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#16 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
Moderator |
I'd like to point out that we are talking about cadets here and not a rifle squad that will have to execute a battle drill in Baghdad in two months. Whether the cadet unit is able execute battle drill 1A will not determine how successful or worthless they will be as officers.
The Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) will train cadets to a minimum required proficiency on small unit battle drill. The Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) will do the same, and then if the officer will be leading dismounted squads, then they will train once again on small unit dismounted battle drill at the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) or Engineer OBC, etc. Then, they will be exposed to again during Ranger School, Sapper School, and the Scout Patrol Leader Course (SPLC). Bottomline, the Army system is designed so that cadets achieve a minimum level of standards that is built upon at initial officer training so that when a second lieutenant reports to his unit, he/she knows enough to be able to understand the importance of battle drill, how to resource and train it, and how to recognize right from wrong so that they can assess the training status of their unit on the task. More importantly, there are already senior squad leaders and platoon sergeants in place who have been doing the drill all their careers, and they can put any lieutenant over the top if they aren't up to speed. On the other hand, the Army is not setup well at all institutionally for COIN. There are no mandatory college courses that will hit this topic (although there are tons of various angles to get at it, although not necessarily in a holistic way). The required military science courses will focus on the BOLC I skills that are required for commissioning. Then, whatever instruction that is done at BOLC and the officer's basic course, and I don't know how many hours are dedicated to this, will not be of the highest caliber 95% of the time, and will most likely be in a classroom with an instructor:student ratio of 1:200. This is why doing some academic training about COIN in the academic environment of college would be a good idea. I'm not talking about trying to setup a COIN training lane where you have to react to the situation and make choices, as this takes lots of resources to do it right and be realistic. However, sitting down and discussing the appendix about developing your network diagrams after having read that appendix from the FM is a good use of time. Then, someone can discuss how 3ACR used this in Tal Afar during Operation Restoring Rights to determine which tribes were involved in the insurgency, allowing 3ACR to figure out their plan for clearing Tal Afar based on neighborhoods where it was most likely a battle would take place. This would take the theoretical to the applied example. Finally, a little field trip to the local police station's investigator officer could cap off the training by learning tips from someone who has to do real life networking diagrams to try and solve crimes. If you really want to go deep, then you could do another field trip to a nearby town where the cadets could just have normal conversations with people and try to figure out the networking of those who yield power, and try to see whether it is similar to the town's website of elected officials, or if there's a man behind the man, so to speak. If you wonder why I chose the above as an example, it's because it's one of the top two critical skills that current lieutenants in Iraq say they wish they had been trained on. So, I will close out by stating that cadets need to be exposed to many things, and it cannot be a sequential plan such that you go from the individual/team/squad level all the way up through the strategic level. You must be able to train individual and small unit skills while training on training management, doctrine, etc. The trick is how to integrate everything so that it has a logical flow and isn't too disjointed.
