Thread: IISS : Georgia shouldn't join NATO

Can't say I agree.

Originally Posted by Dreadnought

Can't say I agree.

Does that mean that you disagree ?

Originally Posted by Shipwreck

Does that mean that you disagree ?

Well, I do think they should be allowed to join. Not rushed into mind you because of Russian military action but how can NATO turn anybody away from joining. Yes, I do understand it may piss off some people and I'm sure that Georgia will bring along her problems as well but why should the Russians be permitted to bully anybody if they are not part of the Russian Federation but yet do exist with the Russian Federation sphere. That would be contrast to us the US beating down Cuba or Mexico or anybody else within our sphere.
And we dont do it.

Originally Posted by Dreadnought

why should the Russians be permitted to bully anybody

Did you read this paragraph :

Dr Chipman said that the "balance of evidence suggests that Georgia started this war".

Could a mod./adm. edit the title of the thread ?

Georgio -> Georgia

Thanks !

Originally Posted by Shipwreck

Did you read this paragraph :

Yes, I did. Shipwreck Im certain you read and other sources relay that Russian forces were already on their doorstep before Georgia even acted. I will find them and post.

Do you find the BBC as a most credible source for this?

Originally Posted by Dreadnought

Do you find the BBC as a most credible source for this?

I certainly consider the IISS (link) to be one of the most credible sources on the subject.

Another recent article :

How might NATO have changed Georgia conflict?
By William H. McMichael - Staff writer, Navy Times
Posted : Thursday Sep 11, 2008 19:22:38 EDT

Administration officials agree that Georgia’s leaders knew provoking Russia into a military strike would have disastrous consequences and that Russia overreacted when it sent its forces well beyond the two breakaway regions of its former territory — a potential NATO member and staunch U.S. ally in the Iraq war.

But if Georgia had already been admitted to NATO, a move for which member nations stated their support in an April declaration recently seconded by Vice President Dick Cheney, the Russian invasion would have drawn NATO — and U.S. troops — into the fight.

Article 5 of the NATO treaty declares that “an armed attack against one or more of them ... shall be considered an attack against them all” and trigger a response by all.

As the Pentagon has made clear during its efforts to attract more NATO combat forces to the war against al-Qaida and Taliban extremists in Afghanistan, many NATO members restrict where and how their forces may be used. As a result, some nations’ troops are precluded from combat action, or fighting at night, for instance.

The possibility that NATO could add yet another member of the former Soviet bloc and, if it were threatened, see some members impose caveats on its defense, raised concerns from Virginia’s senators, who hail from each side of the aisle: Republican John Warner and Democrat James Webb.

“I do not want to see the American G.I. begin to take on another conflict where there are no restrictions whatsoever on the use of our forces,” but they are joined by NATO allies who assert such caveats and fail to perform risky operations, Warner said at a Sept. 9 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the Georgia situation’s implications for U.S. policy.

Webb expressed concern over both the willingness of some NATO allies to fight as well as the innate ability of new members to contribute militarily to the alliance.

“We have been bringing in a series of protectorates ... rather than allies — if you would define an ally as a nation that actually bolsters your security by joining,” Webb said.

The administration is opposed to caveats, said Eric Edelman, undersecretary of defense for policy, who acknowledged that such restrictions could not have been tolerated when NATO was face-to-face with the former Soviet Union on a daily basis.

“It would have been impossible for the alliance during the years of the Cold War to have operated with caveats, and to have defended Europe,” he said.

But if Georgia had been a NATO member, he said, “I think it’s arguable ... [that] perhaps Russia would have acted differently in light of the Article 5 guarantee. That’s a hypothetical. We don’t know.”

Despite widespread concerns about a resurgent, imperialist-minded Russia, there’s a lot of bark to go along with its bite, said Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs.

“I don’t think Russia is 10 feet tall,” Fried said. “And although their bank accounts are full of money earned by exporting oil and natural gas, Russia has substantial weaknesses.”

Economically and demographically, he said, “Russia is ill-placed to have a hostile relationship with the world. ... Over time, I think cooler heads may prevail.”

Meanwhile, even as Russian troops remain on Georgian soil, the U.S. is sending $1 billion in additional economic support to Georgia on top of the more than 1,145 tons of humanitarian aid already delivered by sea and air. It also has pledged to help rebuild Georgia’s military, which Russia decimated.

A military assessment team from U.S. European Command is now on the ground in Georgia — essentially a continuation of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief team that entered the country in mid-August to coordinate delivery of aid, said Marine Corps Lt. Gen. John Paxton, director of operations for the Joint Staff.

Some members of the U.S. team that was training Georgian forces for duty in Iraq also remain, although that training has been suspended, Paxton said.

Paxton also said afterward that he had no update on the status of several captured Marine Corps Humvees that belonged to the U.S. training and assistance team and are presumed to be in Russian hands, “other than that all the classified gear and their crypto gear was stripped off.

“It’s still property that we want to get back,” he said.

Another Pentagon official also confirmed that some instances of cyber warfare were detected in the Russian attack on Georgia, but provided little detail.

“We know there were some [cyber attacks] conducted,” said Army Brig. Gen. Michael Flynn, the Joint Staff’s director for intelligence. “What is unclear is if they were state-sponsored.”

