Thread: Stryker pics from Iraq

This has been an interesting thread to read through with some good information and plenty of misinformation. Having been a part of the Stryker Brigade "transformation" from nearly the beginning (2001), I had the opportunity to command an infantry company through our NTC and JRTC rotations and during operations in Samarra and Mosul. I believe it is important to start from the beginning in order to understand the decision to select the Stryker.

The SBCT was designed as an infantry-centric organization that uses information supremacy maneuver to a place of advantage to destroy the enemy in the close fight through combined arms. Within an IN company, there is a Mobile Gun System platoon manned by armormen, a mortar section with 120mm and 60mm mortars, a fire support team, and a sniper team.

As a BDE, the SBCT was designed as a medium force that could bridge the gap between the light forces (quick deployability) and the heavy forces (slow deployability). It was never designed to replace either force (i.e. the Stryker was never meant to replace the M1 Abrams or the M2 Bradley). Historical examples where such a force would have been useful were plentiful (for example, Kosovo, where our heavy forces were too heavy for the bridge infrastructure; Desert Shield, where the 82nd ABN Ready BDE was a symbolic defense)Thus, a requirement for a vehicle that could be transported in a C-130 was developed. Another major criteria was the selection of a platform that had a commality of parts across the variants and with other vehicles in the Army inventory and with a low mean between failure rate. In other words, a need to reduce spare parts required so that it would reduce the number of supply vehicles to support the brigade. Also, fuel mileage was a major criteria since it would reduce the required # of fuel trucks to support the brigade.

While I don't recall all the details, I saw the decision brief that compared the above criteria and as well as other, and this objective analysis decided that the Stryker was a better vehicle for the BDE. From a subjective point of view, the soldiers in my battalion were involved in a side by side comparison of the M113 and the Canadian LAV-III, and the soldiers preferred the LAV-III hands down over the M113.

All of that being said, I would like to address a few of the points brought up throughout this thread:

