Contrary Peter Principle

**Shek** · 25th July 2007 03:49

WTF?

Contrary Peter Principle (SWJ Blog)

Peter Principle: A colloquial principle of hierarchiology, stated as "In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence." Formulated by Dr. Laurence J. Peter in his 1968 book The Peter Principle, the principle pertains to the level of competence of the human resources in a hierarchical organization. The principle explains the upward, downward, and lateral movement of personnel within a hierarchically organized system of ranks.

Matt Bennett writes in Third Way Dispatch (The Peter Pandemic Takes Its Toll: H.R. McMaster is Passed Over) of a type of reverse Peter Principle where genuinely gifted and brilliant public servants who are kept far below the level to which they should ascend.

... There are, no doubt, scores of such talents in the federal bureaucracy, held down from their rightful rise by political calculation, petulance or oversight. But one recent and egregious example is the Pentagon’s failure to promote (for a second time) Army Colonel H.R. McMaster.

Now you may be thinking, wasn’t it H.R. McMaster that led the pacification of Tal Afar, an operation so successful that Bush devoted an entire speech to it just last year? Didn’t I read about McMaster’s brilliant strategy in a long New Yorker piece about him? Wasn’t it McMaster who won a Silver Star in the Gulf War, leading troops so bravely and well that Tom Clancy wrote it up? And surely it was McMaster who’s PhD dissertation became a hugely influential book, Dereliction of Duty, that the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs made required reading for senior military types?

Well brace yourself – the answer to all of your questions is yes. McMaster is a brilliant tactician, a decorated hero, a soldier’s soldier, and a master of the very kind of war we’re fighting in Iraq – the counterinsurgency. In fact, he’s back in Iraq now, helping soon-to-be-fall-guy David Petraeus try to fend off further disaster. But somehow McMaster’s “superiors” – the suits at the Pentagon who helped bring us the Fiasco that McMaster is attempting to clean up – have decided that he isn’t flag officer material...

**S-2** · 25th July 2007 05:21

This was intensely painful to read. Shek, when YOU'RE asking WTF, it's frightening to all of us. We count upon you to shed some light and clarity on an issue of this magnitude. Clearly, what can be said?

Correct me if wrong, but passed over a THIRD time will mandate his leaving the service. Something ferkin' stinks at echelons above reality (evidently never more appropriate).

"...helping soon-to-be-fall-guy David Petraeus..."

This is equally frightening. I've long suspected that he'll be left holding the bag while Casey sits as Chief of Staff.

WTF, indeed!

**Bigfella** · 25th July 2007 11:40

Originally Posted by S-2

This was intensely painful to read. Shek, when YOU'RE asking WTF, it's frightening to all of us. We count upon you to shed some light and clarity on an issue of this magnitude. Clearly, what can be said?

Correct me if wrong, but passed over a THIRD time will mandate his leaving the service. Something ferkin' stinks at echelons above reality (evidently never more appropriate).

"...helping soon-to-be-fall-guy David Petraeus..."

This is equally frightening. I've long suspected that he'll be left holding the bag while Casey sits as Chief of Staff.

WTF, indeed!

Hear Hear!!

Given some of those who have risen to great heights recently (Sanchez leaps to mind) this stinks big time. The elevation of Petraeus gave me some hope, but this has plonked me back on my ample behind.

Are there any dark mutterings as to why he has been passed over again? Has he pissed off the wrong person (or people), or is this just another example of mediocrity repressing brilliance?

I also share the concerns expressed about the fate of Petraeus. The cynic in me wonders if he was given his current job, not because of his successes, but because the mission was almost certain to end unhappily. If he does become the fall guy for this mess it will be a dark day for the US Military.

Petraeus seems to genuinely understand how to tackle Islamic extremism & how to combat it. He also seems to have surrounded himself with clever people who have original ideas. I always take this as a good sign - mediocre people are generally scared of bright people & try to avoid them. I would hate to see Petraeus end up like Percy Hobart - discarded just at the time when his unique knowledge was most needed.

**Blademaster** · 25th July 2007 21:58

Who was Percy Hobart?

And what was the book, Dereliction of Duty, about?

*Never mind* did a google on it. What did you think about the New York Times Book Review editor's comments regarding this book? Here it is:

The New York Times Book Review, Ronald Spector
The notion that a war like that in Vietnam, which began 14 years before the election of Kennedy and continued for six years after the end of the Johnson Administration, can be satisfactorily explained by reference to decisions made in Washington during late 1964 and early 1965 would seem at best questionable. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

**dave angel** · 25th July 2007 22:55

what did you expect? you can't possibly think that the people who, through the most self-serving moral cowardice and intellectual 'blind-eying', have brought the US Army from liberator of oppressed people with flowers thrown on tanks to the verge of defeated invader in four short years might actually allow the elevation of those who - by their actions - shine unwelcome light on the most fundamental abdication of moral responsibilty the US Military has seen in 40 years can you?

(and breathe. fcuk that was a long sentence....)

**Bigfella** · 26th July 2007 14:15

Blademaster,

Percy Hobart was a brilliant if prickly character who pioneered the practical application of new concepts of armoured warfare in the British Army. He was sacked on the eve of WW2 due largely to personality clashes with other officers.

Had he been listened to & kept in the service he would have been an invaluable asset during the Battle of France. As it was he was returned to service & did a fine job, but never attained the position he would have had he not been sacked. A waste of talent caused by less able officers who could not or would not come to terms with his ideas.