Link

26 August 2008 – Russian President Medvedev formally recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and accuses Georgian President Saakashvili of using ‘genocide to solve his political problems.’

22 August 2008 – Russia promises a 'partial' withdrawal of troops by the end of the day, but claims some “peacekeepers” will be left inside Georgia. US General Craddock calls the move 'far too little, far too slow'.

21 August 2008 – Thousands protest in Abkhazia, pleading Russia to recognise its own independence.

21 August 2008 – In response to statement by NATO, Russia suspends its military co-operation arrangements with Russia until further notice.

20—21 August 2008 – As Russia pushes its own proposal forward, the UN Security Council remains deadlocked over the conflict; Western powers demand Russia to step up its troop withdrawal from Georgia.

20 August 2008 – US and EU countries reprimand Russia for failing to adhere to the EU-brokered ceasefire agreement.

19 August 2008 – NATO freezes its partnership with Russia, and declares normal relations with Russia to be impossible. Statement issued by NAC (North Atlantic Council) emphasizes concern over Georgia´s territorial integrity and the humanitarian situation.

19 August 2008 – Medvedev tells Sarkozy that—contrary to the EU ceasefire—Russian troops will remain in a buffer zone inside Georgia proper on the border with South Ossetia, and the remainder of troops will go back to South Ossetia and to Russia.

17 August 2008 – Medvedev tells President Nicolas Sarkozy in a telephone conversation that Russian troops will begin to withdraw from Georgia on Monday 18th of August.

16 August 2008 – President Medvedev signs six-point EU-brokered ceasefire, which includes a promise to withdraw troops to pre-conflict positions.

11 August 2008 – French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner visits recent bombardments in Gori, approximately 50km outside of Tbilisi. Kouchner and French President Sarkozy expected to travel to Moscow on the evening of 11 August.

11 August 2008 – As 2,000 Georgian troops prepare to leave Iraq and return home, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticize the US for facilitating the move of troops ‘practically to the conflict zone.’

11 August 2008 – Russia has stationed more than 9,000 paratroopers in Abkhazia, thus exceeding the limit of 3,000 from the 1994 peace agreement. It continues to move more troops and armour across the border; there are reports that the movement also includes T-72 tanks and Hurricane rocket launchers.

11 August – European Commission calls on Russia to ‘stop immediately all military activity on Georgian territory.’

11 August 2008 – Russia delivers an ultimatum to Georgia: that it must disarm 1,500 troops in Zugdidi, near Abkhazia, which Georgia rejects.

11 August 2008 – Kouchner arrives in Georgia in the hope of brining about an armistice between Russia and Georgia, while the two sides continue fighting.

11 August 2008 – Russia moves troops and armour into Abkhazia.

10 August 2008 – Georgia reports to have offered Russia a peace deal, saying it would withdraw its troops from South Ossetia. Russia denied any cessation of armed conflict by the Georgians, and demanded an unconditional withdrawal from South Ossetia.

10 August 2008 – Georgia reports death of 130 Georgian civilians and 1,165 injuries. Russia rejects the claim that it has hit civilians.

10 August 2008 – US President George W. Bush declares Russia’s troop build-up to be a ‘disproportionate response’; UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband denounces Russia’s bombing of targets ‘well beyond’ South Ossetia.

10 August 2008 – Reports of bombs dropped outside of Tbilisi, near a military airport.

10 August 2008 – Russian diplomat reports death count of 2,000 in South Ossetia; the numbers have not been verified.

9 August 2008 – Georgia claims to have shot down two Russian warplanes.

9 August 2008 – Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba claims Abkhaz forces have embarked upon an operation to drive Georgian forces out of the hotly-disputed Kodori gorge.

8 August 2008 – President Saakashvili declares a ‘state of war.’

8 August 2008 – Both South Ossetia and Georgia lay claim to the disputed territory during intense shelling of Tskhinvali by both sides. Georgia accuses Russia of provoking ‘undeclared war.’ Russia warns Georgia that its ‘aggression’ will not go ‘unpunished.’

7 August 2008 – Georgia claims South Ossetia igniting a ‘war’; Russia calls the situation ‘extremely dangerous.

1 August 2008 – Explosion in South Ossetia; Georgia reports injury of two policemen.

22 July 2008 – UN Security Council holds a special closed session regarding reports of the flight of Russian jets over South Ossetia; no unanimous decisions are made.

29-30 July 2008 – South Ossetia accuses Georgia of shelling villages outside of Tskhinvali. Georgia asserts that South Ossetians directed fire towards its monitoring group.

10 July 2008 – In a press conference with President Saakashvili, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for an end to violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

3-4 July 2008 – Explosions in South Ossetia prompt Russia to accuse Georgia of military intervention and to condemn its ‘aggression’.

30 June-2 July 2008 – Blasts in Sukhumi market and Russian peacekeepers’ checkpoint on Georgian-Abkhaz border. Russia blames Georgian special forces for the incidents.

17 June 2008 – Four Russian peacekeepers detained in Abkhazia for allegedly transporting illegal ammunition; Russian Defence Ministry demands their return.

