Western nations, especially the United States, were already
suspicious of Chinese attitudes, motives and actions; after
all, People's Republic leader Mao had stated that "The way to
world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta."1
These western nations, including a suspicious United States,
appeared to minimize, or not fully to understand, the China-
India dispute background: that China believed that Aksai Chin
had been legally Chinese since 1899 or before, that no official
boundary had been agreed upon between the two nations, and
that Nehru's "forward policy" had thrusted troops even beyond
India's claim line into Tibetan/Chinese territory. These
same nations saw China's goals as monolithic intent on world
conquest, and clearly viewed China as the aggressor in the
Border War. China's first nuclear weapon test in October,
1964, and her support of Pakistan in the 1965 India-Pakistan
Bordr War tended ot confirm the American view of monolithic
communist world objectives, including Chinese influence (if
not expansionism) over Pakistan. Yet, an examination of
China's international objectives, since the Communists came
to power in 1949, shows a pattern of conservative aims and
limited objectives, rather than expansionism. China's role
in the Korea Conflict was not simply to assist North Korea,
but also to protect herself again assault from anti-Communist
western forces. China's actions in Tibet in 1950 were viewed
by India as blatant aggression; but China saw her move into
Tibet as simply reuniting what is "traditionally Chinese" ter-
ritory. The 1962 Border War, again, had only the objective
of keeping what was "traditionally Chinese"; otherwise, why
would have China given all of NEFA back to India? In 1979,
China feared increasing anti-Chinese attitude in Viet Nam.
When Viet Nam invaded Kampuchea--and after much preplanning
and thought--China launched a limited objective assault, to
punish Viet Nam. Thus, the People's Republic of China has
been historically non-expansionistic.""
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