On Military Campaigns (Zhanyi Xue ) - Page 2

**Officer of Engineers** · 06-23-2006, 23:31 PM

Ok, Andy, it's only you and me here and we've got alot of work to do.

1) I like the idea of pre-positioning. That was what the 15ABC used when they sent 2 regts during the last Sino-Indo king-of-the-hill shoving match.

2) BLUEAR would get regular practise in preparing their toys each and everytime a new REDAR comes to play. So, that part makes perfect sense. They don't have to bring their own toys. Just fix the ones at the border which they do constantly.

3) In fact, the entire mobilization can be even speeded up. Ship the maintenance pool out immediately while the rest of the motor rifle bde gears up. In fact, you can even hide movement (I'm liking this more and more). A company size maintenace pool would be extremely hard to spot. In theory, you can 10 hours out of the bde's mobilization period. And IF the toys are parked right, all the boys have to do is jump in and they're in formation.

**** disclaimer: I'm talking about China's neighbours and their abilities to spot these, not the US nor Western allies who could detect these movements alot earlier.

4) And if you're flooding troops; maybe even only at the battalion level (More revelations about the bn-bde-corps model?) to these depots. Yes, you've moved the enmey. More over, you've created several potential axis of attack of which one to three may be the real one.

5) The new toys for BLUEAR. Andy, this is the 1st year we saw them. We'll have to wait and see if BLUEAR takes them home with them.

6) Even so, former BLUEAR might still be tasked with the pre-positioning toys.

*** I wonder how long before Pinkov takes this work as his.

PS. And do we still need 38 and 39 GAs as the decisive force in WZC?

-{SpoonmaN}- · 06-24-2006, 04:08 AM

I like the PLA's logic about fighting battles of annihilation, since let's face it, if anyone could afford heavy personnel losses it's the PLA. It seems Euro-American Militaries are somewhat limited by the inability of their populations to stomach a heavy loss of life, since people seem to think the 2400 odd Americans lost in Iraq is a lot, and well, considering what they're doing and how many Americans have served there, it's really not that high a casualty rate at all, especially compared to what USAF bomber crews or Kriegesmarine U-Boat crews went through in World War Two.

xinhui · 06-24-2006, 04:30 AM

Pinkov is too stupid to understand WZC. he wrote whatever we summarized at CDF.

The more I think about this, the more I think of the first PVA battle of PVA of Korea war. It can serve as a good example of "flood the plain" with infantry and move the enemy. Think of it this way, none of China's neighbor is heavily fortify nor heavy populated near the boarder.

Blasko has a copy of two volumes I cited above (tranlated into English, thanks to US tax payers), Of all the folks at RAND, he is the one who understand WZC the most!

**Officer of Engineers** · 06-24-2006, 21:56 PM

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Originally Posted by -{SpoonmaN}-

I like the PLA's logic about fighting battles of annihilation, since let's face it, if anyone could afford heavy personnel losses it's the PLA.

Not anymore. Tianamen Square has put an end to that kind of casualty tolerance. The days of losing 30,000 men to teach a lesson is long over. The PLA could still tolerate to lose 30,000 men - provided that they have something substantial to show for it ... and it ain't about teaching lessons.

xinhui · 06-25-2006, 16:52 PM

more of "border counterattacks" as call for by Zhanyi Xue.

Long D transportation will primarily be conducted by rail supplemented by road and air movement. Short D will be covered mainly using wheeled or tracked vehicles and also on foot. helicopters are used to enhance transportation capabilities. A campaign mobility corridor should be set up to ensure that troops may safely move, fight and be supported (note the phase corridor, one thing about the PLA, they know every well what their air force can and can not do) Such a mobility corridor requires good air and ground defenses, reliable comm and logistic and repair facilities.

When a war is clearly unavoidable, the PLA may take preemptive measures to seize the initiative before the enemy strikes. Elite forces and long-range firepower disrupt for his attack plans. It is also important to expose the enemy's intention to the international community, but not let him gain the initiative by striking first.

If the enemy does attack first, it is difficult to stop him at the border. key strategic points much be identified, occupied and defended, while mobilie forces delay the main enemy offensive and protect the flanks. Enemy second echelon forces can be disrupted by deep attacks employing firepower from all services and the use of airborne and SOF behind enemy lines. ................Sometimes, however, it is possible that the campiagn objective is not fully achieved, though the military situation is favorable. Then, because of political requirements, the campaign may be ended.

xinhui · 06-25-2006, 16:58 PM

some stuff on airborne.

