Groups 4 and 5 are that the members do not wear uniforms.

    Group 4 focuses on infiltrating opposition groups and act as provocateurs. They grow their hair long, dress shabbily, set up secret cells and sometimes carry out assassinations. Terror and violence are their stock in trade and they frequently recruit criminals as auxiliaries.

    Group 5 is not unlike Group 4 but was set up to kidnap or kill influential opposition figures in the closing years of Suharto's rule. In August 1998 Prabowo admitted to a military investigation team that he was responsible for a number of kidnappings and disappearances. He and two other senior Kopassus officers were removed from their posts, Prabowo was dismissed from the army and 11 Kopassus Group 5 members were tried and given minor sentences. They were known as Tim Mawar (Rose Team).

    The activities of Groups 4 and 5 are shrouded in mystery. After Prabowo's dismissal, several Group 4 and 5 platoons were reported as having defected. Since then, there has been talk of 'phantom' troops operating in Aceh and Maluku, which suggests that the 'disappeared' Kopassus platoons may still be operating though no one knows who is in command.

  13. #13
    A Self Important Senior Contributor troung's Avatar
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    MILITARY CULTURE AND DOCTRINE
    The basic TNI doctrine places primary emphasis on the army, the dominant service in the Indonesian military. Both the air force and the navy are charged with providing direct support to the army, with their individual service missions secondary in importance. The army prides itself on its history as a revolutionary people’s army and as the prime mover of Indonesia’s independence. Consequently, the military came to view itself as the guardian of national unity and as a co-equal to the civilian political leadership (some Indonesian military advocates note that the establishment of the army predated that of the Republic).

    In contrast to armies in other Southeast Asian states—such as the Thai and Philippine armies—the Indonesian army developed an ideological and legal framework to support a formal role in political affairs, originally called “middle road” and later renamed dwifungsi, or dual function. This concept held that the military had a “sociopolitical” as well as a defense function and gave the military an institutionalized role in politics. The concept of the “middle road” was formally enunciated by the army chief of staff General Abdul Haris Nasution in a speech to the army’s Officers Training College in 1958 and developed in seminars at the Indonesian General Staff and Command College in the 1960s.

    Nasution argued that the armed forces were neither “a tool of civilian society” as in Western countries, nor a “military regime” that dominates the state, but a force of the people, working with other forces of the people. After Suharto and the military assumed power in 1966,dwifungsi became official policy. Beginning in 1966, the government enacted a series of laws to define the role of the military in govern-mental and national affairs (Sidwell, 1995).

    The military was given corporate representation in the parliament and active and retired military officers served in positions in the cabinet, the civil administration, and state corporations. The paradigm not only permitted, but also demanded, that officers take an active part in politics to en-sure stability and central control. The dual function dovetailed with the doctrine of “total people’s defense” (Sishankamrata), a Maoist-style concept of people’s war that contemplated mass mobilization to defend the country against external or internal threat. The doctrine assumes that a nation as di-verse and as dependent on vulnerable air and sea lines of communication as Indonesia is could not be centrally defended. Total people’s defense was meant to ensure that even if the center were overrun (as in the case of the Dutch capture of the Republican leadership in1948) resistance would continue. The doctrine calls on the army to fight an invading force as a guerrilla army, wearing the enemy down. General Nasution later became disillusioned by the way in which Suharto changed and implemented dwifungsi and became an influential critic of the system in his later years.

    through guerrilla tactics until stronger allies arrive to assist or the invader finds the effort too difficult to sustain. The basic national defense strategy recognizes that there is very little threat of a conventional attack by outside forces. Indeed, no country besides the United States has the capability to mount a conventional amphibious invasion. For an outside power to prevail, it must have the support of a major part of the population. Even during the Indonesian Revolution, the KNIL was a predominantly indigenous soldiery with mainly Dutch and a few local officers. In the most serious challenges to national survival—the regionalist Permesta revolt in East Indonesia and the contemporaneous rebellion in Sumatra by the anti-Sukarnoist Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) from 1957 to 1959, and the abortive coup d’état of October 1965—the main danger was from disaffected army units supported by a significant segment of the population.

