I think it would be a fair assessment to say this is a classic example of "Amaeturs think tactics. Professionals think logistics." The Soviets were much more professional because at least they had an firm grasp of the operational art of providing logistics during warfare while the Iraqis do not. Hence you see many shortfalls of meeting the Soviet doctrine as evidenced by the Iraqis. The Soviet doctrine rely on the Soviet capability of meeting its logistical needs during warfare which is something that the Iraqis have proved incapable of. It is very easy to provide logistics during peacetime but during time of war, it becomes much more difficult.
Several things would go against a RGFC counter-attack aside from VII Corps.Originally Posted by Stan187
1) Saddam had already decided on a retreat
2) The road to Kuwait City was blocked by dead and dying flesh and steel
3) The Marines won the Battle of Kuwait City Airport, meaning that the Iraqis were blind
4) The Coalition had complete air superiority
The Iraqis and the Iranians were grossly under-represented in the intelligence department.
Chimo
Still, do you have any reference materials as to what the Soviets supplied as to bird recee? I want to add to my collection of materials.
Moscow was informed of the start of hostilities by the U.S. Secretary of State only one hour before they started on the night of 17 January 1991 (51) and its reaction to them was subsequently largely negative. At the end of January 1991, the new Soviet foreign minister, A. Bessmertnykh "cautioned the Americans against destroying Iraq rather than concentrating on the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait" (52) and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party called on Gorbachev to "take the necessary steps" to bring about an end to the bloodshed. (53) On 12 February 1991, Primakov left for Baghdad as a special presidential envoy and as a result of his negotiations a Soviet plan for a cease fire and an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was submitted. (54) The plan was further elaborated later on in talks with Tariq Aziz in Moscow 21-22 February 1991 and in addition to the full withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, it provided for the lifting of U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq after most Iraqi troops had left Kuwait, and international supervision over its implementation. (55) However, the Soviet diplomatic effort caused an extremely negative American reaction "on a scope unprecedented since Gorbachev's coming to power," (56) and President Bush stated that the Soviet proposal "falls well short of what would be required." (57) With Gorbachev's approval, Primakov submitted a revised proposal which took into account the American objections and Saddam Hussein accepted the revised proposal on 23 February 1991. (58) However, as he did not accept an American ultimatum from 22 February 1991, the U.S.-led land attack then started. According to a Russian scholar: "A last minute agreement reached between Mikhail Gorbachev and Saddam Hussein on Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait was turned down by the U.S., which reciprocated with an ultimatum unacceptable to Iraq." (59)
Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ) - Find Articles
while it does not explicity state recce was provided, what else would make Saddam go from thinking he could win to trying to get the hell out of dodge after a special visit? I know the US passed along satalite photos to other states to drive home points or as part of its own agenda including satalit eintel to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. It is my view and was widely shared in 91 at least in my Bn's 2 and 3 shops that they were given satalite photos. This is also supported by the way they overreacted to the USMC drills. With no amphibious experiance to speak of how would they know which beaches to defend? There is a bunch of circumstantial evidecne but nothing concrete.
Also in late 91 Saddam was supportive of the military coup in Moscow, I am guessing this was payback to both Gorby for supportign Bush and to his military connectiosn that helped him.
Uhmmm....Several things would go against a RGFC counter-attack aside from VII Corps.
1) Saddam had already decided on a retreat
2) The road to Kuwait City was blocked by dead and dying flesh and steel
3) The Marines won the Battle of Kuwait City Airport, meaning that the Iraqis were blind
4) The Coalition had complete air superiority
General Franks ordered a 90 degree turn to mee the RG who was moving to block VI at 11AM, Saddam's retreat order came at 1PM. Obviosuly the RG was already manuvering to refuse the flank. Combat broke out after an Iraqi mechanized battalion from the 12th mechanized Divsiosn 50th Armored Brigade attacked the MLRS attached 210th FA but ran into the M and K troops 3rd Sqdrn 2nd ACR which was screening the redlegs.