The operational area for an airborn div is approx 800 Sq Km 80Sq Km for an airborne regiment. Using a signle lift, an airborne div required from 9 -12 DZ an airborne regiemnt 3 to 4 and an airborne btn one. if multiple lifes are used the numberof DZ may be decreased. A btn DZ is normally 4 sq km. for night drop, the size should increase. a btn DZ using Choppers will be 3 sq KM, composed of 3 to 4 coy LZ each about 300x200 meters. Interestly enought Zhanyi Xue cited "Market Garden" as example the need for a rapid link up between AB and ground force.

Am I reading this correctly or since the 2002 MTEP, the tempo of hte Operation increased?

xinhui · 06-25-2006, 17:01 PM

Zhanyi Xue calls for detailed planning (centralized planning) operation forces are organzied into an assortment of groups, such as "assault groups" or "fire support groups" to accomplish specific taks, such as anti-airborne groups to protect against enemy attacks using paratroopers or heliborne force.

Anoop C · 06-25-2006, 22:54 PM

Xinhui, Colonel,

Could you indulge me with a few clarifications? I collated the info you have presented in different threads and now I am thoroughly confused about the meaning of the WZC!

1. If the WZC involves a PLA Division in a battle of annihilation against an enemy Battalion, how do the following pieces fall into place?

(a). The mass of PLA that is needed to fix the enemy battalion's support system (over a bde or more) in place to isolate the target battn for annihilation? What I mean is, if the final battle needs to occur with odds of 11,000 men to 900 enemy, assuming roughly same odds in the battle shaping stage (which is a conservative estimate, since the fluid nature of the early battle will require more, not less favorable, odds for the PLA to fix the enemy to its satisfaction), maybe 3 PLA Divs. or 1 Corps are needed to fix just over a Bde worth of enemy combatants. How does the PLA expect to manoeuver its echelons to achieve such an overwhelming advantage?

(b). Why, after achieving such an overwhelming advantage, would the PLA be satisfied with annihilating just ONE enemy battalion? As the Colonel mentioned elsewhere, the PLA of today cannot appear to waste as many casualties for something as frivolous as "teaching a lesson". It seems an excessive waste of resources to me! If we assume that there will be more than one enemy Battn. to be decimated, the number of troops required under the WZC scheme just went up to much more than 1 Corps!

(c). How does even the frontage match up between a PLA Div. and a measly enemy Battn?

(d). If the WZC is meant to be a meeting engagement, then applying the Indo-Pak experience, one would expect an enemy Battn. to be disposed of by even the Div's scout troops in the march. What I mean is that the Div. HQ would not concern itself with trying to isolate an enemy Battn. - its objectives would be much larger.

Quote:

Originally Posted by xinhui

PLA plans to have a much deeper reserve and thus rotate the tired units with fresh one.

In another post, the Colonel had mentioned that for 7 PLA units forward, they have one unit in reserve, while in the IA, for two units forward, one is kept in reserve. The ratio thus seems to be much more favorable for PLA's enemies, contrary to what is being mentioned above.

Also, if the battle of annihilation achieves such good odds as a PLA Div. against an enemy Battn., what is the need for continuous replenishment? I mean, there is very little battle of attrition until the last phase and the last phase is overwhelmingly in PLA's favor, if the WZC is to be believed.

If the purpose of the PLA units are to fix the enemy in place, won't the demands of manoeuver place a strain on the lateral lines of communication? If so, how does the PLA intend to handle the excess logistical load of rotating troops through its internal lines of communication, which is what the reserve rotation would require, without losing momentum?

Thank you in advance.

Anoop C · 06-25-2006, 23:17 PM

Jamestown China Brief

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China Brief

Volume 6, Issue 11 (May 24, 2006)

PLA DOCTRINE ON SECURING ENERGY RESOURCES IN CENTRAL ASIA

By Martin Andrew

An article in the April edition of the Far Eastern Economic Review, written by two senior Chinese academics, reveals that China would go to war to secure its energy needs [1]. For the past few years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has reorganized the army into combined arms battle groups in order to perform this mission, which it has labeled the doctrine of "active defense." The PLA is being organized and equipped to fight its battles deep inside an enemy's territory, rather than on the periphery or in the Chinese hinterland as envisioned by the "people's war" theory, which Mao himself acknowledged creates a large amount of infrastructure destruction.

Modernizing to Ensure China's Future Energy Security

By the end of the decade, Kazakhstan will become vital to China's energy security. China is buying up Kazakh oilfields and companies. If there were to be a problem with the flow of oil to China, its doctrinal philosophy of "active defense" means that the Chinese government will launch a pre-emptive strike to ensure the security of the state and its assets. The PLA is mechanizing much of its army and is creating at least two powerful armor heavy mechanized corps modeled after the 1980s Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups, which are designed for both breakthrough and exploitation roles in an offensive operation. Too heavy for amphibious deployment against Taiwan or for operations in China's tropical areas, the corps is designed to ensure China's future energy security. The force, using Xinjiang province as its springboard, would quickly overrun the defenses of any Central Asian state and would then be able to secure relevant oilfields. The PLA has already announced its readiness to go to the next stage of its development and "forge a strong military force powerful enough to take on important missions on the basis of China's economic development" [2].

