zraver

Ya, the lack of knowledge about how SLAT armor works proved it wasn't from anyone familiar with ground power. A lot of people think SLAT armor is designed to detonate the charge away from the vehicle. It's not standoff distance doesn't protect from the jet. The bars either slag the fuse preventing detonation or more likely the round hits between the steel bars and the copper cone needed to form the jet is crushed so that even if the round fires it is just an HE charge not a HEAT charge.

Bluesman

Blackfive, the Paratrooper of Love, agrees with me.

__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell

Bluesman

And my post was up before his.

Shek

Appeal to authority fallacy.

__________________
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Bluesman

Blinded by prejudice.

Shek

No, I found the biographical description about Boyd interesting.

However, you way oversold the piece. The OODA loop is already part of doctrine, and anyone who has done targeting knows this already. Getting inside the enemy's decision cycle is a huge premise behind the creation of the SBCTs - information dominance through the "battlefield internet" would allow blue forces to react faster than the enemy. So, the essay didn't introduce anything new there. It then continued with some incredibly weak context in some areas and used analysis that could have been taken straight from Sun Tzu. Finally, it used some spurious correlation about the motivation behind the surge. For the strategic insights offered, Sun Tzu would have been a more efficient use of time.

Bluesman

SMILEY! Look at the SMILEY!

There goes another'un!

Bluesman

But this part is serious.

I actually DO believe there is a prejudice against airpower, and I could go on about why I think so, what you and a great many others that aren't 'air-minded' miss about it. The thread about 'Most decisive weapon of WWII' was GREATLY instructive to me about what is believed and assumed about airpower by people that are knowledgable about other forms of armed force.

The FUNCTION of air forces is quite obviously different from what you're used to, and the capabilities are obviously poles apart, offering massive advantages, while having few relative disadvantages, compared to surface forces. Usually, airpower is misunderstood to have a 'support' function, when in reality, airpower is a PRIME warfighting force in the modern era. (I didn't say 'the only', nor most important', so don't make an argument that supposes that's what I'm saying. But it IS capable of winning wars in ways no surface force can match, or resist, or prevent.)

Personally, and I don't say this to be insulting (but you and Gunny and others that simply do not appreciate what airpower really does might read it that way), I assert that the reason you poo-poo this article or the decisive nature of heavy bombardment in WWII is because you see the air component of a force as an auxiliary, as combat support, as a facilitator of the REAL arbiter of battle: GROUND POWER.

Well, I think Bill Whitten sees what you don't. I also assert something else: this is WAY too deep a subject - with an emotional component to it to complicate communication's meaningfulness further - to take place like this, in an over-'n'-out fashion on a message board. We're simply going to talk past each other, and mis-understand each other's points (although I'm just arrogant enough to believe I 'get' you, but you're not understanding ME). I bet we'd have more fun and piss each other off a lot less if we could give-'n'-take face-to-face, so I'll leave it with this: I like you, I respect you, and I am NOT selling you short (as that would be a mistake). But I can see clearly where you're not seeing this relationship clearly.

Hope we're still mates, and you're not going to take this as a slap at you. It isn't.

citanon

Having never served in the military, here's what I get out of this article.

In essence, I think the author is stating that to win decisively, cheaply and quickly in a modern environment, the US needs to act agilely at all levels tactical and strategic and in all aspects of warfare, which includes the psychological, human, political, and media aspects. He advocates agility through the OODA cycle. Importantly, we should also understand the OODA cycle of the enemy combatants and non-combatant actors, such as the civilian populace.

Parts of his article digress from supporting his central thesis or use examples that dubiously support his conclusions. By large, I agree him on the agility part but disagree on the universal applicability of OODA, and I think we can understand how OODA can break down by trying to think about what we have to do if we want to have a computer program execute OODA in the air combat situation that inspired OODA.

1. The computer needs to know the relevant variables it needs observe and manipulate in order to successfully prosecute air combat.
2. The computer has to have a wealth of information regarding the enemy aircraft to the extent that it has better information than the enemy and there are no gross surprises such as an unseen, second enemy aircraft.
3. The computer has to know what constitutes adequate observation and orientation and the minimum amount of time it needs to collect enough data. In this case it's simple. You just need to wait long enough to get a good position and velocity vector reading on yourself and the enemy aircraft.
4. The computer has to have a model that predicts the enemy behavior. The model does not have to be correct forever. It just can't be grossly erroneous within the time it takes to execute the OODA cycle.
5. The computer has to have a model that predicts how its own actions can affect the situation. The requirement here is also that the model cannot be grossly incorrect within one OODA cycle.
6. The computer then needs to synthesize the data and process the information to make a decision.
7. Finally, it needs to have an aircraft with sufficient performance to execute the necessary action.

OODA works in air combat because the information requirements are straightforward, the modeling is relatively simple, the processing is performed by well trained and experience airmen, and the action portion is executed through a platform well matched to the requirements. However, this is not necessarily the case for the situations encountered in other areas of warfare.

