Thread: Contrary Peter Principle

Originally Posted by JAD_333

What's all the fuss? First of all making colonel (O-6) is a big hurdle in the military. Secondly, there are tons of talented colonels and navy captains out there who never make general officer. Promotion is thru an inverted funnel. It takes more than brain smarts to make a star. He is being evaluated by his peers, not by Congress. Promotion boards are made up of general officers who go over each candidate's service records and annual evaluations. We don't know what's in them, so we're acting all indignant in the dark. Sure he's brilliant, but what of the other brilliant candidates who don't have extensive public exposure. Anyway, he gets more shots at it. Looks to me like he has punched his ticket perfectly to get a star. We'll see.

JAD,
The issue is the bureaucratic promotion process and the institution's promotion system. We aren't holding senior officers accountable for poor performance (the only GO to be relieved in OIF/OEF so far are MEDDAC GOs involved in the WRMC scandal), and we aren't rewarding outstanding behavior with faster promotions. COL McMaster has proven himself to be an outstanding leader, both as the most successful commander in the full intensity fight of Operation Desert Storm and as the most successful non-GO commmander in the COIN fight of Iraq. His PhD indicates that he has the intelligence and strategic thought to be a successful GO - he's not just a tactically successful commander, aka, a one-trick pony. The fact that proven performance has not be rewarded is a disgrace in my opinion. We state we are at war; yet, our promotion system works like it is at peace.

Originally Posted by Shek

JAD,
The issue is the bureaucratic promotion process and the institution's promotion system. We aren't holding senior officers accountable for poor performance (the only GO to be relieved in OIF/OEF so far are MEDDAC GOs involved in the WRMC scandal), and we aren't rewarding outstanding behavior with faster promotions. COL McMaster has proven himself to be an outstanding leader, both as the most successful commander in the full intensity fight of Operation Desert Storm and as the most successful non-GO commmander in the COIN fight of Iraq. His PhD indicates that he has the intelligence and strategic thought to be a successful GO - he's not just a tactically successful commander, aka, a one-trick pony. The fact that proven performance has not be rewarded is a disgrace in my opinion. We state we are at war; yet, our promotion system works like it is at peace.

Shek:

I agree with a lot of what you say. However, I still have trouble with the implication that the system is broken because it didn't select a celebrated expert. I have had long talks with an active BG about the selection process. He had served on several selection boards. I was surpirsed how collegial they work, similar in some ways to how college fraternities pick pledges.

The military system is, of course, more systematic. Each member of the selection board, all of which are general officers, rate all 0-6 whose seniority qualifies them to be considered for a star. The board has a list of qualities to rate, and much like judges do in an ice skating competition, they use a number system. Some qualities, like for example, battalion-level or major ship command, weigh more heavily than others.

In the end, the candidates with the most points get the available billets. Many good officers are passed over in this process not because it failed or they didn't score well, but because there were not enough available billets in his specialty. An O-6 with, say, a public affairs background might be a god, but the chances of making BG are practically zero since there are one maybe two 1-star slots in each service for public affairs, and a score of 0-6s are competing for them.

I don't see anything glaringly wrong with this system. I would much rather have my peers judge me than someone way up the line who would be prone to make arbitrary choices based on first impressions, lobbying, noteriety or the like.

No system is perfect and McMasters may be proof of that. But then again, what do we know about him other than what we read in books and in the media? What about all the other qualities that go into the selection process? What about the smart, effective officers who are not celebrated, and whose time has come for consideration? Do we pass him over them? What have we lost by not promoting him now? He is performing in his speciality. And O-6 is nothing to sneer at. Will he pick up his marbles in a huff and go home? If so, he doesn't deserve promotion. I'll wager he makes BG next time.

I agree with you that 1-stars with poor performance tend to be invulnerable, while hard chargers often are held back. That's one of the downsides of a systematized military. The best remedy is to reassign (fire) the poor performers and not promote them up the line. What are we talking here--4 years, up or out? But overall, it seems most of the cream rises to the top.

Originally Posted by JAD_333

Shek:

I agree with a lot of what you say. However, I still have trouble with the implication that the system is broken because it didn't select a celebrated expert. I have had long talks with an active BG about the selection process. He had served on several selection boards. I was surpirsed how collegial they work, similar in some ways to how college fraternities pick pledges.

The military system is, of course, more systematic. Each member of the selection board, all of which are general officers, rate all 0-6 whose seniority qualifies them to be considered for a star. The board has a list of qualities to rate, and much like judges do in an ice skating competition, they use a number system. Some qualities, like for example, battalion-level or major ship command, weigh more heavily than others.

In the end, the candidates with the most points get the available billets. Many good officers are passed over in this process not because it failed or they didn't score well, but because there were not enough available billets in his specialty. An O-6 with, say, a public affairs background might be a god, but the chances of making BG are practically zero since there are one maybe two 1-star slots in each service for public affairs, and a score of 0-6s are competing for them.

I don't see anything glaringly wrong with this system. I would much rather have my peers judge me than someone way up the line who would be prone to make arbitrary choices based on first impressions, lobbying, noteriety or the like.