14-15 June 2008 – Reports of an ‘intensive’ exchange of fire outskirts of Tskhinvali between Georgian and South Ossetian troops.

6-7 June 2008 – Saakshivili and Medvedev meet, but agree that they cannot resolve ‘all of their problems’; Georgia declares the two sides must meet for a longer discussion.

5 June 2008 – EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana declares EU’s will to ‘try to assist all sides in lowering the temperature’ in Abkhazia.

June 2008 – Abkhazia breaks all ties with Georgian government

31 May 2008 – Russia deploys 300 ‘unarmed’ soldiers to Abkhazia, claiming they are required for railway repair works. Georgia indicts Russia in planning a military intervention.

26 May 2008 – UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) confirms Georgian UAV shot down by Russian jet in Abkhazia on 20 April; Russian Foreign Minister claims video has ‘serious inconsistencies’.

15 May 2008 – Reports of Russian warning of troop increases in South Ossetia.

15 May 2008 – Russian defence chief Yuri Baluyevsky urges NATO to help stop the ‘military build-up’ in Georgia, and names the US, Turkey, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria the top providers of military resources to Georgia.

9 May 2008 – Reports that Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze maintains that war between Georgia and Russia could break out ‘tonight, tomorrow, anytime.’

5 May 2008 – Georgian news agency reports of the construction of a new Russian military base for peacekeepers in Abkhazia.

4 May 2008 – Separatist forces in Abkhazia declare they have shot down two Georgian UAVs, bringing the total to four since March. Georgia claims the flight of drones is its ‘sovereign right’, and any aggression against them would be seen as a ‘blatant violation of sovereignty’.

Lets just look at a timeline shall we?

Originally Posted by Dreadnought

Lets just look at a timeline shall we?

Source ?

From Der Spiegel :

DID SAAKASHVILI LIE?
The West Begins to Doubt Georgian Leader
By SPIEGEL Staff
09/15/2008

Hillary Clinton looks tired. It is Tuesday of last week as she sits, exhausted, in the United States Senate. Even her outfit, a beige blazer over a black T-shirt, looks washed out.

Gone is the glamour of the Democratic Convention in Denver, where the party nominated Barack Obama as its presidential candidate, and gone is the dream of her own presidential candidacy in 2008. Instead, it's back to business as usual for Clinton. The Senate Armed Service Committee is in session, discussing the conflict between Russia and its tiny neighbor, Georgia.

Clinton speaks late in the debate. Even her voice sounds tired. But politically she is still her old self, and she cuts right to the chase.

"Did we embolden the Georgians in any way" to use military force? she asks the members of the committee. Did the Bush administration really warn Moscow and Georgia sufficiently about the consequences of a war? And how could it be that the United States was so taken by surprise by this outbreak of hostilities? These questions, says Clinton, should be examined by a US commission, which should "in the first place determine the actual facts."

Although Clinton speaks for only a few minutes, her words show that the mood toward Georgia is shifting in the United States.

For Americans, wasn't this war in the faraway Caucasus -- over there in the Old World -- nothing but a struggle between a giant, expansionist country and a small, democratic nation it was seeking to subjugate? And wasn't Georgia attacked merely "because we want to be free," as President Mikhail Saakashvili was saying in front of CNN's cameras almost hourly?

"Today, we are all Georgians," Republican presidential candidate John McCain declared. The neoconservative commentator Robert Kagan compared the Russian action with the Nazis' 1938 invasion of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. And in a meeting with US Vice President Richard Cheney, Saakashvili was assured of Washington's support for his most fervent wish: admission to NATO.

But now, five weeks after the end of the war in the Caucasus, the winds have shifted in America. Even Washington is beginning to suspect that Saakashvili, a friend and ally, could in fact be a gambler -- someone who triggered the bloody five-day war and then told the West bold-faced lies. "The concerns about Russia have remained," says Paul Sanders, an expert on Russia and the director of the conservative Nixon Center in Washington. His words reflect the continuing Western assessment that Russia's military act of revenge against the tiny Caucasus nation Georgia was disproportionate, that Moscow violated international law by recognizing the separatist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and, finally, that it used Georgia as a vehicle to showcase its imperial renaissance.

But then Saunders qualifies his statement: "More and more people are realizing that there are two sides in this conflict, and that Georgia was not as much a victim as a willing participant." Members of US President George W. Bush's administration, too, are reconsidering their position. Georgia "marched into the South Ossetian capital" after a series of provocations, says Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried.

Does this suggest that America's pronouncements of solidarity with Saakashvili were just as premature as those of the Europeans? British Prime Minister Gordon Brown had called for a "radical" review of relations with Moscow, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt decried what he called a violation of international law, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel promised Georgia that, at some point, it would "become a member of NATO, if it so wishes."

But now the volume is being turned down on the anti-Moscow rhetoric. Last week German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier publicly called for clarification on the question of who is to blame for the Caucasus war. "We do need to know more about who bears what portion of the responsibility for the military escalation and to what extent," Steinmeier told a meeting of Germany's more than 200 ambassadors in Berlin. The European Union, he said, must now "define our relations with the parties to the conflict for the medium and long term," and that the time has come to have concrete information.

