ELECTION 2008 | The Pub | The Field Mess | The Staff College | Bookmark WAB



Go Back   World Affairs Board > Military Forums > The Field Mess
Register FAQ WAB RSS Feed Forum GuidelinesMembers List Search Today's Posts Mark Forums Read

Greetings, and welcome to the World Affairs Board!

The World Affairs Board is one of the premier forums for the discussion of the pressing geopolitical issues of our time. Topics include foreign & defense policy, international security, military developments, weapons proliferation, terrorism, international strategic affairs, and politics. Our membership includes many from military, defense industry, and government backgrounds with expert knowledge on a wide range of topics. Registration is fast, simple and absolutely free so why not register a World Affairs Board account and join our community today?
Reply
 
LinkBack Thread Tools Rate Thread Display Modes
Old 04-27-2005, 07:19 AM   #61 (permalink)
dave angel
Military Professional
 
Join Date: 11-05-04
Location: Glasgow
Posts: 758
Country:
Quote:
Originally Posted by dalem
Here's another semi-annoying Dale question, not specifically restricted to Canada:

Understanding the budget realities that an ally like Canada (maybe substitute "the UK" too) faces, why don't we just sell you guys a baby CVBG? I mean, we've put 2 into mothballs or the boneyard in the last decade and it looks like we're trying to dump the J F Kennedy too. And we cashiered all the Spruance class DDGs. So...

We sell Canada a medium-old CV/CVN and a few good AAW escorts for a dollar, the stip being that Canada buys a new F-18 wing from us to fly off of the darned thing. Load it up with helos and jet fuel and you're part of the CVBG team at bargain basement prices.

Now I know that there must be huge infrastructure and/or operational costs involved, but it's still cheaper than building from scratch, and better than losing net assets, right? What am I missing?

-dale
the 'bulk buy' option is an obvious solution to the telephone number like costs of modern defence programs, but two issues - for all countries - crop up: by building our own equipment we maintain our own national technological and defence industries and to a fair degree we keep the money at home, a more 'defency' issue is that we aren't reliant on another country for spares and support - the obvious example is iran, on monday they have a very modern, capable air force with great support from the providing country, on tuesday that support evaporates and by friday nothing works. in an age where military systems are supposed to last for 30 years and more no one can take the risk of support drying up and being left with very expensive paperweights.

personally i would be quite happy for the RAF and RN to cancel the Typhoon and JSF and buy new build F15 E/T's for the RAF and AMRAAM capable Harrier GR9's for the RAF and RN, i'm sure they would be cheaper and they are obviously combat proven. if the F15's could be built in the UK then we would be able to say we were spending the money at home and not reliant upon any future US government for spares and upgrade technology.

as for the carrier idea, would an ex-USN carrier take the 30 odd years of expected service the RN would want out of it? again we come to the problem of spending the money at home - it would be very difficult to politically justify buying ex-USN stock while british shipyards sit idle.

going back to the roles of british/canadian/australian forces with relation to US forces, perhaps if the US could provide both long-term assurance of product support and cheap licencing agreements for new home country built assets the three countries could plough the savings they make into an serious increase in the areas of military power that they do particularly well - like infantry, special forces and ASW.

my understanding is that the US doesn't need x hundred new fighter intercepter / strike aircraft from its allies, it needs highy trained, well equiped and well lead infantry and special forces and air forces that are capable of moving large formations over long distances at no-notice and navies that are capable of handling sierra leone/east timor type operations.

the days when britain (for example) could maintain a large force that was the equal of all others in every sphere of warfare are long gone, so if the US could allow its partners to buy high end equipment on attractive licencing agreements those partners could perhaps concentrate on the areas that they do well in and the US needs assistance in.

