Was Bosnia Worth It?

**Shek** · 19 Jul 05,, 12:14

Two questions for everyone out there:

1. Some of the first hand accounts that I've heard is that if NATO were to leave Bosnia today, it would descend back into violence, which contradicts this account. Which one is closer to the truth?

2. Is the US seen as the biggest savior? I know that we were the biggest contingent once we went in at the end of 2004. However, we were slow to get involved prior to then outside of air power and there were plenty of other nations that committed to the UN mission there before us.

This article seemed a little too rosy to me, which is why I'm asking the questions. Thanks.

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Washington Post
July 19, 2005
Pg. 21

Was Bosnia Worth It?

By Richard Holbrooke

If you wonder whether the 1995 American intervention in Bosnia was the right decision, go to a really horrible place, one whose name has become synonymous with genocide and Western failure. Go to Srebrenica.

Ten years after Bosnian Serbs under the command of Gen. Ratko Mladic murdered 7,000 Muslims there, I found myself back in that valley of evil as part of the official American delegation representing President Bush and the nation. We walked across muddy fields, under leaden skies, through a vast throng of victim families who were burying more than 600 of their loved ones, their grief and personal hatred of those who had done this undiminished by the passage of a decade.

But even in Srebrenica, there has been progress since my last visit, five years ago. Then, only 10 brave -- one might say recklessly brave -- Muslim families had returned to their homes, and they lived in constant fear among 12,000 Serbs. Today 4,000 Muslims have returned, and one-third of the Serbs have already left. This is astonishing, and more of the same seems certain if the international community -- and especially the United States, the most respected nation in the Balkans -- remains involved; in this regard, Bush's strong words of support at the ceremony -- read by the head of his delegation, Ambassador for War Crimes Pierre Prosper -- were welcomed. There was also an important effort at reconciliation: Top leaders from Serbia and the Serb part of Bosnia came to lay wreaths, an important acknowledgment of Serb responsibility for what happened.

Things have improved even more in the rest of Bosnia. Above all, there is peace and not simply a cease-fire; this war will not resume. Nor has Bosnia become two separate states, as many critics of the Dayton Peace Agreement predicted. Although many (including in the Pentagon) predicted a Korea-like demilitarized zone between Serbs and Muslims, there are no barriers between the regions, and there are growing economic and political ties between ethnic groups. More than a million refugees have returned to their homes, many, like those in Srebrenica, to areas where they are in a minority. Both the European Union and NATO are beginning talks that could lead to association agreements between Bosnia and Brussels.

So there is good news (which often means "no news" to editors) from Bosnia. But not nearly enough. From the beginning, implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement was insufficiently aggressive. The most important failure was not capturing the two most wanted war criminals in Europe, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. This is a story unto itself of missed opportunities and poor intelligence. Mladic is, after all, in Serbia, and has been seen in public. I would guess that Karadzic has trimmed his trademark gray pompadour, grown a beard, and is hiding in some monastery in the deep mountains of eastern Bosnia or Montenegro. If Karadzic and Mladic are not brought to justice, the international security force (now a European Union force, with NATO reduced to a small office and fewer than 200 American troops) will never be able to leave, and Bosnia's return to a multiethnic society (and the institutions of Europe) will be delayed or prevented.

It is by now universally understood that a great crime was committed in Srebrenica. As assistant secretary of state for European affairs at the time, I argued, unsuccessfully, that we needed NATO airstrikes to stop the Bosnian Serbs -- bullies who preferred long-range artillery and short-range murder to anything resembling a real military operation. But Britain, France and the Netherlands had troops deployed, as part of the United Nations' peacekeeping force, in three extremely exposed enclaves in eastern Bosnia, including Srebrenica. Facing the brutal threats of Mladic, they refused to consider airstrikes until the Dutch troops were ignominiously escorted out of Srebrenica. By then it was too late.

