Officer of Engineers

I'm going to start this forum off with a small critic over the following and invite people to throw their two cents in. I know the Brigadier is completely facinated by this book but I like to throw a few wrenches into the wheels to help see the pitfalls.

There is no doubt the US has been trying to make the light forces a bit more than what they really are, mainly as an initial entry force. To get there the firstest with the mostest. Reading through this, there is an emphasis to be able to deliver a decisive force as the initial entry force.

There may be no choice in the matter. Things like the Kuwait War revealled just how unprepared light ground forces are to be nothing more than speed bumps to much larger and more powerful formation.

However, this all being said, with a solid look at these forces, even with bandaide solutions, they are not full armoured columns and could not be expected to survive such an onslaught.

__________________
Chimo

Ray

Colonel,

I continue to be fascinated by the concept. Note: Concept.

This proves that they are not static and instead are continuously evolving.

It is basically an "Entry Force" with an eye on the Middle East scenario and basically, to put it very crudely a sort of "Firm Base" for the Heavier Forces to build up and then take the initiative.

Obviously, this force would have to bank heavily on the air power to neutralise and destroy elements attempting to oust this Entry Force.

It will be interesting to learn what Major Shek would have to contribute since he knows the Iraq War conceptually, been in it and now following the course avidly.

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Blademaster

There is a simple solution to the problem. Just manufactore large RoRo ocean going ships in quantities of 40 - 50 and all this talk of using light force of initial entry forces would go away.

I mean take a look at the airplanes now. They are rapidly close to the cost of building ships. For instance, Airbus 380 is a 300 million dollar plane. A RoRo ship can't cost more than 500 million dollars and can carry a great deal more than the 380 can.

Prepositioning ships Concept works in the given climate of limited funds and geographical political contexts.

It seems to me that everybody is looking for the magical silver bullet that would solve every problem.

Gun Grape

The US military has been doing this since the 80s (USMC ) and 90s (Army, AF)

gunnut

I think people often mixed up the words "light" with "rapid reaction." Although the 2 often go hand-in-hand, they need not be.

Light infantry is needed to operate in terrain or conditions unsuited for heavy units. By the virtue of being light, they are easier to deploy. Since they are easier to deploy, they are usually the first units sent into hostile territory to confront aggression, sometimes with disasterous consequences.

A rapid reaction force need not be a light infantry unit. It can be an armored battalion/regiment, can it? A unit like that should be able to better stand up against heavy units, yet easier to deploy than traditional mechanized infantry or armored divisions.

There is definitely a place in this world for light infantry units, both for low intensity conflict and peace keeping missions. They are cheaper to operate and can access more terrain types than a fully mechanized heavy division.

At the same time we should also have smaller heavy units (I know, sounds like an oxymoron) that are air transportable. These could be attached to light infantry units as support or be the lead element of much larger and heavier units.

Thoughts?

Franco Lolan

Political circumstances rarely call for a rapid reaction force that is more easily deployed than a reinforced heavy division. Either paramilitary forces take part or a large buildup is the scenario.
Furthermore, despite all the talk of "light" units, they still need to go on steamships, given air assets aren't sufficient.

Ray

Colonel,

Have you got the "load tables" (i.e. how many aircraft would be required to air transport an armoured regiment) and the cost to transport per kilometer?
****************

The composition of a RRF (Rapid Reaction Force) or the "Light" Force would depend upon the threat analysis. Their task would be to form some sort of an airhead or a beachead so that the follow up forces can enter the theatre unhindered.

The air cover would be absolutely essential.

As the follow up forces come in, they would reach out and contact the enemy and "fix" them.

Thereafter as the Invasion Forces increase in strength and composition, the invasion per se will commence.

The whole Invasion, so to say, unfortunately will have to be a graduated response and the timeframe of the build up would be as per the threat analysis done prior to the Invasion and finetuned as it develops.

The mode of transportation of this graduated response will depend on the timeframe analysed and even changed to finetune the response in the event of the situation grossly be different. Of course, costs for such a change would naturally have to be accepted.