1. To my knowledge, we have lost only two Strykers to enemy fire during its 12 months in Iraq. The first one was due to a command detonated IED (the one in flames in the picture) in Samarra. The force of the blast ruptured a fuel line and the AFSS (automated fire suppression system) didn't work properly, preventing the fire from being extinguished. The only injury was a broken ankle on the driver. The second one was when a RPG struck some fuel can on top of the Stryker. The resulting fire was unable to brought under control when the onboard, handheld fire extinguishers failed to work. Other extinguishers almost had the fire under control when ammunition stored on top began to cook off. The decision was made was allow the vehicle to burn instead of risking any soldier's life. There were no injuries. There have been others that received battle damage from VBIEDs and RPGs, but these were able to be repaired quickly. It is true that a 500lb VBIED caused a Stryker to rollover with no injuries to the crew and the Stryker could roll on its own. In another case, a 500lb VBIED was detonated a few feet from a Stryker and the only damage was a cracked display screen inside the vehicle.
2. The slat armor has been very effective in defeating or minimizing RPG damage - there have been no soldiers killed in the interior of a Stryker. The slat armor is designed to completely defeat a RPG (either with a single or a tandem warhead) by "catching" it between the slats, prevent the point detonating fuse from activating. If the round does strike the actual slat, then the standoff distance that allows the slat to "catch" a round minimizes any potential damage as the plasma jet loses energy. There have been hundereds of RPG attacks against the Stryker and dozens of strikes and the Stryker has done its job in protecting the soldiers.
3. The operational mobility of the Stryker has been incredible, as evident by the fact that Stryker BNs have participated in operations in Samarra, An Najaf, Mosul, Tal Afar, Fallajuh, Balad, Babil province, andalong the MSR north and south of Baghdad. This operational mobility would not have been possible if it were a tracked vehicle. While there is a trade off in tactical mobility vs. the M113, I can not recall a single time in Iraq or at JRTC where this affected a company plan. I would also like to point out that tracks do not automatically equal better off road mobility. Most of my senior NCOs grew up with Bradley, and they all hands down believed that the Stryker could go places that you couldn't dream of going with the Stryker. While there were plenty of times where a Stryker would get stuck (between the irrigation canals in the Tigris valley and the rain in northern Iraq, there was plenty of mud to go around), never once did we require a recovery vehicle.
4. The smooth and quiet ride provided by the Stryker allows the infantry to arrive at an objective fresh and undetected. This quiet ride resulted in the unit being described as a "phantom" in Samarra since we "were everywhere at once and no where at once." While the only experience I had in a tracked vehicle (M113) was in the summer of 1994, I recall swearing off ever being in the mech infantry because of the rough ride. My soldiers that were on Brads in their previous lifetime described the quality of the ride as night and day in favor of the Stryker, and that they were often fatigued after just riding in the Bradley (a relative term if you are light IN as was). The quiet ride was effective for my company (after I switched command) when they rolled up on a firefight between insurgents and a MP unit along the MSR in Baghdad. The insurgents didn't hear them, but finally realized what happened and broke contact after the company killed 6 through precision M4 engagements and the use of the M2 .50 cal on the remote weapons station (RWS).
5. The roomy interior in the Stryker allowed for tremendous flexibility in cross loading pax, attachments, equipment. While not roomy like a luxurious vehicle when fully loaded, the Stryker was able to handle its crew, a 9 man infantry squad, the PL, the FO, mission essential equipment such as urban mechanical breaching tools, explosive detectors, small UAVs, etc. (and this is with all soldiers wearing their body armor, which makes a big difference in size). This flexibility prevented attachments from having to bring their own vehicles (HMMWVs). The room also allowed the Strykers to be used as a means of non-standard CASEVAC.
6. The Stryker does fly in a C130. My CO TM, consisting of 30 Strykers across 7 variants, conducted airland operations at NTC in March 03. We were able to fly with full vehicle loads and the accompanying passengers (IN SQD, etc.). Within 2 minutes of landing and exiting the aircraft, each vehicle had reconfigured to where it could fight (FM and digital comms established and guns in action). Stowage racks took additional time to reinstall on certain variants, but this could be done when time was available. To provide RPG protection, separate C130s would be necessary to fly in the palletized slat armor or reactive armor when that is fielded.
7. The Stryker does not have an amphibious capability. It does have a fording capability, and the high wheels help here.
8. The Stryker received minimal damage from daily IEDs, typically consisting of 152mm or 155mm rounds; maybe shrapnel damage to stowage racks and some flat tires (it has run flats, so vehicles always self-recovered to the FOB and changed tires, rarely if ever affecting the mission).
9. While the higher wheel base makes a slightly larger target, the slat protects against RPG strikes and the height makes it safer for soldiers in the hatches when an IED detonates (tougher angle for shrapnel/blast effects to reach soldiers).
10. The "sprint" speed and max sustained speeds for the vehicle are above the advertised max speed of 62.5, allowing for rapid movements when necessary and making IEDs even more ineffective since they're difficult to time.
11. The Stryker uses the same engine as the FMTV. This reduces the # of lines of PLL/ASL required to sustain the BDE (commonality of parts). If the BDE had M113s, they would have to stock both FMTV engines and M113 engines, increasing the required # of trucks to haul parts or reduce stockage of repair parts and risk non-mission capable equipment. This is just one example. The GAO report on the comparison exercise between the Stryker and M113 concluded that the Stryker would require much less repair parts than supporting a M113 fleet.
12. Don't compare apples to oranges when comparing costs. The cost of the $2.5 million Stryker include: ceramic armor, C4ISR systems (ASIP, FBCB2, EPLRS, NTDR, PLGR, HF, SATCOM, routers, hubs), RWS. To compare to the M113A3, you would have to compare a cost of $1.42 million (basic Stryker with RWS and 14.5mm armor protection) vs. $570K for a M113 to M113A3 upgrade with RWS. Additional costs would be added to the M113A3 for the bolt-on kits to up the protection to 14.5mm like the Stryker. Over the long run, maintenance and fuel costs for the M113A3 are greater than the Stryker, making the cost comparison almost a wash.

My points are starting to turn into a laundry list, so I will stop here. However, I would serve in a Stryker unit again in a heartbeat and believe that the Stryker was the right choice for the Army. The things that were given up by choosing the Stryker over the M113, smaller size and weight and cross-country mobility, would not be worth the loss of ease of maintenance, operational mobility, additional room for pax/loads, and quiet operation. The money spent on the Stryker was well spent.

In closing, I would like to shift to the soldiers of the SBCT, for they are the ones that are truly making it successul. While the Stryker is a great platform for an infantry-centric organization, it is the innovation and competence of the NCOs and soldiers in operating the Stryker and digital equipment that allow them to reach an OBJ and demonstrate controlled violence of action in seizing a search that OBJ to capture a high value target or remove a cache of weapons/explosives that could have been used against our fellow soldiers.