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Reply With QuoteHe shouldent even be an ally in the short term, he is an evil dictator who claims hes helping us when in reality he launches a half hearted attack on the terrorists.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...-1-2005_pg7_40Musharraf not a long-term ally of America: think tank
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: The Musharraf regime is “unlikely to evolve into a long-term ally in the war on terrorism,” though the United States should seek to “prevent Pakistan from descending into chaos in the short term,” according to the Cato Institute, a leading liberal think tank.
The Institute set up in 1977 to pursue libertarian values issues a handbook every year for the consideration of Congress and the administration. In its section on South Asia, Cato urges the US to vigorously pursue Al Qaeda and Taliban elements inside Pakistan’s territory - “preferably” in cooperation with the Musharraf government - mobilise international support to contain Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation and hold it accountable for allowing the export of nuclear military technology, and focus on India as a potential long-term military and economic partner of the United States in the region.
Quoting the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations on Pakistan that it described as “hard choices,” Cato said the United States should commit itself to a period of sustained aid, including military assistance, to Pakistan, but only on condition that Gen Pervez Musharraf proves that he stands for ‘‘enlightened moderation’’ by confronting Islamic extremism, curbing nuclear proliferation, and paving the way for the return to democracy.
Cato said the “fundamental conundrum” the United States has faced in its dealings with Pakistan both before and after 9/11 lies in the recognition that Islamabad’s pre-9/11 alliance with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its strong ties to radical Islamic terrorist groups helped to create the environment that gave birth to Al Qaeda.
However, Cato noted that the 9/11 Commission report portrays Pakistan as “dramatically different” than it was before 9/11. The report implies that the decision by Musharraf to sever his country’s links to the Taliban and provide logistical support for the US invasion of Afghanistan marked a dramatic reversal in Pakistan’s approach to radical Islamic terrorism.
Cato disagreed with the commission’s conclusion that Pakistan has been evolving into a reliable ally of the United States in the war on terrorism, saying, “that conclusion is flawed. Pakistan is not a dependably effective strategic partner. The decision by Musharraf to abandon the Taliban after 9/11 reflected not a strategic choice but a tactical one. It was based on the clear recognition that anything less than full cooperation with the United States would result in punishing American military retaliation, including the invasion of parts of Pakistan, and possibly the overthrow of the Musharraf government. At a minimum, the refusal by Pakistan to back the American invasion of Afghanistan would have led to the total diplomatic and economic isolation of the regime, which could have played into the hands of rival India in its bid for regional hegemony.”
Cato said that the assumption that Pakistan has severed its ties with those who advocate a radical Islamic agenda is “based more on the rhetoric emanating from Islamabad than on the policy steps taken there since 9/11”. Referring to what the commission called “an extraordinary public essay” by Gen Musharraf, in which he called on Muslims to adopt a policy of “enlightened moderation,” to shun militancy and extremism, to seek to resolve disputes with “justice,” and to help “better the Muslim world,” Cato pointed out the this was in contrast to the fact that there are scores of Al Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban fighters and perhaps Osama Bin Laden himself, in Pakistan.
Cato said Pakistan had come frighteningly close to war with India over Kashmir and was the favourite stomping ground of terrorist groups. “Policymakers should focus on what attracts terrorists to Pakistan. In many respects, it is a ‘failed state’, corruption is widespread, the government is ineffective, and there is immense support among the general public and the elites for radical Islamic causes. Motivated by ideology and cheap tuition, millions of Pakistani families send their children to religious schools, or madrassas, which have become incubators for anti-Western propaganda that contributes to the terrorist problem.”
According to Cato, radical Islamism is backed not only by leaders of large political parties and by the tribes on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but the Pakistan Army and intelligence services, in particular, are at best ambivalent about confronting Islamic extremists.
“Meanwhile, Islamic terrorists have found refuge in Pakistan’s un-policed regions, which now provide both a base of operations against US forces in Afghanistan and a safe haven for planning attacks against Americans inside the United States. Widespread support for extremist Islam in Pakistan may explain why many of the Pakistani government’s early efforts to pursue Al Qaeda members hiding along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border failed. That sentiment may also explain why Musharraf’s government refused to vigorously pursue former Taliban and Islamic militants gathered in tribal, semiautonomous regions of Pakistan.”
