Thread: U.S. VS. Soviet Union

Originally Posted by zraver

Soviet subs, and sub actions were aimed squarely at an interdiction of the North Atlantic.

I was always under the impression that they have two roles. The interdiction that you speak of and the protection of the boomers.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

I was always under the impression that they have two roles. The interdiction that you speak of and the protection of the boomers.

Since thier boomers never left thier own waters coastal subs were better suited to the task.

Only the boomers launched from the late 80s on. Before that, they had to goto Cuba to be effective.

But we're getting off topic. We have Soviet Field Marshalls telling us that they were never ready to march to the Rhine. They didn't have the numbers. These are retired officers invited to a NATO project to give an accurate assessment of the Cold War.

I, for one, find their views fascinating. Should we doubt their word?

If not, then, what was the realistic plan according to their doctrines? I think spoiling attacks against the BAOR, V Corps, and VII Corps are well within their capabilities.

Originally Posted by zraver

Since thier boomers never left thier own waters coastal subs were better suited to the task.

What are boomers?

Submarine - Ballistic Launched Missiles

Originally Posted by Silent Hunter

I'm talking about the whole system- prison camps and all.

True, but I will argue that this was probably the period in which Bolshevik communism is at its most pacific in history. It was terrorism against the Tsar, World War I, the Civil War, the Great Patriot War and the Cold War was the last.

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Only the boomers launched from the late 80s on. Before that, they had to goto Cuba to be effective.

They were also fairly noisy too.

Boomers as SSBNs. They're called that in US Navy slang because they fire things that go "boom".

Originally Posted by Expat Canuck

What are boomers?

Nickname for a missile boat (sub's are boats) eg:

Hunt For Red Oktober: "sounds like a boomer coming out of the yard"

eg: A sub (Typhoon class in this case) leaving the Polyarni Inlet

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Only the boomers launched from the late 80s on. Before that, they had to goto Cuba to be effective.

But we're getting off topic. We have Soviet Field Marshalls telling us that they were never ready to march to the Rhine. They didn't have the numbers. These are retired officers invited to a NATO project to give an accurate assessment of the Cold War.

I, for one, find their views fascinating. Should we doubt their word?

If not, then, what was the realistic plan according to their doctrines? I think spoiling attacks against the BAOR, V Corps, and VII Corps are well within their capabilities.

Doubt thier word, no, but look at it closely. According to your sources- they say they didn't have the numbers, not they didn't have the desire. They just did not think they had the correlation of forces required to win. Military officers tend to be conservative, and act as counter point to political enthusiasm for war among political masters.

I agree with them BTW for all but 2 periods of time. From the end of WW2 to early 60's and from the mid eighties on. But the door was wide open 73-75 before the US Army recovered its morale, got better tanks, and the air force got the teen fighters, F-111, and PGW's en masse.

It will never happen for obvious reasons, it I bet whole forests worth of trees died in the paperwork and maps planning to reach the Rhine.

I've read your comments with interest and largely disagree.

The collection platforms were varied, redundant, and comprehensive. Their doctrine was sound. They didn't lack for available units to perform such tasks.

Describing their tactical approach march to offensive operations as "blundering" is an unusual term. A soviet division commander had a responsibility to develop a reconnaissance plan up to 100kms in depth. Lead regiments provided, doctrinally, a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) of platoon size, followed by a security detachment of company size, an advance guard of battalion size and, finally, the main body- itself echeloned twice.

You seem convinced of the inviolability of the IGB, i.e. the Soviet regimental CRP leaves assembly area and intersects w/M68 tank gun-end of story. Perhaps. What's inserted/projected, when, and how are subject to conjecture based upon their battle-plan but the means were available, varied, and expected to be extended into our operational depth.

In general, you seem dismissive of their equipment and capabilities though agreeing that it was doctrinally sound. As to equipment, I see nothing that suggests that their collection platforms weren't first-rate for the period, particularly their signal and NBC collection systems.

You may have a point that they lacked an adequate helo for reconnaissance. So did we until the OH-58D came along. Still, it was the intention to attempt to conduct aerial observation from both sides. Whether the air-defense environ on either side would have made that possible is deeply speculative but we certainly feared that Soviet commanders would display great determination in developing their intelligence picture and would use any available asset to do so.

