Report of the Somalia Commission of InquiryEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From its earliest moments the operation went awry. The soldiers, with
some notable exceptions, did their best. But ill-prepared and
rudderless, they fell inevitably into the mire that became the Somalia
debacle. As a result, a proud legacy was dishonoured.
Systems broke down and organizational discipline crumbled. Such
systemic or institutional faults cannot be divorced from leadership
responsibility, and the leadership errors in the Somalia mission were
manifold and fundamental: the systems in place were inadequate and
deeply flawed; practices that fuelled rampant careerism and placed
individual ambition ahead of the needs of the mission had become
entrenched; the oversight and supervision of crucial areas of
responsibility were deeply flawed and characterized by the most
superficial of assessments; even when troubling events and disturbing
accounts of indiscipline and thuggery were known, there was disturbing
inaction or the actions that were taken exacerbated and deepened the
problems; planning, training and overall preparations fell far short
of what was required; subordinates were held to standards of
accountability by which many of those above were not prepared to
abide. Our soldiers searched, often in vain, for leadership and
inspiration.
Many of the leaders called before us to discuss their roles in the
various phases of the deployment refused to acknowledge error. When
pressed, they blamed their subordinates who, in turn, cast
responsibility upon those below them. They assumed this posture
reluctantly - but there is no honour to be found here - only after
their initial claims, that the root of many of the most serious
problems resided with "a few bad apples", proved hollow.
We can only hope that Somalia represents the nadir of the fortunes of
the Canadian Forces. There seems to be little room to slide lower. One
thing is certain, however: left uncorrected, the problems that
surfaced in the desert in Somalia and in the boardrooms at National
Defence Headquarters will continue to spawn military ignominy. The
victim will be Canada and its international reputation.
The following is a summary of the final report of the Commission of
Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. To the best
of our ability, the report fulfils our obligation under various orders
in council to investigate the chain of command system, the leadership,
discipline, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces, as well as
the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence, in
respect of the Canadian Forces' participation in the United Nations
peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1992-93.
During the deployment of Canadian troops, events transpired in Somalia
that impugned the reputations of individuals, Canada's military and,
indeed, the nation itself. Those events, some of them by now well
known to most Canadians, included the shooting of Somali intruders at
the Canadian compound in Belet Huen, the beating death of a teenager
in the custody of soldiers from 2 Commando of the Canadian Airborne
Regiment (CAR), an apparent suicide attempt by one of these Canadian
soldiers, and, after the mission, alleged episodes of withholding or
altering key information. Videotapes of repugnant hazing activities
involving members of the CAR also came to light. Some of these events,
with the protestations of a concerned military surgeon acting as a
catalyst, led the Government to call for this Inquiry. It is
significant that a military board of inquiry investigating the same
events was considered insufficient by the Government to meet Canadian
standards of public accountability, in part because the board of
inquiry was held in camera and with restricted terms of reference. A
full and open public inquiry was consequently established.
The principal conclusion of this Inquiry is that the mission went
badly wrong: systems broke down and organizational failure ensued. Our
Inquiry canvassed a broad array of issues and events and a massive
body of documentation and testimony to reach this unhappy
conclusion. Even then, in two major respects, we encountered
considerable difficulty in fulfilling our obligations.
First, the Inquiries Act provides the authority to subpoena witnesses,
hear testimony, hire expert counsel and advisers, and assess
evidence. Under normal circumstances, such powers should have given us
the confidence to present our findings without qualification. However,
on January 10,1997, while Parliament was adjourned, the Minister of
National Defence announced that Cabinet had decided that this Inquiry
had gone on long enough, that all hearings must be cut off on or about
March 31,1997, and that a report with recommendations was required by
June 30, 1997.
This was the response of the Government to our letter setting out
reporting date options and requesting an extension until at least
December 31, 1997, a period of time that would have allowed us to
conclude our search for the truth. That search had already involved,
among other things, thousands of hours of preparation and
cross-examination of the individuals who played various roles in the
Somalia deployment - and as time progressed, the superior officers to
whom they reported. As our investigation progressed, we were able to
move closer to the key centres of responsibility as we moved up the
chain of command. Unfortunately, the Minister's decision of January
10, 1997, eliminated any possibility of taking this course to its
logical conclusion and prevented us from fully expanding the focus to
senior officers throughout the chain of command who were responsible
before, during and after the Somalia mission.
The unexpected decision to impose a sudden time constraint on an
inquiry of this magnitude is without precedent in Canada. There is no
question that it has compromised and limited our search for the
truth. It will also inhibit and delay corrective action to the very
system that allowed the events to occur in the first place.
