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Reply With QuoteI doubt our troops are well trained enough to handle modern warfare with an equivalent nation. I mean, how many weeks do they train in basic training? Correct me if I am wrong, But is it not something like 12?
Sir,Originally Posted by Ray
A few thoughts:
1. The oil spot strategy is different than a strategic hamlet program, or New Villages as Sir Templer called them in Malaya. For the benefit of others in the thread, since I'm sure you could school circles around me on the subject, strategic hamlets are used to provide security for the rural population, to prevent infiltration by insurgents into this population to win their hearts and minds, and to implement food controls to starve the insurgents of supplies. I'm sure you could add more reasons from your experience in Mizoram. The rubber and tin boom help to save the New Village effort in Malaya, providing the funds to allow for infrastructure that prevented them from just being squalid villages that would have just served as incubators for potential insurgents. In the end, the New Village effort in Malaya was marginally successful.
In Vietnam, the corruption of the SVN government under Diem and the decision to build hamlets that were near key terrain (meaning that their location served military objectives, not political objectives such as locating providing good farm land for the displaced villagers) meant that the Strategic Hamlet program was an utter failure. COL Krepinevich's book The Army and Vietnam goes into great detail about these failures.
The insurgency in Iraq isn't a rural, agrarian based insurgency. So, strategic hamlets, or whatever you call them, are not a viable strategy.
2. Oil spot. The premise here is that you secure an area and build the security forces there. Once the indigenous security forces can handle the required tasks, you expand the secure area and use your military forces to secure the new ground until indigenous security forces are trained and can handle the new area. So, it is just like an oil spot that originally starts small, but eventually spreads until it is much larger, the strategy that Krepinevich calls for is to stop the interdiction operations (e.g. in Anbar, etc.) and whack-a-mole type operations and instead concentrate and truly pacificying specific areas until moving on.
3. Reality. We following a hybrid strategy, with some whack-a-mole and oil spot. Until recently, we really didn't have enough ISF to have a stay behind presence in many areas. However, given the fact that you can't just leave some territory as the Wild West due to "modern" inventions like the car bomb and press, which when combined, create their own momentum and power, the oil spot by itself isn't viable IMO. For example, if we were to have concentrated solely on Baghdad last year and not seized Fallujah in November, then you would have left a terrorist sanctuary, where they had training camps, car bomb factories, etc. IMO, it's much better to dedicate some (not all or even a majority, probably) operations to interdicting the insurgents/terrorists infrastructure to degrade their operation.
If you look at current operations, you now see "clear and hold" being the modus operandi. For example, Tal Afar and the string of small towns along the Euphrates near the Syrian border have all been seized and invested within the past three months, with efforts to build an ISF infrastructure there to prevent future terrorist rat lines and safe havens. So, this "clear and hold" is basically the oil spot under a different name.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
I doubt our troops are well trained enough to handle modern warfare with an equivalent nation. I mean, how many weeks do they train in basic training? Correct me if I am wrong, But is it not something like 12?
The Ball Mall, LLC: Your Central Ohio Source for Used and Recovered Golf Balls.
Wrong. The United States is the pre-eminent military in the world. Some of our allies have some very good troops, but they don't have them on the same scale as we do. This is not an attempt to boast or brag, just to state that when you invest the amount of capital that the US has into an all volunteer force for decades, you will end up with a very solid product that is advanced beyond what others have to offer.
Also, basic training is just that - basic training that focuses on providing soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airman the basic skills so that they can hit the ground running when they reach their units, which is where the real training begins.
So, start your eductation here
U.S. military power is of a different order entirely. The United States now accounts for between 40 and 50 percent of global defense spending, more than double the total spending of its European allies (whose budgets are so riddled with ine⁄ciencies that, aside from territorial defense, peacekeeping, and some niche capabilities, the European pillar of nato is militarily irrelevant). In virtually every sphere of warfare, the United States dominates, an unprecedented phenomenon in military history. On and above the earth and on and below the sea, U.S. military technology far surpasses that of any potential opponent. No other power has the ability to move large and sophisticated
forces around the globe; to coordinate and direct its own forces and those of its allies; to keep troops equipped, fed, and healthy; and to support those troops with precision firepower and unsurpassed amounts of information and intelligence.
Viewed from within, of course, the picture looks very different. U.S. soldiers know all too well their own deficiencies and vulnerabilities: they grouse about aging trucks, jammed rifles, and intermittent data links. Viewed from the outside, however, the world has seen nothing like the U.S. military. British infantrymen in 1900 shot more accurately than their continental European counterparts but did not differ all that much from them in terms of equipment and unit skills (and the Tommies found themselves inferior to Boer citizen-soldiers equipped with German-made rifles). Today, an average U.S. battalion has better kit—from body armor to night vision devices—than any
comparable unit in the world; with a few exceptions (mostly allies of the United States), it trains more effectively in the field; and it has officers and sergeants groomed by a military schooling system more thorough than any in history.
This qualitative advantage looms even larger at the higher levels of the armed forces. No other military has the b-2 bombers or the satellite constellation, the aircraft carriers or the long-range unmanned aircraft of the U.S. Navy and Air Force. No other country is remotely close to having the resources afforded by a $400 billion defense budget or the accumulated military-industrial capital of years of spending on construction and infrastructure. No other research establishment can match that of the United States, which receives more money than the entire defense budget of its largest European ally.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
In urban combat in Iraq, the kill ratio is much lower than what it should be. Is it not?
The Ball Mall, LLC: Your Central Ohio Source for Used and Recovered Golf Balls.