From 1991 to 1995 the United States had been reluctant to act in Bosnia. But after Srebrenica, President Bill Clinton knew that although the American people would not like it, the United States could no longer avoid involvement there. Thus began the diplomatic and military policy that led to the Dayton accords, to peace in Bosnia and, four years later, to the liberation of the Albanian people in Kosovo from Slobodan Milosevic's oppression.

Sending 20,000 American troops to Bosnia as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping contingent to enforce Dayton took real political courage. There were widespread predictions that it would fail, and there was opposition from most of Congress and the foreign policy elite. In a poll at the time, Clinton's decision was supported by only 36 percent of the American public, who expected heavy U.S. casualties. As it turned out, that expectation was misplaced; in the 10 years since Dayton, no -- repeat, no -- American or NATO military personnel have been killed by hostile action in Bosnia. It is a mark of the respect in which NATO -- that is, the United States -- is held.

This was Clinton's most important action in regard to Europe -- an action opposed, incidentally, by most of his political advisers. It was a classic commander-in-chief decision, made alone, without congressional support and with only reluctant backing from the Pentagon. But it worked: Without those 20,000 troops, Bosnia would not have survived, 2 million refugees would still be wandering the face of Western Europe, a criminal state would be in power in Bosnia itself -- and we would probably have had to pursue Operation Enduring Freedom not only in Afghanistan but also in the deep ravines and dangerous hills of central Bosnia, where a shadowy organization we now know as al Qaeda was putting down roots that were removed by NATO after Dayton.

Was Bosnia worth it? As we approach the 10th anniversary of Dayton, there should no longer be any debate. Had we not intervened -- belatedly but decisively -- a disaster would have taken place with serious consequences for our national security and the war on terrorism. Dayton reasserted an American leadership role in Europe after a period of drift and confusion. But the job is not yet finished, and it is encouraging to see President Bush and the new team at State recommit the nation, as they did last week at Srebrenica.

Richard Holbrooke was the chief architect of the Dayton Peace Agreement. He writes a monthly column for The Post.

**Officer of Engineers** · 19 Jul 05,, 12:56

Originally Posted by shek

1. Some of the first hand accounts that I've heard is that if NATO were to leave Bosnia today, it would descend back into violence, which contradicts this account. Which one is closer to the truth?

Without some kind of force in place, violence will erupt again but it would not be immediate. We've reduced their effectiveness and intrude upon their military stuctures (Croatian and Muslim forces are too integrated to be seperated with ease, Serb forces to a lesser degree) too much for them to mount anything above platoon actions for the time being.

The orginial war contained issues dating back to the Ottoman Turks when they 1st came to the area. No one forgets a thing there. No one forgives a thing there. Tito held the place together at the point of a gun ... and so are we.

Originally Posted by shek

2. Is the US seen as the biggest savior? I know that we were the biggest contingent once we went in at the end of 2004. However, we were slow to get involved prior to then outside of air power and there were plenty of other nations that committed to the UN mission there before us.

The US is the biggest saviour for the exact reason the US mission was the only one the US would agree on. All other plans had been quietly rejected by the US as favouring the Serbs too much (and hence, no political action by UNPROFOR).

**Hk40** · 19 Jul 05,, 16:17

Not to dance around the question of "in The End Was It Worth It?" - One would have to say Yes.
Where does a country draw the line or a line? Look at Africa, genocide on mamoth porportions! The G8 Rock-Aide only scratches the surface as to what is really needed that can really make a difference. That being infrastructural need. They need paved roads, safe drinking water, proper sewage systems, schools, medical facilities, electrical faciliteis. Sure helping AIDS is big and needs to be addressed. But Africa needs to become self-reliant.
Back to Bosina. Yes it was worth it.
~ Hk40 ~

**dave angel** · 20 Jul 05,, 09:18

bosnia was worth it. everytime our AFV came around the corner the shooting died down. when we sat outside a village the people had a chance to collect water, food and firewood - they would not of had that chance without an AFV sat outside the village.

we escorted aid convoys that wouldn't have got through without us, we evacuated the sick and the homeless. we had a childrens party for 300 kids from several different villages, kids who'd known nothing but hunger, shooting, looting and cold for months spent the day being fed, watching clowns and magicians, having snowball fights with soldiers and being checked out by the med staff.

our presence brought the media, our vehicles allowed the media to do their job and the media brought airstrikes.

