Thread: Russian Military Photos

If we were dealing with Russian troops in the same numbers as Syrian/Lebanese forces, if they were attacking us, then yeah, we would take them on. I'd like to think that our training and most definitely our equipment are better than Georgia's. If we're dealing with Russian troops in Russian numbers, where they can overwhelm us easily, no, I wouldn't want that, though if it was already happening, I'm fairly certain we'd take a pretty heavy price, at least in the beginning. After a while we'd be drowning in the enemy.

Unfortunately, stories like Avigdor Kahalani and Zvika Force in the Golan Heights in 1973 are the nadir, not the norm.

The case can also be made that there have been plenty of Soviet "observers" throughout the region, and that IAF soldiers have shot down Soviet MiG's flown by Soviet pilots over the Sinai desert. Not the same as tanks, but still indicative of the skill level of the IDF, at least back then. I'd like to think it hasn't changed that much.

Something to consider Ben, the 58th Army did much better against Georgia than the IDF did against the Hezbollah though the Russians did have their share of initial clusterfcks. A recce company got shot up for absolutely no reason. However, what was different was that they regrouped and recommitted to achieve very well defined OPOBJs.

Granted, the Russians were ready with a lot of contingency planning and they've even launched the war without a full warfooting by the 58th but it does show that their officers know how to fight a war.

In other words, you're going up against officers who are just as well trained as yours ... and perhaps even better schooled than yours.

Within context of what I wrote about a T-90 regiment, it's not tank against tank but regiment against regiment and all that it implies.

Colonel, I'd love to debate this one with you, but I'm afraid that I'm not that well up to verse in IDF Regiment tactics, and definitely not up to verse on Soviet/Russin Regiment tactics. Anything up to Company level, I might be able to debate properly, that comes with being part of the CO/XO's tank crew.

Unfortunately, I only ever ended up doing one set of maneuvers in the Brigade CO's tank, and I was fairly superfluous as anything but a tank gunner.

In the CO/XO's tank, you're dealing with 11 tanks maximum, so it's easy to get a general picture of what's going on and where things are going, and you only need to listen in on the Company frequency anyway if you want to find out what's actually happening, Battalion frequency if you want to get a broader general picture.

In the Brigade CO's tank, suddenly you're listening to at least 2 tank battalions (72 tanks including 6 battalions, 4 Battalion CO/XO's and 2 Artillery spotter tanks), an infantry battalion, an Artillery battery, a Brigade artillery spotter tank, an Air Force liaison tank, plus there's the recce company that advances in front of the regiment itself, plus a squad of recce troops whose sole purpose is to guard the Brigade CO's tank and his command post. On top of all of that, he also needs to listen to the Division frequency, and at times also to the Command frequency. Those are only the things that I remember, I'm pretty sure there's still more. All that leads to so much mess that the Brigade CO's tank is a 6 person crew, with another radio operator and the Brigade Operations Officer on board as well.

To be honest, I have no idea how the Brigade CO kept track of everything, I know I was busy enough just finding targets and hitting them, and all the distracting background noise is no help at all...

Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers

Something to consider Ben, the 58th Army did much better against Georgia than the IDF did against the Hezbollah though the Russians did have their share of initial clusterfcks. A recce company got shot up for absolutely no reason. However, what was different was that they regrouped and recommitted to achieve very well defined OPOBJs.

Granted, the Russians were ready with a lot of contingency planning and they've even launched the war without a full warfooting by the 58th but it does show that their officers know how to fight a war.

In other words, you're going up against officers who are just as well trained as yours ... and perhaps even better schooled than yours.

Within context of what I wrote about a T-90 regiment, it's not tank against tank but regiment against regiment and all that it implies.

Sir, PoG had prepared for that war for years. They were heavily dug in and well equipped as well as being structured so they didn't have to move or maintain C4SRI. They fought more like the Imperial Japanese on an atoll in WWII than as a main force combatant. Georgia on the other hand collapsed when the offensive failed. The Russian's chased a routed enemy which is rather easier than chewing through defensive belts. Sir conventional wisdom was that a light infantry army could not stand up to an armor heavy professional main force unit on the assault. PoG did your job (engineering) and did it proud by standing that wisdom on its head. Red Army partisans couldn't do it in WWII, the VC/NVA couldn't do it in Laos etc. But PoG did....