The above is easier said than done. That is why the Dick Cheney document has indicated that it would be essential for the US to have Bases at the "hot spots" or near the "hot spots" of the world. That is why the emphasis is on the Middle East where the strategic interest of the US is high!

Officer of Engineers

Sir,

I've asked the good Major Shek to come in on this, he would have more operational info than I on this. To the rest of you, it's just not as simple as load tables and operational cost. You have to land combat viable formations which is not always cost-effective (ie, deliver all the ammo at once instead of piece meal as required by each indivdiual platoon and company).

Gunnet,

You've ignorned one element in your post, the time required. Either you deliver a light infantry brigade in 72 hours OR one heavy battalion in 72 hours. As combat effective a heavy battalion is, it cannot do the job of a brigade, not even a light infantry brigade.

BM,

While pre-positioning is the current solution, it is NOT an optimum solution. The Americans are currently positioned against Iran, North Korea, and China. What can it do for another Rwanda - both politically and geographically. For those of you who states that Rwanda was not a US responsibility - BULLCRAP! It is EVERYBODY'S responsibility. No one can nor SHOULD standby while babies are litterally being butchered.

Blademaster

Well the solutions that they are proposing are certainly less optimal than the pre-positioning solution for major wars.

Then a light brigade or division that you term as speedbumps would be enough for this kind of thing.

True some countries wanted to contribute but lacked the necessary lift. One of the two things happened: 1) They could have asked USA but didn't because they refused to submit to US command 2) US refused to submit to another country's command thereby denying the necessary lift.

Ray

gunnut

Sir, I'm flattered and honored to have you confuse me with the good colonel. I'm just a civvie with some interest in military affairs.

Thank you for clearing that up. I was unsure of how effective a smaller heavy unit is compared to a larger but lighter infantry unit. Looks like numbers do count for something.

I believe there's definitely a need for a rapid reaction light infantry unit for any major power in the world. What happened in the first Gulf War was rare. A very large and heavily armed and armored formation on the march in an area where there was essentially no opposition. Besides North Korea, China, and Russia, what other power can muster that kind of muscle today? Most of the conflicts will be small scale rebelion type operation where humanitarian crisis is of more concern.

Ray

Regarding your point as also for those who wish to know more of strategic lift and the options, here is an informative article which you can google.

MOVING U.S. FORCES:
OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC MOBILITY
FEBRUARY 1997

Happy reading. It is 117 pages long in PDF format with two columns!

But those with patience will be highly rewarded with knowledge.

Worth every minute of time taken to read.

Anoop C

Ray sahab,

Here is a table of load factors taken from "Combat Service Support Guide", by Maj. (Retd.) John Edwards, US Army. The 463 L pallets perhaps refer to ammo pallets. One CDS bundle is equivalent to 2000 lb load. I do not know if an aircraft can carry all this at once, or only a combination of these, subject to maximum take-off weight.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Aircraft, # of 463 L pallets, Fuel (lb), CDS (bundles), Passengers

C-130, 6, 6000, 16, 90

C-141B, 13, 9000, 40, 200

C-17, 18, n/a, 40, 102 (can have
84 more seats)

C-5A, 36, n/a, n/a, 73 (255 more in
cargo hold)

KC-10, 25, n/a, n/a, 69


I hope that helps.

Ray

Anoop C

Ray sahab,

You are too kind in talking me up. All I do is pick the professionals' brain and get my kicks that way!

I don't have a link to the load table because it is from a hard copy of the book. If you are interested in owning this book, I will be very happy to send you a copy - it doesn't cost very much.

The book is a mine-lode of information for civilian enthusiasts. For professionals like you, it will only be a repetition of what you already know, but in the US Army context.

More books from the same publisher can be found here. Please let me know if anything looks interesting. I bought the one on Combat Leader's Manual too (previous page in the following link, but am yet to read it):

http://www.stackpolebooks.com/cgi-bi...oks.storefront