Thread: Doctrine: Total Peoples Defense

Loyalty and Integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces
Major Robert Creveling, USAR

Foreword.

Many changes have occurred in Indonesia since I initially wrote this article in June of 1999. In August East Timor selected independence from Indonesia in a UN-sponsored referendum. While this article helps explain why the Indonesian military (TNI) would support pro-Jakarta militias in disrupting the referendum, I have yet to meet anyone--including two former Indonesian ambassadors--who foresaw intensity of the reaction to the results.

Second, Indonesia successfully conducted its first democratic election in forty years, resulting in the selection of Aburrahman Wahid ("Gus Dur") as President and Megawati Sukarnoputri as Vice President. President Wahid seems to have reduced the political influence of the Army by moving General Wiranto to the position of Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security and by placing a civilian and a Navy Admiral in Wiranto's two previous positions of Defense Minister and Chief of TNI, respectively. Arguably, the most significant announcement the new President has made is that he will permit the province of Aceh to conduct a referendum, although it is currently unclear as to what exactly they will be voting for--independence, greater autonomy, or merely Islamic Law.

Unlike East Timor, Aceh has been a part of Indonesia since the archipelago nation earned its independence in 1949. As you read the following article, ask yourself how the Indonesian military might react to the prospect of a referendum for independence in that province. You will find that current political developments have little impact on my original findings, which aimed to provide insight into the culture of the Indonesian military. In fact, if anything, current developments have served to validate the utility of the analysis contained herein. I stand by my conclusion that "because cultural change is both difficult and slow, [this] analysis of loyalty and integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces will remain useful in explaining and predicting TNI actions for several years to come."

-Robert Creveling,
Alexandria, VA
29 November, 1999
Introduction.


Many western observers encounter difficulties in understanding the seemingly irrational and unprofessional actions of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). They have admitted to abducting student activists, committing human rights violations in Aceh and Timor, and more recently, rumors abound that members of the TNI are connected to various "provocations" throughout Indonesia, ranging from the Banyuwangi Ninja murders to the race riots in Ambon. My purpose is to provide insight into the culture of the Indonesia military in order to help the western reader interpret and to predict TNI actions. Because it is my belief that the key to understanding the mindset of the Indonesian officer lies in understanding his views of integrity and loyalty, I will start by providing two examples--one hypothetical and one real--that illustrate Indonesian officers' attitudes toward these two concepts. Next, I will describe the historical and doctrinal factors that have shaped their mindset; and finally, I will interpret allegations against TNI, without trying to prove or disprove their veracity.
Integrity.

Figure 1 - Protestors in Jakarta demonstrate against recent elections in East Timor

Imagine that you are a small-group instructor at the United States Infantry Officer Advanced Course. One of the students in your class is from Indonesia (this is not far-fetched; MG Agus Wirahadikusumah is an IOAC graduate). During a block of instruction on ethics, you ask your students to write as succinctly as possible their definition of "integrity."

As you thumb through their responses, you are not surprised to see some of the same definitions you learned during basic officer training: "doing the harder right over the easier wrong," "obeying the laws and legal orders of the officers assigned over you," "always telling the truth," etc. Suddenly, you pause as you read the definition submitted by your Indonesian student: "Unity, security, and stability".

When you question your Indonesian student about his puzzling response, he explains to you that the greatest challenge a TNI officer faces is maintaining the unity and integrity of the vast archipelago consisting of over 7,000 inhabited islands and numerous ethnic groups speaking hundreds of regional dialects (the Indonesian language is a "second" language to many Indonesians). Moreover, the term "Unity of the Republic of Indonesia" is one of the five principles enshrined in the Pancasila state philosophy, while "security and stability" are doctrinal preconditions for national development. National development, in turn, provides "national resilience" against dissolution. Thus, just as the emphasis on one meaning of the word integrity causes US officers to produce responses related to honesty, the TNI's emphasis on the other meaning of integrity would cause its officers to respond in a manner quite puzzling to a westerner.
Loyalty.


Three days before I graduated from the Indonesian Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in May of 1999, my class of 175 enjoyed a formal social gathering with our families and the SESKOAD staff. I was surprised to see Kopassus (Special Forces) Major Bambang Kristiono at this party, as he had earlier been dropped from the course to undergo court-martial proceedings related to the abduction, torture, and disappearance of student activists in 1997-98. He had already pled guilty to masterminding the operation, but was able to attend the party because his sentence was under appeal.