UNPROFOR can rightly be slagged off for its failure to end the war, but that wasn't its job. we ensured that aid got to the people that needed it in the middle of a civil war.

the american experience of bosnia is pain-free, because america only deigned to put its soldiers on the ground - as opposed to its politicians sniping from washington - after the fighting had stopped. for those nations involved in UNPROFOR it wasn't: the british army lost some 30 soldiers in bosnia, the french a similar amount. canadians also were killed in some numbers, all of our soldiers made disgusting decisions about the abandonment of principle to save civilian life, all of us drove our AFV's alongside civilian vehicles to protect them from fire, all of us buried civilians. all of us searched burnt out homes for bodies, all of us met scores, hundreds, thousands of refugees who looked like our mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, and worst - our sons and daughters.

bosnia was no testosterone filled glory parade, but yes, it was worth it.

**Shek** · 20 Jul 05,, 12:35

Just to clarify my position, I wasn't questioning whether Bosnia was worth it, but rather interested to get opinions on Holbrooke's take about how stable the situation really is (is it peace at the tip of a gunbarrel?) and who the Bosniacs consider to be the real savior. While I was on short string to backfill the Russian BDE's sector in the event they pulled out of Bosnia due to Kosovo, I never actually served in the Balkans, so I was curious to solicit opinions from those with first hand accounts.

**dave angel** · 20 Jul 05,, 16:01

its still a bit of a cesspit. its certainly true that many are just getting on with their lives as regular people, but there remains a significant element that would happily cut the throat of their neighbour.

from my experience the bosnians see no 'saviour' country, they see a whole planoply of nations who had the power to stop the conflict and didn't until it reached a point convenient to them.

oddly enough my best friend has just retured from a dirty weeked in sarajevo, so it must be improving. though even the postcard shows buildings with big holes in them.

from what i read the people are happy to move towards their place in central europe, they have always worked all over europe so are quite outward looking and educated. they aspire towards NATO and EU membership and the apparent path of gold that membership entails.

i'd definately take the US 'worship' with a big pinch of salt, those who i have met in the UK seem quite bitter about the west's actions during the war.

**Officer of Engineers** · 20 Jul 05,, 22:01

Captain,

What percentage of the EU force are going to be East Europeans and would that have any effect. The Russians certainly did not enjoy a good reputation in I/SFOR.

**Amled** · 20 Jul 05,, 23:35

As a layman; who only saw, read and heard of the atrocities being committed in Bosnia through the medias reporting, I would have to say - yes.
If for no other reason that Bosnia spelled the beginning of the end for Serbian strong man Slobodan Mihajlovic. IMO if that man would have been allowed to remain in power the intercine violence would have continued unabated in the areas that used to be Yugoslavia.
But as I said this is a layman’s opinion, those outsiders military and non-military alike who had hands on experience in the area are the best qualified to render an opinion.

**Confed999** · 20 Jul 05,, 23:57

I don't believe in "peacekeeping". More often than not, it's just a delay in the violence.

**Amled** · 21 Jul 05,, 00:41

Originally Posted by Confed999

I don't believe in "peacekeeping". More often than not, it's just a delay in the violence.

There are times a "Peacemaker", the .45 cal variety is a better solution!

**Major Dad** · 21 Jul 05,, 04:22

[QUOTE=shek]Two questions for everyone out there:

1. Some of the first hand accounts that I've heard is that if NATO were to leave Bosnia today, it would descend back into violence, which contradicts this account. Which one is closer to the truth?

2. Is the US seen as the biggest savior? I know that we were the biggest contingent once we went in at the end of 2004. However, we were slow to get involved prior to then outside of air power and there were plenty of other nations that committed to the UN mission there before us.