a healthy and logical division of labour for the good of all - see, told you i was a communist!
dave angel is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-27-2005, 15:04 PM   #62 (permalink)
troung
A Self Important
Senior Contributor
 
troung's Avatar
 
Join Date: 08-03-03
Posts: 4,304
Country:
Quote:
my understanding is that the US doesn't need x hundred new fighter intercepter / strike aircraft from its allies, it needs highy trained, well equiped and well lead infantry and special forces and air forces that are capable of moving large formations over long distances at no-notice and navies that are capable of handling sierra leone/east timor type operations.
As for allied air forces we need people that can handle certain missions. Most of the German air force is of little use other then their EW/SEAD Tornados. So we generally want planes and pilots that can handle a special niche and of course PGM strike missions are always welcomed. It's like the UK in ODS sending over Tornado ADVs which was nice and all but the planes patrolled behind the lines while the Strike Tornados took a big part in the operations. The Mirage 2000D is not the worlds most capable striker but all the pilots do is really train for that mission so they are damn good, we had Mirage 2000Ds flying over Kosovo and Afghanistan but the Mirage 2000Cs sat around.

Quote:
personally i would be quite happy for the RAF and RN to cancel the Typhoon and JSF and buy new build F15 E/T's for the RAF and AMRAAM capable Harrier GR9's for the RAF and RN, i'm sure they would be cheaper and they are obviously combat proven. if the F15's could be built in the UK then we would be able to say we were spending the money at home and not reliant upon any future US government for spares and upgrade technology.
UK did look at the F-15 back in the day but went for the Tornado ADV. Not the best move as the Tornado was even after "entering service" not even marginally combat ready for years (cement block in the nose rather then a radar). The JSF buy is good as that would give them a modern plane for the future and allow them to work close with the USA and others.

---------
--------
OOE

Quote:
I'm thinking that more of a distraction than anything else. The enemy is too busy shooting at them to notice us bellycrawlers. However, it does at least make us aware of the potential and limitations of tac rotor aviation.
That is an expensive distraction at best. Being not well protected the helicopter would have to keep well out of the line of fire or risk being killed and becoming a distraction for the ground forces which would have to rescue the crew.

Quote:
You know how long it took me to buck for a raise?
Probably longer then I have been alive

Quote:
Most of it went into operations. We did six out of the blue unexpected wartime operations (Kuwait, Somalia, E Timor, Kosovo, 11 Sept, Afghanistan) with an actual decrease in the budgets.
I know I was just messing around.

Quote:
The Canadian Forces-including their national assets (such as headquarters, surveillance, and command and control), as well as maritime, air, land and special operations forces-will proceed with specific measures to support the transformation concepts described above.
Looks like a bigger role for Canadian Special Forces units.

Quote:
complete the modernization of the CF-18 through the acquisition of a satellite-guided air-to-ground weapons capability to reflect the increased focus on close support to ground forces, while retaining its air-to-air capability at existing levels;
Yeah that had been what I was talking about. Before Kosovo and such the CF-18s were not of much use in CAS/all weather strike only gettign LGBs in 1999. With some JDAMs and such they could take an important role in a future Afghanistan type event.

Quote:
The LEO C2s would be around to at least 2015 by which time simple wear and tear would render it inoperative.
Well from what I had read the MGS was supposed to replace them. There are second hand Leopard 2s and M-1s around and many NATO forces are picking up Leopard 2s. And if they buy a new tank they could put the Leo-C2s on the market as 3rd world nations are picking those up.

Last edited by troung : 04-27-2005 at 15:08 PM.
troung is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-27-2005, 15:17 PM   #63 (permalink)
Wraith601
Title Classified
Senior Contributor
 
Join Date: 11-23-04
Location: Mississippi
Posts: 1,144
Country:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers
All of these are really classified as tank destroyers and not tanks, lacking sufficient armour in a running gun fight and that's what really concerns me in bringing these things into theatre. As inf spt, they have their place and can even put T-90s at risk.

