Thread: What is Best MBT in Asia?

Originally Posted by zraver

But that is not the mark of the master strategist. NATO's-Air Land Battle Doctrine thats strategy andthe mark of a master.

True and so is the Deep Battle doctrine formulated by the Soviets.

Originally Posted by zraver

As for the Soviets the late 60's and early 70's were thier heyday in terms of capabilites. they had not yet los tthe air race completely, had a huge lead in tanks in numbers and in some ways capabilites (T-64/72) and all their divsional+ commanders were battle hardened veterans who saw the elephant as junior officers and then studied under the Great Patriotic War's winning feild commanders. Wether or not that would have translated into a winning war is unknown, but they were in 100 times better shape in 1970 than in 1980.

Come on, take a look at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That was one hell of an engineering feat. It scared the Chinese so much that they thought that the People's War doctrine was worthless and basically accepted the fact that they will lose up to 1000km of war frontage land to the Soviets and be prepared to fight the Soviets in Beijing ala Stalingrad style.

True and so is the Deep Battle doctrine formulated by the Soviets.

deep battle and Soviets do not mix. Thier mind set was entirely tactical, a lesson of WW2 where they used tactical and operational sucesses to achive strategic aims. Thier goal was very much centered on finding-fixing- and marinalizing NATO's feildforces in order to split the alliance and win the war by forcing a politcal settlement before it went nuclear (or thats how I am a many others read thier deployment) NATO beucase of a great many factors had to use strategic targets 24-72 hours behind the front to win the tactical battle.

Come on, take a look at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That was one hell of an engineering feat.

It also went in vs an unorganized poorly trained and led foe in Terrain nothign like that of Europe. Drawing inferance son how the Red Army would have fared in Europe via thier performance in Afghanistan.

Iraq however was a show case of the deep battle doctrine and manuver warfar etheory. However bad the iraqies did, we can still draw inferances based on how the US units manuvered. They heavy units were after all fresh from guarding the Inter-German Border.

Originally Posted by zraver

deep battle and Soviets do not mix.

Are you mixing up terms here? Deep Battle was 1st formalized by Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky. If I remembered right, he advocated fixing and bypassing the main force to attack the logistics and enemy HQ. He formulated that the decisive battle was not against the main force but against the reserves.

Originally Posted by zraver

It also went in vs an unorganized poorly trained and led foe in Terrain nothign like that of Europe. Drawing inferance son how the Red Army would have fared in Europe via thier performance in Afghanistan.

The engineering was impressive and you are correct that it was an unopposed advance. However, while we were impressed, we were not the ones who got a wake up call. It was the Chinese who planned their defence with distance as a major obstacle. Apparently, it was not so much of an obstacle to the Soviets.

Are you mixing up terms here? Deep Battle was 1st formalized by Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky. If I remembered right, he advocated fixing and bypassing the main force to attack the logistics and enemy HQ. He formulated that the decisive battle was not against the main force but against the reserves.

I was reffering to NATO's deep battle doctrine. The Soviets fought tactically to get deep, NATO fought deep to win tactically too totally different concepts.

Might I suggest that you use AirLand for NATO's doctrine instead of Deep Battle since even I thought Tukhachevsky when you mention it and got confused when you stated that it has nothing to do with the Soviets.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Might I suggest that you use AirLand for NATO's doctrine instead of Deep Battle since even I thought Tukhachevsky when you mention it and got confused when you stated that it has nothing to do with the Soviets.

ditto on that

Originally Posted by -{SpoonmaN}-

As for the IDF, while they need to be respected for their aggression and initiative, put an Israeli Division against a US Army Division and I don't think the Israelis would have a fun experience. Part of their successes, especially against Egypt in 67, stems from the spectacular failures of their oponents as much as their own skill. For example, at least according to the History Channel (me big expert I know) the Egyptions MoD had ordered all AA sites to turn their RADAR off that day because he was worried that a rival faction would have his plane shot down while he was visiting the front lines. That morning, the Israelis happened to turn up and destory the entire EAF.
Sometimes you just get lucky I suppose.