This article seemed a little too rosy to me, which is why I'm asking the questions. Thanks.

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In my opinion, no, it was not. I have no doubt that if/when the UN forces leave, the situation will return to the status quo ante. I find it odd though, that considering the abuse the moslems have been taking in other threads, no one is talking about getting the h*ll out of Dodge and letting the Serbs finish the job. Especially since, if my memory serves, it was the KLA who started the killing with the ambush and murder of 4 Serb police back in the 80's? Wouldn't it be ironic if, 50 years in the future, the Balkans wars were considered the opening engagement of the War on Terror?

**Officer of Engineers** · 21 Jul 05,, 05:02

Well, Major,

You've got everything wrong here. If you want it bluntly, it's the Greater Albania (Islam) vs Greater Croatia (Nazis) vs Greater Serbia (Communists). There are NO GOOD GUYS there. And if you want the truth, the CIA (Americans) supported the Croats (Nazis) against us Canadians (the Good Guys) at Krajina.

**Major Dad** · 21 Jul 05,, 05:20

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Well, Major,

You've got everything wrong here. If you want it bluntly, it's the Greater Albania (Islam) vs Greater Croatia (Nazis) vs Greater Serbia (Communists). There are NO GOOD GUYS there. And if you want the truth, the CIA (Americans) supported the Croats (Nazis) against us Canadians (the Good Guys) at Krajina.

OK, there are no good guys. I still find it ironic that, in the midst of the 'War on Terror', we (or, I should say, you) have a sizable force in the field, defending non-Good Guy moslems.

**Officer of Engineers** · 21 Jul 05,, 05:26

I'm speaking specifically of Yugoslavia. If you read through all our threads (the good Captain, Dave Angel and mine, both UNPROFOR vets), the Muslims screwed us over just as much as everybody else.

And what about the CIA? Supplying the Croats with Canadian Fortification layouts (through satellite photos) and allowing Military Professional Inc to advice the Croats how to defeat the Canadian 2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment Battle Group at Krajina?

**dave angel** · 21 Jul 05,, 09:31

its certainly true to say there were few 'good guys' - except us obviously! - but there were lots of 'worse' guys.

civilisation does not accept the forced deportation, shelling, rape and murder of civilians regardless of their religion - which in bosnia was a very westernised, birth marriges and deaths form of religion. the only beards i saw were on the plastics who turned up with saudi money, the people ate sausage and drank an excellent plum brandy as part of their daily diet.

before the war sarajevo was as european as prague or london, you could spend a week there and not know you were in a 'muslim' country, just a european one with funny looking churches.

colonel, my understanding is that the east european forces have fitted in quite well with the 'NATO standard' in SFOR/EUROFOR, they make up a fair pewrcentage as it allows them a low-risk, but still operational environment to train in western doctrine and to operate with other armies. i'm not sure however that the ukrainians should be invited back (for those not in the know they turned up for UNPROFOR with a full mechanised infantry battalion group, mortars, ATGW, the works. they flogged it all to the serbs and left six months later having done half a dozen patrols and only had a few 'jeep' like wagons left, no ammunition and about fifty rifles between 850 troops) the russians were just as bad, they also sided with the serbs anytime they could, including stopping aid convoys for 'security reasons' and having a habit of 'accidentally' firing on western helicopters overflying their TAOR. their soldiers were a joke, crap drills, they were illdisciplined and they had zero motivation. the officers and the SF(?) were well turned out and seemed switched on, the SF(?) units seemed far more motivated to do the kind of work they were supposed to be doing (patrolling, civil aid, monitoring and agreeing local ceacefires etc..) than the regular units.

the russian regular units were generally unco-operative, the intelligence officers - who stuck out like the *******s on a bulldog - divided their time between snooping around western units disguised as liason officers and talking to the serbs about our patrol routines and bartering russian kit for any western kit the srebs had robbed.