However, there's an old cliche, if it looks like a tank, it will be used as a tank, even if it is not a tank.
What ytpe of armor would you like to see in Canadian service?
Wraith601 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-27-2005, 15:44 PM   #64 (permalink)
dave angel
Military Professional
 
Join Date: 11-05-04
Location: Glasgow
Posts: 758
Country:
Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
UK did look at the F-15 back in the day but went for the Tornado ADV. Not the best move as the Tornado was even after "entering service" not even marginally combat ready for years (cement block in the nose rather then a radar). The JSF buy is good as that would give them a modern plane for the future and allow them to work close with the USA and others.
i'm lead to believe that in the late 70's we looked at the F14 and F15 for the air defence role while the USAF looked at the tornado GR1 for a strike/SEAD aircraft. i think that the US government decided to buy 'all american' in principle and not go for the tornado in particular and so the UK govt decided to not buy either of the american aircraft in retaliation, which is why the tornado ADV appeared with its 'blue circle' radar (blue circle is a british cement company and all british aircraft radars are called blue xxx!).

the tornado ADV has been a real disappointment compared to the F15/F14, though the tornado GR1/GR4 has been a major success. unfortunately europe is likely to continue producing limited numbers of expensive aircraft/ships/tanks/rifles while we appear unable to sell equipment to the US because of its 'buy american' policy.

if you won't buy anything from us we're unlikely to want to buy anything from you - losing high tech, high paid jobs while paying £x billion to the US for products the public rarely sees isn't a vote winner.

perfect example: the ALARM missile, significantly better (and combat proven) than the HARM, but the US won't consider it because its not a US product. the last european design bought by the US military was the Harrier - in the 70's.

we would buy from you - on the bulk order principle - if you would by from us, but its just one way traffic, and thats not politically sustainable. hence the SA80/Tornado ADV/Typhoon jobs creation program.
dave angel is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-27-2005, 16:55 PM   #65 (permalink)
Franco Lolan
Senior Contributor
 
Join Date: 09-29-04
Posts: 789
Quote:
Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers
Our only possible military response would be a naval task group to support a USN CVBG.



Would the Canadian PM have this occur? Or is the Parliament needed? (Does Canada have somehting along the lines of a War Powers Act) What is the political stance? Would Canada react instantaneously or wait and see international opinion?
Franco Lolan is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-27-2005, 21:11 PM   #66 (permalink)
Officer of Engineers
Military Professional
Moderator
Scotch taster
 
Join Date: 08-06-03
Posts: 16,660
Country:
Quote:
Originally Posted by dave angel
the days when britain (for example) could maintain a large force that was the equal of all others in every sphere of warfare are long gone, so if the US could allow its partners to buy high end equipment on attractive licencing agreements those partners could perhaps concentrate on the areas that they do well in and the US needs assistance in.

a healthy and logical division of labour for the good of all - see, told you i was a communist!
I will make no bones about this. We're just spear carriers. However, from both the political desirability and a military necessity, we have to be able to conduct independent combat operations at least at the brigade level and below. New Zealand is in somewhat of a crisis in that I cannot see them deploying beyond a re-enforced company for the near future. Operations HARPOON by 3 PPCLI and SNIPE by 45Cmdo comes to mind.

Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
That is an expensive distraction at best. Being not well protected the helicopter would have to keep well out of the line of fire or risk being killed and becoming a distraction for the ground forces which would have to rescue the crew.
You don't like it. I don't like it. However, it is the one piece of puzzle that we're missing in a combined arms operation, however much I hate the fact that we're using a donkey to do the job of a Porche. It's filled. Not good. But filled.

Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
Looks like a bigger role for Canadian Special Forces units.
The Special Operations Group will be our initial response force. I'm not sure it will be the right force, essentially, turning the JTF II from Black Ops (A Squadron)/Green Ops (B Squadron) Force to an Airborne (Ranger) force. On taskings, I expect the light infantry battalions to flush out the numbers as required.

Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
Yeah that had been what I was talking about. Before Kosovo and such the CF-18s were not of much use in CAS/all weather strike only gettign LGBs in 1999. With some JDAMs and such they could take an important role in a future Afghanistan type event.
To be honest, I'm not too comfortable with my birdbrains crapping near me. They've been hunting pigeons for far too long to change their menu to rats.

Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
Well from what I had read the MGS was supposed to replace them. There are second hand Leopard 2s and M-1s around and many NATO forces are picking up Leopard 2s. And if they buy a new tank they could put the Leo-C2s on the market as 3rd world nations are picking those up.
Two vehicles are replacing the role of the LEO C2s. The MGS and Multi-Effect Fire Vehicle (the ADAT (Air Defence, Anti-Tank missile system) on a LAV III Chasis). We are going to have one armoured regiment of two armoured squadrons, one AT squadron, and one arm'd recee sqn. The problem about introducing a tank or even retaining tanks is that it effectively rendered the home regt cbt ineffective. The maintenance pool must be deployed with the force. In the past, we had three pools with 3 arm'd regts (transformed into one single arm'd regt and two arm'd recee regts).

Quote:
Originally Posted by Wraith601
What ytpe of armor would you like to see in Canadian service?
What I like to see? Star Wars Imperial Walkers. It would be nice not to have to roll over a mine and just step over it. Lasers would be damned cool.

However, realistically and fitting within our budget. The M1s and "borrowing" the American garage when in theatre. This is assuming (and not an invalid one) that we will be serving alongside the Americans for a long time to come. Aside from that, the CHALLENGER and borrow a British garage when in theatre.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Franco Lolan
Would the Canadian PM have this occur? Or is the Parliament needed? (Does Canada have somehting along the lines of a War Powers Act) What is the political stance? Would Canada react instantaneously or wait and see international opinion?
Parliment has to be notified, not necessarily approval saved for the Declaration of War.
__________________
Chimo
Officer of Engineers is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-27-2005, 21:37 PM   #67 (permalink)
troung
A Self Important
Senior Contributor
 
troung's Avatar
 
Join Date: 08-03-03
Posts: 4,304
Country:
Quote:
You don't like it. I don't like it. However, it is the one piece of puzzle that we're missing in a combined arms operation, however much I hate the fact that we're using a donkey to do the job of a Porche. It's filled. Not good. But filled.
Yeah I knwo the role is now filled, but I actually wonder if they would even be deployed and used as gunships in a joint operation say with the UK and USA.

The most I could see would be a ticket punching to prove it works and leave the important armed helicopter roles to AH-64s from the USA/UK/Dutch.

Quote:
To be honest, I'm not too comfortable with my birdbrains crapping near me. They've been hunting pigeons for far too long to change their menu to rats.
I don't want to sound like I am trashing the CF.

But the big problem with the CAF CF-18A/Bs was that after the cold war they fell far behind and lost the ability to really hunt pigeons. The weapons to conduct that have since become dated like the AIM-7M.

As for hunting rats they will need to go to the basics and through joint training we could bring them up to standard on killing rats regardless of the weather. With the LGBs and JDAMs (along with dumb things) they would be able to better support joint operations. Of course thta would require a chnage in the focus of their training.

But if anything we need the CF-18s more for killing rats then hunting pigeons. Pigeons the USAF would be cherry picking anyhow in time of war. Having them hunt pigeons is making them CAP over safe airspace and burn off fuel but hunting rats makes them usefull.

Quote:
The Special Operations Group will be our initial response force. I'm not sure it will be the right force, essentially, turning the JTF II from Black Ops (A Squadron)/Green Ops (B Squadron) Force to an Airborne (Ranger) force. On taskings, I expect the light infantry battalions to flush out the numbers as required.
Will JTF-II be fleshed out to really take on a Rangerish role under this plan? They said enlarge but IIRC JTF-II has only 250 men they would need more numbers to keep doing what they do plus have a Ranger role. I would not want to break a spear by using it when one should use a hammer. And the Black Ops would have a different skill set (CT) then needed for line combat and would be wasted fighting a toe to toe battle when a LIB should be doing so. And the Green Ops are more like Green Berets. I could see copying what the UK is doing and forming a Ranger unit out of a line unit but not "downgrading" JTF-II into Rangers.
troung is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 12:17 PM   #68 (permalink)
Officer of Engineers
Military Professional
Moderator
Scotch taster
 
Join Date: 08-06-03
Posts: 16,660
Country:
Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
Yeah I knwo the role is now filled, but I actually wonder if they would even be deployed and used as gunships in a joint operation say with the UK and USA.

The most I could see would be a ticket punching to prove it works and leave the important armed helicopter roles to AH-64s from the USA/UK/Dutch.
In coalition ops, the Griffens would most likely be tasked to the rear while other coalition assets be tasked up front.

Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
I don't want to sound like I am trashing the CF.
As long as you remain legitimate in your points, I do not mind at all. In fact, I welcome it.

Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
Will JTF-II be fleshed out to really take on a Rangerish role under this plan? They said enlarge but IIRC JTF-II has only 250 men they would need more numbers to keep doing what they do plus have a Ranger role.

I would not want to break a spear by using it when one should use a hammer. And the Black Ops would have a different skill set (CT) then needed for line combat and would be wasted fighting a toe to toe battle when a LIB should be doing so. And the Green Ops are more like Green Berets. I could see copying what the UK is doing and forming a Ranger unit out of a line unit but not "downgrading" JTF-II into Rangers.
JTF II is supposed to expand to 450, battalion strength. I don't have the info as to
how much expansion is black ops or green ops. I'm also not sure where they're getting the bodies as only Sergeants and up are qualified to join that unit. I know I would get mighty pissed if they keep stealing my good sgts away from me. Sgts that I spent time and effort in building.

We do have 3 jump coys in each of the 3 light inf bns. There has been alot of push to reform the Canadian Airborne Regiment and we are getting 5000 extra bodies.

However, I do remember all the problems with the CAR, sitting around doing nothing because they're so "elite" while the rest of the force got overstretched on deployments. When they were finally tasked with a mission, Somalia, they screwed that up royally.
Officer of Engineers is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 14:35 PM   #69 (permalink)
troung
A Self Important
Senior Contributor
 
troung's Avatar
 
Join Date: 08-03-03
Posts: 4,304
Country:
Quote:
As long as you remain legitimate in your points, I do not mind at all. In fact, I welcome it.
Thanks and I hope I am remaining legitimate.

Quote:
In coalition ops, the Griffens would most likely be tasked to the rear while other coalition assets be tasked up front.
Well the role for attack helicopters in the CAF would be filled. Yet when we get down to it they would probably do as much as Portugal's F-16s in Kosovo, burning up fuel on really useless patrols. Kind of just sending them for the sake of sending them.

Quote:
JTF II is supposed to expand to 450, battalion strength. I don't have the info as to how much expansion is black ops or green ops. I'm also not sure where they're getting the bodies as only Sergeants and up are qualified to join that unit. I know I would get mighty pissed if they keep stealing my good sgts away from me. Sgts that I spent time and effort in building.
I wouldn't think it worthwhile the use Black or Green to be Rangers. Plus with the lowest ranking guys being sergeants you get very NCO heavy. I guess there would be a backlash to lose the best NCOs.

Quote:
We do have 3 jump coys in each of the 3 light inf bns. There has been alot of push to reform the Canadian Airborne Regiment and we are getting 5000 extra bodies.However, I do remember all the problems with the CAR, sitting around doing nothing because they're so "elite" while the rest of the force got overstretched on deployments.
I guess those jump companies could be turned into a rapid responce Ranger unit and to support JTF-II field operations. Or at least the officers and NCOs used as a cadre to provide a group to be formed around.

Probably have to call the "Raiders" or "Commandos" as I think Canada has Rangers who patrol the north. Raiders might sound to "warlike" . Britain is forming a Ranger unit out of leg infantry to support SAS operations and the Australian have done the same. Plus those would not be as NCO heavy as a Green unit turned into Rangers.

Quote:
When they were finally tasked with a mission, Somalia, they screwed that up royally.
I have never gotten the whole story behind that.
troung is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 15:23 PM   #70 (permalink)
dave angel
Military Professional
 
Join Date: 11-05-04
Location: Glasgow
Posts: 758
Country:
troung, i think the 'ranger' idea for 1PARA has been privately binned. 'they who must not be named' have been concerned for many years that 'they' are becoming part of the 'para mafia' and that previously more softly-softly tactics are being pushed aside for more aggressive, para-like tactics.