At 3:30 a.m., 2nd Cav received the order from Lt. Gen. Franks to move due east, to make contact with the Republican Guard. 3rd Armored Division would pass to the north, between 1st Armored Division and 2nd Cav. The regiment was to be prepared to execute a passage of lines with 1st Infantry Division. Imagery had shown exactly where the Tawakalna Division was and how it was deployed. The RG was setting up a defensive line to allow other Iraqi units to flee the Kuwait theater of operations. 2nd ACR was to find the southern end of the enemy division’s line, then to pass through the 1st Infantry Division to allow them to turn the flank.
The RG had correctly identified the threat and properly moved to meet it. The result was known as 73 Eastings. And like the battered kamphgroups of 1945 the RG was simply over matched and no amount of valor or skill would turn the tide. This is not to imply they wre as good as the US, no whee close but the RG were capable mechanized troops.
Blademaster,
Giv ethe Iraqies some credit please. They kept an army in the feild for months with no problem. Thier logistics only failed after the USAF went to work and dropped the bridges that army needed. No feild army no matter how advanced can survice when its airspace is hostile and it's road links have been cut by laser guided bombs.I think it would be a fair assessment to say this is a classic example of "Amaeturs think tactics. Professionals think logistics." The Soviets were much more professional because at least they had an firm grasp of the operational art of providing logistics during warfare while the Iraqis do not
Not sure what you're trying to state here. Anyone with a TV would have known VII Corps' advance.
Chimo
Its an attempt to make the Iraqis into the Soviets and state that since the US rolled over the Iraqis, it would have been the same with their masters..
Sure.
The US achieved significant success against a third world army wrecked by a tinpot dictator, but thats about it.
Karmani Vyapurutham Dhanuhu
My bow is stretched for its task
And please give the Red Army some credit too. They have shown an ability to rebuild its links and LOCs under wartime conditions even with US Air Force in play which is something central to Soviet doctrine.
Zraver,
I am not trying to take away from US's achievements. What the US did in Gulf War I was nothing short of an astonishing feat. They smashed an entire coherent army filled with tanks and artillery enough to make a brave man sweat in the face 8000 miles away from home in a foreign land in less than 2 months. No other army could do that since the days of the Mongols. But you are arguing that the Iraqi Army was at the same level of the Red Army and that is causing a lot of us with credible disbelief.
Just look at the equipment quality alone...a few months back, I went through the Soviet Plan of AD...its lunacy...in the terms of resources that went into it, and the level of technology that came about. Figures why the SU eventually imploded. That amount of money being spent on defence..
The Iraqis, heck any country- couldnt hold a candle upto the SAM belt that the Soviets developed...and if one cites Bekaa valley...please!! That was a limited conflict against the Syrians equipped with hand me downs. The Red Army, AF and their associated arms were a different thing altogether.
The Iraqis had poor organizational ethos- thanks to the lack of development of a professional officer corps for its potential for rebellion, and were firmly stuck with weaponry a decade and a half behind that employed by the coalition. The results speak for themselves. If Saddam had tac nukes, multiple integrated SAM units redolent with S-3XX systems, professional armour and infantry units whose officers rose on merit, not just clan affiliations, whose tech levels were at the same or marginally behind the ODS, who were not outnumbered in the air and had their own AEW&C as well..then its somewhat of a comparison. Because at the end of the day, even in numbers - the Red Army was massive. But otherwise, the Iraqis were nowhere near superpower status.
Look at PGMs- the US used them so extensively- were the SU types so far behind? The Su-24's to Mi-24 loadouts are heavy with all sorts of laser guided to SACLOS missiles, optical bombs...and a warchest that matched the WWIII scenario. Would the US have undisputed airsuperiority over a WWIII battlefield?