    From this history, the military leadership has drawn the conclusion that internal cohesion in the army and the support of the population are the main elements of national survival. The operational concept for a successful conventional defense of the nation is for the outer islands to absorb the initial blow, and local re-sources to be mobilized and reinforced by the air and naval power available. The Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) will rein-force the forward defense, mobilize and train additional forces, and prepare the heartland—Java—for the main battle.6The emphasis on guerrilla tactics calls for the military to maintain intimately detailed knowledge of Indonesia’s terrain, people, re-sources, and infrastructure. Given the diversity of these factors across Indonesia’s great breadth, the TNI doctrine calls for anubiquitous military presence everywhere to collect and store the necessary intelligence for guerrilla warfare and, most important, toestablish the rapport with the local population that would enable the TNI to operate in accordance with classic Maoist and Yugoslav doctrine

    The reality, of course, particularly in the restive provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya, was different. The TNI doctrine is supported by a territorial command structure of 12 military area commands (Komando Daerah Militer or Kodam), each theoretically responsible for the independent defense of a part of the archipelago (see Figure 2.1 for the locations of the Kodam). 8Like dwifungsi, the concepts behind the territorial system were developed in seminars in the 1950s and early 1960s. While at the General Staff and Command College in 1960, Suharto was one of the participants at a seminar in which the establishment of a parallel structure to the civil administration was first discussed.9The structure was developed primarily to counter an internal threat from a communist insurgency. Under Suharto’s “New Order” regime, the territorial command system was used to maintain Suharto in power and monitor the activities of religious organizations, student organizations, trade unions, and other non governmental organizations that could become sources of dissident activity.

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    In correspondence with Angel Rabasa, TNI historian Ken Conboy noted the important influence that the Yugoslav model exercised over the Indonesian concept of a “people’s war.” Conboy cited A. H. Nasution’s comments about the Yugoslav resistance during the Second World War. Nasution mentioned that Tito was widely known in Indonesia since the time of the Indonesian revolution, spoke in positive terms about the Yugoslav system of self-reliance, and stated that the Indonesian concept of total people’s defense mirrors the Yugoslav system. (See Nasution, 1985.) Conboy also notes that many Indonesian officers, including half a dozen who became prominent generals, attended war college and staff college in Yugoslavia prior to 1965.8The territorial system includes the newly reestablished unnumbered Kodam in the Moluccas (2001) and Kodam Iskandar Muda in Aceh (2002). Both had been disestablished in a major consolidation and reorganization of the military command structure in 1986.9These concepts became the Territorial Management and Civic Mission doctrines (McDonald, 1980, p. 34).10This section of the chapter is partially based on the personal experiences of Colonel John Haseman (U.S. Army, retired) and Colonel Charles D. McFetridge in their tours as U.S. Defense Attachés in Indonesia and on other sources as cited.

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    Apart from the important political issues involved, given the doctrinal background of the Indonesian army, its structure and deploy-ment are based on sound considerations. The Indonesian army characterizes its forces as “tactical” and “territorial.” Approximately one-quarter of the army’s strength is assigned to its two major tactical commands, Kostrad (approximately 27,000 personnel) and the Special Forces Command (Kopassus) (about 5,000 personnel). About two-thirds of the army’s strength is assigned to the territorial system; the remainder is in army headquarters’ staff, schools, and technical units and centers.

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    Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad)
    Kostrad’s fighting strength lies in 33 combat battalions organized into two divisions with five infantry brigades and one separate air-borne brigade which comes directly under Kostrad headquarters (see Figure 2.2). The two divisions are headquartered on Java, and the separate brigade is in South Sulawesi. Each division has both air-borne and infantry brigades. Kostrad rotates alert status among its brigades and designates one battalion in rotating order for immediate deployment to meet security contingencies anywhere in the country.

    Kostrad battalions are available on a standard basis for service in troubled areas on longer deployments, usually 12 months or longer in duration. All of Kostrad’s battalions have been repetitively deployed in recent years to the primary security challenges in EastTimor, Aceh, the Moluccas, and Papua.TNI doctrine calls for Kostrad to be the nation’s second line of defense and primary reinforcement against any outside threat. A simi-lar approach is used to deal with internal instability. The local military command relies on available resources to contain and defusethe threat with territorial battalions used in civic action programs, while the Kodam ready-reaction battalion or battalions confront the armed enemy. If the Kodam cannot handle the problem with forces on hand, Kostrad units, assisted by air and naval elements as appropriate, reinforce the Kodam. Thus, Kostrad has been used almost exclusively as the national reaction force against guerrilla threats in East Timor and Aceh, to put down riots and other civil disturbances, and most recently to respond to sectarian and religious violence in such places as the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi.

    The key to success in either case, according to TNI doctrine, is support of the population, without which neither a prolonged conventional defense nor a successful counterinsurgency can be accomplished. Consequently, improving discipline and understanding of the rules of engagement among troops deployed to conflict area has been a key priority of senior army officers. According to former army deputy chief of staff Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri, 60 percent of the training is focused on understanding the rules of engagement and avoiding civilian casualties. The TNI has also issued written guidelines for troops sent to the field. The guidelines provide basic instruction in combat situations, with emphasis on rules of engagement and respect for human rights (“Military Professionalism PaysOff …,” 2002).