Name me an equivlent nation.
Chimo
I haven't seen many figures on this, and those that do exist are speculative in nature since we don't track enemy body counts in an official manner. However, of the few stories that I have seen where individual units did keep their own unofficial tally, it was quite lopsided, nearing a three digit ratio in favor of American forces.
In the bigger picture, body count ratios are not important strategically, except as it matters within the context of how strategically short-sighted many Americans are about US casualties.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
Here's one "box score" for you:
http://www.strykernews.com/archives/...cumentary.html
4 September 2004 - 5-20 IN killed 102 insurgents, insurgents killed 0 Americans
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/m...s_worth?page=3
Here's a company who in 11 months in Iraq had killed nearly 100 insurgents and 1 donkey while the battalion, which has four companies, suffered eight killed in their full 12 month tour.
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/Transcripts/050913a.htm
Here's an assault on Tall Afar four month ago where the 3rd ACR killed 118 insurgents while suffering a single KIA.
These are three examples - extrapolate as you wish.
FYI, US hostile deaths in Iraq just surpassed 1700.
Last edited by Shek; 28 Dec 05, at 03:40.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
It was on the history channel.
The Ball Mall, LLC: Your Central Ohio Source for Used and Recovered Golf Balls.
And the point is
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
And the point is
Preemption of any "where did you find this"
The Ball Mall, LLC: Your Central Ohio Source for Used and Recovered Golf Balls.
But you provided zero stats, only an assertion. I'll agree that the History Channel is a reputable source, but I've seen a handful of mistakes on it as well. If you can talk some stats, I can provide some feedback. Until then, here's another anecdotal piece of evidence that contradicts the assertion that you are backing.
What you may be thinking of is the fact that we didn't resource enough troops to fight a counterinsurgency, with the tradition metric being a 10:1 ratio of friendly security forces to insurgents. Is this the stat you heard?http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04326/414709.stm
Jack Kelly: Victory in Fallujah
Iraq's Iwo Jima gets scant media respect
Sunday, November 21, 2004
The rule of thumb for the last century or so has been that for a guerrilla force to remain viable, it must inflict seven casualties on the forces of the government it is fighting for each casualty it sustains, says former Canadian army officer John Thompson, managing director of the Mackenzie Institute, a think tank that studies global conflicts.
By that measure, the resistance in Iraq has had a bad week. American and Iraqi government troops have killed at least 1,200 fighters in Fallujah, and captured 1,100 more. Those numbers will grow as mop-up operations continue.
These casualties were inflicted at a cost (so far) of 56 Coalition dead (51 Americans), and just over 300 wounded, of whom about a quarter have returned to duty.
"That kill ratio would be phenomenal in any [kind of] battle, but in an urban environment, it's revolutionary," said retired Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters, perhaps America's most respected writer on military strategy. "The rule has been that [in urban combat] the attacking force would suffer between a quarter and a third of its strength in casualties."
The victory in Fallujah was also remarkable for its speed, Peters said. Speed was necessary, he said, "because you are fighting not just the terrorists, but a hostile global media."
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
I think the HC meant in house to house combat, without the aid of air support and tanks, the like. I also found support for the narrow kill margin in the mte agazine of the American Legion, whatever it is called.
Cite all the battles you want. One suicide bomber killing a dozen troops does help narrow the ratio.
The Ball Mall, LLC: Your Central Ohio Source for Used and Recovered Golf Balls.
How many suicide bombers do you need to kill that one dozen? What we've been seeing thus far is that most suicide missions do not succeed and very few of the successes results in that kind of carnage and most of those are against civilians.
Chimo
The proficiency of the US Army in urban battle drill is light years beyond what it used to be. So, if that's what your vague recollection is, then the HC is flat out wrong.
Now, back to my original point in the discussion. The US Army doesn't maintain official body counts. It poisoned the command atmosphere in Vietnam, made a sham of integrity, and grew out of a failed attrition strategy.
We are fighting a counterinsurgency in Iraq, so the more important indicators are political progress, economic progress, and the training of the Iraqi security forces. We will continue to slay insugents by the bushel when they surface long enough to get whacked, but that is only killing the symptom. The key will be fixing the underlying problems that are fueling the insurgency.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
I can only think of two examples of individual suicide bombers killing American soldiers - a pregnant female killing two Rangers during the initial ground war and the Ansar al-Islam suicide bomber at the FOB Marez mess tent right before Christmas last year, which killed 13 American soldiers, I believe. There may be a handful of others, but their individual suicide bombers don't attack Americans or other coalition members for a reason - they die without gaining effects. As far as suicide car bombers, the number of Americans killed could be as high as 114, although this statistic captures both static, roadside car bombs as well as suicide, piloted car bombs. So, your suicide bombers account for around 4-7% of the just over 1700 American servicemen killed in battle, and based on the number of suicide bombers that die trying to kill Americans, we maintain probably 1:3-5 ratio in our favor vs. suicide bombers. I guess you are technically correct that it does improve the statistic in favor of the insurgents from the 1:50-100 ratio when facing us in a hasty defense or the 1:30 ratio when they defend from a position prepared for six months. However, given the small percentage of casualties that the jihadi suicide squad accounts for, it doesn't affect the overall ratio too much.
You might want to do some more research before you just start spouting off assertions you can't even properly remember. I've provided around 5-6 empirical examples so far, and you've provided zero, so until you bring some facts to the table, we'll consider your assertion disproved.
To help you along in your research, here's a free Christmas gift:
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
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