Cato believes that the “disappointing results” of Pakistan’s early military offensives raise doubts about Gen Musharraf’s ability to challenge the power of the local tribal leaders in Waziristan. Despite the military pressure and the financial rewards offered by the United States, many Pakistanis continued to shelter the militants, including foreigners who operate there. At the same time, two assassination attempts on Gen Musharraf in December 2003 seemed to have mobilised the president to take action. The capture of several Al Qaeda operatives during the summer of 2004 indicated a growing willingness on Gen Musharraf’s part to pursue Al Qaeda terrorists.
Cato referred to Pakistan’s “uneven record” in pursuing Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and “troubling revelations” about Dr AQ Khan. It said the official explanation that it was a “rogue operation” were not believed by the people in Pakistan. “The Khan network may also have been a way for the military and intelligence services to gain access to funds for covert operations in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. Musharraf’s decision to pardon Khan immediately following the revelations about his activities raises serious questions about Pakistan’s commitment to non-proliferation. It also calls into question the security of Pakistan’s own nuclear military programme and underlines concerns that Pakistan’s nuclear secrets could fall into the hands of Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists.” Cato claimed that throughout 2003 and 2004, the Bush administration agreed under pressure from Islamabad not to dispatch American and British forces to the tribal areas inside Pakistan where senior Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders were believed to be hiding. Also troubling was the Bush administration’s decision to designate Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally”. Cato said American officials defend their support for Pakistan by stressing that US policy is driven by the short-term goals of the war on terrorism and also that Gen Musharraf’s government may present the only realistic chance to reach an agreement over Kashmir.
According to the think tank, “US policymakers should consider an alternate interpretation of Pakistan’s behaviour. Since 9/11, Musharraf has been opportunistic. He responded to political and military pressure from the United States by ending his country’s alliance with the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups, taking steps to liberalise his country’s political and economic system, and opening the road to an accord with India over Kashmir. But there are no signs that Musharraf and his political and military allies have made a strategic choice to ally themselves with US long-term goals in the war on terrorism by destroying the political and military infrastructure of the radical and violent anti-American Islamic groups in Pakistan. It is highly probable that Musharraf is not strong enough to do so. From that perspective, the partnership with the United States and Musharraf’s willingness to negotiate with India over Kashmir are nothing more than short-term moves aimed at winning US assistance and preventing India from emerging as Washington’s main ally in the region. If this alternate interpretation is correct, the current American relationship with Pakistan is, at best, a short-term alliance of necessity. Over the medium and long term, US policymakers should distance themselves from Musharraf’s regime, seek out ways to cultivate liberal secular reforms in Pakistan, and engage in more constructive relations with India.”
The Pakistani newspaper's publishing this report from CATO immediately after Dr Rice's testimony that the US has 'contingency plans' to secure Pak's nuke assets even if Musharraf is removed is rather interesting.
Given the problem Pakistan is having internally i.e. the rebellion in Balochistan and the unrest amongst the Shia of Northern Territories, the timing of this report to be published in Pakistan is apparently loaded.
There is no doubt that Musharaf's support of the US's 'War on Terror' has not been taken well by the common masses and even with some moderates like the cricketer Imaran Khan who married a British Jew heiress.
Yet, it must be given to Musharraf that he has very deftly neutralised teh danger of the US cosying up too much with India. That is indeed a diplomatic coup!
It is also true that Musharraf has mainly been rhetorical in condemning the radical Islamists and his arrest of the Taleban high flyers have been more often than not cosmetic. The miliatry action in Waziristan has not been a success. In fact, the lukewarm action there has given courage to the Balochis to rebel against the Federal govt and it is on the boil inspite of military action. In fact, the terrorist elements are still very active in Pakistan inspite of the high profile actions against them.
Musharraf continues to allow the madrassas to prevail and it is no secret that they brainwash poor (and so folks with no hope) in radical Islam. Obviously, these terror factories churn up more terrorists to replenish the low order terrorists arrested by the Pak govt in high profile actions. Thus, there is no abatement to the terror regime that has been unleashed worldwide.
It is also a mystery how Musharraf who claim to be in the forefront in the war on terror could have pardoned AQ Khan who sold and organised the nuke capability of the US's 'axes of terror' i.e. Iran, Linya and North Korea.
At best, it remains a short term policy unless of course the US has something up its sleeve as was hinted at by Dr Rice in her testimony at the Congress for clearance as the incoming Secretary of State.
He shouldent even be an ally in the short term, he is an evil dictator who claims hes helping us when in reality he launches a half hearted attack on the terrorists.
