xinhui

Col, reading from PLA’s text book “Zhanyi Xue” or “On Military Campaigns” by Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye, (eds) Beijing National Defense University Press, 2000. Another one of the series of text book release by PLA on “Campaign” including He Dingqing’s “a course on the science of campaigns”. Beijing: Military Science press, 2001.

On Military Campaigns

War zone boundaries will be drawn according to the Strategic Task (s) to be accomplished and may not conform exactly to existing Military Region boundaries – being larger or smaller then Military Regions depending on the mission. Like wise, the commander and staff of the MR maybe replaced or augmented by senior personal from the four General headquarters department of CMC

(Xinhui comment: interesting, I was under the impression WZC comdr only available from General Staff Department, I hope they don’t yank a ass-kisser from the general political department)

Within a War Zone a main effort or direction (fangxiang) will be designated as well as supporting directions (to accomplish secondary missions) and sub-campaigns with specific functions ( for example, air offensive campaign, ground defense, anti airborne campaign, etc) Subordinate to the overall warzone commander will be a commander for the main direction or lead service, along with “campaign corps” commanders from the service participation in the operation. The smallest “campaign corps” level organization in the ground force is the group army (i.e., an army level unit)

(Xinhui comment: Col, what is your translation of “campaign corps”?)


Operations will be divided into phases organized according to tasks to be accomplished, terrain to be taken, or time. Warzone commanders will utilized a combination of main force units, local force (including PAP units) and militia augmented by civilian support

(Xinhui comment: no surprise there. However, it does confirm some of our initial reading of WZC back in late 1990s.)


Basic Principles of Military Campiagns


Know thy enemy, and know thy self (zhi bi zhi ji)

Be fully prepared (chongfen zhunbei)

Be pro-active (jiji zhudong, demonstrate initiative, activism and creativeness)

Concentrate forces (jizhong liliang)

In-depth strikes (zongshen daji) (one should attack the enemy’s first echelon, at the same time also hit its follow-up echelons, important in-depth targets, the enemy’s rear and its command systems. One should be able not only to attack the enemy’s depth, but also to protect one’s own depth, not only on the ground, but also in the air, the sea and even outer space.

Take the enemy by surprise (chu di bu yi) ………Under modern conditions; it is difficult to sustain surprise, which can only exist at the initial period of time. Therefore, once surprise is achieved, one must move quickly to exploit and expend the initial battle success……………

Unified coordination (xietiao yizhi, Unified command, objective and planning)

Continuous fighting (lianxu zuozhan) …….a military campaign is the sum of a series of combat operation. Execute non-stop, consecutive operations …………one must setup a strong reserve force…………


Comprehensive Support (quanmian baozhang)


Political Superiority (Fahui zhengzhi youshi)
















Integrated Operations, key point strikes:


Zhangyi Xue defines “integrated operations, key point strikes” (Zhengti Zuozhan, zhongdian daji) as follow:

1. Bring into full play the overall superiority of a People’s war by uniting the military with government, the military with police and civilian (Xinhui comment” People’s war “is dead”, People’s war forever! Long live People’s war, does not matter what the underline military doctrine PLA will employ, when they fight, China will fight with everything she get including the kitchen sink, no matter how small the scale)

2. Integrate the military struggle with struggles on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts. (Xinhui comment: Also refer to internal crack down as well, sadly to say. During the Muslim of Xinjing revolt of the early 1990s, PRC did not just have a few captures, they went in with everything they gone. The people who headed the cracked down was Hu Jintao and General Liao Xilong, current head of General logistic department and member of the CMC)

3. Synergize all the essential campaign factors such as strength, space, times, mean, etc. to form an integrated operation force.

4. Take destroying and paralyzing the overall structure of the enemy’s operational system as the starting point.

5. Move forward and to seek resolution of the overall campaign situation by concentrating crack forces in the main direction of the campaign, at the critical junctures and in important operations.

6. adopt flexible and adaptable methods to execute active focused integrated strikes aimed at those targets that are critical in sustaining and supporting the overall enemy operational system.

7. Strive to paralyzed the enemy force first and annihilate it later.

8. Pursue battles of annihilation

9. strive to fight quick battle with fast resolution so as to accomplish campaign objectives as soon as possible.




Other elements

Information warfare

Firepower operation
Mobility – Zhanyki Xue calls mobility the most important combat operation of a campaign ……..should attempt to identify and avoid hitting the enemy’s strong point. Rather, forces should be concentration on the enemy’s weak point using both air and ground movements. Campaign mobility also requires rapid and sudden attack to disrupt the enemy’s rhythm and freedom of action.