Which Side Launched the First Strikes?

Much depends on the clarification of this question of blame. After this war, the West must ask itself whether it truly wants to accept a country like Georgia into NATO, especially if this means having to intervene militarily in the Caucasus if a similar conflict arises. And what sort of partnership should it seek in the future with Russia, which, for the first time, has now become as insistent as the United States on protecting its spheres of influence?

The attempt to reconstruct the five-day war in August continues to revolve around one key question: Which side was the first to launch military strikes? Information coming from NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) now paints a different picture than the one that prevailed during the first days of the battle for the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali -- and is fueling the doubts of Western politicians.

The Georgian government continues to maintain that the war began on Thursday, Aug. 7, at 11:30 p.m. According to its account, it was at this time that it received several intelligence reports that approximately 150 Russian army vehicles had entered Georgian territory, in the separatist republic of South Ossetia, through the Roki Tunnel, which passes under the main Caucasus ridge. Their objective, say the Georgians, was Tskhinvali, and additional military columns followed beginning at 3 a.m.

"We wanted to stop the Russian troops before they could reach Georgian villages," Saakashvili told SPIEGEL recently, explaining the marching orders that were given to his army. "When our tanks moved toward Tskhinvali, the Russians bombed the city. They were the ones -- not us -- who reduced Tskhinvali to rubble." But reports by the OSCE describe a different situation in those critical hours.

The OSCE maintains a mission in South Ossetia, which was caught between the fronts when the war erupted. According to a so-called spot report that OSCE officials wrote at 11 a.m. Georgian time on Aug. 8: "Shortly before midnight, central Tskhinvali came under heavy fire and shelling, with some of it presumably coming from launching pads and artillery stationed outside the conflict zone. The Tskhinvali office of the mission was hit, and the three remaining international employees sought shelter in the basement."

Spot reports are sent regularly to the Vienna offices of the 56 OSCE member states. The Aug. 8 report is kept neutral, a reflection of the fact that both Georgia and Russia are members of the organization, so that the information it contains is initially absent of any value judgments. Instead, it merely identifies where the Russians violated Georgian airspace or where the Georgians occupied South Ossetian villages, for example.

As SPIEGEL has learned, NATO had already hazarded a far more definitive conclusion at the time. Its International Military Staff (IMS), which does the preparatory work for the Military Committee, the highest-ranking military body in the alliance, quickly evaluated the existing material. The Military Committee includes officers from all 26 member states.

At noon on Aug. 8, the NATO experts could not have deduced the full scope of the Russian advance, which Saakashvili later described as an attack, while Moscow called it an operation to "secure the peace." Nevertheless, they were already issuing internal warnings that, in light of initial Russian attacks with warplanes and short-range missiles, Moscow was not expected to remain passive.

Georgia's Calculated Offensive

One thing was already clear to the officers at NATO headquarters in Brussels: They thought that the Georgians had started the conflict and that their actions were more calculated than pure self-defense or a response to Russian provocation. In fact, the NATO officers believed that the Georgian attack was a calculated offensive against South Ossetian positions to create the facts on the ground, and they coolly treated the exchanges of fire in the preceding days as minor events. Even more clearly, NATO officials believed, looking back, that by no means could these skirmishes be seen as justification for Georgian war preparations.

The NATO experts did not question the Georgian claim that the Russians had provoked them by sending their troops through the Roki Tunnel. But their evaluation of the facts was dominated by skepticism that these were the true reasons for Saakashvili's actions.

The details that Western intelligence agencies extracted from their signal intelligence agree with NATO's assessments. According to this intelligence information, the Georgians amassed roughly 12,000 troops on the border with South Ossetia on the morning of Aug. 7. Seventy-five tanks and armored personnel carriers -- a third of the Georgian military's arsenal -- were assembled near Gori. Saakashvili's plan, apparently, was to advance to the Roki Tunnel in a 15-hour blitzkrieg and close the eye of the needle between the northern and southern Caucasus regions, effectively cutting off South Ossetia from Russia.

At 10:35 p.m. on Aug. 7, less than an hour before Russian tanks entered the Roki Tunnel, according to Saakashvili, Georgian forces began their artillery assault on Tskhinvali. The Georgians used 27 rocket launchers, including 152-millimeter guns, as well as cluster bombs. Three brigades began the nighttime assault.

The intelligence agencies were monitoring the Russian calls for help on the airwaves. The 58th Army, part of which was stationed in North Ossetia, was apparently not ready for combat, at least not during that first night.

The Georgian army, on the other hand, consisted primarily of infantry groups, which were forced to travel along major roads. It soon became bogged down and was unable to move past Tskhinvali. Western intelligence learned that the Georgians were experiencing "handling problems" with their weapons. The implication was that the Georgians were not fighting well.

The intelligence agencies conclude that the Russian army did not begin firing until 7:30 a.m. on Aug. 8, when it launched an SS-21 short-range ballistic missile on the city of Borzhomi, southwest of Gori. The missile apparently hit military and government bunker positions. Russian warplanes began their first attacks on the Georgian army a short time later. Suddenly the airwaves came to life, as did the Russian army.