Originally Posted by ChrisF202
He's the best lackey we got Chris! One phone call from Bush Boy, and he drops his pants and assumes the pozishunn! The half hearted attack was actually a full hearted attack, and the Waziri's slaughtered the Pak-Army platoons sent in to rein them in. The end result was more than a hundred pakistani soldiers died, and only 4 or 5 Waziri's were killed ( if that), and the rest filtered over next doors in the heart of Afghan Pukhtunistan.
you can't fight these guys Chris. Specially not in that terrain. Infinite places to hide, and infinite cover...along with very friendly tribes. For the last 2000 years some jackass has been trying to subdue them, and has failed time and again. Musharraf cannot be expected to do that, specially when there is not much incentive to. Besides what does Pakistan really get from killing the Waziris? except more trouble
Now the PAF and Cobra gunships are pounding their positions, to no effect! andthe Taliban are enjoying a massive resurgence in Afghanistan.
Last edited by lulldapull; 31 Jan 05, at 23:02.
"He shouldent even be an ally in the short term, he is an evil dictator who claims hes helping us when in reality he launches a half hearted attack on the terrorists."
No offense man but you gotta get out more...
-----
Do I smell putting Benziar Bhutto back in charge.......
Lull,
He maybe a dictator, but it is taking things a wee bit far, to call him 'evil'.
Zia was evil.
Can Musharraf undo the damage done by Zia?...or has it spiralled out of control?
Cheers!...on the rocks!!
Reagan bastard was evil Ray ( Who started all this islamic {EDIT}
Al-qaida/ Taliban/ and all this riff raff was his brainchild, along with his Conservative thugs. After all it all came back to haunt the thugs who created it..... on 9-11
You reap as you sow.
Last edited by Confed999; 02 Feb 05, at 00:57.
No the question should be, can Bush Boy undo the damage done by his fundo predeccessors???
I disagree what makes the Taliban and that whole mess our fault is that the CIA did not control the arms into Afghanistan but let the ISI do that. We supplied the guns and should have controlled who got them. The ISI gave out the weapons to the groups they wanted to rule after the Soviets left.
The ISI under Zia gave the weapons to the most anti American groups (HIA for example)who didn't do the most fighting as they try and claim. Had Reagan controlled the arms and who got them we could have weakened the anti American groups by just not supplying them. But we did not make the groups just turned the blind eye with the ISI wispering sweet nothings into out ears.
It is rumured that 300,000 spare rifles were left over with ISI after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, some of these 300,000 were given to fuel the insurgency in Kashmir.
The Indian army has captured enough to arm 2 divisions of infantry, with captured rifles, gpmgs, and rocket launchers.
Cheers!...on the rocks!!
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,144206,00.html
WASHINGTON — Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's potentially explosive announcement last month that he would not step down as military chief and rule his country as a civilian drew barely a whisper from the U.S. media and Washington officials.
The silence, say foreign policy analysts, reveals as much about U.S. policy toward Pakistan since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks as any public remarks could. While U.S. officials may not wish to criticize Musharraf, analysts say it might be a mistake in the long term for the United States to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's military ruler.
"The tensions are between long-term objectives and short-term objectives," said Ashley Tellis, foreign policy scholar at Carnegie Institute for International Peace. "Our objective in the short term is to defeat Al Qaeda, and we essentially need Musharraf as the head of the army that is assisting us. The long-term objective is to have Pakistan a democracy, meaning you don't want a military chief as head of the country."
Just before the new year, Musharraf, who has held office since taking over in a bloodless military coup in 1999, announced he would not honor a promise he made in 2003. He had pledged to hang up his uniform at the end of 2004 in return for broader constitutional powers allowing him to dissolve Parliament and the prime minister's office at his discretion.
His announcement came weeks after the largely pro-Musharraf Parliament approved a bill allowing him to retain his position as army chief while serving as president.
Musharraf explained on Dec. 30 that the reversal was necessary for the security of the country, suggesting that "any change in internal or external policies can be extremely dangerous for Pakistan."
Little has come in the way of a response from Washington. Asked by Agence-France Press on Dec. 31 about the development, Secretary of State Colin Powell said, "This is a judgment for the Pakistani people to make.
"The Parliament provided the means for him to do this. What I have to look at is where Pakistan has been, back in 2001, and where it is now, and the significant changes that have taken place as it has moved toward democracy," Powell added.