IIRC, 20 odd years ago about a third of the successful recruits to 'them' were from the PARA reg, the rest were signallers, engineers, other infantry, tankies, cooks and bottle washers. its now going towards the 65% mark and the senior management - deliberately non-para people - are getting very concerned about a change of ethos within the regiment and it affecting their ability to do certain tasks - the 'greyer' tasks rather than the 'greener' ones.

we think that the 'ranger' role has now been made into a roulement job as another btn has been discreetly slated for the role in 9 months or so.

TBH its a bit of a waste of a para btn anyway - guarding an airfield?
dave angel is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 16:10 PM   #71 (permalink)
troung
A Self Important
Senior Contributor
 
troung's Avatar
 
Join Date: 08-03-03
Posts: 4,304
Country:
Quote:
troung, i think the 'ranger' idea for 1PARA has been privately binned. 'they who must not be named' have been concerned for many years that 'they' are becoming part of the 'para mafia' and that previously more softly-softly tactics are being pushed aside for more aggressive, para-like tactics.
I had thought it was supposed to be a non Para unit to become the "Rangers"?

Quote:
we think that the 'ranger' role has now been made into a roulement job as another btn has been discreetly slated for the role in 9 months or so.
I had heard that part of it was to keep around a battalion which was to be "binned" and by making them into "Rangers" would keep them on the books.

And excellent post

OT but what unit did you serve in?
troung is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 18:18 PM   #72 (permalink)
Anon
New Member
 
Join Date: 08-03-03
Posts: 0


Damn, who did that?

On whose request? Do i have a fan club or something?

And WTF is up with the Druganov in the foreground?!?!?!?

Ack!
Anon is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 18:41 PM   #73 (permalink)
dave angel
Military Professional
 
Join Date: 11-05-04
Location: Glasgow
Posts: 758
Country:
troung,

scaleys and slime - the army grapevine...

the original idea was for 1PARA to be held in the SF support role on a permanent basis - come under DSF, in the SF budget etc... but there wouldn't be any saving of inf btns from the ones slated for disbandment.

'they' put the brakes on the plan, both for the 'mafia' reason and that any unit slated to support UKSF is going to become both a transit camp for aspirant SF folk and a dumping ground for those not progressing anywhere else. thats not a good way to run a battalion and it got an enormous amount of stick from within PARA reg who - rightly - see using a para btn as airport guards as a total waste of very valuable resources.

any infantry btn in the british army can support the SF and they do so regularly, it increases the breadth of knowledge and experience in the wider army and keeps a lid on the 'two armies' concept that PARA reg have been known to promote.

variety is the spice of life, what makes british infantry battalions so useful is that they can jump from police support in northern ireland to mountain warfare in afghanistan to peacekeeping in kosovo because they will have fullfilled similar roles within the operational memory of the battalion (20yrs or so), hiving off a battalion so it only does task X results in a stale battalion that says 'its not my job!'.

Last edited by dave angel : 04-28-2005 at 19:05 PM.
dave angel is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 19:22 PM   #74 (permalink)
Officer of Engineers
Military Professional
Moderator
Scotch taster
 
Join Date: 08-06-03
Posts: 16,660
Country:
Quote:
Originally Posted by M21Sniper


Damn, who did that?

On whose request? Do i have a fan club or something?
Accentix

Hey
Officer of Engineers is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 04-28-2005, 21:20 PM   #75 (permalink)
Officer of Engineers
Military Professional
Moderator
Scotch taster
 
Join Date: 08-06-03
Posts: 16,660
Country:
Quote:
Originally Posted by troung
I have never gotten the whole story behind that.
To be fair, the CAR did accomplish all its OBJ in theatre.

Quote:
Report of the Somalia Commission of InquiryEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From its earliest moments the operation went awry. The soldiers, with
some notable exceptions, did their best. But ill-prepared and
rudderless, they fell inevitably into the mire that became the Somalia
debacle. As a result, a proud legacy was dishonoured.