Russian troops from North Ossetia did not begin marching through the Roki Tunnel until roughly 11 a.m. This sequence of events is now seen as evidence that Moscow did not act offensively, but merely reacted. Additional SS-21s were later moved to the south. The Russians deployed 5,500 troops to Gori and 7,000 to the border between Georgia and its second separatist region, Abkhazia.

Calls in Europe for International Investigation

Wolfgang Richter, a colonel with Germany's General Staff and a senior military advisor to the German OSCE mission, is another expert on the situation. Richter, who was in Tbilisi at the time, confirms that the Georgians had already amassed troops on the border with South Ossetia in July. In a closed-door session in Berlin last Wednesday, he told German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung and the leading members of the foreign and defense committees in the German parliament that the Georgians had, to some extent, "lied" about troop movements. Richter said that he could find no evidence to support Saakashvili's claims that the Russians had marched into the Roki Tunnel before Tbilisi gave its orders to attack, but that he could not rule them out. For some members of parliament, his statements sounded like an endorsement of the Russian interpretation. "He left no room for interpretation," one of the committee members concluded. "It is clear that there was more responsibility on the Georgian than the Russian side," another committee member said.

On the strength of all these reports, it was clear to Western observers who had ignited the South Ossetian powder keg. In the heat of battle, the analysts understandably did not take into account the background to the conflict, which includes years of Russian provocation of Tbilisi.

But now it is high time for the European Union to address the reasons behind the war. Moscow has been baffled by the Europeans' refusal to condemn Saakashvili's assault on Tskhinvali and the insistence on pointing the finger at Russia instead. The Europeans, a diplomat with the Russian Foreign Ministry complained, apparently lack the "courage to stand up to Washington and its allies in Tbilisi."

At an informal meeting in the southern French city of Avignon two weekends ago, Europe's foreign ministers called for "an international investigation" into the conflict. The logic of that decision was that anyone who hopes to mediate should not be biased in evaluating what happened in the Caucasus. Apparently even the foreign ministers of Great Britain, Sweden, the Baltic States and other Eastern European countries agreed. Before the Avignon meeting, they had advocated a tough stance toward Moscow and more solidarity with Tbilisi -- irrespective of the facts.

The 27 foreign ministers plan to adopt a formal resolution at the beginning of this week calling for an investigation. But the question of who would be in charge of such a delicate mission remains completely unanswered: the United Nations, the OSCE, non-governmental organizations, academics -- or a combination of all of these groups? Only one thing is clear: The EU itself has no intention of taking on the issue. Europeans fear that this would only widen the gap between hardliners and those advocating cautious reconciliation with Moscow.

Saakashvili, the choleric ruler of Tbilisi, is following the shift in opinions in the West with growing unease. He reiterates his version of the attack on Georgia in daily television appearances, an international PR firm is constantly inundating the Western media with carefully selected material, and Tbilisi is already taking its case to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, where it accuses the Russians of "ethnic cleansing."

But Saakashvili is no longer as confident in his allies' support. Ahead of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's visit to Tbilisi this week, Saakashvili called upon the Western alliance to show its resolve, noting that a display of weakness toward Moscow would lead to "a never-ending story of Russian aggression."

Is Saakashvili Already Dead Politically?

The Georgian president is also coming under pressure in his own country, as the united front that developed during the Russian invasion crumbles. Those who have long criticized Saakashvili and his senior staff as an "authoritarian regime" are speaking out once again. Back in December 2007, Georgy Khaindrava, a former minister for conflict resolution who was dismissed in 2006, told SPIEGEL that Saakashvili and his circle are people "for whom power is everything." A few weeks earlier, Saakashvili had deployed special police forces in Tbilisi, where the opposition had staged large demonstrations, and declared a state of emergency. At the time, Khaindrava expressed concerns that Saakashvili could soon attempt to bolster his weakened image with a "small, victorious war" -- against South Ossetia.

In May 2006, former Foreign Minister Salomé Surabishvili had already cautioned against her former boss's actions. The "enormous arms buildup" he had engaged in made "no sense," Surabishvili said, adding that it created the impression that he planned to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia militarily.

Last week, the heads of Georgia's two major political parties called for Saakashvili's resignation and the establishment of a "government that is neither pro-Russian nor pro-American, but pro-Georgian." In Moscow, former Georgian Deputy Interior Minister Temur Khachishzili, who spent years in prison for attempting to assassinate Saakashvili's predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, is drumming up support for a change of government back home among the more than one million Georgians living in Russia.

Is Saakashvili, who only five weeks ago had gained the West's sympathy as the victim of a Russian invasion, already dead politically? Last week he received support from an unexpected source, the Red Star, a newspaper published by the Russian Defense Ministry. The paper published remarks by an officer of the 58th Army, which Moscow has since denied. Nevertheless, the officer, ironically enough, fueled doubts as to the conclusion, by Western intelligence agencies and NATO, that Russian army units had not reached Tskhinvali until Aug. 9.

In the Red Star account, Captain Denis Sidristy, the commander of a company of the 135th Motorized Infantry Regiment, describes how he and his unit were already in the Roki Tunnel, on their way to Tskhinvali, in the night preceding Aug. 8. Did Moscow's invasion begin earlier than the Russians have admitted, after all?