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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3 |
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#17 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
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__________________
Semper in excretum. Solum profunda variat. |
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#18 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator |
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I agree that you never stop learning. However, you cannot follow a lockstep process in the US Army developmental path where you cannot look at higher level topics because you haven't reached proficiency at some basic tasks. The ROTC or USMA experience is designed to produce officers with rudimentary soldiering skills (the basic courses prior to going to a unit will get them to the necessary skill level here) and with exposure to an environment where they get to practice following and leading. However, the primary purpose is to produce someone with a broad education and problem solving skills developed through their academic discipline. I think that some of our philosophical differences here resonate through the differences of Sandhurst vs. USMA/ROTC development models. As far as COIN goes, the incentives are not aligned for studying COIN right now, and there is an inherent gap in our institutional training for COIN. If it doesn't go onto the training schedule, then it doesn't get covered to the extent it should, and then you are left with varying degrees of coverage. Given that it is our primary mission right now, it deserves more attention that it currently receives. So, while officers theoretically have the tools from their undergraduate education to be able to handle COIN, the problem is that the schoolhouse doesn't do a good job and in units, you don't have the time to spend on it to get at more than just the very basics. As far as the 1:200 ratio, that is not a typo. Field exercises are done and evaluated at the platoon level and below, but nearly all classroom training is done in the big auditorium. The US Army doesn't place emphasis on education, whether it is graduate schooling or the actual military schools. Thus, it is resourced such that you need to have a lot of 1:200 briefings for the basic courses (this ratio improves to 1:15-20 for the captains' courses and beyond). Additionally, the quality of the instructors varies greatly. You don't get the cream of the crop for the basic courses, because there is no career incentive for being an instructor there. It is considered by many to be a "sham" job because you aren't with a "real" unit, and so while you'll get some high quality instructors (although their skillset will vary - e.g. they may be an expert on platoon ops in a conventional environment, but their experience and upbringing on COIN may be lacking), you are typically looking at the center of mass type officer. |
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#19 (permalink) |
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Military Professional
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Thank you Shek, for your reasoned reply. It is quite clear that there are major differencies between our nations training methods. Of course, our numbers have been diminishing, whilst yours seem to be at a high level still, even after the 'peace dividend' cuts. Equally, both systems have developed over a long period of time so must suit the characteristics of the respective countries. It is inevitable that there will be subtle differences in outlook, but generally I would assume much of the ethos, if not the doctrine, will be closely matched. As has been remarked, we live in interesting times.
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#20 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator |
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The Marine Corps does have a heritage of small wars, but I don't know how much it still permeated through the mainstream of the USMC. |
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#23 (permalink) |
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
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Again the rider to my post is that there would be a difference in perspective in training of cadets in India to those elsewhere.
Therefore, my comments are based on the Indian model. A cadet, an officer cadet, on commissioning is to lead his platoon. Therefore, before he becomes an officer, he is made conversant with the platoon weapons, given a general idea about company and battalion support weapons. He is also taught platoon battle drills and platoon battle procedures. He is made conversant with the Basic tenets of leadership and during the platoon exercises at the Academy which a course undergoes, what he has learnt about leadership gets practiced. He still is no expert after this training. But he learns the rudiments of these fields. The Army is basically structured to fight regular battles. Counter Insurgency is a different kettle of fish even though the basics remain valid. It requires specialised training because the environment of each counter insurgency and its causes would be different and hence requires different applications. e.g. the Counter Insurgency in Iraq will not be the mirror image of, let us say, Kashmir or even Balochistan or even Afghanistan. Each counter insurgency is driven by the political atmosphere prevalent. For instance, the counter insurgency in Kashmir is not similar to the now nascent, though could come alive, insurgency in Manipur and the like, even though both are States of the same country!! Therefore, at best, cadets, if absolutely a must, could be given an overview including the deviation in tactics that would be necessary. The cadet has to know the basics of regular drills before he is introduced to CI and its variances. In India, the young officers are put through Young Officers course to hone all skills to the extent they can imbibe without confusing themselves, before the come to apply the same when in their units. Even so, they have to understudy before being given independent command. In the CI grid, they also have to attend the Command CI school.
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![]() "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination." I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to. HAKUNA MATATA Last edited by Ray : 01-26-2007 at 05:51 AM. |
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#24 (permalink) | |
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Contributor
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Down with the British ![]()
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"To every man upon this earth, Death cometh soon or late; And how can a man die better; Than facing fearful odds, For the ashes of his father; And the temples of his gods." |
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#25 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
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#26 (permalink) | |
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tankie
Military Professional
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They have been qouted as being the 5th largest economy at this moment in time . UP THE BRITS ![]()
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TANKIE , WITHOUT WAX |
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#27 (permalink) | |
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Foreign Service
Moderator Lei Feng Protege |
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__________________
Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present. -Marcus Aurelius, Meditations |
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#28 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
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#29 (permalink) | |
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Military Professional
Moderator Scotch taster |
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Who's responsible to make sure the young cadet doesn't get into too much trouble? The platoon sergeant?
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Chimo |
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