Special operation


Missile attack – PLA’s conventional ballistic missile attack is recognized as an important part of any joint campaign. Under special conditions, a conventional missile attack may be conducted independently. (Col, you will like this one) Zhanyi Xue specified that conventional missile attack is imitated FIRST in a campaign sequence to maximized its shock effect on the enemy (Xinhui: Did Rummy copied a page from PLA’s playbook? Shock and awe, PLA style. Note the text book was published in 2000)



etc

etc

etc

Officer of Engineers

Alot of good info, Andy. Sorry for this late reply but I read this last night but couldn't put two words together after spending the day with #1 Daughter. Speaking 5-year-old-nese for a day wrecks my English (actually any intelligeble conversation for the night).

The fact that a WZ may ecompassed more than one MR tells me that MR is heading the way of the dodo. It's an admin HQ more and more. General Staff may be assigned from central command which means more than one MR are now lacking qualified Staff.

I find "campaign corps" to be extremely interesting. It's now formalized; at least the concept is now formalized. There's meat to our theories now. What this does tell me is that when putting a WZC package together; there's now a set requirement and not just taking what's available.

It also fit into our understanding of the PLA's version of "Joint Force," ie, you have this much time in this area to do your job. You get the hell out when your time's up regardless if you finish the job or not.

I really do find this extremely revealling

Translation: A well co-ordinated battle plan with no flexibility of deviation, ie Attack by Echelon. Still Communist Military style of thinking here.

__________________
Chimo

xinhui

For a flag office, the first thing he/she does when prompted to MR level is spend 2 years at NDU.

One person I been following is General Liu Zhenwu and see how his promotion route respect a typical PLA flag ranks.

HongKong Garrsion cmdr 1997
42 GA Cmdr 1999
Guangzhou MR cmdr
Nanjing MR cmdr. 2004


When General Liang retired, I think Liu will take his place consider he was the commander both from Guangzhou and Nanjing MR.

Officer of Engineers

Sorry, Andy, I did not wished to downgrade MR as an HQ. Even as an admin HQ, it has its very important function in running and operating Area. It's main purpose seems to be preparing a fighting force instead of commanding one. For anyone going through the command career ladder, you still need your ticket punch at MR.

xinhui

Well, the book was published in 2000 and just recently (thanks by Byran C) we realized the importance of "blue army", also noted General Liao Xilong, who is one of the most active speaker for WZC is now runs the General logistic department for CMC. So, we got two possible commanders IDed. General Liang for TW and General Liao for SE Asia. However, what about the reminding 3? Asean, DPRK and f-USSR? consider the fact neither Liao nor Liang were armor dudes, Liao (commander of Xinjing MD > Chengud MR > CMC) Liang (Guangzhou MR > Nanjing MR > CMC) And yet, the 2 armored GA, 38th and 39th are getting the latest toys. I need to dig up my old notes.

Will the next PLA Erwin Rommel please stand up and introduce yourself!!!

xinhui

speaking of NDU, Come to think of it, none of the member of the CMC has SHangyang MR links.




NDU creates new training modes of senior officers with support of civilian teaching resources

PLA Daily 2006-06-19

　　

　　It was early summer. Over 30 generals attending the strategy course at the National Defense University (NDU) came to the Pudong Cadres College, Shanghai to attend the courses. This is another practical activity created by the NDU in its efforts to improve the training modes of senior officers. The advantage of such practical activity is that: it can give full play to the strengths of both military and civilian institutions of higher learning in joint efforts to foster high-ranking officers. Such practice has enabled the NDU to broaden its avenue of fostering senior commanders for the army. It also signifies that an important change has taken place in the PLA in terms of the training modes of senior officers.

　　In recent years, the NDU has made vigorous efforts to improve the training modes for cultivating military talents by extending the teaching practice from classrooms to field troops, and then to the whole society, and through which it has built new platforms for its students' study and practice with the support of civilian teaching resources, and at the same time it has broadened the horizons of its students and enhanced their strategic thinking ability.

　　In this teaching activity, the students, who are high-ranking officers from various military organizations, were organized to visit the former site of the First National Congress of the CPC, a number of large enterprises as well as some economically fast-developing cities and countryside. These visiting activities have enabled these high-ranking officers to get a deeper understanding of the significance of using the scientific outlook on development to guide the construction and development of the country, and enhance their sense of responsibility of fulfilling the historical mission of the army in the new century and the new period.

　　By Peng Shan

　　(June 19, PLA Daily)

Officer of Engineers

*** SMACK MY HEAD AND KICKING MYSELF ***

WZC IS Attack By Echelon!

Jay

Sir,
How does this correspond to kill zones??

If I understand it right, they choose a place in the enemy line, attack the formation continously, cut a hole, while at it, they also tactically form a kill zone somehwere in the line, where the opponent have weaker defense, and start pounding them??

__________________
A grain of wheat eclipsed the sun of Adam !!

Officer of Engineers

Are we saying the same things?