While enlisted personnel would be largely conscript, that shouldn't suggest that the soviet soldier of 1945-1990 was unpatriotic nor incapable of performing his assigned missions, in general. Further, it's commonly accepted that the quality of those troops performing/assigned to reconnaissance profiles were among the better soldiers available to Red army commanders- by intent. Finally nothing should suggest that the professionalism of the Soviet officer corps would impede the Red Army's ability and determination to conduct these operations.

For myself, finally, your anecdotal experiences at NTC would only confirm the deep regard which our threat teams held for Soviet reconnaissance/counter-recon operational doctrine. It was sound, well-equipped, and generously staffed with very capable human material.

Again, IMHO, "blundering" is a grossly dismissive term to describe Soviet tactical reconnaissance capabilities.

Originally Posted by S-2

I've read your comments with interest and largely disagree.

The collection platforms were varied, redundant, and comprehensive. Their doctrine was sound. They didn't lack for available units to perform such tasks.

Describing their tactical approach march to offensive operations as "blundering" is an unusual term. A soviet division commander had a responsibility to develop a reconnaissance plan up to 100kms in depth. Lead regiments provided, doctrinally, a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) of platoon size, followed by a security detachment of company size, an advance guard of battalion size and, finally, the main body- itself echeloned twice.

So the divisions lead element was a platoon. In the Us Army each battalion has that capability. Given the frontage even an attacking division has to occupy that is not enough assets to both mask the divisions axis and keep the armored cavalry from knocking them out leaving the recon up to the security element.

You seem convinced of the inviolability of the IGB, i.e. the Soviet regimental CRP leaves assembly area and intersects w/M68 tank gun-end of story. Perhaps. What's inserted/projected, when, and how are subject to conjecture based upon their battle-plan but the means were available, varied, and expected to be extended into our operational depth.

In a high threat enviroment they did not have the assets to fight the r/cr battle with thier scouts. They lacked heavy armor or IFV's relying on light wheeled scouts and the occasional light tank. When they ran into the ACR's then yes it would be M68+BRDM= funeral pyre.

In general, you seem dismissive of their equipment and capabilities though agreeing that it was doctrinally sound. As to equipment, I see nothing that suggests that their collection platforms weren't first-rate for the period, particularly their signal and NBC collection systems.

Signals is a much deeper type of intel even on the battalion level. On the purely tactical level thier scouts face anti-tank teams and armor without the ability or numbers to respond in kind.

You may have a point that they lacked an adequate helo for reconnaissance. So did we until the OH-58D came along.

The OH-58D was a vast improvement but we've had dedicated observation helos going back into the 60's at least.

While enlisted personnel would be largely conscript, that shouldn't suggest that the soviet soldier of 1945-1990 was unpatriotic nor incapable of performing his assigned missions, in general.

Military training is always set to the lowest common denominator. For Soviet infantry this is fire from the hip and a few commands in Russian for the asiatics most likely to be assigned to rifle platoons.

Further, it's commonly accepted that the quality of those troops performing/assigned to reconnaissance profiles were among the better soldiers available to Red army commanders- by intent.

They are still outnumbered conscripts led by conscript NCO's and equipped for the wrong fight.

Finally nothing should suggest that the professionalism of the Soviet officer corps would impede the Red Army's ability and determination to conduct these operations.

No complaints with thier officers were voiced by me.

For myself, finally, your anecdotal experiences at NTC would only confirm the deep regard which our threat teams held for Soviet reconnaissance/counter-recon operational doctrine. It was sound, well-equipped, and generously staffed with very capable human material.

generously staffed is quite subjective. NTC was stepped up to make the army fight above its weight to build in capability.

Again, IMHO, "blundering" is a grossly dismissive term to describe Soviet tactical reconnaissance capabilities.

Once that light platoon makes contact with the ACR and gets eliminated what exaclty is the rest of the division doing? Given the ranges NATO could fight at from the mid-late 70's onward and the new accuracy that came with it the security element was to far away to assist.

"Lead regiments provided, doctrinally, a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) of platoon size...".

That was my comment.