But Muqtedar Khan, professor of political science at Adrian College in Michigan, said Musharraf's move directly "undermines the claim that this is a democracy and also suggests he is unsure about his own position in Pakistan.
"In many ways (Musharraf) is an autocrat," Khan said. "He is more liberal than the Middle East dictators," but as long as he changes the constitution to accumulate more power and continues to wear a military uniform, "Pakistan will remain a non-democracy."
Khan said he doubted that Washington would raise much of an objection because to do so would create tensions between the two countries and among political parties in Pakistan.
Since Sept. 11, the United States has given more than $1 billion to help beef up the Pakistani military's so-far unsuccessful search for Al Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden, who is believed to have been in hiding along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Other U.S. aid to Pakistan has increased and trade agreements have been more favorable to Pakistanis. In March, Pakistan was given "non-ally status" in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One month ago, President Bush promised to help Musharraf with new weapons systems.
Tellis suggested that Pakistan has astutely used its geographic proximity and strategic role in the War on Terror — Musharraf has helped to crack down on Taliban and Al Qaeda in his country and is allowing U.S. military on its bases. His claims to have kept more radical Islamic elements at bay is a powerful form of leverage.
"What [the Bush administration is] struggling with is the brute reality of what they cannot negotiate around," said Tellis. "They recognize that if they push too hard, what [Musharraf] is likely to say is take a hike."
One of those areas where the United States refuses to push is related to Musharraf's response to the investigation of top nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who helped turn Pakistan into a nuclear power and has admitted to selling nuclear materials to countries like North Korea, Iran and Libya for decades.
In 2002, Musharraf announced that a government investigation had uncovered Khan's activities. Since then, Pakistan has been unwilling to let International Atomic Energy Agency officials question Khan, who had been in charge of Pakistan's nuclear program since 1976 and is considered by many to be a national hero. Musharraf instead assured the U.N. agency that Pakistan can handle the Khan inquiry itself. Powell suggested in his Dec. 31 interview that the United States is so far satisfied with Musharraf's attention to the problem.
"Musharraf is the best ally we have in Pakistan, and the best ally we are likely to get in the foreseeable future," said Jim Phillips, foreign policy fellow at the Heritage Foundation. "We don't want to undermine him, but at the same time we can't back away from our goals of promoting democracy in Pakistan and in the Muslim world."
John Gershman, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus, a Washington, D.C., think-tank, said the Muslim world is watching closely and may be tired of what they see as a double standard.
"I think Pakistan has benefited from a double standard at least as much as Saudi Arabia in the post-9/11 period," he said, "and I think it's a problem when we have really hard evidence that the absence of democratic institutions provides a fertile proving ground for fundamentalist Islamicist activity."
Meanwhile, protests against Musharraf, which range from former ruling parties to more extreme Islamic groups, have not stirred up enough outrage among Pakistanis to create any concern for Musharraf, according to observers.
"The opposition at this point is completely divided and feckless. Unless he fails disastrously by a silly or costly mistake, I think people will tolerate it for a little while longer. There is a process of some kind of social and economic stability right now," said Tellis.
He added that the Bush administration might privately encourage Musharraf to start transitioning to a civilian rule. But anything more than that could show weakness in Musharraf's position.
"The relationship with the U.S has to stay stable," Tellis said
Long term or short term, the way things are moving in Pakistan with the rebellion in Balochistan and unrest in Shia majority Northern Territories, the scenario does not auger well for either Musharraf, in particular or for the subcontinent, in general.
"It is rumured that 300,000 spare rifles were left over with ISI after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, some of these 300,000 were given to fuel the insurgency in Kashmir.
The Indian army has captured enough to arm 2 divisions of infantry, with captured rifles, gpmgs, and rocket launchers."
Rumored?
Weapons were turned over to the Kashmir war because we did not control who got them but left that to Pakistan.
Large bore anti material rifles were turned over as well. Clinton gave a warning to some Indian Prime Minister (I will check on the name) about how they should watch out for snipers in the Kashmir (and other places inside India) with 50 caliber rifles.
So we blundered by not controlling who got what and where the weapons turned up. Hell some of the Mujahideen sold Stingers to the highest bidder.
We footed the bill but failed to use our levrage on the ISI.
Putting Benazir would not be the solution. She is a thief as per the Pakistanis.
"Putting Benazir would not be the solution. She is a thief as per the Pakistanis."
Well she looks better then Mush....
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