Ray

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"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Anon

Becuase of British failures and a bad British plan, not through any fault of their own, but yeah....i will give ya that one in a technicality Sir.

Of course at Market Garden there were no NVGs(night insertion) Helo Gunships, JDAMs, or Paveways.

Im still looking into Kandahar.

I am going to revise my statment though cause im sure plt and smaller sized elements have been turned back/stopped many times.

SO:

No solely US airborne, AAslt or Amphibious force of Battalion size or larger has ever been turned back or defeated in battle via force of arms.

That should be a much more accurate statement. The first one was just asking for trouble, lol.

Shek

But comparing it to a deployment of 6 Abrams is a bogus comparison. When you compare it to an organization where the #s have been crunched and it is still a stretch to sustain (i.e. the SBCT), and then you double or triple the fuel requirements, then you are aiming to fail.

Don't worry - I've seen plenty of majors and lieutenant colonels who think that gas grows on trees too

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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

Shek

??? ???

Are you referring to Objective Rhino, where the plan was never to hold the airfield in the middle of the desert?

Anon

After having read plenty of 20/20 hindsight Operation Rhino reviews i do not accept that statement that "The Rangers were forced to Retreat from Kandahar airfield".

IMO, that is a falsehood.

Operation Rhino accomplished every single mission goal laid out for it. It was far from a picture perfect run or planned op, but it was a successful operation.
http://www.construction.com/NewsCent.../20020225b.asp

If you have some stuff that suggests otherwise sir id happily read it.

Shek

Sir,
We'd just use our "beverage base powder" packages (military-speak for kool-aid) to overpower the tasted of the iodine tablets.

I'll look later to see if there are any solid presentations, but most of postings come from my experiences in planning and familiarity with N-hour sequences and air load planning.

Anon

Well barring a well planned and well thought out resupply effort, i think you're absolutely correct. And one need not neccesarily 'boost fuel requirement needs by 300%' just by introducing an armored force. Their consumption will depend how many of them there are and what you're asking them to do.

If they sit in a concentrated reserve in the center of your perimeter waiting for a counterattack that never comes they'll use almost no fuel at all.

Really as long as you can drop them on scene with a full tank of gas they're going to be very useful in a defensive role, even if you never get another drop of fuel for them for a couple days.

LOL, well then i dont feel so bad. A colonel should know better. I can claim bloody JNCO ignorance.

Shek

Snipe,
There's no question that we can do some amazing feats when we put our resources towards a goal. However, as time passes, much of the important minutae of history tends to become hazy. As Ray has pointed out, much of this discussion has been very much in the abstract and not grounded in realistic scenarios. My point is simply that there has been a lot of hoorahing over OIF, whereas many of the "lessons learned" that are being espoused do not take into account the context.

Why were we able to fly into Bashur with Airborne Dragon? Because SOF linked up with Peshmerga and facilitated an unopposed airborne assault and the supplying of the major obstacle to any vehicular based task force - gas. So, to try and triumph Operation Airborne Dragon as proof that heavy task forces are sustainable in any operation is bogus. Heck, in less than 50km you had a NMC rate for Abrams of 40%. Now take away gas, meaning you have to fly it in, bumping space for more vehicles or spare parts, and increase the size of your armored task force, where does that leave you?

Take the "lesson learned" that speed was vital to preventing destruction of Iraqi oil infrastructure and was responsible for our overwhelming success. That's been pretty decisively debunked IMO as the reason for our success in OIF. That isn't to say that it is a bad thing necessarily, but in the case of OIF, it is spin.

My point is that it's easy to overlook the hard stuff and reach conclusions that one may want to reach, and I think that our overly abstract discussion here has fallen pray to these phenomenon.

The first step, as in any mission, is to analyze the enemy. Who are the threats to the US? Iran? North Korea? China? A radical regime in Pakistan? Non-state actors, i.e. terrorist groups?

Once we determine who the enemy is, then we need to talk political objectives, as war is just the extension of politics. This will drive us to the required military objectives.

Take China, for example. Should we go to war over Taiwan? Fine, the USN and the USAF come to the rescue, save Taiwan from the evil Chinese, and then they ride off into the sunset? That briefs well, but the hard part comes next - does it lead to an even greater confrontation? Do we need to fight on mainland China then? Is Taiwan worth this risk?