During OIF, it was clear that the commanders needed information regarding the size, position and dispositions of the enemy force. It was also clear that commanders could effectively affect the outcome of battle by controlling the maneuver and engagement of the enemy by coalition forces. This fullfilled requirement 1. The the vast capability of the coalition for collection and synthesis of the pertinent information fulfilled requirement 2.

The coalition commanders' extensive knowledge and experience in conventional warfare fullfilled requirements 3, 4, and 5 and allowed them to make good decisions, a la requirement 6 while the speed, precision and firepower of coalition forces fulfilled requirement 7.

In contrast, coalition air dominance and air attacks blinded enemy intelligence collection, disrupted enemy communications, and denied maneuver freedom to enemy forces, preventing the enemy from fulfilling requirements 2, 6 and 7. Coalition use of deception and surprise denied the enemy requirements 4 and 5.

In essence, the coalition had the opportunity to utilize OODA at the theater level. Was this done? Gen. Tommy Franks' autobiography contends that this was essentially what happened during the operational phase of the war.

However, look at what happened after major combat operations were "over" and the insurgency began. No one, initially, had a good idea of how the insurgency works, what factors were relevant or where the centers of gravity were. Also, there was a dearth of intelligence regarding the identity of insurgents and their goals and motivations. Yet, initially, the military attempted to use conventional tactics to supress the insurgents. IMO, this was actually case where OODA type thinking was applied without any of the requirements for the success of OODA being met.

This was a case where the commanders needed to sit down and rethink the pertinent variables and construct new models of the situation. This is essentially the type of take-your-time, wise decision making that OODA discourages. In a dog fight, you'd be dead if you did this, but for the insurgency, this was what was needed and what officers like Gen Patreus did.

So was OODA wrong for addressing the insurgency? Not quite.

First, the President and the Secretary of Defense could have moved more quickly to find commanders and strategies capable of addressing the insurgency. In essence, the variables they could tweak was the commander in charge and the measures of success were the political and strategic indicators of whether we were moving towards success. In contrast, one could argue that Lincoln practiced OODA at the strategic level by moving much more quicly to change commanders during the Civil War. Also, Bush and his advisors moved too quickly to throw their support behind an elected Iraqi government, thereby denying themselves the agility to execute OODA at the political level.

Second, at the local and human level, OODA was key the Iraqi population's behavior. People needed to use available indicators to decide rapidly whether to support insurgents or American forces, and the "speed" and "agility" with which they changed adjusted to the blowing of the wind decided whether they lived or died. Understanding the OODA of the populace and local power brokers was key to understanding how to win the insurgency.

Three, by pushing American troops to engage with the local populace, the Surge and the use of Concerned Citizens has pushed OODA down to the tactical level, where individual companies or battalions are better placed to collect intelligence through Iraqi allies, access local local conditions and local needs and respond rapidly and appropriately in an OODA type cycle and the better educated, more disciplined, more ethical and more resource rich US forces are in a far better position to agilely respond to local conditions than AQI.

In the end I think agility in decision making and execution are key, but OODA itself is not always applicable. In those times, one needs to back up and think deeply about the variables and the models needed to understand the situation. At least, that's this scientist's point of view.

Shek

Citanon,

GEN Franks oversells this based on research done since the war. Slide #7 gets directly at this:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...warcollege.pdf

I think your analysis that OODA is simply a process and that it's the decisions made within the process that are key is spot on.

Shek

No worries, it's all good.

I don't disagree that air power can be a prime warfighting force. It won the Cold War, as the deterrence provided by SAC forced communism to fight in the hinterlands rather than attempt a more direct approach. It was prime in Afghanistan (however, the issue I have with the article re: Afganistan is not about whether SOF or air power was king, but the fallacious implications that derive from ignoring the necessity of having an indigenous proxy force that provided both a national leader for the new regime and gave an indigenous face to the operation, which gave it legitimacy).

The reason I poo-poo this article is not because of some bias against air power, but because it is an article written about land power than tries to graft Boyd as an inspiration/causation for success while using poor/inaccurate examples. If there is any bias against Boyd, it is because of hero warship of him by many 4GW folks.

If you want to try and point towards people who influenced strategy in Iraq, then you need to read Galula, Kilcullen, Nagl, Cohen, Crane. If you need a strategic inspiration, then read Sun Tzu and link it to this article - http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...pr06/Cohen.pdf

The problem is that I haven't seen you layout anywhere in the thread what the great insights are, i.e., what he sees and what I don't. You moved the argument to some abstract air power vs. land power level without drilling in on the specifics of the article.

If you read my post, I don't ascribe any malacious intent steming from the seemingly air power lens - simply that the examples are weak, indicating that the author has an air power lens. In the end, my contention is that either the insights are nothing new and are readily available and accessible to those who have read Sun Tzu, or are not new and already part of doctrine (OODA). Furthermore, it ignores the real derivation/inspiration of the surge strategy and the on the ground learning and decisions that have evolved. So, my issues with the article lay more heavily on the historical accuracy side and not necessarily with critiquing the validity of his general points. By focusing on Boyd, it sells the real sources short and points readers who may not be familiar with Galula, Kilcullen, Nagl, et al, in the wrong direction.