If we're talking recent armored opponents, the US was up against Iraq. If we are all judged by who we fight, the US Army has yet to be tested very harshly as well. Fortunately, that whole NATO-WP thing never went down. Don't forget, the Iraqis fought the Israelis in 73 in Syria. As the Colonel would say, they were made into minced meat.

Originally Posted by Stan187

If we're talking recent armored opponents, the US was up against Iraq. If we are all judged by who we fight, the US Army has yet to be tested very harshly as well. Fortunately, that whole NATO-WP thing never went down. Don't forget, the Iraqis fought the Israelis in 73 in Syria. As the Colonel would say, they were made into minced meat.

I'd argue that considering the major technological, political, tactical and economic advantages they held over them at the time, Iraq's performance against post-revolution Iran was rather poor too.

Originally Posted by Stan187

If we're talking recent armored opponents, the US was up against Iraq. If we are all judged by who we fight, the US Army has yet to be tested very harshly as well. Fortunately, that whole NATO-WP thing never went down. Don't forget, the Iraqis fought the Israelis in 73 in Syria. As the Colonel would say, they were made into minced meat.

1- In the case of the US/UK/FR we can look at how the various units manuvered under fire in the type of rolling operational sized meeting engagement we might have seen if NATO/WP had come to blows. It is less about how the Iraqies did then about how western doctrine worked or didn't work, and it worked at least on the assault. The Iraqi's had tanks missiels and helicopters of roughly the same type as the USSR, had a soviet doctrine refined over years into a "leathal" defensive belt proven in combat with highly mobile and spirited reserves.

No matter what else ODS was as close to the clash of titans as we were ever going to get with out having NATO/USSR divisions on the wrong side of the Inter-German Frontier.

2- Iraq did not fight in Syria, they had an armed brigade in Jordan but it refused to move to support Jordan and fell victim to Israeli air attacks and got mauled. IIRC Iraqi army units have never traded blows with the IDF post 47-48.

Originally Posted by zraver

1- In the case of the US/UK/FR we can look at how the various units manuvered under fire in the type of rolling operational sized meeting engagement we might have seen if NATO/WP had come to blows. It is less about how the Iraqies did then about how western doctrine worked or didn't work, and it worked at least on the assault. The Iraqi's had tanks missiels and helicopters of roughly the same type as the USSR, had a soviet doctrine refined over years into a "leathal" defensive belt proven in combat with highly mobile and spirited reserves.

No matter what else ODS was as close to the clash of titans as we were ever going to get with out having NATO/USSR divisions on the wrong side of the Inter-German Frontier.

2- Iraq did not fight in Syria, they had an armed brigade in Jordan but it refused to move to support Jordan and fell victim to Israeli air attacks and got mauled. IIRC Iraqi army units have never traded blows with the IDF post 47-48.

Did the Iraqis follow Soviet doctrine? It didn't seem like it to me, from what I've read. We often assume that Arab forces were using Soviet doctrine because they were taught by their Soviet advisors, but the crux of the matter is that those were mostly technical advisors who taught them how to use equipment, not Soviet doctrine.

Despite being big, the Iraqi army in ODS was still third tier. Just like Israel, the US has not fought many worthy opponents in armored war (not past WWII).

Iraq sent a two-division armored task force to help the Syrians as the Israelis were breaking out from the Golan into Syria-proper territory in 73, zraver. The Jordanians also sent the 40th and 60th Armored Brigades IIRC.

Originally Posted by Stan187

Did the Iraqis follow Soviet doctrine?

No but then again, they didn't have a chance to. Soviet doctrine stipulates that you always have to maintain contact with the enemy, even on the recee level. The Iraqis never probed the American lines except for the Battle of Al Khafji for which they paid an extremely heavy price.

About the only place where their Soviet teachers would have been proud was the Battle of Kuwait City Airport. They lost that one too but the USMC advance was halted which should have set up a counter-attack by the RGFC.

By then, the RGFC was caught off guard by VII Corps and was being pulverized.