I was puzzled at the warm reception Bambang received from my classmates. Clearly, had an American officer been convicted of such a crime, his fellow officers would have treated him as a pariah. After questioning some of the Indonesian officers, I came to the conclusion that they all believed Major Bambang was a scapegoat. He had simply obeyed the orders of his superiors, then protected them by claiming he alone had planned the operation out of feelings of hati nurani (inner conscience), believing his actions justifiable because the activists threatened national integrity. Thus, in the eyes of Indonesian officers, Bambang's actions were acceptable because he had obeyed his orders then had remained loyal to his superiors. The question of the legality of these orders was not as important as their aim: neutralizing political activists who were provoking instability. Instability, of course, threatens the integrity of the Indonesian republic. 1

Historical Foundation.


To understand the evolution of the Indonesian officer's interpretation of integrity and loyalty, we must selectively examine historical events since Indonesia's independence in 1945. TNI believes that they were formed spontaneously by the people when the Japanese emperor announced the capitulation of Japan on 14 August 1945. These freedom fighters urged President Soekarno and V.P. Hatta to declare independence on 17 August 1945. Soon thereafter, Indonesia's pre-WWII colonizers, the Dutch, attempted to regain control of Indonesia. The struggle ended four years later, when The UN Security Council called for a cease-fire, the release of captured Indonesian leaders, and the return of Jogjakarta, the capitol, by the Dutch. 2

The exceptional leadership of General Soedirman during the struggle for independence is arguably the single greatest influence on the TNI's self-perception. When the Dutch invaded Jogjakarta on 19 December, 1948, President Soekarno, V.P. Hatta, and several cabinet members were captured because they refused to leave the city to wage a guerrilla war, as President Soekarno and General Soedirman had agreed upon prior to the Dutch attack. Soedirman, although critically ill, disregarded Soekarno's orders to surrender, and instead retreated to the woods to lead a large-scale guerilla war against the Dutch forces. He also headed a military government that was later to become the basis for the current territorial apparatus. 3

Thus, in the TNI's view, it was Soedirman's act of disobedience that was chiefly responsible for achieving Indonesia's independence from Dutch colonization. As a result of this action, the TNI views itself as an "instrument of the nation" (alat negara) rather than "an instrument of the government" (alat pemerintah), meaning the Indonesian military is obliged to disregard civilian leadership if obeying their orders will endanger national integrity or sovereignty of the nation. 4 In his book on the dual function of TNI, Bilveer Singh correctly notes that the Indonesian military elite remains convinced that they are the only true guardians of the country, the constitution, and the state philosophy, Pancasila. This was summed up by General Nasution when he argued that "on three occasions the ABRI became the savior of the Republic when the civilian government was either unable or incapable", namely, during the Dutch attacks in 1948-49, the numerous regional revolts in 1957-58, and the 1965 communist coup. 5 Thus, as an organization, TNI is foremost loyal to the nation and its integrity, not to its civilian leaders.


Indoctrination.

Soedirman's influence on the TNI mindset was reiterated on 10 May 1999 in a speech by Army Chief of Staff Subagyo presented to the officers attending the Army Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in Bandung:

Faced with the developing of a situation that is uncertain at this time, I hope that all of you officers in actualizing leadership will hold firmly to the mandate of General Soedirman who stated: "That the sole national possession of the Republic of Indonesia that remains wholly intact and unchanging in the face of all problems and changes is the Indonesian Defense Force." 6

Subagyo then elaborated on these words, explaining that the meaning contained in the statement "unchanging" is first, that the Indonesian Defense Force is a military of the people, military of freedom fighters, and a national military that was formed from the people, and "struggles" with the people, for the good of the people. The second connotation of "unchanging" is that the Indonesian Defense Forces possesses a "spirit and resolve to "struggle", that is, to defend the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) that is based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution that was proclaimed on 17 August, 1945." 7 Classroom instruction at SESKOAD reiterates the TNI's role as an instrument of the nation rather than an instrument of the civilian government. The school even has a "Department of Struggle" (Departemen Perjuangan) tasked with inculcating students with a sense of duty and nationalism. 8

Besides Soedirman's statement on ABRI's unchanging role, there are two other Codes of Conduct implemented in the post-independence era that Western observers must be familiar with in order to understand the TNI mindset. The first is the Sumpah Prajurit, or Soldier's Oath, which orders all soldiers to adhere to the following set of rules:

- To be faithful to the Government and obedient to the laws and the state Ideology, Pancasila .

1. To obey military law.

2. To execute my duties with full responsibility to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.

To firmly uphold military discipline, meaning to be obedient, faithful and subordinate as well as devoted to superiors, without questioning their orders or decisions (emphasis added by author). 9

It is noteworthy that whereas Indonesian officers are devoted to their superiors, without questioning their orders, American officers are taught that they will remain faithful to the constitution and obey the legal orders of the officers appointed over them. I often highlighted this point to my Indonesian classmates, explaining that the US emphasis on legality is a post-Vietnam phenomena intended to avoid the recurrence of My Lai-type human rights violations.