The airbases would be hit by waves of Fencers, Tactical missiles galore, every radar worth its name on either side would be jammed- the difference being that the FSU had far more, regimental sized units of Flankers and Fulcrums would be in the fray, never mind the horde of MiGs...how is this in anyway comparable to ODS? You'd have NATO struggling to prevent the FSU from gaining air dominance and vice versa, not the antiseptic shootdowns of isolated obsolete MiGs. One MiG-25 took down Speicher, with the amount of resources thrown against it- imagine the difficulties vs regimental MiG-31 ops..it would be chaos on both sides!!
Heck, even on tanknet veterans of the Fulda Gap standoff acknowledge that if the bell rang, their survival was unlikely...casualties on either side would have been horrific.
How many did the US take in crushing Iraq?
BM is right, the US triumph in ODS was indeed professional and excellent warfighting, but it was in nowway comparable to WWIII, ETO.
Last edited by Archer; 27 May 07, at 17:12.
Karmani Vyapurutham Dhanuhu
My bow is stretched for its task
No it's an attemot to counter the trend since 91 to underestimate the Iraqies in order to down play the American achievement. The Red Army of same period had a slight edge in technology in some areas, vastly more numbers, and better trained officers. However it was also torn by factionalism, was multi-lingual, and horribly trained on the small unit level. It was no where near as powerful as the Red Army of even 10 years earlier. Added to this is the assumption that all Iraqies surrendered in droves and never really fought.
This is patently untrue as the RG did fight, fought hard and manuvered as well as any Soviet division subjected to the same situation would have done.
Blademaster,
When did the USSR ever face an airpower as large and as competent as the USAF/RAF? In WW2 the small size of the Luftwaffe meant German planes were actually pretty thin, never more than 2000 of all types for the entire theater. Simply put only Nazi Germany, Vietnam, North Korea, PRC, and Iraq have been subected to the type of airiel encirclement the USAF can do. Of those only Vietnam found an answer to it aided by thick jungles. The two mechnianized foes (Germany and Iraq) ended up having whole armies smashed.And please give the Red Army some credit too. They have shown an ability to rebuild its links and LOCs under wartime conditions even with US Air Force in play which is something central to Soviet doctrine.
What we do know is that the Soviet style layered airdefense faield to work anywher eit was tried. Vietnam, Syria, Egypt, Iraq etc never succeeded in stopping an air attack. To think that the Red Army would fair any better onc ethe VVS was dealt with ignores the evidence gathered over 50 years.
OOE,
Not true knowing the cops are about to kick your door in and doing something to flush the drugs are two different animals. The RG and the 12th Divsion did in fact conduct a movement to contact to set up a shoulder to stem the allied advance inorder to get the rest of the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. They could ahve done it alot worse, how they could have done it better giving the allied advantages is behoynd me.Not sure what you're trying to state here. Anyone with a TV would have known VII Corps' advance.
All those things might have had an impact, then again dropping the bridges and rail lines and hitign the telephone exchanges in Eastern Germany and Poland might have cuased the same type of airborne encirclement the Iraqies and Germans faced. The WGSF was big but not quite big enough and releid heavily on follow forces, hence the development of the ALBD to deal with it. The teerain they had to cross favored NATO air with the Red Army being highly dependant on bridge sover the Vistula, Oder, and Elbe rivers.
Nor was the VVS very effective. Overly tied to cround control with poor radars, little ACT time and not equipped with very advanced stores. Most Soviet ordnance was decidely dumb at the time of the USSR's breakup. PGM's took the limelight in Iraq but in truth were only a single digit figure on the types of ordnace dropped.
The VVS also faced the same type of problems it wished to inflict on NATO, only more so with numbers closer to even and with a distinct technological and qualitive edge in training and doctrine the VVS might have denied air superiorty simply by the sheer number of targets it put in the air until it ran out of planes but it would not have won. When Russian pilots tangled with the IAF they got thier asses handed to them. The VVS never changed, in the late 80's they started making noises about going to a pilot based concept but the USSR fell apart before it could gain any traction.
Zraver,
You are falling into the cultural trap as many has done before. The Soviet Air Force was never designed to establish air supremacy. It was designed to do one thing only: Keep the NATO birds busy and thus off the backs of the Soviet Army.