No system is perfect and McMasters may be proof of that. But then again, what do we know about him other than what we read in books and in the media? What about all the other qualities that go into the selection process? What about the smart, effective officers who are not celebrated, and whose time has come for consideration? Do we pass him over them? What have we lost by not promoting him now? He is performing in his speciality. And O-6 is nothing to sneer at. Will he pick up his marbles in a huff and go home? If so, he doesn't deserve promotion. I'll wager he makes BG next time.

I agree with you that 1-stars with poor performance tend to be invulnerable, while hard chargers often are held back. That's one of the downsides of a systematized military. The best remedy is to reassign (fire) the poor performers and not promote them up the line. What are we talking here--4 years, up or out? But overall, it seems most of the cream rises to the top.

JAD,

My complaint against the promotion system isn't just this case. The only battalion commander in my last brigade to get selected for a tactical brigade command was by far the worst battalion commander within my brigade (he wasn't my commander, but from speaking across the company level commanders in the brigade, this was a consensus). The other two battalion commanders were selected for secondary commands. Something is wrong in the system when this happens.

Of the list that COL McMaster could have been on, two of the officers on the list were my former battalion commanders. One of them absolutely deserves to be on the list - the other one I was not impressed with. So, I've got some frame of reference to this particular list.

In terms of the board process, while it sounds good as it is briefed, I'm not so confident in the process itself. How do you judge someone else - while there may be some "objective" standards, the reality is that it is a subjective process, and people tend to judge things through their own lenses. So, you've got a bunch of folks, many of whom would not be comfortable commanding at the brigade level in the current counterinsurgency environment, selecting among those whose reports are written about how they peformed in the counterinsurgency environment. There is some bias that exists because of the lens that the board brings to the table. I think that this has impacts on the margin, as you will tend to rate those who are in your own image higher, even though that isn't what the Army necessarily needs.

In the end, we have a rigid process that doesn't necessarily reward the right folks, and it surely didn't do justice in this particular case.

"...I still have trouble with the implication that the system is broken because it didn't select a celebrated expert."


I stole this outta Wikipedia but it would seem "celebrated expert" might be glossing this man's accomplishments. High School to the present. Take a look-

"Colonel McMaster graduated from Valley Forge Military Academy in 1980, where he served as a Company Commander, with the rank of Cadet Captain.

McMaster graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1984. His first assignment after commissioning was to the Second Armored Division at Fort Hood, where he served in a variety of platoon and company level leadership assignments. In 1989, McMaster was assigned to the 2nd ACR in Bamburg, Germany, where he served until 1992, including the deployment to Operation Desert Storm.

McMaster served as a military history professor at West Point from 1994-1996, teaching, among other things, the battles in which he actually fought.

From 1999 to 2002, McMaster commanded 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment. He then took a series of staff positions at U.S. Central Command, including planning and operations roles in Iraq.

In his next job, LTC, and later COL, McMaster worked on the staff of U.S. Central Command. More specifically, he worked for the then Deputy Commander, LTG John Abizaid as his Executive Officer. As LTG Abizaid made his fourth star and became Central Command's head, McMaster gained his current rank and served as GEN Abizaid's Director, Commander's Advisory Group (CAG). In other words, Colonel McMaster served as the head of USCENTCOM's brain trust. He excelled in this job, transforming the command's CAG into a world-class brain trust. After McMaster's depature from the Headquarters, he retained GEN Abizaid's total trust and open-door access, meeting with the CENTCOM head more than a dozen times in the resulting four years.

In 2004, he was assigned to command the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Shortly after Col. McMaster took command, the Regiment deployed for its second tour in Iraq in early 2005. In May 2005, the 3rd ACR was assigned the mission of securing the Iraqi city of Tal Afar. The culmination of that mission came in September 2005, when the 3rd ACR conducted Operation Restoring Rights to defeat the insurgent strongholds in Tal Afar. The success of this operation has been touted by President George W. Bush, and was the subject of an article in the April 10, 2006 issue of The New Yorker.

The PBS show Frontline broadcast a documentary in February 2006 that featured interviews with Col. McMaster during which he described his personal experiences in Tal Afar, Iraq.

Col. McMaster handed over the reins of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment on 29th June 2006 and headed for the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, England, to devise "better tactics to battle terrorism." According to the Institute's website, Col. McMaster is a Senior Research Associate with a mandate to "Conduct research to identify opportunities for improved multi-national cooperation and political-military integration in the areas of counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and state building."[1]

Since 2007, Col. McMaster has been part of an "elite team of officers advising US commander General David Petraeus" on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.[2]

Despite Presidential acclaim for his counterinsurgency campaign in Tal Afar and his position as an adviser to General Petraeus, Col. McMaster has been passed over for promotion to Brigadier General two years in a row."

This man's career is too auspicious to escape scrutiny. The above C.V. failed to mention his silver star at 73 EASTING. At a minimum, there's an unseen battle being fought and this constitutes a shot across somebody's bow. Beyond that, it's difficult to surmise what a man has to do to achieve the relatively mundane accomplishment of B.G. in the U.S. Army. Given all the unmitigated idiots that have achieved this "exalted" status, McMaster is an absolute no-brainer.

It should have been a relatively restful way-station on the way to the top. If this is as far as he goes, give him a Cav Regt. until the day he decides to hang up his spurs.

The guy was born to be a soldier.