The second major guiding force is the Sapta Marga, or Seven Pledges, enumerated as follows:

I. We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.

II. We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology, who are responsible and know of no surrender.

III. We are Indonesian knights, who are devoted to the One God, and who defend honesty, truth and justice.

IV. We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces, guardians of the Indonesian state and nation.

V. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces uphold discipline, are obedient and observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldiers attitude and oath.

VI. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces set ourselves to perform our task with courage, and are always ready to devote ourselves to the state and nation.

VII. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces are loyal and keep our word and the Soldier's Oath. (emphasis added by author) 10

The continued relevance of these two creeds is demonstrated during the Independence Day Parades that I participated in as a student at SESKOAD on the 17th not just of August, but of every month. Students recite The Preamble of the Constitution, the Pancasila, Sumpah Prajurit and Sapta Marga during these ceremonies. Moreover, in a speech to my class in December 1998, General Wiranto encouraged all students to internalize and practice the values contained in Sudirman's statement on the unchanging role of TNI, the Soldier's Oath, and the Seven Pledges, as these creeds and oaths would guide them through Indonesia's crisis.
Ramifications.

One of the most significant ramifications of TNI indoctrination is that it requires officers to mindlessly obey illegal orders, rationalizing that their actions preserve national integrity and promote the greater good of stability and national development. Paradoxically, the importance of obeying all orders in accordance with the Soldier's Oath has caused TNI to stray from its role as a "tool of the nation" (alat negara) by forcing each officer to become the tool of his commanding officer (alat atasan). Why? Because the Draft Law on Voluntary Military service of May 1982 stipulates that soldiers who disobey the Sumpah Prajurit or Sapta Marga--and therefore the orders of one's superior, whether legal or illegal--will be court-martialed. 11 This helps explain the common statement of senior TNI reformists that the military has diverged from its basic role by becoming the "instrument" (alat) by which Soeharto maintained security and preserved power.

Within this context we also understand why an officer or soldier would convey or obey orders to abduct, torture, and murder student activists: activists create unrest and instability, which threatens the integrity and growth of the nation. Moreover, it explains allegations that TNI is arming, training, and supporting pro-integration forces in East Timor, in contradiction to the civilian government's orders: a vote for autonomy in Timor will fuel separatist movements in Aceh, Irian and other regions in the archipelago and threaten national integrity. General Soedirman certainly would not follow such dangerous instructions from civilian leaders

While Indonesia's history of separatist movements and the TNI indoctrination helps us to comprehend TNI actions taken in the name of national preservation, it is harder to understand why TNI would be involved in the "provocations" that seemingly promote instability and national dissolution. There are two explanations for this.

The first is that TNI might incite unrest in isolated areas so it can "come to the rescue" and demonstrate its invaluable role in preserving national integrity. For example, there are many high ranking Generals, both retired and active, who wholly believe that TNI's role in the parliament is critical toward preserving national stability. In the past few years, they have witnessed the TNI's allocation of seats in the DPR whittled away from 100 to 75 in the previous election, then to 38 in this 1999 election. The TNI is also reducing its role in kekaryaan positions, whereby active duty officers serve as Mayors, Governors, District heads, and other important postings in the government and government-controlled industries. Thus, I believe that TNI officers, past and present, are capable of creating unrest with the hopes of demonstrating the importance of TNI and dwifungsi out of a genuine concern for national integrity, or perhaps more succinctly, out of hati nurani (their inner conscience). Naturally, TNI "provocateurs" would want their involvement to remain secret; if exposed the populace would demand a diminution of TNI power rather than its preservation.

The second explanation for TNI members' involvement in provocations is more related to loyalty to one's patron and self-preservation than it is related to loyalty to the nation and national preservation. For example, one Kodam Jaya (Jakarta District) intelligence officer in my class who was based in Jakarta during the May 1998 riots concurred with western news reports that TNI members were involved. These reports claimed that LTG Probowo, the former Kopassus commander and son-in-law to former President Soeharto, plotted to discredit GEN Wiranto so he could replace him as Commander of ABRI/Defense Minister. There are also rumors that Kopassus deserters have admitted to participation in other provocations, such as the Banyuwangi Ninja murders. If true, their motive might be to send a veiled warning to the government that it should not pursue legal action against Prabowo or former President Soeharto, who is still revered as a father by many in TNI.