Now in main force v mainforce Gog/Magog vs Israel.... (best of the best corps sized units for each) The IDF's Merkava's lack a round that can reliably kill the T-90 just as much as the Russian's lack an effective round vs the Merkava. Neither side has good infantry training. Israel has better attack helos, but is outmatched in artillery. Russian engineers are known for their skill, but Israel has better NCO's... Israel has better recon capabilities and com gear and the IDF has the better air force in terms of pilot training and overall technology. Russia has a much better vertical envelopment capability and the superior navy (an Oscar II off the coast is a huge force multiplier).

It will come down to the commanders, and here Israel appears to be lacking based on the last war each side fought. Georgia showed a lot of Russian flaws, but operational planning wasn't one of them. Israel's operational planning on the other hand was an abject failure.

Z,

Out of curiosity, are you basing your opinion of the commanders on Lebanon 2006, or Gaza 2008?

If on Gaza 2008, then I'd say that the commanders put on a fairly good show without many fcuk-ups, though I wasn't here so I wouldn't be able to tell you.

If you're basing it on Lebanon 2006, then I want to point out that the main flaw was in Brigade level and above, though some Brigades (mine, the 401st Armored, included) performed quite well even at the Brigade level. Every unit performed properly up to and including the Battalion level. I should also point out that after the army was "purged" in 2006-2007, the same effective and efficient Battalion/Brigade commanders in 2006 have now been promoted to Brigade/Division level in 2010. Moreover, just like any proper armed forces, studies and inquiries were commissioned, lessons were learned and then implemented.

I submit that it took Lebanon 2006 to give the IDF the wake up call it needed (unfortunately at the loss of so many lives) but our officer Corps has been greatly improved since then, all the way up to the level of our Chief of Staff.

Originally Posted by bigross86

Z,

Out of curiosity, are you basing your opinion of the commanders on Lebanon 2006, or Gaza 2008?

If on Gaza 2008, then I'd say that the commanders put on a fairly good show without many fcuk-ups, though I wasn't here so I wouldn't be able to tell you.

If you're basing it on Lebanon 2006, then I want to point out that the main flaw was in Brigade level and above, though some Brigades (mine, the 401st Armored, included) performed quite well even at the Brigade level. Every unit performed properly up to and including the Battalion level. I should also point out that after the army was "purged" in 2006-2007, the same effective and efficient Battalion/Brigade commanders in 2006 have now been promoted to Brigade/Division level in 2010. Moreover, just like any proper armed forces, studies and inquiries were commissioned, lessons were learned and then implemented.

I submit that it took Lebanon 2006 to give the IDF the wake up call it needed (unfortunately at the loss of so many lives) but our officer Corps has been greatly improved since then, all the way up to the level of our Chief of Staff.

Neither 2006 nor 2008 was very impressive at those levels. In Cast lead despite holding all the cards an attacker could hold, the IDF faield to really damage Hamas. Most of the Hamas dead were early on and uniformed police forces. The IDF never really went toe to toe with the rest of the Hamas fighters inside the cities. Compare either Lebanon or Cast lead to Russian actions in Georgia and you see a distinct lack of aggression on the part of the IDF. I know the IDF is averse to casualties, but sometimes you have to employ FIDO and just do the mission. Russia shoved her army down Georgia's throat.

Originally Posted by bigross86

If you're basing it on Lebanon 2006, then I want to point out that the main flaw was in Brigade level and above, though some Brigades (mine, the 401st Armored, included) performed quite well even at the Brigade level

Ben, you've missed the big point Z was trying to state. Your brigade never achieved their OPOBJs despite having achieved the TACOBJs compared to the Russians who really never cared to achieve the TACOBJs and is quite willing to sacrifice men and machine for the OPOBJs.

No offense to you Ben but why was you BN OC allow to define his own OPOBJs?

Colonel, I'm not quite sure I'm understanding the question. How exactly would you define the TACOBJ's and OPOBJ's? I might be able to answer better if I understand the language a bit better, and I don't wanna give a wrong answer.

Another thing that just occurred to me is that we're trying to draw conclusions from one type of combat to another. Lebanon 2006/Gaza 2008 and Georgia were not exactly massive armor battles. Many of the things that hampered the IDF in Gaza (mainly, civilians) won't be present in a Regiment v Regiment battle. Some things, like Officer initiative and troop morale can probably be inferred from the last battle, but not the actual result based on the previous action.