Defensively, the Iraqis departed from Soviet teachings tremendously. There were no kill zones to speak of and it's a puzzle to me why the West Flank was not refused. They also have alot to learn technically. Why you have AT mines in a natural anti-tank ditch is beyond me.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

No but then again, they didn't have a chance to. Soviet doctrine stipulates that you always have to maintain contact with the enemy, even on the recee level. The Iraqis never probed the American lines except for the Battle of Al Khafji for which they paid an extremely heavy price.

About the only place where their Soviet teachers would have been proud was the Battle of Kuwait City Airport. They lost that one too but the USMC advance was halted which should have set up a counter-attack by the RGFC.

By then, the RGFC was caught off guard by VII Corps and was being pulverized.

Defensively, the Iraqis departed from Soviet teachings tremendously. There were no kill zones to speak of and it's a puzzle to me why the West Flank was not refused. They also have alot to learn technically. Why you have AT mines in a natural anti-tank ditch is beyond me.

Did the RGFC have the operational awareness/initiative to exploit the halt and counter-attack? (assuming they were not attacked by the VII Corps)

It seems to me from reading on how they did in the Iran-Iraq war, that there was a big gap in correctly understanding and interpreting events on the battlefield in order to take advantage of them. An acute lack of coordination too. Do you think it is right to read it as such?

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

About the only place where their Soviet teachers would have been proud was the Battle of Kuwait City Airport. They lost that one too but the USMC advance was halted which should have set up a counter-attack by the RGFC.

By then, the RGFC was caught off guard by VII Corps and was being pulverized.

Defensively, the Iraqis departed from Soviet teachings tremendously. There were no kill zones to speak of and it's a puzzle to me why the West Flank was not refused. They also have alot to learn technically. Why you have AT mines in a natural anti-tank ditch is beyond me.

The Iraqi kill zone defnesive belts were awesome, probalby the most superbly designed non-concrete defensive designs ever created. They used mines and ditches to channel attacks into mutally supporting cross fires with dug in hull down fighting posistions, pre sighted artillery, and infantry bunkers. However T-55/T-62 class tanks and AT-3's even backed up by the worlds best tube artillery was no match for the Abrams and Apache, plus the Iraqi's were dehydrated, hungry and cut off and lost the will to fight.

Thats why most people ignore the iraqi front line and talk about the RG divsions.

They left the flank exposed beucase there was no need to guard it. American history, soviet satalite reccee, military maxims and physical location of amphibs all said the US was gonna try for D-Day 1991 style. Plus the western desert is impassable under normal circumstances- no roads, no water- no land lines nothing a typical army would need to survive. Without experiance they had no way of knowing that this war was going to depend of the truck and our ability to sustain an army on the move in the middle of nowhere. It was a blind spot that was cultural to thier military. America has run into the same type of cultural biases in OIF. We assumed they wanted to live in peace and be free.... becuase thats what we want. They couldn't move across the desert so assumed we couldn't either.

Did the RGFC have the operational awareness/initiative to exploit the halt and counter-attack? (assuming they were not attacked by the VII Corps)

Iraq used fiber optic communciations and we were enver able to cut all the lines. The RG divisions got moving as soon as the gorund war started aiming to hit the allies in TMoaB but hit in the flank instead by VII Corps. Even then they manuvered well operationally. We didn't get an exploitive break through where we got into thier rear with minnimal fighting, we had to crush thier formations one by one as thier oriented on the attack. Unlike the regular army the RG was a professional force that did operate along Soviet lines. Look at thier conduct of "Blessed Ramadan and the othe rthree battles from April-Aug of 88 that routed Iran and got Iraq a technicalk win out of the war. Rehersal, deep supporting fires and chemical attacks and a large amount of mechnisation.

Originally Posted by zraver

The Iraqi kill zone defnesive belts were awesome, probalby the most superbly designed non-concrete defensive designs ever created.