    Thus, Kostrad has been used almost exclusively as the national reaction force against guerrilla threats in East Timor and Aceh, to put down riots and other civil disturbances, and most recently to respond to sectarian and religious violence in such places as the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi. The key to success in either case, according to TNI doctrine, is support of the population, without which neither a prolonged conventional defense nor a successful counterinsurgency can be accomplished. Consequently, improving discipline and understanding of the rules of engagement among troops deployed to conflict area has been a key priority of senior army officers. According to former army deputy chief of staff Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri, 60 percent of the training is focused on understanding the rules of engagement and avoiding civilian casualties. The TNI has also issued written guidelines for troops sent to the field. The guidelines provide basic instruction in combat situations, with emphasis on rules of engagement and respect for human rights (“Military Professionalism PaysOff …,” 2002).

    Since the early 1990s, the TNI has made ambitious plans to expand Kostrad to three full divisions, most likely building upon the separate brigade on Sulawesi (Lowry, 1996, p. 22). However, the government has never made funds available for such a major expansion and the plan remains unfulfilled. As is, Kostrad has priority for weapons and equipment over the territorial battalions and cultivates unit loyalty by allowing qualified personnel to remain in Kostrad assignments throughout most of their careers. The army chief of staff is responsible for the recruitment, training, and equipping of Kostrad and its personnel. However, Kostrad is directly under the armed forces commander’s operational control. Thus, it is the TNI, and not the army, that gives Kostrad its mission, deployment orders, and operational guidance. In this regard, operational control of Kostrad is very much like the chain of command over U.S. Army divisions, without the intervening level of the unified command.

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    Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus)
    The Indonesian army’s most elite unit is Kopassus. Its 5,000 personnel are very well trained, superbly conditioned, have strong esprit de corps, and are linked by personal ties to charismatic commanders. Kopassus personnel are trained and organized for both traditional special forces missions—infiltration, guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare, training, and counter terrorism—and covert and intelligence operations throughout the country. Kopassus units are permanently garrisoned on Java, but operational teams are maintained continuously in the same troubled regions where Kostrad units are deployed. Kopassus historically has been the most frequently deployed component of the force structure. Those deployments have generally involved small task force (seldom larger than two companies), team, and individual deployments on intelligence gathering; reinforcement to larger tactical units; and “black” (covert) operations. Kopassus deployments range in length from a few days to many months. Long-term missions, such as those in East Timor, were usually accomplished by rotating different units with short overlaps for operational familiarization and handoff to the replacement unit. Kopassus has never, to the knowledge of any observers, deployed its operational groups in toto.

    Kopassus personnel are tough, ruthless soldiers who have been accused or suspected of numerous human rights violations over the past 15 years. In many cases, it is not known whether these abuses were perpetrated by rogue elements acting out of personal loyalty to officers involved in unauthorized activities or by personnel responding to orders given through the chain of command. In any case, up to the present time, Kopassus personnel have effectively been protected from investigation and prosecution for wrongdoing. A notable exception was the 1999 Honor Court and forced retirement of Lieu-tenant General Prabowo Subianto, a long-time special forces officer and later Kopassus and then Kostrad commander, and the sub-sequent courts-martial of several of his former subordinates for a series of political abductions in 1998. General Prabowo’s estrangement from many senior TNI officers also contributed to his downfall. Kopassus has undergone several reorganizations during the past 15years.

    The most recent, in 2001, confirmed its current strength at approximately 5,000 soldiers in an organization including three operational groups (see Figure 2.3). Kopassus organization reflects traditional special operations structures seen elsewhere, with the key element being a small operational team. These teams usually consist of 10 to 15 personnel but are routinely formed into whatever size team is needed to accomplish the assigned mission. Command of Kopassus teams, companies, battalions, or groups is an avidly sought posting. Successful commanders are usually assured of rapid career advancement to the general officer rank.

    ---
    Territorial Forces
    The bulk of the army’s personnel is assigned to the territorial forces. Personnel are assigned to either the territorial structure or the dozens of combat arms and combat support battalions assigned to the territorial organization. Around 150,000 troops are assigned to these forces (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2000b, p. 22).By doctrine, each Kodam has at least one infantry battalion under direct Kodam control. At least one battalion per Kodam is assigned the Kodam quick-reaction mission, maintaining an alert readiness posture to respond to natural calamities or civil unrest in the Kodamarea of responsibility. These units may be airborne infantry battalions, although in recent years the percentage of combat troop swho are in fact airborne-qualified has declined.12In some cases, the best available security may be provided by cavalry, field artillery, or air defense artillery units.