Remember the old joke: Two Soviet Generals are sitting in a Paris cafe sipping their new expressos which they are tasting for the first time in their lives. One General ask, "So who won the air war?".
Well, the Soviets would not have done several things the Iraqis did.
1) Not one step backwards
2) Yielded momentum from the start
3) Not refusing an open flank
4) Replenish their losses, including replacing those leaders who were failing to keep morale up (political officers)
5) Waited for the hammer to fall
Chimo
Is that my cultural gap, or a Soviet gap in apreciation of the effects of airpower? The 2 biggest armored battles (Normandy and Iraq) of all time were not fought by Russia (who fought the 3rd largest in terms of total veihicles) but by US/UK I think we know a thing or two about the effectiveness of tack air. The Red Army has always had a ground fixation to the detriment of air and sea power. It's cultural with no warm water ports and a largely illiterate population until the 1950s.
1) The Red Army was quite capable of retreat in order to attmept save itself. A great example of this was the retreat to the Volga in the summer of 42. Of course they doidn't have to contend with Jstars.Well, the Soviets would not have done several things the Iraqis did.
1) Not one step backwards
2) Yielded momentum from the start
3) Not refusing an open flank
4) Replenish their losses, including replacing those leaders who were failing to keep morale up (political officers)
5) Waited for the hammer to fall
2) The Germans sure had the initive until they willing gave it up when Hitler fixated on Stalingrad.
3) Mainstien sure seemed to find unrefused flanks, he just didn't hav ethe tool after 43 to make it count. The Germans were still cutting off and destroying Soviet formations as alte as mid 44, but lack of resources kept them from capatalising.
4) How many Soviet officers at the small unit level were replaced at Stalingrad or Lenningrad the or places where the Red Army found itself under a state of seige or encircled. In the early part of WW2 Timenshenko remained in command despite his obvious failures.
5) You mean like Kursk? Where like the Iraqies they spent thier time building and digging and waiting for the inevitable attack.
Like the Red Army in 41 the Iraqies were expecting a different type of war than they got. Unlike the Soviets they never had a chance to recover not haivng the time or depth and subjected to a level of violence that no power on earth could have withstood.
By 1991 NATO was at its peak in cold war streangth while the USSR was at its lowest point since 1940.
Zraver,
You went too far back. We're speaking of Soviet doctrine which while alot of it was developed in WWII was not refined, formalized, and set into SOP until after the war. I grant you Kursk was a study in fortifications but the lessons of that battle all but disappeared from Soviet publications.
Again, the place to start when stating Soviet doctrines is the ST 100-7 OPFOR Battle Book ... or is that book all wrong?
Again from the Book
1-4 TYPES OF COMBAT.
The OPFOR recognizes two types of combat: offensive and defensive. Traditionally, offensive combat is the only type that can ultimately bring victory. It is, therefore, the most decisive type of combat.
a. Offense. The goal of offense is the BLUFOR's total defeat and the capture of important objectives. This goal is achieved by destroying BLUFOR NBC and precision strike systems (including support elements), chemical attack weapons, artillery, and maneuver formations by the use of long-range missiles, aircraft, and artillery fire. This enables the swift advance of tank and mechanized infantry (or infantry) units and formations in coordination with aviation and airborne assault forces. These formations defeat the BLUFOR by assaulting his flank and rear, by encirclement, and by splitting his forces and defeating them in detail. See Chapter 5 for detailed information on the offense.
b. Defense. The defense is a battle with the objective of repelling an attack by BLUFOR, inflicting considerable losses, and holding important terrain, allowing the buildup of forces in other sectors and creating favorable conditions for launching an attack. This objective is achieved by the fire of all available weapon systems; by a wide maneuver of fire; forces, and assets; and by stubborn holding of occupied positions, lines, and objectives in combination with conduct of counterattacks. See Chapter 6 for detailed information on the defense.
Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 27 May 07, at 20:53.
Chimo
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