At least that's what I think. Unfortunately (and fortunately as well), the last real tank v tank action Israel has seen was in 1981, and the last real massive tank battle (Division v Division) was in 1973, almost 40 years ago

Originally Posted by bigross86

Colonel, I'm not quite sure I'm understanding the question. How exactly would you define the TACOBJ's and OPOBJ's? I might be able to answer better if I understand the language a bit better, and I don't wanna give a wrong answer.

Another thing that just occurred to me is that we're trying to draw conclusions from one type of combat to another. Lebanon 2006/Gaza 2008 and Georgia were not exactly massive armor battles. Many of the things that hampered the IDF in Gaza (mainly, civilians) won't be present in a Regiment v Regiment battle. Some things, like Officer initiative and troop morale can probably be inferred from the last battle, but not the actual result based on the previous action.

At least that's what I think. Unfortunately (and fortunately as well), the last real tank v tank action Israel has seen was in 1981, and the last real massive tank battle (Division v Division) was in 1973, almost 40 years ago

Israel's goal was the defeat of PoG or Hamas as the case may be- she failed.

Russia's gial was the defeat of Georgia and securing of South Ossetia and Abkhazia- she achieved 100% of her goals.

Civilians were present in all 3 wars. Russia had the weakest force of the attackers with the poorest air support and oldest equipment. Yet through the aggressive application of the tools they did have they routed the Georgians and won. I think if Israel was willing to stick a knife into Hamas guts she would win, but its that up close and personal aggressiveness that has been missing.

But again, can one draw conclusions from one type of warfare to another? Is it applicable to draw from a conflict in Urban terrain vs a militia that's well entrenched in the civilian population to a Regiment v Regiment battle in the open plains?

Another thing to look at is politics. I don't really think that Russia really cares what people say about it in the world media. Israel may pretend it doesn't care, but in actuality we toe the line most of the time. Therefore Russia had more ability to rout the Georgians than the IDF did against Hamas.

Originally Posted by bigross86

But again, can one draw conclusions from one type of warfare to another? Is it applicable to draw from a conflict in Urban terrain vs a militia that's well entrenched in the civilian population to a Regiment v Regiment battle in the open plains?

The invasion of Georgia was not open plains. Russia prosecuted that war across the breadth of Georgia. It wasn't much of a match up, but the impressions are valid. Russia remembered/re-learned how to win. Following the Soviet experience in A-stan and then in Chechnya most people had a very low opinion of the Russian military. The average Joe doesn't make those comments anymore.

Another thing to look at is politics. I don't really think that Russia really cares what people say about it in the world media. Israel may pretend it doesn't care, but in actuality we toe the line most of the time. Therefore Russia had more ability to rout the Georgians than the IDF did against Hamas.

And toeing the line has achieved what exactly? If you had gone in with knives and not come out till the job was done would you be hated any more? The back to back defeats in 2006 and 2007 did untold harm to Israel by making the IDF look weak. The Russians looked bumbling in Georgia, but they proved even a bumbling bears hug-kills. Battlefield victory wins public opinion victories.

OK, I'll agree with you that the Russians no longer have the reputation of not being able to win, but that still doesn't answer the question: Can one draw conclusions on a Regiment v Regiment tank battle from observing a battle in an urban environment where the tank is out of it's element?

It's not exactly drawing conclusion from apples to oranges, but it's like drawing conclusions from green apples to red apples. Just because they're both apples doesn't mean they're the same...

Originally Posted by bigross86

OK, I'll agree with you that the Russians no longer have the reputation of not being able to win, but that still doesn't answer the question: Can one draw conclusions on a Regiment v Regiment tank battle from observing a battle in an urban environment where the tank is out of it's element?

It's not exactly drawing conclusion from apples to oranges, but it's like drawing conclusions from green apples to red apples. Just because they're both apples doesn't mean they're the same...

I already did a comparison, and it boils down to aggression. I have little faith the current IDF is willing to trade blood for victory.

Depends against which enemy. Hamas, for all the rhetoric, is not yet an existential threat to Israel. A Russian army would be, and the IDF has shown in 1973 that they're more than willing to stand and fight for every inch of ground. I don't think that fundamental tenet of IDF philosophy has changed