Last week, Moscow investigators also conceded, for the first time, that the number of civilian casualties of the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali was not 2,000, as Russian officials have repeatedly claimed, but 134.

When asked about the account in the Red Star, a spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry told SPIEGEL that it was the result of a technical error. Moreover, the spokesman said, the official in question had been wounded and therefore "could no longer remember the situation clearly."

Last Friday Captain Sidristy, since decorated with the Russian defense ministry's order of bravery, was given a second opportunity to describe his version of the events to the Red Star. His unit, he said in his revised version, had advanced on Tskhinvali somewhat later than he had told the paper the first time.

As it appears, it is still difficult to separate truth and lies about the brief war in the Caucasus.

RALF BESTE, UWE KLUSSMANN, CORDULA MEYER, CHRISTIAN NEEF, MATTHIAS SCHEEP, HANS-JÜRGEN SCHLAMP, HOLGER STARK

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

Link

Originally Posted by Shipwreck

Source ?

My bad, RUSI Georgia-Russia Conflict Timeline (includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia)

Originally Posted by Dreadnought

My bad, RUSI Georgia-Russia Conflict Timeline (includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia)

From the same source (RUSI) : (emphasis mine)

The August 2008 South Ossetia Conflict: Revising the Status Quo
By Jeffrey H. Michaels, Lecturer in Defence Studies, King's College London
11 August 2008

Georgia's military strategy seems to have relied upon a delayed Russian military response, due to Putin's absence from Moscow, and likely predicated on the belief that President Medvedev would not take any action without Putin being present. This strategy was flawed. As a result, Tblisi could see a consolidation of Russian control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Tbilisi's Motivations for Initiating Military Action

Despite attempts by Georgia to portray the current conflict as Russian aggression, its origins should be traced back to Tbilisi. While both sides share responsibility for the small-scale violence that preceded the full outbreak of hostilities, it was Georgia rather than Russia that escalated the violence. The Georgian military assault on South Ossetia was deliberately timed to coincide with the Olympic Games. Indeed, Georgia's military strategy seems to have relied upon a delayed Russian military response, due to Putin's absence from Moscow, and likely predicated on the belief that President Medvedev would not take any action without Putin being present.

Georgian President Saakashvili was most likely counting on his military forces to deliver a knockout blow to the separatist forces, thereby allowing a relatively quick seizure of South Ossetia. For the last several years, the Georgian military has increasingly become beholden to an offensive military doctrine, and has developed capabilities intended to retake South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, it is important to note that this offensive doctrine was not premised on an immediate and large-scale Russian military response, although common sense should have dictated otherwise. By contrast, Georgia would have been well-served to rely on a defensive military doctrine, and use non-military means to reintegrate the separatist regions.

Problems with Georgian Military Assault on South Ossetia

The Georgian military assault likely consisted of two infantry brigades with tank, heavy artillery, helicopter and air support. The build-up of these forces was almost certainly observed by the Russians, thereby denying Georgia strategic surprise. Moreover, this large build-up was not consistent with Georgian claims that Tbilisi only intended to suppress South Ossetian mortar fire on Georgia. Likewise, the full-scale military assault on Tshkinvali could not be interpreted as anything other than an attempt to retake the region.

The most curious feature of the Georgian assault is that there appears to have been no attempt to secure the southern end of the Roki Tunnel, thereby severely impeding Russia's ability to bring forward heavy ground units. Indeed, the Georgians seem to have demonstrated very little strategic or operational finesse; a further indication their doctrine and military plans were inadequate. Judging by the direction and pace of the Georgian offensive, there appears to have been a complete disregard for the possibility of Russian intervention. The Georgian political and military leadership most likely deceived themselves into believing Russia would not intervene. Given that any Georgia-Russia military confrontation would be suicidal, the Georgian leadership probably insisted that its operational planning be limited to portraying an invasion of South Ossetia as merely a conflict between Georgia and South Ossetian forces.

Georgia's indiscriminate use of heavy weapons (air and artillery) against Tshkinvali was extremely clumsy and wholly counter-productive. There appears to have been little military rationale for this action, as it was not aimed at South Ossetian defensive positions. Not only did this bombardment have the effect of strengthening South Ossetian resistance, but it also gave the Kremlin an excuse to intervene militarily, knowing the Russian population would be supportive.

The Georgian leadership seems to have miscalculated at a number of levels. Firstly, they appear to have overestimated the capabilities of the Georgian military to affect a quick seizure. Secondly, they misperceived Russia's willingness and ability to quickly intervene with its military forces. Thirdly, Saakashvili also probably hoped the US and NATO would support Georgia, or that the possibility of their intervention would deter Russia from any military action.

It is also unclear what rules of engagement the Georgian forces were operating under with respect to the Russian peacekeepers, and whether they treated them as a hostile force. Russia used unverified reports of casualties among Russian peacekeepers as an additional excuse to intervene, and this issue will almost certainly be a key bargaining tool of any political settlement. In other words, Russia will probably argue that a peacekeeping force is inappropriate, and therefore there will be a need to retain heavy forces in South Ossetia.