If we are to discuss the Iraqi following Soviet doctrine, then they've failed right off the bat, especially when following defensive principals

Chapter 6 - OPFOR Defensive Operations

The time to conduct a defensive action and the type of defense the OPFOR executes is dependent upon the primary mission of the OPFOR unit, the unit(s) on the battlefield and its current location in relation to the BLUFOR. Typically, the OPFOR will assume the defense to:

* Consolidate tactical gains
* Await additional resources
* Protect a flank
* Stop a BLUFOR counterattack
* Regroup
* Free up resources for other operations
* Hold key terrain
* Await logistical support

From the book at least, you don't rely on defence to win a war.

Originally Posted by zraver

They used mines and ditches to channel attacks into mutally supporting cross fires with dug in hull down fighting posistions, pre sighted artillery, and infantry bunkers. However T-55/T-62 class tanks and AT-3's even backed up by the worlds best tube artillery was no match for the Abrams and Apache, plus the Iraqi's were dehydrated, hungry and cut off and lost the will to fight.

If you mean their initial layout, they did went by the book but as I stated, why you have AT mines in a ditch is beyond me. Also as time went on, the Iraqis never replaced their losses. Those burnt out tanks and tubes were still sitting there, not replaced when the Marines hit the line.

Whether this was due to lost of capability or the lost of will or they never planned on losing so much, the fact was that the line was no longer capable of stopping anything.

From the book again

Chapter 6 - OPFOR Defensive Operations

6-4 ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE.

a. Reconnaissance. Divisional, brigade, and battalion reconnaissance elements will be located in and forward of the security zone (if established) or forward of the main defensive area.

b. Combat Security Outposts. First-echelon brigades on main avenues often form combat security outposts, and each forward battalion can establish such an outpost. A combat security outpost for a battalion is normally a reinforced platoon. This platoon occupies a position 2 to 3 km forward of the main defenses. Figure 6-1 lists the conditions under which different types of security forces deploy.

(1) Missions.

* to delay, inflict losses on, and to deceive the BLUFOR about the true location of the main defenses.
* Form strongpoints forward of the main defenses. They take over the mission to delay the BLUFOR's main effort when the divisional forward detachment shifts to a secondary axis.
* Forces the BLUFOR to deploy in a position short of the main defensive belt, believing it actually is the main defensive belt.

Artillery units firing in support of the combat security outpost may have to occupy temporary firing positions farther forward than normal, even in front of the forward edge. The combat security outposts described above should not be confused with company or battalion-sized elements placed into forward positions by second-echelon brigades and/or divisions when required by the situation. These forces, too, have a mission similar to that of the forward detachments in the security zone.

Obviously, they've failed in this also.

Originally Posted by zraver

They left the flank exposed beucase there was no need to guard it. American history, soviet satalite reccee, military maxims and physical location of amphibs all said the US was gonna try for D-Day 1991 style. Plus the western desert is impassable under normal circumstances- no roads, no water- no land lines nothing a typical army would need to survive. Without experiance they had no way of knowing that this war was going to depend of the truck and our ability to sustain an army on the move in the middle of nowhere. It was a blind spot that was cultural to thier military.

I find the Soviet reference surprising since they would automatically assume building a road on the West flank. Still, do you have any reference materials as to what the Soviets supplied as to bird recee? I want to add to my collection of materials.

Originally Posted by zraver

Iraq used fiber optic communciations and we were enver able to cut all the lines. The RG divisions got moving as soon as the gorund war started aiming to hit the allies in TMoaB but hit in the flank instead by VII Corps. Even then they manuvered well operationally. We didn't get an exploitive break through where we got into thier rear with minnimal fighting, we had to crush thier formations one by one as thier oriented on the attack. Unlike the regular army the RG was a professional force that did operate along Soviet lines. Look at thier conduct of "Blessed Ramadan and the othe rthree battles from April-Aug of 88 that routed Iran and got Iraq a technicalk win out of the war. Rehersal, deep supporting fires and chemical attacks and a large amount of mechnisation.

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/his...tawakalna.html

The division did managed to set up a hasty defence but they were both physically and pyschologically out of position. However, I really don't know if they could have marched on the Marines. They would be just as blocked by their own dead on the Highway of Death.