The Soviet/Russian/Chinese system does not envisioned choosing a place in line. It's more of a "feel" in line where resistence is the softest (where also maybe the hardest terrain). The current force fixes the enemy in place while a follow up echelon goes where the resistence is the lightest for the "breakthrough" which in reality is an envelopment manouver along a 2ndary or even a tierary axis.

Jay

Sir,
I think I almost matched it in laymen terms. When I meant "choose a place" I meant a favourable place where they can acheive breakthrough.

So, basically they stretch out the opposition forces along the battle field, find a sweet spot, hit them up continously with different units, the opponent tries to reinforce his lines from elsewhere, find that spot, take it over and repeat it along the line.

But ofcourse if you are fighting an enemy with lots of reserves (like USA, India, NK) this may not entirely happen. What if they replenish the line with reserves, rather than picking them up from the line?

Also, what if the opponent also use the same strategy?? Another thing I wanted to know is, when a unit gets bogged down, would you not automatically send in another unit/reserve to fight it out with out disturbing the front line?

Officer of Engineers

No, they try to concentrate the oppenant in one spot, to fix them in one spot so they don't move and thus, a 2ndary or even a tierary force can go around them.

Not sure I follow you here. Are you saying that the enemy brings the reserves up to plug the breach?

I am definetely not following you here.

Are you talking the attacker or the defender?

Jay

Yes Sir.

What if the enemy also use the same type of echelon attack on your formation?

Defender defending against an echelon attack.

xinhui

if I may.

PLA expects Opforce to bring up the reserve and they plan on it. They would love to fight a meeting engagement and ambush the reinforcements. That is the tactic they used over and over again. During the Anti-Japanese war, the 8th route army would lay siege to a Japanese garrison but most of the time never conduct actual attacks against fortified positions, they ambush the reinforcements. Thus, they want isolate first then destroy. During 2nd phase of WZC, PLA send in their motorized infantry brigades to isolate, While the brigades are not well armed even by PLA standard, they can move fact. They will position themselves in major junctions to isolate and force Opforce to react. PLA coin this type of operation, “move the enemy”



In a perfect WZC setting. PLA will have complete initiatives surprise and thus out reserve the Opforce. problem with attack with echelon is that once the attack is over, one need time to re-org. PLA plans to have a much deeper reserve and thus rotate the tired units with fresh one. Campare to PRC's neighors, PLA enjoy a better transporation system (TW is a different case)

Officer of Engineers

Andy,

Been thinking this alot. I like to chop 10-14 days off for our eval of the WZC Campaign. With the dropping of a divsional march and replacing it with a whole bunch of brigade marches, I don't see the need to incorporate whole 38GA and 39GA formations into the picture.

This also plays very nicely into what you've just written as the brigades marches in to meet the enemy re-enforcements.

xinhui

Col:

I am going to slap myself silly. OMG!

I think I got it, but not sure I can make myself clear, but here goes.

Remember all those folks keep asking why PLA had not equipped their MIB with latest and greatest, after thinking about this in-lights of recent notes, there might be an explanation: Logistic!

I got into an exchange with Bryan C regard rather PLA units carry their equipment with them when they are selected to be the blue army of that year. The answer is no, they don’t. They travel light to their training base to pick up the vis-mod equippment to conduct the training as the bad guys.

After the 1984 one million men de-mobilization, PLA conducted three additional rounds of downsizing (in sum, 900,000 men, including 3 armored divisions) where all those equipping went? I think they are being stored in the hundred of National Defense mobilization centers (another name for depot), each one of those centers is regiment in size and they are dotted China’s boarders. You train the way you fight so you want to pick up the same equipment at the depot as the one you trained in. In order to increase mobilization speed, PLA moves their troops light and give them their heavies at the boarder. This way, the reaction time is greatly increased. (Am I making any sense?) On the other hand, they give latest to 38/39 GA because they will bring their own heavy with them in the same logistic train. As for the dated equipment, fortification is the force multiplier, when you can flood every junctions with troops, you can afford to time for some to digging. If you can force Opforce limited options, you can channel them, hence “move the enemy” Only recently, I noted more and more MIB are equipped with up-to-date equipments such as WZ551 APC and Type 96 MBT. Change in doctrine? Or they just can’t get any miles out of those old junk?

Here is another view: To the west, most of the PLA troops are stationed in Lanzhou and Chengdu (200,000) near the Tibet-Qinghai highway, not in either Xinjing or Tibet. In time of war, Lanzhou MR boys can go either Tibet or Xinjing, Chengdu MR boys can go either Tibet and Vietnam. Beijing MR can go either Xinjing and near DPRK. And, Jianan MR’s role is national reserve. There is a reason why Indian military visited Lanzhou MR HQ.