Russian Military Response

The Russian military response to the Georgian actions were almost certainly pre-planned, and the rapidity of their response indicates they had enough forewarning to place their own units on alert in advance. The immediate Russian response was an attempt to gain air superiority over the conflict zone prior to the ground advance. This included not only dominating the skies over South Ossetia, but also attacking Georgia's military airbases.

Russia's initial ground advance into South Ossetia occurred without any Georgian attempts to counter them. Tanks and mechanised infantry from the Russian 58th Army advanced into South Ossetia, and do not appear to have met any significant resistance until they reached Tshkinvali. However, despite some Russian claims that they captured the city, there were still reports of continued fighting, and it was not until 10 August that the remaining Georgian units were ordered out of the city.

The Russians may have hoped that the mere appearance of Russian heavy units would have precipitated an immediate Georgian withdrawal. Indeed, the first reports of Russian units entering South Ossetia indicated brigade strength. However, given that Georgia had at least two brigades present, the Russian military probably hoped to avoid large-scale fighting until a superior ground force could be brought to bear, despite having control of the airspace. The lack of adequate forces immediately on hand may also explain Russia's unwillingness to risk manoeuvring around the Georgian forces in an effort to cut off their lines of communication.

Having met increasingly stiff Georgian resistance, Russia decided to add more forces into the region, including elements of the elite 76th Guards Airborne Division. Embarrassingly though for Russia, the head of the 58th Army, General-Lieutenant Anatoly Khrulev, was wounded in the fighting. Moreover, at least two Russian fighter-jets have been downed. As of 11 August, the majority of Georgian units had departed South Ossetia, although there is still evidence of some Georgian forces fighting a rearguard action. Russia's inability to completely drive off Georgian forces probably accounts, in part, for their unwillingness to agree to an immediate ceasefire.

In addition to the above-mentioned air and ground actions, Russia also appears to be increasing its pressure on several additional fronts. There are numerous reports Russia has waged an effective cyber-attack on Georgia. Russia is also mobilising its Black Sea Fleet, most likely for the several-fold purpose of economic blockade, possible ship-to-shore bombardment, and potentially to support an amphibious landing. There are also several reports Russia has sent forces into Abkhazia, and that Abkhaz units supported by Russian air assets have created a new front by attacking Georgian units in the Kodori Gorge. Likewise, Russian forces also appear to have made a limited advance into Georgia itself and engaged Georgian forces near Senaki.

It should be noted that the launching of simultaneous military actions on numerous fronts is a standard Russian approach to waging conventional war. The overall intent is to overwhelm the adversary's decision-making system and force them to dissipate their military resources. Nevertheless, Russia's actions in Abkhazia are also motivated by a desire to achieve a new status quo in this separatist region as well as South Ossetia.

The Course of Battle

Two factors will determine the future course of events. Firstly, Georgia's willingness to militarily contest control over South Ossetia, and to a lesser extent Abkhazia, rather than withdraw back into Georgia, will be a crucial factor in achieving a ceasefire. Secondly, Russia feels it has an opportunity to establish a new regional status quo.

Russia has the advantage of time, and will likely use this to great effect, delaying diplomacy to achieve a more favorable long-term strategic balance. The main intent of Russian military actions will be to degrade Georgian military capabilities to the extent that the progress Georgia has made in improving its military forces over the last several years, mainly with US help, will be completely reversed. This strategy is likely motivating Russia's targeting of Georgian military facilities and infrastructure, and the timing of Russia's willingness to agree to a ceasefire will probably be determined by the degree to which Georgia's air force and heavy ground units have been attrited. Even if Georgian forces are withdrawn from the conflict zone, Russia may choose to continue attacking these units if it feels they have withdrawn with most of their equipment intact.

A New Status Quo

After years of playing diplomatic and covert games with Georgia over the fate of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as its Western ambitions, Moscow now has an opportunity to establish a new status quo in the region. Although Russia's initial military reaction was a pre-planned response, its recent actions reflect Moscow's recognition that they can now shape the future to their advantage. Russia probably has at least four primary goals in mind:

1. Strengthen Russian control over the separatist regions, to include the replacement of 'peacekeepers' with permanently stationed Russian army units

2. Revise the regional military balance in Moscow's favour for a number of years to come

3. Humiliate President Saakashvili and dissuade future military adventurism

4. Discourage future US and NATO military engagement with Tbilisi. Russia's diplomatic and military policies in the days and weeks ahead will likely be designed with these limited objectives in mind.

It is important to note Russia has no intention of taking control of Georgia itself, as this would be a much more expensive prospect, with no guarantee of success. Russian air strikes have not targeted the Georgian leadership in Tbilisi, nor have they targeted the Georgian Defence Ministry. Moscow has few incentives to seek unlimited objectives, and the complete collapse of the Georgian state is not in their long-term interests. Nevertheless, in the meantime, Russia will probably continue building up its regional military presence to the point where it can credibly threaten an invasion of Georgia. However, this build-up will be intended as a bargaining counter, rather than as actual preparations for an invasion.

The views expressed above are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.