Systems broke down and organizational discipline crumbled. Such
systemic or institutional faults cannot be divorced from leadership
responsibility, and the leadership errors in the Somalia mission were
manifold and fundamental: the systems in place were inadequate and
deeply flawed; practices that fuelled rampant careerism and placed
individual ambition ahead of the needs of the mission had become
entrenched; the oversight and supervision of crucial areas of
responsibility were deeply flawed and characterized by the most
superficial of assessments; even when troubling events and disturbing
accounts of indiscipline and thuggery were known, there was disturbing
inaction or the actions that were taken exacerbated and deepened the
problems; planning, training and overall preparations fell far short
of what was required; subordinates were held to standards of
accountability by which many of those above were not prepared to
abide. Our soldiers searched, often in vain, for leadership and
inspiration.

Many of the leaders called before us to discuss their roles in the
various phases of the deployment refused to acknowledge error. When
pressed, they blamed their subordinates who, in turn, cast
responsibility upon those below them. They assumed this posture
reluctantly - but there is no honour to be found here - only after
their initial claims, that the root of many of the most serious
problems resided with "a few bad apples", proved hollow.

We can only hope that Somalia represents the nadir of the fortunes of
the Canadian Forces. There seems to be little room to slide lower. One
thing is certain, however: left uncorrected, the problems that
surfaced in the desert in Somalia and in the boardrooms at National
Defence Headquarters will continue to spawn military ignominy. The
victim will be Canada and its international reputation.

The following is a summary of the final report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. To the best
of our ability, the report fulfils our obligation under various orders
in council to investigate the chain of command system, the leadership,
discipline, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces, as well as
the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence, in
respect of the Canadian Forces' participation in the United Nations
peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1992-93.

During the deployment of Canadian troops, events transpired in Somalia
that impugned the reputations of individuals, Canada's military and,
indeed, the nation itself. Those events, some of them by now well
known to most Canadians, included the shooting of Somali intruders at
the Canadian compound in Belet Huen, the beating death of a teenager
in the custody of soldiers from 2 Commando of the Canadian Airborne
Regiment (CAR), an apparent suicide attempt by one of these Canadian
soldiers, and, after the mission, alleged episodes of withholding or
altering key information. Videotapes of repugnant hazing activities
involving members of the CAR also came to light. Some of these events,
with the protestations of a concerned military surgeon acting as a
catalyst, led the Government to call for this Inquiry. It is
significant that a military board of inquiry investigating the same
events was considered insufficient by the Government to meet Canadian
standards of public accountability, in part because the board of
inquiry was held in camera and with restricted terms of reference. A
full and open public inquiry was consequently established.

The principal conclusion of this Inquiry is that the mission went
badly wrong: systems broke down and organizational failure ensued. Our
Inquiry canvassed a broad array of issues and events and a massive
body of documentation and testimony to reach this unhappy
conclusion. Even then, in two major respects, we encountered
considerable difficulty in fulfilling our obligations.

First, the Inquiries Act provides the authority to subpoena witnesses,
hear testimony, hire expert counsel and advisers, and assess
evidence. Under normal circumstances, such powers should have given us
the confidence to present our findings without qualification. However,
on January 10,1997, while Parliament was adjourned, the Minister of
National Defence announced that Cabinet had decided that this Inquiry
had gone on long enough, that all hearings must be cut off on or about
March 31,1997, and that a report with recommendations was required by
June 30, 1997.

This was the response of the Government to our letter setting out
reporting date options and requesting an extension until at least
December 31, 1997, a period of time that would have allowed us to
conclude our search for the truth. That search had already involved,
among other things, thousands of hours of preparation and
cross-examination of the individuals who played various roles in the
Somalia deployment - and as time progressed, the superior officers to
whom they reported. As our investigation progressed, we were able to
move closer to the key centres of responsibility as we moved up the
chain of command. Unfortunately, the Minister's decision of January
10, 1997, eliminated any possibility of taking this course to its
logical conclusion and prevented us from fully expanding the focus to
senior officers throughout the chain of command who were responsible
before, during and after the Somalia mission.

The unexpected decision to impose a sudden time constraint on an
inquiry of this magnitude is without precedent in Canada. There is no
question that it has compromised and limited our search for the
truth. It will also inhibit and delay corrective action to the very
system that allowed the events to occur in the first place.

Second, the careful search for truth can be a painstaking and, at
times, frustrating experience. Public inquiries are equipped with the
best tools that our legal system can provide for pursuing the truth,
but even with access to significant procedural powers, answers may
prove elusive.