The Chinese government views stability as essential to China's future growth and the PLA group in Shenyang will have another armor heavy corps to ensure the stability of China's heavily industrialized northwest. An unstable, nuclear-armed North Korea would be viewed with alarm in Beijing, and the economic and military power of a unified Korea on its northwestern border could be seen as another reason for intervention. The armor heavy corps could easily cross the Yalu River and quickly occupy large parts of the country, as most of North Korea's weapons systems are on the border facing South Korea.

Adopting a New Structure for the Modern Battlefield

In order to adapt to "informationalized warfare" and to enable more rapid decision-making on the battlefield, the PLA has decided to increase the number of army corps by removing the division and instead will adopt a three-level command system of corps, brigade and battalion [3]. Under the previous organizational system, the regiment acted as the basic tactical unit, subordinate to the division as it lacked command personnel and power within its headquarters to act independently of the division. In a modern brigade, the company is the tactical unit. Moving from the previous Russian-style corps and division structure requires few changes at the battalion or even regimental level, but it does mean a radical change in command and control arrangements since the brigade is expected to act independently once committed into operations, requiring a whole new way of thinking [4]. These new army corps will provide the PLA with an independent intervention force, able to breakthrough and rapidly exploit enemy defenses and allow it to take control of energy sources, copying the successful maneuvers by U.S.-led coalition forces that quickly regained the Kuwaiti oilfields in Operation Desert Storm.

The Armor Heavy Corps

The PLA has moved away from its triangular structure at the higher levels to a square organization of two armored and two mechanized brigades in its heavy combined army group (corps). The current Group Army (heavy) was composed of one armored and three mechanized divisions, an air defense brigade, an artillery brigade, a helicopter group (Dadui), an engineering regiment, a headquarters unit and a logistical support unit. The divisions are in the classic Soviet triangular structure down to the platoon level. This force totals around 70,000 personnel with around 600 main battle tanks (MBTs), over 300 pieces of artillery and more than 1,000 various armored support vehicles [5].

Contrast this with the new structure, which in addition to the two mechanized and two armored brigades has a brigade each of aviation, artillery, air defense and engineers each composed of four battalions, and a battalion for chemical defense, communications, corps level air defense and electronic warfare. The new PLA armored corps is envisioned to have a total of 500 MBTs, 586 tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) supported by 126 155mm self-propelled guns, 36 30-tube 122mm and 27 12-tube 300mm multiple rocket launchers, 12 DF-15D theater ballistic missiles, 48 attack helicopters and 78 other helicopters and around 2,000 other types of vehicles [6].

The corps is strikingly similar to the two sized corps operational maneuver groups the Soviet Army in Germany attempted to create in the 1980s [7]. Their mission was to be a breakthrough and exploitation force, striking deep into NATO's rear to cause the collapse of the front line. Never fully established due to their cost and their vulnerability to NATO precision-guided munitions, this is not a concern facing PLA planners squaring off against Central Asian militaries or North Korea. The biggest organizational change in PLA armored units is within the company structure, where there are now 14 Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFV) per company, compared to 10 in the old structure [8]. The company is larger by four vehicles meaning it can sustain more casualties than the previous one and still remain a viable maneuver element. The previous three vehicle platoons had trouble providing fire and movement with only two vehicles if one became disabled, whereas four vehicle platoons can lose one vehicle and still remain viable combat elements. As the combat support elements are held at the brigade and corps level, the only supporting weapons organic in the battalion are a platoon of six 120mm self-propelled mortars.

Developing the Corps

In March 2005, the PLA conducted a Battle Management C4I exercise in the Tianshan Mountains and the Taklimakan Desert to develop and test its doctrine for the new corps and brigade structures [9]. Involving more than 10,000 personnel and 1,000 vehicles, the exercise saw an army battle group formed with a headquarters having four subordinate combat groups that were not necessarily maneuver groups. The exercise concentrated on the joint tactical group, which was responsible for operations. Joint operations involving aircraft and artillery strikes in conjunction with offensive electronic warfare were practiced. The armored forces involved in the exercise operated with armed helicopters. All these aircraft movements and artillery missions, including both tubed artillery and multiple rocket launchers, would have also tested the PLA's and PLA Air Force's joint doctrine in airspace control. The exercise validated these concepts and demonstrated that the PLA was able to conduct modern offensive operations on its borders away from its logistics bases. The capability of the PLA to operate away from its logistic bases and having the core of an intervention force based in Xinjiang will not be lost on China's neighbors.