Of course, there's all sorts of permutations and combinations, and so going through this drill can be very exhaustive. However, once you zero in on where you think the threats will be in the next 20-30 years, then you can properly tailor your force and devote your energies to the best solutions. Would an airmech TF of a battalion size be effective in a mainland China scenario? Iranian scenario?

Once you start at the correct starting point, then this discussion becomes less abstract and sexy, but it does become more realistic and focused on the enemy we will have to fight instead of an enemy we want to fight.

Shek

Not the M1 - it burns a lot of fuel idling.

Shek

Again, you cannot fly with a full tank o' gas. 3/4 a tank is the MAXIMUM in order to account for expansion at altitude. Heck, the M1 would probably go down to 5/8 between JI and loading on the plane.

Also, we haven't spoken about the air load process on the other end: movement to the DAF, JI and all its associated headaches - cleanliness, no leaks, HAZMAT certification, tie-downs, defueling, etc. - most of which are NON-NEGOTIABLE even under Chapter 3 movements. This is something that requires considerable preparation, focus, and unit time on the front end on a habitual basis in order to be on track for any N-hour sequence.

Anon

I appreciate the points you make in your last post and agree Shek.

It is my opinion that the operational concept of a dedicated purpose built airmech force is sound, but i do fully understand that its actual EMPLOYMENT AND USE AS INTENDED would have to be carefully executed.

In many cases, as you properly point out, a deep raiding AirMech force would be untenable. However, in many cases, it is not only tenable, but also very desirable to have around.

I realize that Airborne Dragon was a limited op with unique circumstances, but then, M1s are much heavier and more logistics intensive than a dedicated light tank would be. Is not the Stryker MGS in essence very similar to the type of vehicle i'm talking about afterall? So as you see, we now have more options ranging from heavy to light airmech. When appropriate we can put anything from a small M1 force to a much larger Stryker force in the enemy rear.

I merely wish to expand that capability with a purpose built light tank(the 82d Abn operated with exactly such a vehicle in it's TO&E for 30+ years and would benefit from a modern Lt tank) and expand our airlift potential.

Airmech is here already(if you look at the russians its been here for decades on a DIVISIONAL scale!). To me the question is how to best utilize and support that unique capability. Pretneding the capability doesnt exist as some seem to want to do seems pretty stupid.

Anon

3/4, 5/8, full tank, whatever the case may be.(an external expansion tank with expansion valve such as can be found on any racecar would fully correct that problem btw)

I understand fully that in order to be most proficient at air movements that it would have to be practiced. I'm fine with that.

Officer of Engineers

Gentlemen, I so stand corrected.

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Chimo

Anon

Just for the record sir, the Delta contingent did get roughly handled and did have to pull back under fire, but the primary overall mission(scouting kandahar AB for future use as a Major FOB) was still a success, even if a bit on the costly side(about 10 Delta were wounded including one troop that had a foot blown off, and one MH47 heavily damaged when one of the wheels was blown off on egress by enemy fire).

Of course Delta's portion of the operation was an audacious one.

They directly assaulted Mullah Omars residential fortress. Unfortunatley, he was not at home and it was heavily defended...

Anon

I think so.

Even if used in a completely conventional role a light mech TF would be an effective cavalry screen or rapid reaction reserve or exploitation force.

And i think one of the real useful missions such a force could have would be 20-30km tactical vertical leapfrog manuevers, being airlifted in Co or even Bn elements by CH47s to seal of LOCs and cut-off forward enemy positions.

This sort of thing would take an even lighter vehicle, something on the order of about 15 tons max.

At any rate, if you have a good light tank that is CH47 slingable and C130 droppable, and you have air supremacy(pretty much a given for the US) you can really get creative with the application of armor in your enemies rear. Hitting targets, performing mounted LRRPs, shuffling your forces around and in/out of the enemy rear by air to sew confusion, etc.

It's IMO a fantastic capability. The Russians sure think so. They've been doing AirMech since the late 70s.(The Invasion force of Iceland in Clancys book Red Storm Rising was a Divisional sized AirMech force as Soviet Abn Divs are actually light mech formations).

We could design a pretty nasty little 15 ton COTScentric light tank if we set our minds to it. As always its just a matter of $$$$$$$$$.

Just think of the planning problems you create for the opposition when you can threaten his rear along the entire length of the FEBA.