    The Kodam quick-reaction battalions are usually well trained be-cause of the nature of their mission. The professional level of the other territorial battalions varies widely, and is dependent on the re-sources available to the applicable command, the amount of attention given to the units by the chain of command, and on other training, resource, and personnel constraints. Even these units, however, are called upon to deploy to troubled regions for operational commitments.

    For example, every territorial infantry battalion, except those from Papua, were eventually sent to East Timor for a year long deployment during the military campaign there. The kodam are divided into Komando Resor Militer (Military Resor13Commands or Korem), with at least one infantry battalion each. Korem, in turn, are divided into Komando Distrik Militer (MilitaryDistrict Commands or Kodim) headed by a lieutenant colonel, and districts are divided into Komando Rayon Militer (MilitarySubdistrict Commands or Koramil) with a junior officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) in charge. In theory, every village has a noncommissioned officer (Babinsa) assigned. In practice, an NCO can be responsible for several villages. Large Korem and those in which important industrial centers are located have several assigned battalions. The air defense artillery battalions, for example, are assigned to defend such areas as the Lhokseumawe industrial zone in Aceh and the Bontang and Balikpapan industrial areas in East Kalimantan (see Table 2.1 for the numbers of various types of tactical units in the command structure).

    The missions of the territorial battalions span a number of traditional and less conventional duties. They are assigned the static security mission for strategic centers. In the area around Lhokseumawe, Aceh, several battalions have reinforced organic units that are as-signed to static defense of the huge Exxon Mobil natural gas fields and the state oil company Pertamina refinery against the threat posed by the separatist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement. Exxon Mobil halted its operations and evacuated its staff for several months in 2001 because of the threat to its employees, costing Indonesia $100 million per month in lost revenue. Some territorial battalions maintain high standards of training and soldierly proficiency and are capable of meeting any tactical requirements that may be assigned to them. Many units, however, are not at a high level of readiness, and virtually all territorial units operate below their authorized strength. A primary reason for these short comings, of course, is that priority in meeting personnel requirements is given to Kostrad and Kopassus. In addition to the shortage of resources, the corruption, the diversion of assets, and other problems that plague the territorial forces, territorial units suffer from depleted personnel strength because of the large number of soldiers who are assigned additional employment in the civilian sec-tor in order to supplement their salaries (see Chapter Six for a further discussion).

    The territorial battalions have borne the brunt of internal stability missions in the past and continue to play an important role inmaintaining public order despite the transfer of that responsibility tothe national police in 1999. The reaction capabilities of these unitsvary enormously depending on their quality of leadership, logisticalsupport, equipment, and training. Few territorial battalions havecrowd-control equipment and training. For a young commanderwith such constraints, the choices available in the event of major civildisturbances are bleak: Shoot rioters or allow the violence to run itscourse.Naval and Air ForcesThe army has always been the politically dominant service in Indo-nesia. Until the appointment of Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto asarmed forces chief during the Wahid administration, all armed forcescommanders in chief had been army officers and the army verymuch set military policy. Nevertheless, as an archipelagic countrywith more than 14,000 islands and a coastline of 55,000 kilometers,Indonesia is dependent on the navy and the air force to maintaininter-island communications and transport troops and militarystores.

    The 1957 to 1959 rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi were putdown with the help of air power, and today, air transport is a criticalelement in the central government’s ability to respond quickly tooutbreaks of communal conflict in the outer islands.14There are two operational naval commands, the Eastern Fleet, basedin Surabaya, and the Western Fleet, with headquarters in Jakarta.Indonesia’s naval forces consist of 17 main frigate-size combatants,36 patrol and coastal combatants, including 16 unseaworthy formerEast German corvettes, missile and torpedo craft, 26 landing craft, 12mine countermeasures craft that are mainly used for coastal patrol

    14TNI historian Ken Conboy points out that while air power played a role in the sup-pression of the rebellions, ground forces were the decisive factor, and the vast majorityof the troops were moved by sea (correspondence with Ken Conboy, June 2002).

    MILITARY OPERATIONS

    According to Indonesian army doctrine, there are three kinds of operations: combat operations, intelligence operations, and territorial operations. To seize an area controlled by an enemy, the military conducts intelligence or combat operations. Intelligence operations are covert in nature and conducted by intelligence units. Territorial operations are carried out by combat or territorial units and have the purpose of restoring political, economic, or social order.