To impart these new concepts to the armored units, the PLA has centralized all initial and advanced training for armored and mechanized troops in the joint armored training base in the Beijing military area. The PLA Daily reported that "in the past few years, this training base has turned out more than 60,000 armored combatants who are now playing an active role in the PLA's three services." The unit's curriculum was completely revamped in line with the PLA's new informationalized warfare strategy, providing new training outcomes for the "new-style armored combatant" [10].

To ensure that field units continue this training, the PLA has developed and tested a computer-based "fighting capability evaluation system" to enable exercise evaluations to be conducted "quantitatively" instead of subjectively. This speeds up the training cycle and reports are now ready in 40 minutes using few staff; previously, it took more than 10 personnel working one week before a report could be produced [11]. The reports can now be transmitted to commanders in Beijing almost immediately after the exercise ends.

Current and Future Developments

The opportunity costs to equip the heavy corps will be immense and two reduced-size corps could be ready within two years by stripping and diverting new equipment away from current PLA divisions. The PLA armored units in Xinjiang have already increased the readiness of its armored vehicles in the past two years and received the PLA's newest equipment, as have forces in Sichuan [12]. To enable the future PLA to fund these corps as well as other areas of the army, there needs to be further personnel reductions. Further downsizing of the PLA will occur to enable China to secure its energy resources in Central Asia with the armor heavy corps being the instrument to do so. They will become China's new strategic weapon.

Notes

1. Wu Lei and Shen Qinu, "Will China Go to war Over Oil?" Far Eastern Economic Review, Volume 169, Number 3, April 2006, pp. 38–40.
2. Sun Xuefu, "Forge a military force commensurate with China's international status," PLA Daily Online, April 28, 2006.
3. "Military to be restructured: Paper," Xinuanet, July 13, 2005.
4. Black Sea Ministers of Defense Forum, "A Discussion of the Black Sea Region Post 9/11," Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2, 2002.
5. Wang Hui, "ZTZ-98 zhuzhantanke zhuanji," Inner Mongolia Cultural Publishing Company, 2002, p. 74.
6. By comparison, the U.S. Army Division 86 Aviation Brigade fielded 134 aircraft including 48 attack helicopters. Wilson, John B., "Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades," Center of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington DC, 1998, p. 386.
7. This comprised four brigades with a total of 415 MBTs and 96 152mm SPGs supported by heavy MRL and tactical ballistic missile brigades.
8. Wang Hui, "ZTZ-98 zhuzhantanke zhuanji," Inner Mongolia Cultural Publishing Company, 2002, p. 77.
9. Wang Chuanfeng and Li Fengming, "Division tempers joint operation ability in Tianshan Mountains," PLA Daily Online, March 11 2005; Wei Chun, "Battle on the Sea of Death Battlefield," PLA Pictorial, April 1, 2005, pp. 28–31.
10. Wu Shunxiang and Zhang Kunping, "New type of armored combatants trained for Three services," PLA Daily Online, April 4, 2006.
11. Li Jingwei, "Regiment of Shenyang MAC develops 'fighting capability evaluation system'," PLA Daily Online, February 13, 2006.
12. Sun Xuefu, "Forge a military force commensurate with China's international status," PLA Daily Online, April 28, 2006; Wang Jianmin, "Footprints of the Forerunner," Zhanqi Bao, February 16, 2006.

So the change over to Battn - Bde - Corps has been officially confirmed?

**Officer of Engineers** · 06-26-2006, 00:24 AM

Anoop,

Please be patient if we leave a few questions unanswered. We've only discovered the div-bn battle today. We don't know exactly what it means and how it fits into WZC thinking and execution. Remember, we don't have a PLA officer here explaining their thinking to us. We have to go back to previous examples and writings to extrapolate. If we're lacking Chinese examples, we would have to goto Soviet/Russian examples and finally towards NATO examples.

For example, it took us months to finally discover that corps is actually a re-enforced division in the Chinese battalion-brigade-corps structure. Also, note that WZC is still a work-in-progress for the PLA. Maybe they're making mistakes that they will discard later when it becomes unworkable and we have to be ready to jettison that thinking also. For example, FIST units (an elite company or battalion within a division) once was the example of Chinese military thinking are no longer mentioned. Also, as Andy stated in the Red vs Blue thread, alot of divisions are not being disbanded in favour of corps.

And it took years to discover that a PLA brigade is actually a glorifed regiment. Our original thinking was that it was a Western style brigade (wrong) and then we shifted to a reduced division (wrong again). Part of this was that the original mention of brigades within the PLA fitted our brigade's TOE. Later we learned that they took a division and cut a third of its combat service and combat support. It was not until Andy start realizing that these brigades were actually the "Hero" Regiments of the divsions that we finally clued in.

So, be prepare that we (and in fact, the PLA themselves) may be wrong.

This being said, let's attack your questions.

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