A Soviet Combined Arms or Tank Army would likely attack w/ two divisions forward and a MRD and TD in the army's second echelon. Each division would likely attack on two armored avenues of approach (if possible) w/ a regiment allocated along each axis. Thus, in a combined arms army you'd likely see four regiments of two divisions in the first echelon attacking along four axis of advance. In point of fact, two battalions from each division would likely lead the divisional assault. I'd assume that the CRP and security element would come out of the hide of the regimental advance guard battalion. In addition, IIRC, each division retained a divisional reconnaissance battalion.

Once you reach the combined arms army/tank army level, elements such as Spetsnatz and sophisticated engineering/signal/NBC reconnaissance assets begin showing up in the order of battle. These assets were pushed forward into the divisional formations to better enable their early utilization.

"In a high threat enviroment they did not have the assets to fight the r/cr battle with thier scouts."

I don't know. Your assumption ignores task-organizing. An MRR/TR combines an interesting assortment of vehicles. BRDMs, BRDM-2 (a superb ATGW platform), BMP-1/2, ZSU 23-4, BTR-70, MTLBs and (of course) tanks. My recollection is that the regimental security element (company-sized) and advance guard were task-organized according to mission expectations.

Again, this is in addition to the divisional reconnaissance battalion and encompasses more than simply reconnaissance. Mission definition is important. A CRP or it's follow-on forces were expected to identify targets and bypass while extending into the rear. If unable, they were expected to engage and destroy by fire. If not, they were expected to engage and suppress by fire to facilitate the secure movement of the regimental main body. Eventually, that leads to a reinforced battalion in the regimental advance guard pinning opposition if need be.

It naturally continues upward, but in every case the intent is to restore freedom of movement into our defensive depth.

"The OH-58D was a vast improvement but we've had dedicated observation helos going back into the 60's at least."

Dedicated? To the extent of lifting Mk-1 eyeball above tree level, perhaps. My dad served in 3AD's divisional cav squadron in 1964/65. The lift available in a divisional cav squadron then was nil. Needless to say, the assets weren't coveyed away in the CAB. There just weren't a lot.

If there was one advantage to USAEUR in the post-Vietnam period, it was the plethora of platforms and accumulated aviation expertise which we'd acquired in SVN. The utility to Europe was obvious and the transition rapid. It's commonly acknowledged that we'd written the book in the use of aerial reconnaissance assets (particularly helicopters), but the Soviets weren't far behind and by the late seventies they were developing some SERIOUS army aviation related muscle and eyes.

"Military training is always set to the lowest common denominator. For Soviet infantry this is fire from the hip and a few commands in Russian for the asiatics most likely to be assigned to rifle platoons."

Zraver, that sort of thinking will get you killed in combat. If you think that GSFG was anything except top-notch, well-drilled, superbly equipped and manned you'd be wrong. We're talking reconnaissance forces along the IGB, not a CAT C division in Kazakhstan nor, truthfully, the security detachments of combat divisions (whose mission is not reconnaissance).

"They are still outnumbered conscripts led by conscript NCO's and equipped for the wrong fight."

So who were our soldiers before an all-volunteer army and how were they equipped so much the better? I'll happily state that any number of them were highly educated and patriots. Like I said, your arrogance and rote regurgitation of Viktor Suvorovisms would quite likely cause you much consternation. Soviet reconnaissance forces were generally among the best and brightest of the Soviet ground forces.

"Once that light platoon makes contact with the ACR and gets eliminated what exaclty is the rest of the division doing? Given the ranges NATO could fight at from the mid-late 70's onward and the new accuracy that came with it the security element was to far away to assist."

Huh? Full circle to the top. A CRP per regiment, followed by a company (-), a battalion (-) and the main body. Two regiments likely in the divisional first echelon. You're way off here.

Ranges? What exceptional difference in engagement ranges in the late seventies? I know that army well.

I went back and confirmed the presence in each division of a reconnaissance battalion in an MRD or TD.

In addition, we've failed to account for the presence of a reconnaissance company organic to each MRR/TR. Finally, I can't recall whether there is a recon platoon organic to each manuever battalion or not. Perhaps somebody else can help there.

All of these assets (eight divisional or regimental company-sized detachments per division) have been largely unaccounted and don't apply toward those elements allocated to march security.

In essence, these forces did not perform classic cavalry missions as screening a main body's advance. Instead, they were expected to find and exploit gaps in our covering force area and penetrate upwards of 50-100km ahead of the division.

Great read gentlemen!!