This seemingly outlandish analysis finds support from the works of Neils Mulder, an anthropologist who has spent thirty years studying Indonesian and SE Asian culture. He writes:

The world outside the home is a competitive area where people vie with each other for prestige and power, where prowess is admired, and where the most successful become the patrons of other Beneficiaries incur a debt of gratitude that creates obligation for life. In the hierarchy of power, protection, patronage and prestige, and favors given also oblige, and those debts of gratitude tie people to each other, often in predictable ways; it functions as the cement that keeps the known, the personal world together. 12

I had the opportunity to witness the TNI's system of patronage in 1999 when the LTG Djamari, the Kostrad (Strategic Reserve) Commander visited the Indonesian Command and Staff College. As he lectured the 175 students on personal integrity, one of his aides sorted envelopes of money for SESKOAD officers who were former Kostrad members. This is a common and open method used by TNI commanders to supplement the meager salaries of their soldiers (a Major makes less than $100.00/month). A Kopassus supply officer in my class informed a fellow international student that he had accompanied LTG Prabowo to the bank to draw the equivalent of $100,000 to distribute to his subordinates upon his change of command. Such actions display power and cultivate loyalty.

Current events can also be interpreted by understanding culture of patronage and the loyalty it incurs. Andy Ghalib resigned yesterday as the Indonesian Attorney General. He also happens to be a Lieutenant General in the Indonesian Army. Ghalib made little progress investigating the wealth of his former boss, General Soeharto. Not only did he remain loyal to his former mentor, the patronage system served an additional critical function of ensuring that had Ghalib exposed Soeharto, he too would have been exposed. After all, as a Lieutenant General, Ghalib has certainly received monetary gifts from his superiors (perhaps even Soeharto) and had also provided them to his subordinates--this is a necessary means of surviving on ludicrously low salaries. Thus, had Ghalib accepted monetary gifts from bank officials, while clearly illegal, it is a norm acceptable under the "feudalistic culture" of the TNI. 13 This also explains why the assistant commandant of SESKOAD, in an informal discussion a politics and reform once declared "we are all corrupt, including Megawati and Rais " 14

If the reader still cannot relate to the culture of patronage and loyalty within the TNI and its ability to motivate officers to extreme actions, then look closer to home (assuming the reader is American). What actions might a Mafia soldier take to protect his Godfather? The answer will provide you insight into the TNI's culture.
Conclusion.


In this end of tour report, I have intentionally ignored that TNI's leadership has launched a reform campaign, or Paradigma Baru, as symbolized by the Indonesian Armed Forces' change of name from ABRI to TNI. Because cultural change is both difficult and slow, I nevertheless believe that my analysis of loyalty and integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces will remain useful in explaining and predicting TNI actions for several years to come. Finally, the analysis contained herein is completely my own based on my experience as a foreign student attending the Indonesian Command and Staff College from 1998-1999. It does not in any way represent the official viewpoint of the United States Government.
Bandung, Indonesia June 1999

Robert Creveling is an Army Reserve Major and a FAO, Southeast Asian (48I). He holds a BS from the United States Military Academy, an MS from the Illinois Institute of Technology, and is currently attending the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC in order to earn a Masters in International Public Policy.



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Endnotes
1. In my mid-term report I describe the "Sospol Estimate," that territorial officers conduct to determine appropriate courses of action to maintain security/stability. I argue that the abduction of the activists was probably someone's "optimal course of action" (Prabowo?) resulting from his sospol estimate.BACK

2. Singh, Bilveer. P 32. Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces.BACK

3. Ngandani, p 31.BACK

4. For the sake of brevity, I have ignored the influence of General Nasution in forming TNI's self perception. He was largely responsible for encouraging Soekarno to return to the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila philosophy, for implementing the territorial structure to counter the communist influence, for declaring TNI "a special interest group" so that it had a constitutional right to seats in the DPR, and for placing officers in non-military kekaryaan positions after the nationalization of Dutch industries. In short, he set the groundwork for Dwifungsi . See chapter 2 of Singh, mainly pages 45-47. BACK

5. Singh, pg 157.BACK

6. Subagyo, p 64. Ceramah Kepada Pasis Susreg ke-36 SESKOAD tentang Kepemimpinan Lapangan di Lingkungan TNI-AD Dalam Menghadapi Tantangan Masa Depan, 10 May 99.BACK

7. Ibid, 64.BACK

8. The concept of "struggle" is as positively emotive to Indonesians as the "Spirit of 76" is to Americans. Hence the selection of the name "PDI-Perjuangan" (the PDI Struggle Party) by Megawati Sukarnoputri.BACK

9. Singh, pg 44.BACK

10. Ibid, 42-43.BACK

11. Maynard, Harold, pg. 199, The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces" in Southeast Asia in the Modern World, edited by Edward A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika, Jr. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc, 1986.BACK

12. Mulder, 239. Inside Southeast Asia. Religion, Everyday life, Cultural Change. Amsterdam, The Pepin Press, 1996.BACK

13. Eeep Saefulloh, 26 May 99, Kompas. As a panelist discussing civil-military relations Eep said that as early as 1995 MG Agus Wirahadikusumah had expressed the need to end "leadership that cultivates a feudalistic culture."BACK

14. Syndicate discussion (13-man group) with BG Taat Tridjanuar attended by the author. BACK