Even in those areas where we were able to conduct hearings - on the
pre-deployment phase of the mission and part of the in-theatre phase -
we were too often frustrated by the performance of witnesses whose
credibility must be questioned. The power to compel testimony was our
principal mechanism for determining what transpired in Somalia and at
National Defence Headquarters. Some 116 witnesses offered their
evidence to the Inquiry in open sessions broadcast on television
across Canada.

Giving testimony before a public inquiry is no trivial matter. It is a
test of personal and moral integrity that demands the courage to face
the facts and tell the truth. It also involves a readiness to be held
to account and a willingness to accept blame for one's own
wrongdoings. Many soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers
showed this kind of integrity. They demonstrated courage and fidelity
to duty, even when doing so meant acknowledging personal shortcoming
or voicing unwelcome criticism of their institution. We are cognizant
of institutional as well as peer pressure facing the witnesses who
appeared before us. These soldier-witnesses deserve society's respect
and gratitude for contributing in this way to the improvement of an
institution they obviously cherish.

However, we must also record with regret that on many occasions the
testimony of witnesses was characterized by inconsistency,
improbability, implausibility, evasiveness, selective recollection,
half- truths, and plain lies. Indeed, on some issues we encountered
what can only be described as a wall of silence. When several
witnesses behave in this manner, the wall of silence is evidently a
strategy of calculated deception.

Perhaps more troubling is the fact that many of the witnesses who
displayed these shortcomings were officers, non-commissioned officers,
and senior civil servants - individuals sworn to respect and promote
the values of leadership, courage, integrity, and accountability. For
these individuals, undue loyalty to a regiment or to the institution
of the military - or, even worse, naked self-interest - took
precedence over honesty and integrity. By conducting themselves in
this manner, these witnesses reneged on their duty to assist this
Inquiry in its endeavours. In the case of officers, this conduct
represents a breach of the undertakings set out in their commissioning
scroll.

Evasion and deception, which in our view were apparent with many of
the senior officers who testified before us, reveal much about the
poor state of leadership in our armed forces and the careerist
mentality that prevails at the Department of National Defence. These
senior people come from an elite group in which our soldiers and
Canadians generally are asked to place their trust and confidence.

We are well aware of recent reports submitted to the Minister of
National Defence addressing issues of leadership and management in the
Canadian Forces. Certainly, such studies and reports by informed
specialists are valuable. But only a full and rigorous public
examination of these issues, with the opportunity given to members of
the military to provide information and respond to criticism, can lead
to a thorough assessment of the scope and magnitude of these
problems. Only an extensive and probing analysis of the people,
events, and documentation involved can lead to focused and meaningful
change.

This Commission of Inquiry was established for that very purpose. Its
truncation leaves the Canadian public and the Canadian military with
many questions still unanswered. In fact, the decision to end the
Inquiry prematurely in itself raises new questions concerning
responsibility and accountability.

Although we have raised concerns about the credibility of witnesses
and leadership in the armed forces, it would be unfair to leave an
impression that the mission to Somalia was a total failure. While we
point out flaws in the system and shortfalls in leadership, we must
and wish to acknowledge that many soldiers and commanders performed
their duty with honour and integrity. Accordingly, we strongly support
the issuance of appropriate medals to those who served so well during
this troubled mission.

Moreover, we feel it is important in a report of this nature to
acknowledge the invaluable contribution that the Canadian Forces have
made, and continue to make, on Canada's behalf. Thousands of soldiers
have performed difficult and often dangerous tasks on our behalf in
pursuit of the nation's goals. Most often their dedication,
selflessness and professionalism have been taken for granted, because
these qualities have been assumed to be the norm. That is what made
the events involving Canadian Forces personnel in Somalia so
unpalatable. It is the sharp contrast between those events and the
accustomed performance of our military that elicited reactions of
alarm, outrage, and sadness among Canadians. In the end, we are
hopeful that our Inquiry will yield corrective measures to help
restore the Canadian Forces to the position of honour they have held
for so long.
Officer of Engineers is offline   Reply With Quote