    The TNI doctrine differentiated between two kinds of territorial operations: “construction” operations and “opposition/resistance” operations. Construction operations involve civic action. They are designed to improve conditions in areas considered to be at risk of political and social instability. The military is employed in civic action projects such as construction of housing, schools, dams, irrigation systems, and in the introduction of modern farming systems. In some of the outer islands, these projects were implemented in connection with the transmigration program, which involved the resettlement of people from heavily populated areas, generally in Java and Madura, to other parts of the archipelago. Construction operations were per- formed routinely by territorial units or sometimes as part of targeted efforts to reduce the appeal of insurgent groups. If construction and intelligence operations fail to prevent the development of a threat such as an insurgency, the Indonesian military will conduct opposition/resistance operations.

    In the first phase, the military forces concentrate their combat power to eliminate the physical presence of the enemy in what is called the annihilation zone. As the military gains limited control of this area, it is designated as a consolidation zone. When opposition influence wanes, the area is re designated as a stabilization zone. Here “construction” operations are undertaken to reconstruct damaged infrastructure and regain the confidence of the population. When the area is completely pacified, it is re designated as a rear area. After government control is restored, there is a self-correction phase in which the conditions that led the people to revolt are identified and corrected (Sidwell, 1995).
    Last edited by troung; 28 Jun 05, at 19:41.

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    Military Posture

    Since Indonesia was the originator of the concept, Indonesia's strategy for "national resilience" is the purest demonstration of the economic, social, and military mobilization it entails, and thus will be addressed here in some detail. The mission of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or ABRI) is to maintain social and political stability. ABRI accomplishes this mission through the doctrine of dwifungsi or "dual function." The premise of dual function is that the military has two roles in society: the defense of national interests and social-political development. This broad charter justifies assigning military officers to posts in all governmental departments as well as to seats in the legislature.[4] Thus, dwifungsi permits the military to strengthen government agencies by backing them with the authority of its national defense role and the power of armed might.

    ABRI consists of four services: the army, navy, air force, and police. Among the services, the army is dominant. Two thirds of the army's 217,000 personnel are assigned to ten regional commands called Kodams, which are subdivided into successively smaller administrative units--paralleling the civilian structure--all the way down to village level, where a noncommissioned officer is assigned to every village in the country. These territorial forces are the embodiment of "national resilience." The advantage of this dispersion is that the power and authority of the state are brought to every Indonesian. The trade-off, however, is that the dispersion of forces in this manner renders these units militarily impotent. In fact, these territorial forces do not conduct operations or training in greater than battalion strength.[5] ABRI doctrine recognizes the tactical ineffectiveness of their territorial units. To retain some conventional military strength, the army created the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), which is its only organization capable of conducting conventional operations. It consists of two divisions with about 40,000 army personnel.[6]

    Indonesia's National Police--with 180,000 personnel--is second only to the army in size. Its mission is public order, but the force also is active in social and economic development. Although most Indonesian National Police organizations conduct routine police functions, the National Police also possess a special unit known as the Mobile Brigade. This 12,000-man paramilitary unit is organized as an elite corps with the mission of domestic security and defense operations.[7]

    The navy and air force are the most neglected of the services. Each branch contains only a few thousand personnel, with a mixture of rusting Soviet and Western equipment. The common mission of the navy and air force is to support the army, and until the end of the Cold War these services received only a meager portion of ABRI's limited budget.[8]

    Although Indonesia's armed forces undoubtedly are the most powerful element in its society, ABRI accepts the foundation of the government's internal security strategy--that economic and political development are indispensable to internal stability. For the government to pay for economic development, the military endures defense budgets that are significantly lower than those of other countries of its size. Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world, ranked 25th in gross national product (GNP) in 1994, but was 116th in per capita military expenditures and 119th in military expenditures as a percentage of GNP. The success of this strategy has been remarkable. For 30 years, Indonesia has enjoyed domestic stability and an economic growth rate that averaged almost eight percent annually.[9]

    --
    The Indonesian military is taking the second and more direct precaution toward preserving the current regime by strengthening the capabilities of its army to control internal disturbances. This security focus is reflected in organizational changes in the army. Despite the ever-increasing size of the defense budget and China's confrontational attitude in the South China Sea, Kostrad--Indonesia's major tactical organization--is not improving its force projection capability. Rather, the Kodams--the territorial commands which control 70 percent of Indonesia's armed forces and are the principal instrument of internal control--have begun establishing brigade-level headquarters to increase command and control capability between each Kodam headquarters and its subordinate territorial battalions.[26]
    Last edited by troung; 28 Jun 05, at 20:24.

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