This link is to an article written in the 70s. Unfortunately it has been posted by a website known for its links to Nazi sympathisers & holocaust deniers (I found it on a google search). That said, I skimmed the article & it seems OK. A good read for anyone interested in WW2 or armoured warfare.

The Little-Known Story of Percy Hobart

**Arnold123** · 21st September 2007 09:09

Yeh! been there done that got the tea shirt and the wounds. Finally it doesn't matter how good you are it's all down to envy and pride and the shot in the back.

**soutie** · 21st September 2007 09:45

i bet you Mcmaster told other officers and generals how it is ,in other words had no time for bullshyt.

**Bluesman** · 21st September 2007 16:57

So, the guy that wrote the most scathing book on the policy wonks the Democrats used to screw up the Vietnam War is not confirmed by a majority-Democrat Congress.

And the sun came up in the east today, too - yet another sign of the Apocalypse.[/sarc]

**S-2** · 21st September 2007 19:59

"...is not confirmed by a majority-Democrat Congress."

Huh? If you mean McMaster, his name wasn't offered by D.A. for confirmation.

**WaltzingMatilda** · 22nd September 2007 23:17

I share many of the sentiments that have already been expressed and--in that spirit--offer up the following article written by Stephen Van Evera, entitled "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas."

http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/...lish_ideas.pdf

In brief, the article details the internal, bureaucratic dynamics that can hamper a states' foreign policy. From the intro:

Kenneth Waltz argues that states are socialized to the international system because they will be injured or even destroyed if they fail to adapt to it. I believe this claim is correct but should be qualified. Most states are indeed socialized to the international system, but their socialization is often slow and sometimes minimal because states widely fail to evaluate their own ideas and policies. Organization theorists note that organizations are poor self-evaluators; I argue here that states suffer the same syndrome.

This failure to self-evaluate impedes national learning and allows misperceptions to flourish. Myths, false propaganda, and anachronistic beliefs persist in the absence of strong evaluative institutions to test ideas against logic and evidence, weeding out those that fail. As a result national learning is slow and forgetting is quick. The external environment is perceived only dimly, through a fog of myths and misperceptions.

States that misperceive their environment in this way are bound to fail to adapt to it, even when the penalties of such failure are high. Blind to the incentives they face they will respond
inappropriately, even if they accept in principle the need to adapt.

**Ironduke** · 24th September 2007 11:28

From what I've read here and on the Small Wars forum, this man should have been promoted a long time ago. It's a shame that he hasn't been promoted. Hell, his book is required reading! With his dissertation being required reading among his superiors, couldn't he teach them a thing or two in the field as well?

**Ironduke** · 1st October 2007 19:54

I've got his book in my Amazon shopping cart along with the two books by Clausewitz. I'm thinking of adding a few more books before I check out. Can anybody give a recommendation on The Counterinsurgency Field Manual by Nagl?

**Shek** · 2nd October 2007 02:14

Originally Posted by Ironduke

I've got his book in my Amazon shopping cart along with the two books by Clausewitz. I'm thinking of adding a few more books before I check out. Can anybody give a recommendation on The Counterinsurgency Field Manual by Nagl?

I'd get the version of "On War" edited by Peter Paret as your intro to Clausewitz: Amazon.com: On War: Books: Carl von Clausewitz,Michael Eliot Howard,Peter Paret.

Instead of getting the COIN FM, which you can download electronically (Google FM 3-24 and make sure you've downloaded the 2006 version), I'd get the following to get a broader background in COIN and the US Army's experience with COIN:

Amazon.com: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Books: John A. Nagl,Peter J. Schoomaker - A great comparative study between how the British Army in Malaysia was able to adapt to the COIN environment through bottom up feedback while the US Army in Vietnam stifled initiative through a top down approach ill-suited to the demands of the environment.

Amazon.com: A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York Review Books Classics): Books: Alistair Horne - A great look at the French experience in Algeria. A desire to modernize the French Army by deGaulle saw Algeria as a distraction, the revelation of torture by French forces caused a huge drop in domestic support, and short-term gains of heavy-handed tactics won the battle in Algiers but contributed to losing the war all point to some parallels to the current conflict in Iraq but from a perspective detached from the current political debate. The population security approach to COIN is explored in this book as well.

Amazon.com: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era): Books: David Galula - This is COIN 101 and is the fundamental basis of FM 3-24.

Amazon.com: The Army and Vietnam: Books: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. - This shows how the Army as an institution was against COIN in Vietnam and begs the question as to who will win the fight over the future direction of the US Army following OIF. Will Iraq be seen as the special case and not the norm of things to come (while Vietnam fits the special case and so much of the redirection of the Army towards the giant tank battle in the Fulda Gap against the Reds was the proper direction, at the same time, Vietnam was expunged from the lesson books)?

Amazon.com: The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Modern War Studies): Books: Brian McAllister Linn - This is a look at the US Army and demonstrates that the US Army's history includes COIN and COIN successes. Like the French experience in Algeria, you can trace some similarities to Iraq today - a large segment of society that was against the effort in the PI, some commanders who understood what to do in COIN while others saw every problem as a nail and thus, used the hammer that they had as their only trick.

**S-2** · 2nd October 2007 05:31

What is FM 23-4? I googled the FM. There's no listing in the milpubs links but I saw a link to a SWJ article about religion as a foundation to counter-insurgencies.

Did you mean FM 3-24?

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