Second, the careful search for truth can be a painstaking and, at
times, frustrating experience. Public inquiries are equipped with the
best tools that our legal system can provide for pursuing the truth,
but even with access to significant procedural powers, answers may
prove elusive.
Even in those areas where we were able to conduct hearings - on the
pre-deployment phase of the mission and part of the in-theatre phase -
we were too often frustrated by the performance of witnesses whose
credibility must be questioned. The power to compel testimony was our
principal mechanism for determining what transpired in Somalia and at
National Defence Headquarters. Some 116 witnesses offered their
evidence to the Inquiry in open sessions broadcast on television
across Canada.
Giving testimony before a public inquiry is no trivial matter. It is a
test of personal and moral integrity that demands the courage to face
the facts and tell the truth. It also involves a readiness to be held
to account and a willingness to accept blame for one's own
wrongdoings. Many soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers
showed this kind of integrity. They demonstrated courage and fidelity
to duty, even when doing so meant acknowledging personal shortcoming
or voicing unwelcome criticism of their institution. We are cognizant
of institutional as well as peer pressure facing the witnesses who
appeared before us. These soldier-witnesses deserve society's respect
and gratitude for contributing in this way to the improvement of an
institution they obviously cherish.
However, we must also record with regret that on many occasions the
testimony of witnesses was characterized by inconsistency,
improbability, implausibility, evasiveness, selective recollection,
half- truths, and plain lies. Indeed, on some issues we encountered
what can only be described as a wall of silence. When several
witnesses behave in this manner, the wall of silence is evidently a
strategy of calculated deception.
Perhaps more troubling is the fact that many of the witnesses who
displayed these shortcomings were officers, non-commissioned officers,
and senior civil servants - individuals sworn to respect and promote
the values of leadership, courage, integrity, and accountability. For
these individuals, undue loyalty to a regiment or to the institution
of the military - or, even worse, naked self-interest - took
precedence over honesty and integrity. By conducting themselves in
this manner, these witnesses reneged on their duty to assist this
Inquiry in its endeavours. In the case of officers, this conduct
represents a breach of the undertakings set out in their commissioning
scroll.
Evasion and deception, which in our view were apparent with many of
the senior officers who testified before us, reveal much about the
poor state of leadership in our armed forces and the careerist
mentality that prevails at the Department of National Defence. These
senior people come from an elite group in which our soldiers and
Canadians generally are asked to place their trust and confidence.
We are well aware of recent reports submitted to the Minister of
National Defence addressing issues of leadership and management in the
Canadian Forces. Certainly, such studies and reports by informed
specialists are valuable. But only a full and rigorous public
examination of these issues, with the opportunity given to members of
the military to provide information and respond to criticism, can lead
to a thorough assessment of the scope and magnitude of these
problems. Only an extensive and probing analysis of the people,
events, and documentation involved can lead to focused and meaningful
change.
This Commission of Inquiry was established for that very purpose. Its
truncation leaves the Canadian public and the Canadian military with
many questions still unanswered. In fact, the decision to end the
Inquiry prematurely in itself raises new questions concerning
responsibility and accountability.
Although we have raised concerns about the credibility of witnesses
and leadership in the armed forces, it would be unfair to leave an
impression that the mission to Somalia was a total failure. While we
point out flaws in the system and shortfalls in leadership, we must
and wish to acknowledge that many soldiers and commanders performed
their duty with honour and integrity. Accordingly, we strongly support
the issuance of appropriate medals to those who served so well during
this troubled mission.
Moreover, we feel it is important in a report of this nature to
acknowledge the invaluable contribution that the Canadian Forces have
made, and continue to make, on Canada's behalf. Thousands of soldiers
have performed difficult and often dangerous tasks on our behalf in
pursuit of the nation's goals. Most often their dedication,
selflessness and professionalism have been taken for granted, because
these qualities have been assumed to be the norm. That is what made
the events involving Canadian Forces personnel in Somalia so
unpalatable. It is the sharp contrast between those events and the
accustomed performance of our military that elicited reactions of
alarm, outrage, and sadness among Canadians. In the end, we are
hopeful that our Inquiry will yield corrective measures to help
restore the Canadian Forces to the position of honour they have held
for so long.
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Originally Posted by dalem 
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. Britain is forming a Ranger unit out of leg infantry to support SAS operations and the Australian have done the same. Plus those would not be as NCO heavy as a Green unit turned into Rangers. 
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