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Another one from RUSI : (emphasis mine)

Testing times; Georgia’s gamble forces Europeans to take a long and hard look at its collective security agreements
Alastair Cameron, Head, European Security Programme, RUSI
13 August 2008

As the conflict between Georgia and Russia unfolded in the Caucasus, the West found itself lacking any kind of meaningful riposte. In fact, the response from international bodies responsible for conflict management has been so timorous that it raises important questions regarding Europe’s collective security agreements.

Based on the initial calculation that a measured confrontation with Russian ‘peacekeepers’ would not go too far beyond rhetoric, Georgia launched the initial salvo. In doing so, the Georgians felt justified that they were responding firmly to a long series of provocations and underhand tactics aimed at undermining its political and territorial sovereignty.

Gambling with high stakes, there is little doubt that the Georgians will have been emboldened by the notion that an escalating crisis would inevitably draw in the United States, as well as other Europeans, eager to back-up a prospective ally.

This was a very risky strategy, attempting as it were to call Russia’s bluff. Nonetheless, the immediacy and execution of the Russian response should leave observers in no doubt that this was a contingency their forces were well prepared for and a turn in which they ultimately held a much better hand.

However, in launching the attack and subsequently losing its military campaign, Georgia has in the same breadth called the Western countries’ bluff as well. The Western bluff – much like deterrence – was namely that they would step-in early and defend the status quo. Too close to call as violence escalated between the two countries, this desperate situation is one that would have stretched to their very limits the security guarantees that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was either led to believe or had in fact obtained from NATO and/or the US.

A fragile cease-fire and a very different situation in Georgia has now been achieved on the ground, but what of it and what immediate lessons should Europeans draw from the experience?

At first hand, a major power confrontation being conducted on the borders of Europe brings back clear memories of the Cold War era. Unless both the EU and NATO now take a concerted measure of what needs to be done to respond to Russia, these security architectures will face serious concerns coming from within.

While most European diplomats expressed their ‘grave concerns’ regarding the escalation of violence, political leaders from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland issued a joint statement on Saturday saying that ‘the EU and NATO must take the initiative and stand up against the spread of imperialist and revisionist policy in the east of Europe’, thereby strongly taking a stand against Russia's military incursions within Georgia. Officials from those same four countries, plus Ukraine, went to Tbilisi to support Saakashvili in a further expression of solidarity.

As former Warsaw Pact countries themselves, these countries have faced similar confrontations and the sight of Russia baring its claws once more in the Caucasus will only confirm lingering anxieties since the demise of the Soviet Union. The constitutional prerogative which Russia used in order to justify the use of force in view of protecting Russian citizens abroad will have sent chilling signals not only to these countries, but to all those sharing a border or having delicate relations with Russia.

While Europe’s response to Caucasus developments was indeed better off remaining at the stage of diplomacy, a stronger stand should have been taken and made more immediately. So far, Europe’s collective expression of concern in the face of Russian intransigence will have done very little to reassure Europe’s neighbours to its Eastern front, let alone some of its own Allies and Member States.

In a recent RUSI Occasional Paper, ‘NATO’s Strategic and Operational Challenges’ the following point was made:

"the Alliance has yet to have a serious discussion on how to manage Russia, and it has failed to engage the new allies in a manner that reassures them of NATO’s commitment to collective defence under Article Five […] “NATO’s easternmost allies are not in Afghanistan because they feel that the security of Afghanistan is directly linked to their national security. They are there because they feel that their national security is directly linked to the United States and NATO. In support of the Alliance, they are contributing in the spirit of solidarity and in the belief that this contribution will one day be paid back should Russia become problematic."

At current, the wider picture of Europe’s relations with Russia looks pretty grim and security and defence directorates all over Europe will have now begun looking more gravely towards Europe’s eastern periphery. While Western countries have worked hard to maintain the status quo arrested at the end of the Cold War, Russia has never accepted it. The Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty is now in taters and the relationship between all parties further strained.

Many questions remain unanswered as the situation has yet to unfold; however it should be clear that Russian intentions towards the West have taken a new, if not unexpected turn. Europeans must therefore renew with some of the harder-edged defence strategic planning of Cold War years and invest in defence structures in Eastern Europe, establishing bases to help reinforce Europe’s commitment to the security of all allies. Egged on by Central and Eastern European countries, the EU and NATO alike have no other choice than address their concerns regarding issues of mutual defence or expose the weakness of their resolve.

During the Cold War, the concept of a graduated response implied that an aggressive move would be matched with defensive mechanisms. Although careful as to how they should structure their response – indeed no one wishes to trigger a new cold war – Europeans must again get serious about their own defence. Concentrating military efforts where they matter, engaging politically in the Balkans and towards the wider security of the continent, are indeed more pressing challenges than creating what can sometimes appear as vacuous or foreign-aimed capability concepts.

The question as to how Europe’s sense of security will be affected by this in the long run is one which will take time to assess. A conservative guess however is that it is currently more than Europeans will care to face up to.

NOTE

1. “NATO’s Strategic and Operational Challenges” - RUSI Transatlantic and European Security Programme Study; Michael Williams and Alastair Cameron; May 2008 - Pages 7 - 8

The views expressed above are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI.

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